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ABSTRACT  
 
Tax treaties are the main mechanism for international income tax co-ordination 
among countries. The thesis concerns the development of Australia’s tax treaty 
policy and practice in the period from 1946 when the first treaty with the United 
Kingdom was signed to 1969 when the treaty with Japan was signed. The 1969 
Japan Treaty was the last tax treaty that Australia concluded before joining the 
OECD in 1971. The thesis is based on archival and related historical research in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
thesis explains the original rationale for a number of Australian tax treaty policy 
idiosyncrasies and how they have persisted even when contrary to OECD norms and 
when the original rationale for them has disappeared. The thesis submits that the 
present is a propitious time for a comprehensive review of those idiosyncrasies and 
of Australian tax treaty policy and practice generally. 
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A CRITIAL  ASSESSMENT OF THE ORIGINS AND CONTINUED VALIDITY OF 
VARIATIONS IN AUSTRALIAN TAX TREATIES FROM THE OECD MODEL  
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
1.1 Australia joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(hereafter ‘the OECD’) on 7th June 1971. On 23rd October 1997, the Council of the 
OECD adopted Recommendation I [C(97)195/FINAL], which stated that member 
countries should: 
 Pursue their efforts to conclude bilateral tax conventions on income and capital 
with those Member countries, and where appropriate with non-Member 
countries, with which they have not yet entered into such conventions, and revise 
those of the existing conventions that may no longer reflect present day needs; 
 When concluding new bilateral conventions or revising existing bilateral 
conventions, conform to the Model Tax Convention, as interpreted by the 
Commentaries thereon; 
 Their tax administrations follow the Commentaries on the Articles of the Model 
Tax Convention, as modified from time to time, when applying and interpreting 
the provisions of their bilateral tax convention that are based on those Articles. 
By Recommendation II of 23rd October 1997, the Council of the OECD invited the 
governments of member countries to continue to notify the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs of their reservations on articles and observations on the commentaries.  
The introduction to the OECD Model recognises that member countries may enter 
reservations relating to particular provisions in the OECD Model, and that when they 
do so they and their potential treaty partner in negotiations retain their freedom of 
action in relation to those provisions.1 The introduction to the OECD Model also 
recognises that there is no need for member countries to make reservations 
indicating their intent to use alternative provisions that the Commentaries allow 
countries to include in their tax treaties.2 
1.2 Australia has made 15 reservations in relation to articles in the OECD Model,3 the 
eighth highest number of reservations of any OECD country4 and well above the 
                                                          
1  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, Introduction, para 31. 
2  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, Introduction, para 31. 
3  Australia’s reservations to the OECD Model are set out in Appendix 2. 
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average for OECD countries of 8.8 reservations.5 Current Australian tax treaties 
contain 114 instances of variations from the current OECD Model in relation to the 
articles examined in this thesis.6 The origins of 22 of these variations can be directly 
traced to the 1946 UK Treaty.7 The origins of a further 22 of these variations can be 
traced to the 1967 UK Treaty.8 The origins of a further 25 of these variations can be 
traced to other tax treaties negotiated prior to Australia joining the OECD in 1971; 8 
of these originated in the 1972 German Treaty, which was negotiated but not signed 
before Australia joined the OECD. If variations originating with the 1972 German 
Treaty are excluded, a total 61 of 114 variations can be traced to Australian tax 
treaties negotiated before Australia joined the OECD. Australia’s most recent treaties 
still contain a large number of variations that originated in Australia’s pre 1971 tax 
treaties. The 2010 Turkey Treaty contains 28 variations from the OECD Model that 
originated in pre 1971 Australian tax treaties. The 2013 Swiss Treaty, the most 
recent Australian tax treaty to come into force, contains 15 variations from the OECD 
Model that originated in pre 1971 Australian tax treaties. The 2015 German Treaty, 
the most recent Australian tax treaty to be signed, contains 19 variations from the 
OECD Model that originated pre 1971. A further group of variations from the OECD 
Model, which has not been taken into account in Appendix 3 nor, comprehensively, in 
prior literature, are deemed source rules spread through different articles in different 
Australian tax treaties. This thesis will demonstrate that the origins of Australian 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4  See the analysis in Paolo Arginelli and Michael Dirkis, ‘Revisiting and Reviewing 
“Reservations”, and “Observations” and “Positions” to the OECD Model – Selected 
Provisions: OECD Countries’ in Guglielmo Maisto (ed), Departures From the OECD Model 
and Commentaries: Reservations, Observations and Positions in EU Law and Tax Treaties 
(IBFD Publications BV, 2014) 135–83 at Tables 1 and 2 pp 176–8. 
5  Arginelli and Dirkis, above n 4, 139. 
6  The variations are summarised in Appendix 3 and include variations contained in the 2015 
German Treaty. The focus of the thesis will be on articles with direct relevance to cross 
border investment by multinational enterprises. For this reason, it will not contain significant 
discussion of articles in the current or former OECD Models dealing with: Independent 
Personal Services (former OECD Art 14); Income From Employment (OECD Art 15); 
Pensions (OECD Art 18); Government Service (OECD Art 19); Students (OECD Art 20); 
Members of Diplomatic Missions and Consular Posts (Art 27 then 28); Territorial Extension 
(OECD Art 28 then 29); Entry into Force (OECD Art 29 then 30); and Termination (OECD Art 
30 then 31). Further variations from the OECD Model are contained in the 2015 German 
Treaty, which is not yet in force. Many of these variations can be characterised as being 
responses to the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, and as such cannot be 
seen as being products of Australia’s pre 1971 tax treaty policy and practice. These variations 
are summarised in Appendix 3. The count of variations is confined to variants on or omissions 
of OECD Model articles. It does not include additional articles found in Australian treaties, 
such as the articles dealing with fringe benefits tax in the current treaty with the UK or the 
current treaty with NZ.  
7  The details of the articles that can be traced to the 1946 UK Treaty are set out in Appendices 
3 and 4. 
8  The details of the articles that can be traced to the 1967 UK Treaty are set out in Appendices 
3 and 5. 
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deemed source rules can be traced to treaties entered into prior to 1971.9 The 
number of variations from the OECD Model in Australian treaty practice that 
originated prior to Australia joining the OECD raises questions as to why these 
variations arose and persisted and as to the factors that influenced Australian tax 
treaty policy and practice prior to 1971.  
1.3 Although Australia remains an overall net importer of capital, the level of Australian 
offshore investment has increased significantly since Australia joined the OECD in 
1971; and in many of its bilateral relationships, Australia is a net exporter of capital. 
In view of these changes in Australia’s trade and investment position since it joined 
the OECD in 1971, it is legitimate to ask whether its tax treaty practices and policies 
that were developed prior to 1971 continue to be appropriate.  
The Central Questions Investigated In This Thesis 
1.4 The background discussion at 1.1 to 1.3 gives rise to the following questions, which 
this thesis will investigate:  
1. What explanations do available archival materials relating to the negotiation and 
drafting of Australian bilateral tax treaties prior to 1971 provide for variations in 
Australian treaties from the current OECD Model?  
2. Having regard to available archival materials, what factors influenced Australian 
taxation treaty policy and practice between 1946 and 1971 and how, if at all, did 
those factors change in that period?  
3. What variations in Australian taxation treaties from the OECD Model should be 
discontinued in future Australian treaty practice, having regard to the original 
reason why those variations were introduced and subsequent changes in 
circumstances relevant to Australian taxation treaty practice and policy? 
The Structure Of This Chapter 
1.5 The balance of this chapter contains: (i) a review of previous secondary academic 
literature, and Australian government commissioned reports directly relevant to the 
questions identified at 1.4; (ii) an explanation of and justification for the methodology 
used in this thesis; (iii) a statement of the contribution to knowledge claimed to be 
made by the thesis. 
                                                          
9  The deemed source rules in currently operative Australian tax treaties are analysed in 
Appendix 7. As these rules relate to different articles in different treaties, previous research 
which has identified Australian variations from individual OECD Model articles has not 
identified them comprehensively. 
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Prior Literature Directly Relevant To The Questions Identified At 1.4 
1.6 The prior literature10 directly relevant to the questions identified at 1.4 can be divided 
into five main categories. The first is technical legal analyses of Australian tax 
treaties that interpret them using traditional legal analysis having regard to the text of 
the treaty, relevant case and statute law and such extrinsic material permissible 
under treaty interpretation principles. The second traces the history of the 
development of articles in Australian tax treaties by comparing published Australian, 
foreign and model treaties entered into or developed at different points in time. Within 
that category, note is sometimes taken of case law and statutory developments that 
are regarded as explaining the background to or the origins of the development of 
particular provisions in Australian tax treaties. A third category compares articles in 
Australian tax treaties with either the tax treaty practice of other jurisdictions or with 
model treaties developed by international and national organisations. A fourth 
category is commentary on Australian tax treaty policy and practice by individuals 
who had direct involvement in either the negotiation or drafting of Australian tax 
treaties. The fifth category is commentary on what should be Australian tax treaty 
policy and practice having regard to what the commentator perceives to be relevant 
considerations, such as: international tax policy norms; and economic, foreign policy 
and political considerations. Contributions to the literature in categories 1 to 5 will 
now be reviewed.  
Prior Technical Legal Analyses Of Australian Tax Treaties 
1.7 Technical legal analyses of Australian tax treaties have been published by 
commercial publishers since Australia’s first bilateral tax treaty was entered into in 
1946.11 As might be expected, given their intended audience, these analyses have 
                                                          
10  The review of secondary academic literature will be confined to legal scholarship on 
Australian tax treaties and Australian tax treaty policy. Although Chapters 2 to 7 of the thesis 
make frequent reference to scholarship by general historians and economic historians, that 
scholarship is concerned with biographical, economic and geopolitical considerations relevant 
to the contextual background of the narrative but is not directly relevant to the questions 
identified at 1.4 when approached from a perspective of legal research. 
11 The earliest analysis of an Australian tax treaty was F E Koch, The Double Taxation 
Conventions, Volume 1, Taxation of Income (Stevens & Sons, 1947). The earliest Australian 
analysis appears to be in J A L Gunn, O E Berger, J M Greenwood and R E O’Neill, Gunn’s 
Commonwealth Income Tax Law and Practice (Butterworth & Co (Australia), 2nd ed, 1948), 
which at pp1152–74 discussed the 1946 Australia – United Kingdom Tax Treaty. Another 
early publication was N E Challoner and C M Collins, Income Tax Law and Practice 
(Commonwealth) (The Law Book Co. of Australasia, 1953), which at pp892–919 also 
discussed the 1946 Australia – United Kingdom Tax Treaty. Gunn’s Commonwealth Income 
Tax Law and Practice was the progenitor of what is now Thomson Reuters, Australian Income 
Tax 1936 Commentary, which is currently available online at <www.checkpointau.com.au>. 
Challoner and Collins was the progenitor of what is now the CCH Australian Federal Tax 
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interpreted Australian tax treaties using traditional legal analysis. With one exception, 
discussed at 1.10, all technical legal analyses of Australian tax treaties examined by 
the author as part of this research have been based on published material and have 
not made reference to archival material relating to the negotiation and drafting of 
Australian tax treaties. As such, any conclusions that they draw as to the reason why 
particular provisions were included in Australian tax treaties can only be based on: 
(a) instances of official or unofficial statements by ministers or officials explaining why 
particular provisions were included in Australian treaties; and (b) inferences drawn 
from the texts of treaties and a comparison between them using traditional legal 
analysis. Dependent as these works are on inferences from published material and 
on the reliability of official and unofficial and statements by ministers and officials, 
these works cannot provide sufficiently definitive answers to questions 1 and 2 
identified at 1.4. These analyses usually do not include recommendations for 
changes in Australian tax treaty practice or policy having regard to relevant 
considerations, and as such are not of assistance in answering question 3 identified 
at 1.4. The analyses which were produced in close temporal proximity to particular 
treaties can provide evidence of the understanding of the effect of the particular 
treaty current in the tax profession at the time of its entry into force.  
1.8 A more recent example of a technical discussion of a particular treaty is the 2004 
discussion of the 2003 UK Treaty by Vann and Oliver.12 As was the case with the 
works by Parsons and Magney (to be discussed at 1.9), this analysis is based on a 
comparison of the text of the treaty with the texts of previous Australian and United 
Kingdom tax treaties, on a comparison with the OECD Model and Commentary, on 
official explanations by governments of this treaty and previous treaties, and on 
unpublished statements by officials. The article notes features of the treaty that 
appear to be distinctive features of Australian tax treaty practice and, through a 
comparison with UK tax treaty practice, is able to suggest whether Australia or the 
United Kingdom was likely to have initiated variations from the OECD Model. The 
authors’ intent clearly did not extend to ascertaining the origins of these features, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Reporter (ITAA 1936 and others) currently available online at 
<intelliconnect.wkasiapacific.com.wwwproxy0.library>. 
12  R J Vann and J D B Oliver, ‘The New Australia–UK Tax Treaty’ [2004] British Tax Review 
194. It is reasonably common for journal articles on particular Australian tax treaties to be 
published when a treaty is entered into. An earlier example is S H Goldberg, ‘The United 
States–Australia Income Tax Convention’ (1984) 18 Taxation in Australia 904. Articles of this 
nature typically rely on an analysis of the text of the treaty and a comparison with prior 
treaties entered into by Australia and the treaty partner. None of the articles in this category 
that have been examined by the author as part of this research has referred to archival 
sources. 
 
16 
 
their methodology did not involve the use of archival material to explain the origin and 
persistence of these features. Features of Australian treaty practice were identified 
which were either inconsistent with a more residence based treaty policy or which 
(for example in the case of royalties and the substantial equipment permanent 
establishment provision) are varied between treaties in a way that is not consistent 
with a coherent underlying policy.  
1.9 Other works based on traditional technical legal analysis have focused on 
problematic aspects of the interpretation of Australian tax treaties and, in some 
instances, on the historical background and geopolitical context in which treaty 
provisions were developed. An early example of an analysis that focused on 
problematic aspects of a particular tax treaty in particular business contexts was an 
article by R W Parsons in 1968,13 which provided a detailed analysis of tax problems 
relating to a UK business operating in Australia. In those instances where Parsons’ 
article points to differences between the 1967 and 1946 UK treaties, it can assist in 
drawing inferences that are relevant to questions 1 and 2 identified at 1.4. As a 
detailed interpretation of the 1967 UK Treaty in a cross border business context 
made shortly after that treaty was negotiated, it provides evidence of a contemporary 
interpretation (using the methods of traditional legal research) of that treaty by a 
senior Australian tax academic. A later example is a book by T W Magney,14 which 
also focuses on problematic aspects of the application of Australian tax treaties in 
particular situations. Magney’s book largely uses traditional legal research but also 
takes into account extrinsic material, in particular the OECD Commentary and the 
OECD Model and understandings of the intent of provisions derived from experience 
as a practitioner and, possibly, through informal discussions with ministers and 
government officials. Magney’s book did not rely on archival material; therefore, the 
answers it can provide to the first two questions identified at 1.4 are less definitive 
than if they had not had this limitation.  
1.10 A further variation on this approach is articles providing a technical discussion of 
particular issues associated with tax treaties. There is a large group of articles written 
before the Federal Court decisions in Virgin Holdings SA v Commissioner of Taxation 
[2008] FCA 1503 and Undershaft v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 41 
concerning the issue of whether Australia’s tax treaties entered into before the 
introduction of a general capital gains tax in Australia effective from 19th September 
                                                          
13  R W Parsons, ‘Tax Problems Relating to a United Kingdom Business Operating in Australia – 
I’ [1968] British Tax Review 177–97 and 242–64. 
14  T W Magney, Australia’s Double Taxation Agreements: A Critical Appraisal of Key Issues 
(Legal Books, 1994). 
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1985 protect non-residents, who are treaty residents for purposes of those treaties, 
from Australian capital gains tax.15 These articles use traditional legal analysis to 
discuss this question and examine the text of relevant treaties, the OECD Model and 
Commentary and official statements by government or government officials. None of 
these articles makes reference to archival materials. The consensus in these articles 
is that, for various reasons, Australia’s pre CGT treaties did protect non-residents 
from Australian capital gains tax at least in some circumstances. Following the 
Federal Court decisions, Vann wrote a comment on them16 which made reference to 
some archival material, discussed in Chapter 5, supplied by the author and by Philip 
Baker QC. Vann’s conclusion was that the negotiators of the 1967 Australia – United 
Kingdom Tax Treaty did not intend to limit Australia’s right to tax capital gains. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis will examine these arguments in more detail, and further 
archival evidence which supports the conclusion reached by Vann will be examined 
in Chapters 4 and 6. 
Published Literature Which Traces The Development Of Australian Tax Treaties17 
1.11 Avery Jones et al in 2006 traced the origins of concepts and expressions used in the 
OECD Model and their adoption by states including Australia.18 The research by 
Avery Jones et al was confined to published material and examined treaties 
negotiated which represented the first treaty use of a concept, models developed by 
the League of Nations, statutory provisions and general law concepts and case law 
of the relevant countries discussed in the research.19 Vann was responsible for the 
initial research relating the first use of concepts in Australian law prior to the 
development of the OECD Model and of the subsequent influence of concepts in the 
                                                          
15  The articles in this category include: K Emmerton, ‘Part IIIA and Austraila’s Double Tax 
Agreements’ (1993) 5 CCH Journal of Australian Taxation 60; I V Gzell, ‘Treaty Protection 
from Capital Gains Tax’ (2000) 29 Australian Tax Review 41; I V Gzell, ‘Treaty Application to 
a Capital Gains Tax Introduced After the Conclusion of the Treaty’ (2002) 50 Australian Law 
Journal 309; P A Kennedy, ‘CGT and Non-residents, Part A: Protection Under Double Tax 
Agreements’ (1993) Taxation in Australia 27; R L Deutsch and N C Sharkey, ‘Australia’s 
Capital Gains Tax and Double Taxation Agreements’ (2002) 56 Bulletin for International 
Taxation 228. The post 2001 articles respond to Taxation Ruling TR 2001/12 ‘Income tax and 
capital gains tax: capital gains in pre CGT tax treaties’.  
16  R J Vann, ‘Comment on Virgin Holdings SA v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1503 
and Undershaft v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 41’ (2009) 11 International Tax Law 
Reports 653. 
17  Mention should be made here of the comprehensive study of comparative texts of Australian 
tax treaties by Jude Amos (Tax Treaty Law and Practice Guides, ‘Australia’s Double Taxation 
Agreements (The Law and Practice)’ (unpublished). 
18  John F Avery Jones, Luc De Broe, Maarten J Ellis, Kees Van Raad, Jean-Pierre Le Gall, 
Sandford H Goldberg, Jurgen Killius, Guglielmo Maisto, Toshio Miyatake, Henri Torrione, 
Richard J Vann, David A Ward and Bertil Wiman, ‘The Origins of Concepts and Expressions 
Used in the OECD Model and Their Adoption by States’ [2006] British Tax Review 695–765.  
19  Avery Jones et al, above n 18, 696. 
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OECD Model on Australian domestic law. For the purposes of this thesis, this 
research is valuable in identifying: (a) concepts the use of which was well established 
prior to the negotiation of the first Australian tax treaty in 1946; (b) concepts in the 
OECD Model which had their origins in civil law; (c) concepts for which antecedents 
can be found in Australian domestic law; (d) concepts which subsequently were 
adopted in Australian domestic law; and (e) concepts which have been interpreted by 
Australian court, board of review and tribunal decisions or by ATO rulings.  
1.12 The focus of Avery Jones et al’s research was on the converse of question 1 
identified at 1.4; that is, examining when concepts in the OECD Model were first used 
in treaties rather than focusing on the origins of differences between Australian tax 
treaty practice and the OECD Model. The research by Avery Jones et al is relevant to 
question 1 identified at 1.4 in that it identifies potential factors (prior tax treaties, prior 
model treaties, prior domestic law and interpretations of Australian tax treaties by 
courts, boards of review, tribunals and the ATO) which may have influenced 
Australian tax treaty policy and practice, but its limitation is that it is entirely based on 
published material. Thus, this research can tell us whether a concept now appearing 
in the OECD Model would have been familiar or unfamiliar to Australian negotiators 
and drafters and hence the likelihood of the concept being adopted or modified or 
influenced by them. Its reliance on published sources, however, means that it cannot 
provide more direct evidence of such adoption, modification or influence. This thesis 
will attempt to overcome this limitation by examining archival records relevant to the 
negotiation and drafting of Australian tax treaties negotiated prior to Australia joining 
the OECD in 1971. 
Literature Comparing Australian Treaty Practice With That Of Other Jurisdictions Or 
With Models Developed By International Organisations 
1.13 Contributions to the literature in this area have been made by T W Magney in 1994,20 
by Bain, Krever and van der Westhuysen in 2011,21 by Bain, Krever and O’Connor in 
2012,22 and by Dirkis and Burch in 2014.23 All of these contributions, with varying 
                                                          
20  T W Magney, Australia’s Double Taxation Agreements: A Critical Appraisal of Key Issues 
(Legal Books, 1994). 
21  K Bain, R Krever and A van der Westhuysen, ‘The Influence of Alternative Model Treaties on 
Australian Treaties’ (2011) 26 Australian Tax Forum 31–49. 
22  K Bain, R Krever and A O’Connor, ‘National Report for Australia’ in M Lang, P Pistone, J 
Schuch, C Staringer and A Storck (eds), The Impact of OECD and UN Model Conventions on 
Bilateral Tax Treaties (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
23  Michael Dirkis and Micah Burch, ‘Australia’ in Guglielmo Maisto (ed), Departures From the 
OECD Model and Commentaries: Reservations, Observations and Positions in EU Law and 
Tax Treaties (IBFD Publications BV, 2014) 187–230.  
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degrees of comprehensiveness,24 identify variations between current, and in some 
instances25 former, Australian tax treaty practice and the OECD Model. In the case of 
the contributions by Bain, Krever and van der Westhuysen and by Bain, Krever and 
O’Connor, a comparison is also made with the United Nations Model. The 
identification appears to be the result of research based on published material and, in 
some cases, on public presentations by officials. Appendix 3 to this thesis was based 
on the 2012 book chapter by Bain, Krever and O’Connor. Appendix 3 updated the 
findings in that chapter for Australian treaties entered into since the chapter by Bain, 
Krever and O’Connor was written, and corrected some errors in that chapter which 
had arisen due to the failure of the authors to take account of the effect of some 
protocols concluded contemporaneously with particular treaties. Appendix 3 also 
takes into account the analysis in the 2014 book chapter by Dirkis and Burch. 
1.14 While the studies discussed at 1.13 are all valuable contributions to the literature, 
none of them provides adequate answers to the first two questions identified at 1.4. 
First, they all place significant reliance on inferences drawn from a pattern of 
behaviour and on the reliability of published statements and public presentations as 
to the reason behind a variation from the OECD Model. This limits the value of the 
research undertaken in those studies for answering the second of the questions 
identified at 1.4. None of the studies attempts to identify the first instance in an 
Australian tax treaty of any particular variation from the OECD Model. Moreover, their 
approach means that none of these studies is able to identify which variations from 
the OECD Model in particular Australian tax treaties might have been initiated by the 
treaty partner rather than by Australia. Nor does the approach adequately allow a 
determination to be made whether the precise form of a variation from the OECD 
Model was the product of an interchange of drafts during the negotiation process.  
1.15 Dirkis and Burch argue that the variations of Australian tax treaties from the OECD 
Model are broadly due to: (a) variations between versions of the OECD Model over 
time; and (b) compromises reached during negotiations.26 Although Dirkis and Burch 
recognise that variations may have been due to compromises in the negotiation 
process, they do not identify which variations were the product of such compromises. 
                                                          
24  The book chapter by Dirkis and Burch and the book by Magney, while apparently the result of 
a comprehensive analysis of Australian treaties operative at the time they were writing, only 
provide examples of variations from the OECD Model. The article by Bain, Krever and 
O’Connor and the book chapter by Bain, Krever and van der Westhuysen attempt to provide 
what they state to be a comprehensive comparison.  
25  Dirkis and Burch, above n 23 make some comparisons with prior Australian tax treaty 
practice. 
26  Dirkis and Burch, above n 23, 188. 
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Dirkis and Burch suggest that compromises in the negotiations may have arisen 
from:  
 The relative economic positions of the contracting states; 
 The international tax policy positions adopted due to the stage of economic 
development;  
 Changes in the tax policy of the contracting states; 
 Long-held positions by contracting states on particular types of income; 
 Differences in business structures used; and  
 Tax competition.27 
 While these are reasonable inferences to be drawn from published material relevant 
to Australian tax treaty policy and practice and from presentations by officials, they 
are based on inferences and on presentations for which the only publically available 
record is a ‘bullet point’ summary. Moreover, their research does not attempt to 
distinguish between policies and practices that may have arisen due to one factor but 
which were continued because of another or other factors. Hence, the explanation 
they provide of the causes of the variations is less definitive than it may have been 
had their research taken relevant archival material into account.  
1.16 This thesis seeks to address the gaps in the literature left by the studies discussed at 
1.13 to 1.15 by using archival materials relevant to the negotiation and drafting of 
Australian treaties prior to 1972 to identify: (a) not only the first instances of variations 
but also the party to the negotiations who initiated the variation; (b) the factors that 
influenced the introduction of the variations and their persistence or abandonment 
during the period between 1946 and 1971.28  
Commentary On Australian Tax Treaty Policy And/Or Practice By Individuals Involved 
In Negotiation And/Or Drafting Of Australian Tax Treaties 
                                                          
27  Dirkis and Burch, above n 23, 188. Dirkis and Burch provide generic examples of each of the 
factors they list. 
28  General commentaries on double tax treaties also make mention of Australian practice on 
particular articles. For example, E Reimer and A Rust (eds), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions (Kluwer Law International, 4th ed, 2015) refers to Australian practice on particular 
articles when discussing divergent country practices in relation to those articles. Works of this 
nature typically compare model treaties, use traditional legal analysis, note variations by 
particular jurisdictions and refer to secondary literature commenting on issues relating to tax 
treaties.  
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1.17 It is uncommon for Australian individuals involved in the negotiation and/or drafting of 
Australian tax treaties to publish material29 relevant to Australian tax treaty policy 
and/or practice. An exception is the publication by K T Allen, former Assistant 
Commissioner (International Branch) Policy and Legislation Group, ATO, apparently 
originally published between 1988 and 1990.30 While not reflective of current 
Australian tax treaty practice and policy, on some issues it does contain the views of 
the then Australian lead negotiator on tax treaties which contained many of the 
variations between Australian treaty practice and the OECD Model that are a major 
concern of this thesis. After acknowledging the need to prevent international double 
taxation arising from conflicts of source and residence rules, Allen emphasised the 
importance of trade, investment, political and other ties between Australia and the 
potential treaty partner as a reason for concluding a tax treaty with it.31 Allen 
indicated that the allocation of taxing rights in the 1967 UK Tax Treaty had formed 
the model for Australian tax treaties, noting that while those treaties followed the 
OECD Model in many respects, in others they gave greater emphasis to the taxing 
rights of the source country. This Allen saw as reflecting the desire of successive 
Australian governments to ensure that Australia, as a net importer of capital, 
obtained an appropriate share of tax revenues flowing from it.32 Allen then discussed 
how this broad policy objective was implemented and reflected in particular articles in 
Australian tax treaties.33 This thesis will enable an assessment to be made of 
                                                          
29  Australian officials do make seminar and conference presentations but do not usually present 
a formal paper that is subsequently published as part of conference proceedings. 
30  K T Allen Assistant Commissioner (International Branch) Policy and Legislation Group, ATO, 
Canberra ‘The Relevant Considerations, Factors and Criteria Involved in Negotiating 
Australia's Double Tax Agreements’, Thomson Reuters, Checkpoint, Commentary, 
International Agreements. The commentary is currently undated, but internal evidence (Allen, 
at 1870, refers to the 1988 Australia – China Tax Treaty as being signed but not yet in force) 
and the history of the Thomson Reuters commentary suggests that it was originally written in 
approximately 1990 as part of Australian Income Tax Law And Practice published by 
Butterworths.  
 The URL for the online edition of this portion of the commentary as at 8th March 2015 was 
<http://www.checkpointau.com.au.wwwproxy0.library.unsw.edu.au/maf/app/fulldocument?end
Chunk=1&parentguid=AUNZ_AU_LEGCOMM_TOC||Iaaf929df7ad711e38c02ad4129764cda
&startChunk=1&bcguid=AUNZ_TOC||I0896b63badf9335793f345ad6234b170&docguid=I090c
b152a01811e0a942f53c5c101aad&pcs=AUNZ_CA_INTLAGREE&tocDs=AUNZ_AU_LEGCO
MM_TOC&epos=&predefinedRelationshipsType=fullDocRetrieval&resultType=list&isTocNav=
true&tocGuid=AUNZ_AU_LEGCOMM_TOC||Iaaf902b27ad711e38c02ad4129764cda>.  
31  Allen, above n 30, 1805. 
32  Allen, above n 30, 1850. 
33  The features of Australian tax treaties that Allen saw as reflecting this policy objective are set 
out in Appendix 6. It is extremely rare for Australian ministers to make public statements 
about Australian tax treaty practice. An exception occurred in 2008 when the Rudd 
Government commissioned a review of Australian tax treaty policy. Although the review itself 
was never published, key features of Australia’s tax treaty practice as at 2008 as stated by 
the then Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs (The 
22 
 
whether Allen’s published statements are consistent with the archival records of the 
negotiation and drafting of Australian tax treaties in the period prior to 1971. 
Commentary On What Should Be Australian Tax Treaty Policy And Practice Having 
Regard To Perceived Relevant Considerations 
1.18 While there were internal reviews by Australian government departments and officials 
of Australian tax treaty policy and practice in the period reviewed in this thesis, none 
of these was published. The first published comment in an Australian government 
commissioned report was in the 1975 Taxation Review Committee: Full Report34 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘Asprey Committee Report’). The Asprey Committee 
made the following brief comments on the factors that influence taxation treaties: 
‘Double taxation agreements reflect the revenue interests of the parties, their 
economic and social policies and, of course, their respective bargaining 
strength. They also reflect the concern of the parties to prevent injustice and 
discouragement of trade, investment and other contact between their 
residents which tend to result when the same income is subject to unrelieved 
double taxation.’35 
While relevant to the first question identified at 1.4, this statement by the Asprey 
Committee is of limited value in answering that question as there is no indication in 
the Asprey Committee Report of the basis on which it was arrived at; although the 
Asprey Committee Report does note that information had been supplied by the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Taxation and their officers.36 
1.19 The Asprey Committee thereafter confined itself to making some general 
observations on the structures and techniques of treaties likely to be most effective in 
preventing double taxation.37 The Asprey Committee commented that a tax treaty 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Hon. Chris Bowen MP) were set out in Media Release 25/01/2008 No. 004, ‘Australia’s Tax 
Treaty Negotiation Policy'. These aspects of the Media Release are set out in Appendix 6. 
34  Australia, Taxation Review Committee: Full Report 31 January 1975 (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1975). The Royal Commission on Taxation (the ‘Warren Kerr 
Commission’) had reported in 1920 on whether Australia should participate in the United 
Kingdom’s system of Dominion Income Tax Relief and on how Australia’s participation should 
be implemented. That system did not involve the use of bilateral taxation treaties. Australia’s 
role in the development and implementation of the system of Dominion Income Tax Relief is 
discussed in C John Taylor, ‘”Send a Strong Man to England – Capacity to Put Up a Fight 
More Important Than Intimate Knowledge of Income Tax Acts and Practice”: Australia and the 
Development of the Dominion Income Tax Relief System of 1920’ (2014) 12 e Journal of Tax 
Research 74–86. 
35  Asprey Committee Report, para 17.97. 
36  Asprey Committee Report, xviii. 
37  Asprey Committee Report, para 17.98. 
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needed to resolve conflicts of jurisdictional claims, and discussed dual residence 
conflicts, residence source conflicts and conflicts of source rules.38  
1.20 In the case of conflicts of source rules, the Asprey Committee argued for the 
inclusion in tax treaties of definitions of source of different categories of income.39 
Similarly, the Asprey Committee considered that tax treaties should contain their own 
definitions of terms used when referring to different categories of income.40 In both 
these cases, the Asprey Committee noted that some Australian tax treaties of the 
time either applied the law of each contracting state or gave a term a meaning by 
reference to its meaning in the law of one of the contracting states.41 All of these 
observations are relevant to technical aspects of the broad policy objective of 
ensuring that tax treaties prevent unrelieved double taxation and hence are relevant 
to the third question identified at 1.4. As officers of the Australian Treasury and ATO 
supplied the Asprey Committee with information, it is possible that these 
observations by the Asprey Committee may have been influenced by and, to some 
extent, reflect attitudes of those officers to tax treat policy shortly after the period 
examined in this thesis. Hence these observations may be relevant to the second of 
the questions identified at 1.4. 
1.21 The 1999 report of the Review of Business Taxation42 (hereafter ‘the Ralph Review’) 
made brief comments and four recommendations in relation to Australian tax treaties. 
As globalisation had provided opportunities for Australian companies to expand 
offshore, the Ralph Review recommended reciprocal lowering of withholding taxes on 
non-portfolio dividends in Australia’s tax treaties43 to facilitate cross border direct 
investment by lowering the tax cost of repatriation of profits.44 The Ralph Review 
commended the then recent Australian policy of matching non-taxation of the franked 
portion of a dividend with lower rates of withholding tax on non-portfolio dividends by 
                                                          
38  Asprey Committee Report, paras 17.100 to 17.103. 
39  Asprey Committee Report, para 17.102  
40  Asprey Committee Report, para 17.104.  
41  Asprey Committee Report, paras 17.102 to 17.104. 
42  Australia, Review of Business Taxation, Report: A Tax System Redesigned (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1999). 
43  Ralph Review, recommendation 22.21, p677. 
44  Ralph Review, p677. The comment has to be seen in the context of the then current 
Australian tax treatment of foreign source non-portfolio dividends. At the time, generally non-
portfolio dividends funded from income which had been taxed in a country with which 
Australia had a tax treaty were exempt when received by an Australian resident company 
while other non-portfolio dividends and portfolio dividends received by an Australian received 
a foreign tax credit. For a brief discussion of relevant Australian rules at the time see R L 
Hamilton, R L Deutsch and J C Raneri, Guidebook to Australian International Taxation 
(Prospect Media Pty Ltd, 7th ed, 2001) paras 3.10 and 3.110. 
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the treaty partner.45 The Ralph Review considered that this would be of significant 
benefit to Australian investment offshore, particularly into the United States, where a 
15% dividend withholding tax continued to be levied under the 1982 Australia – 
United States Tax Treaty.46  
1.22 The Ralph Review recommended that Australia agree to the non-discrimination 
article in future tax treaties,47 noting that while Australia was the only OECD country 
which did not include a non-discrimination article in its tax treaties, a recent study had 
found that Australia had one of the least discriminatory tax regimes applying to non-
residents.48 If Australia agreed to a non-discrimination article in tax treaties, that 
would mean that Australian enterprises expanding overseas would be able to rely on 
reciprocal rules to protect them against tax discrimination by the host country.49 The 
Ralph Review considered that not agreeing to the non-discrimination article had 
made progress in negotiating Australia’s tax treaties difficult.50  
1.23 The third of the Ralph Review’s recommendations was that priority be given to 
renegotiating Australia’s ageing tax treaties with its major trading partners to make 
them consistent with Australia’s current tax treaty policy and with decisions 
concerning tax reform.51 The Ralph Review observed that none of Australia’s then 
operative tax treaties with the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States: properly 
reflected modern tax treaty policy; took into account emerging tax treaty issues; nor 
reflected decisions yet to be taken in relation to business tax reform.52 Finally, the 
Ralph Review recommended a review of Australia’s overall tax treaty policy to ensure 
that it reflected a balanced taxation of international investment and changed 
investment patterns.53  
1.24 The background to the third recommendation, and one of the major themes of the 
Ralph Review, was that while Australia remained a net capital importer, the 
percentage of Australian investment abroad as a share of foreign investment in 
Australia had grown from 10–20% in the 1980s to about 60% at the time of the Ralph 
Review. Hence, the Ralph Review saw a need for Australian treaty policy to move 
from its historic emphasis on source basis taxation to ‘an appropriate balance of 
                                                          
45  Ralph Review, pp677–8. 
46  Ralph Review, p678. 
47  Ralph Review, recommendation 22.22, p678. 
48  Ralph Review, p678. 
49  Ralph Review, p678. 
50  Ralph Review, p679. 
51  Ralph Review, recommendation 22.23, p679. 
52  Ralph Review, p679. 
53  Ralph Review, recommendation 22.24, p679. 
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source and residence based taxing rights that will encourage both inbound and 
outbound investment’.54 The observations concerning the need to balance source 
and residence taxation, given the changes in the balance of Australian inbound and 
outbound investment, is the most significant aspect of the Ralph Review relevant to 
the third question identified at 1.4. 
1.25 The Board of Taxation’s 2003 International Taxation: A Report to the Treasurer 
(hereafter ‘the 2003 Review’)55 contained a discussion of tax treaty policy in the 
context of a chapter titled ‘Promoting Australia as a location for internationally 
focussed companies’. The 2003 Review saw the balance between residence and 
source taxation and whether the balance struck in the Protocol to the US Tax Treaty 
should be the basis for future policy as major policy questions.56 The 2003 Review 
noted Australia’s historic emphasis on source basis taxation, and identified the wide 
definition of ‘permanent establishment’ and the relatively high withholding tax ceilings 
in Australian tax treaties as examples of this emphasis.57 The 2003 Review also 
noted that Australian tax treaties negotiated since the introduction of capital gains tax 
in 1985 had preserved Australian domestic law source taxing rights over capital gains 
including the then domestic law rule relating to capital gains on shares.58 The 2001 
Protocol to the Australia – US Tax Treaty was characterised as moving further away 
from source taxation by reducing withholding tax rates and qualifying Australia’s levy 
of capital gains tax on US residents.59  
1.26 Problems with Australia’s historic emphasis on source taxation were noted by the 
2003 Review. The source based tax treaty policy was regarded as having detrimental 
impacts on Australian firms investing offshore by exposing them to high taxes in 
treaty partner countries in a context where Australia had unilaterally given up 
significant areas of source taxation.60 The 2003 Review noted that the treatment of 
capital gains in Australia’s pre 1985 tax treaties was a vexed issue with the private 
sector and that this and Australia’s broad claim to capital gains tax jurisdiction 
adversely affected investment decisions by non-residents.61 Moreover, the 2003 
Review considered, Australia’s emphasis on source basis taxation had made 
                                                          
54  Ralph Review, pp679–80. 
55  Australia, Board of Taxation, International Taxation: A Report to the Treasurer, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003, two volumes. 
56  2003 Review, para 3.49. 
57  2003 Review, para 3.50. 
58  2003 Review, para 3.51. 
59  2003 Review, para 3.52. 
60  2003 Review, para 3.55. 
61  2003 Review, paras 3.56, 3.57 and 3.62. 
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updating some of Australia’s tax treaties problematical.62 The 2003 Review pointed 
out that, as Australian offshore investment was concentrated in a few countries, 
priority should be given to revising and updating treaties with those countries.63  
1.27 Again, the major policy conclusion was based on the change in investment inflows 
and outflows. The 2003 Review noted that as Australia moved towards a balance of 
inflows and outflows, the need for source taxation receded, and considered that the 
efficiency gains from moving to a residence based tax treaty policy might exceed the 
revenue foregone.64  
1.28 The 2003 Review made four recommendations in relation to tax treaty policy. The 
first was to move to a more residence based treaty policy.65 The second was against 
a Ralph Review recommendation to apply Australian capital gains tax to the sale by 
non-residents of non-resident interposed entities with underlying Australian assets.66 
The third was to review and keep the ‘key country treaties’ up to date and aligned 
with the first recommendation, and to give priority to the most important partners for 
Australia in tax treaty negotiations.67 The fourth related to consultation with the 2003 
Review, recommending similar processes to those that the government had adopted 
for domestic tax legislation.68 As was the case with the Ralph Review, the most 
significant aspect of the discussion of tax treaty policy by the 2003 Review for the 
third question identified at 1.4 was its observations concerning the need for a balance 
between source and residence taxation given changes in the balance of Australian 
inbound and outbound investment. 
1.29 Several commentators reported on the implementation and/or practical application of 
recommendations by either the Ralph Review or the 2003 Review, or both.  
1.30 In 2003, Norman,69 in surveying Australia’s recent tax treaties and protocols up to the 
2002 Mexico Treaty, noted the extent to which these treaties and protocols 
implemented recommendations made in those reviews, the policy background behind 
them and their practical effects.  
                                                          
62  2003 Review, para 3.58. 
63  2003 Review, para 359. 
64  2003 Review, para 3.61. 
65  2003 Review, recommendation 3.5 and discussion, para 3.70 to 3.73. 
66  2003 Review, recommendation 3.6 and discussion, para 3.74 to 3.76. 
67  2003 Review, recommendation 3.7 and discussion, para 3.77 to 3.80. 
68  2003 Review, recommendation 3.8 and discussion, para 3.81 to 3.83. 
69  Peter Norman, ‘Australia’s Recent Tax Treaties and Protocols’ (2003) 57 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 397. 
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1.31 In 2008, Dirkis70 reviewed changes in Australian double tax treaty practice following 
on from recommendations made by the Ralph Review and the 2003 Review. He 
found evidence of implementation of the first recommendation in the use of an 
exemption (rather than a foreign tax credit) method and the use of lower rates of 
withholding tax in Australia’s then recent bilateral tax treaties and protocols. Dirkis 
discussed the various attempts that Australia has made to override treaties through 
domestic legislation and the relevant case law that gave rise to these attempts. In 
particular, Dirkis discussed s3A of the Income Tax (International Agreements) Act 
1953 (enacted in response to the decision in FTC v Lamesa Holdings BV 97 ATC 
4752). Other modernisation developments that Dirkis noted were changes to the 
exchange of information article and the assistance in collection provisions (based on 
Article 27 of the OECD Model) contained in the 2006 treaties with Norway, France 
and Finland and the 2005 changes to the treaty with New Zealand.   
1.32 Vann,71 in 2009, in an analytical and critical discussion, reviewed Australian current 
and previous reviews of Australian tax treaty policy. Vann summarised the 
discussions of treaty policy in the Asprey Report, the Ralph Review and the 2003 
Review and made observations on the review of Australia’s Tax Treaty Negotiation 
Policy commissioned by the Rudd government.  
1.33 Vann considered that the general theme of a more residence, as distinct from source, 
based treaty policy which came out of these reviews was ‘the most important 
substantive policy change in Australian tax treaty policy since its inception’.72 Vann 
noted that a major driver for the change was the trend that the ratio of inward and 
outward investment was shifting closer to 1:1, a point by then already reached for 
equity investment.73 Vann then argued that when investment flows are in balance or 
are trending towards balance, a country does not give up revenue by treaty 
decreases in source taxation because these were counterbalanced by increased 
revenue from residence taxation.74 Vann then observed that Australia’s shift to a 
residence based policy was still not being pursued consistently and needed to be 
                                                          
70  Michael Dirkis, ‘Selected Aspects of Australia’s Emerging “Model” Double Taxation Treaty’ 
(2008) 65 Bulletin For International Taxation 56–65.  
71  R J Vann, ‘Australia’s Future Tax Treaty Policy’ in Chris Evans and Richard Krever (eds), 
Australian Business Tax Reform in Retrospect and Prospect (Thomson Reuters, 2009) 401–
16. 
72  Vann, above n 71, 407. 
73  Vann, above n 71, 407–08. 
74  Vann, above n 71, 408–09. 
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thought through across tax treaties, with Treasury and the ATO needing to think 
about Australian outbound investment as much as inbound investment.75  
1.34 Vann then argued in favour of the signalling effect of tax treaties, seeing them as 
‘one of several instruments of international economic law which indicate that a 
country has accepted the economic liberalism orthodoxy that underlies the 
international economic order’ and, without endorsing the international economic 
order, observed that the countries which ‘seem to succeed most are ones which 
embrace it’.76  
1.35 Vann then argued that on joining the OECD in 1971, Australia carried its previous 
treaty practices with it with the result that for the next three decades Australian tax 
treaty practice was set in stone and characterised by an extreme source position for 
an OECD country and language oddities being maintained even where the OECD 
terminology produced similar results.77 Vann asserted that these features, coupled 
with Australia’s low number of tax treaties and its ‘take it or leave it’ negotiating style, 
meant that, ‘Australia is not regarded internationally as a country which embraces tax 
treaties as a good thing for the country and the world.’78  
1.36 Hence, Vann argued that Australia, apart from the substantive changes in tax treaty 
policy resulting from the shift in investment patterns, should ‘retreat from its 
exceptionalism in tax treaties and align itself much more closely with the intent and 
wording of the OECD Model’. Vann noted that needless difficulties in negotiations 
were still produced because of Australian peculiarities in treaties, adopted many 
years ago and for which the need has since disappeared.79  
1.37 Australian exceptionalism, in Vann’s view, had adverse consequences for the 
interpretation of Australian tax treaties because it meant that doubt was created as to 
what extent the OECD Commentaries applied, with the result that giving advice or 
rulings to Australian or foreign investors was more difficult and increased the tax risks 
attached to Australian related inbound and outbound investment. For this reason, 
Vann argued in favour of Australia making more information public on its tax treaty 
                                                          
75  Vann, above n 71, 409. As an example of the adverse effects of Australia’s inbound mindset, 
Vann instanced the omission of the non-discrimination article in the current Australia–France 
Tax Treaty and Australia’s litigation in Deutsch Asia Pacific Finance Inc v FCT (No 2) (2008) 
172 FCR 336.  
76  Vann, above n 71, 410–11. The quotation is from p411.  
77  Vann, above n 71, 411–12. 
78  Vann, above n 71, 412. 
79  Vann, above n 71, 412. 
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negotiating positions, noting that currently this has to be indirectly derived through 
the type of research discussed at 1.13 to 1.16.80  
1.38 The element in Vann’s response to the Ralph Review and the 2003 Review that goes 
beyond their recommendations is his call for a retreat from Australian exceptionalism 
in tax treaties and that Australia pursue a more residence based treaty policy 
consistently across treaties. That call highlights the relevance of the first two 
questions identified at 1.4 to the third question. Ascertaining, with the assistance of 
archival research, the reasons behind Australian exceptionalism can provide valuable 
information for assessing whether those exceptional features in Australian tax 
treaties should continue given the acknowledged changes in the balance of 
Australian inbound and outbound investment. 
The Methodology Used In This Thesis 
1.39 The method of traditional legal research is concerned with: (a) identifying what the 
law is; (b) analysing its conceptual coherence; (c) determining how and why it came 
to be what it is; and (d) assessing how it would or should apply in the present.81 
Traditional legal research thus has a limited scope and serves limited functions. It is 
nonetheless essential to the informed development and reform of the law. This thesis 
utilises archival material as a means of considering, in particular, concerns (c) and 
(d) of traditional legal research. As argued at 1.40 to 1.42, the methodology of 
traditional legal research is distinct from other forms of empirical research. While it 
refers to records of past events, the approach taken in this thesis, and in traditional 
legal research in general, is distinct from the research performed by professional 
                                                          
80  Vann, above n 71, 412–13. 
81  Legal research of this type was described as ‘doctrinal research’ in D Pearce, E Campbell 
and D Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth 
Tertiary Education Commission (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987) 309. 
Pearce, Campbell and Harding described ‘non-doctrinal’ research as being research ‘about 
law’ as distinct from research ‘in law’. A similar characterisation of traditional legal research in 
the tax context specifically was made by Judith Freedman, ‘Taxation Research as Legal 
Research’ in M Lamb, A Lymer, J Freedman and S James (eds), Taxation: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach to Research (Oxford University Press, 2005) 13. For works that 
focus on the process of finding the law and identifying and locating sources of law see, for 
example, Enid Mona Campbell, Poh York Lee and Joycey G. Tooher, Legal Research 
Materials and Methods (LBC Information Services, 4th ed, 1996) and more recent works that 
have greater focus on electronic search techniques such as Bruce Bott, Ruth Talbot-Stokes 
and Irene Nemes, Nemes & Coss’ Effective Legal Research (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 
2009). For an argument that legal research should embrace and does include social science 
methodologies see Terry C M Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Thomson 
Reuters/Lawbook Co., 3rd ed, 2010) ch 5.  
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historians. Nor, it is submitted, is the methodology adopted in this thesis or in 
traditional legal research in general properly classified as social science research.  
1.40 All empirical research is conducted in a present moment or in a series of present 
moments. As each present moment is infinitesimal, all reports of empirical research 
in any field are necessarily reports of past events and are themselves past events 
that are experienced in a present moment. What distinguishes history from 
empirically based research in social sciences is the object of historical enquiry. The 
actual events of history to which records relate, being past, cannot be returned to, 
nor can they be replicated in the present, although reconstructions of them can aid 
their historical interpretation. The object of historical enquiry may be thought to be 
knowledge and understanding of past events or of a past reality. By contrast, 
empirically based social science research is considered valid to the extent to which 
its observations are able to be replicated in the present in circumstances that, except 
for the temporal difference, are otherwise identical. This is because empirically based 
social science research is concerned with making claims about a present reality. The 
claims may be spatially or culturally qualified, but once the claim is temporally 
qualified to the extent that it is incapable of being replicated in the present in 
otherwise identical conditions, it becomes a claim about a past reality and can be 
considered a historical artefact.82 Hence, the object of social science research may 
be thought to be knowledge and understanding of a present reality.  
1.41 Traditional legal research is concerned, at least in part, with identifying what the law 
is at a given point in time and how it will or should apply in given factual 
circumstances. It does so by referring to records of past events and by applying 
them, as distinct from replicating them, in a present moment. In the process of 
applying the historical records, legal research may interpret the record using 
historical methods in understanding the development of the record and may take into 
account the results of social science investigation in assessing the likely effect of the 
application of the rule in the present moment. The use of the methods and results of 
these other disciplines, however, is peripheral and supplementary to the key objects 
and concern of traditional legal research, which, as argued at 1.39, is how the record 
of a past event should be applied in a present moment.  
                                                          
82  It is conceded that social science research can be concerned with changes in society over 
time. It is submitted, though, that when such research is making observations that cannot be 
replicated in the present, it is making observations about historical events and to that extent is 
engaged in history. It is submitted, though, that the use of this historical material in social 
science is to contrast the past event with present reality. The past event is not understood for 
its own sake, but rather in contrast to the different present reality. 
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1.42 So far as the interpretation of the past event involves a conclusion by a court of what 
the law was and/or is, it is an authoritative determination and remains authoritative 
until overturned by a subsequent court decision or by statute. Hence, when seen 
from this perspective legal research is at once both a study based on history and a 
study that draws conclusions about present reality.83 
1.43 Only rarely, and then more recently, has traditional legal research paid attention to 
archival materials relevant to statutes and reports of court decisions. Some published 
works have made use of materials in foreign archives relating to tax treaties or model 
tax treaties;84 however, other than literature produced by the author as part of the 
present research and the article by Vann referred to at 1.10, none makes use of 
material in the National Archives of Australia. In addition, other than literature 
produced as part of the present research and a 2014 article by Avery Jones and 
Ludicke,85 none of the prior published works makes use of materials in the archives 
of both partners to a particular tax treaty.  
1.44 In the treaty context specifically, one factor that may have led to the relative lack of 
research based on preparatory materials has been their lack of availability until 
                                                          
83  For a discussion of the impossibility of having direct evidence of past events and 
distinguishing between history and social science see Murray G Murphey, Truth and History 
(State University of New York Press, 2009) 5–13 and 181–2 respectively. A similar argument 
that legal research should be distinguished from other disciplines, such as social and physical 
sciences, is made by Jan M Smits, The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic (Edward 
Elgar, 2012). Smits, at 151, submits that the other disciplines are often limited to 
understanding social or physical reality while the legal discipline should reflect on what 
‘people or organizations legally ought to do’. 
84  These include: John F Avery Jones, ‘The History of the United Kingdom’s First 
Comprehensive Double Taxation Agreement’ [2007] British Tax Review 211; John F Avery 
Jones, ‘Understanding the OECD Model Convention: The Lesson of History’ (2009) 10 Florida 
Law Review 3; John F Avery Jones and Jurgen Ludicke, ‘The Origins of Article 5(5) and 
Article 5(6) of the OECD Model’ (2014) 6 World Tax Journal 203; John F Avery Jones, P 
Baker, L De Broe, M Ellis, K van Raad, J Le Gall, S Goldberg, P Blessing, J Ludicke, G 
Maisto, R Vann, et al, ‘The Definitions of Dividends and Interest in the OECD Model: 
Something Lost in Translation?’ [2009] British Tax Review 406; Sunita Jogarajan, ‘Stamp, 
Seligman and the Drafting of the 1923 Experts’ Report on Double Taxation’ (2013) 5 World 
Tax Journal 368; Sunita Jogarajan, ‘The Conclusion and Termination of the “First” Double 
Taxation Treaty’ [2012] British Tax Review 283; Sunita Jogarajan, ‘Prelude to the 
International Tax Treaty Network: 1815–1914 Early Tax Treaties and the Conditions for 
Action’ (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 679; R J Vann, ‘Travellers, Tax Policy and 
Agency Permanent Establishments’ [2010] British Tax Review 538; R J Vann, ‘Tax Treaties: 
The Secret Agent’s Secrets’ [2006] British Tax Review 345; R J Vann, ‘The History of 
Royalties in Tax Treaties 1921–1961: Why?’ in John F Avery Jones, Peter Harris and David 
Oliver (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Revenue Law: Essays in Honour of John Tiley 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 166; R J Vann, ‘Beneficial Ownership: What Does History 
(and Maybe Policy) Tell Us?’ in Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schuch, Claus 
Staringer, Alfred Storck (eds), Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends (International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation, 2013) 267–331; R J Vann, ‘Do We Need Article 7(3)? History and 
Purpose of the Business Profits Deduction Rule in Tax Treaties’ in John Tiley (ed), Studies in 
the History of Tax Law (Hart Publishing, 2012) vol 5, 393. 
85  John F Avery Jones and Jurgen Ludicke, above n 84. 
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comparatively recent times. For example, many countries only make government 
documents relevant to treaty negotiations publically available after the expiration of a 
period of time, usually not less than 30 years but in some instances in some 
jurisdictions, 60 years. As the first Australian taxation treaty was only signed in 1946, 
government files relating to its negotiation only became publically available in 1976. 
Australia’s next four treaties were negotiated in 1953, 1957, 1960 and 1967 
respectively, and hence government files relating to their negotiation only became 
publically available in 1983, 1987, 1990 and 1997 respectively.  
1.45 The method adopted in this research seeks to reverse this lack of attention to 
archival materials and uses historical methods as a supplementary means of 
achieving objectives (c) and (d) of traditional legal research identified at 1.39. This 
research seeks to identify the origins of distinctive features in Australian taxation 
treaty practice and to assess the factors which influenced the development of those 
distinctive features.  
1.46 Distinctive features of Australian taxation treaty practice were identified at 1.2 by 
comparing currently operative Australian treaties with the OECD Model Taxation 
Treaty. The thesis then seeks to identify the origins of those features and to assess 
the factors which influenced their development by examining official government files 
that relate to the negotiation and drafting of selected Australian taxation treaties in 
the period 1946 to 1971. The factors that influenced Australian taxation treaty policy 
and practice, and their changing degrees of importance, will become apparent 
through an account in the form of a narrative of the negotiation and drafting of 
Australian taxation treaties in the period 1946 to 1971.  
1.47 The only treaties examined have been those in relation to which the author has been 
able to locate reasonably extensive archival evidence in either the National Archives 
of Australia or in foreign government archives. As a result, the negotiation and 
drafting of the 1960 New Zealand Treaty has not been discussed. Considerations of 
space have meant that discussion of the 1957 Canada Treaty has been confined to 
analysis in the concluding chapter of the few variations from the current OECD Model 
that originated in that treaty. The 1969 Singapore Treaty is not discussed because, 
for reasons explained more fully at 6.1, that treaty contains features that are atypical 
of Australian treaties in the period. The last treaty to be discussed in this thesis is the 
1969 Japan Treaty, which was the last Australian tax treaty that came into force 
before Australia entered the OECD and which, it will be argued, in some respects 
represents the ‘high-water mark’ of Australian pre 1971 exceptionalism.  
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1.48 Although the 1972 German Treaty was negotiated but not signed before Australia 
entered the OECD, it did not come into force until after Australia joined the OECD, 
and the Australian attitude to its negotiation may have been influenced by Australia’s 
pending OECD membership in a way that did not affect the negotiation and drafting 
of earlier Australian tax treaties. An examination of the negotiation and drafting of 
that treaty would be more relevant to a thesis concerned with the impact of 
Australia’s OECD membership on Australian tax treaty policy and practice.  
1.49 This chapter has included a review of literature relevant to Australian tax treaty 
practice. Taking that literature into account, the final chapter of the thesis will draw on 
the narrative accounts in previous chapters to identify the factors that influenced 
Australian tax treaty policy and practice in the period and to identify explanations for 
variations in Australian tax treaty practice from the OECD Model. On the basis of that 
identification, the final chapter will then assess what distinctive features of Australian 
tax treaty policy and practice should be discontinued. 
The Contribution To Knowledge Made By This Thesis 
1.50 The first contribution to knowledge by the thesis will be deriving information to assist 
in answering the first two central questions identified at 1.4 through an examination of 
archival materials. While identification of instances of variations in Australian tax 
treaty practice from the OECD Model would be possible without referring to archival 
materials, this is something which has, to an extent, previously been done in the 
research by Dirkis and Burch, by Bain et al and by Magney.86 As noted previously, 
those works do not provide a comprehensive historical account of the development of 
variations in Australian tax treaty practice from the OECD Model. By examining 
archival material, Appendices 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis identify and tabulate the history 
of the development of Australian tax treaty practice in the period 1946 to 1972.  
1.51 While useful for analysis, adopting this approach alone would risk: isolating particular 
developments from each other and from policy developments; failing to take account 
of the interplay of argument in negotiations; and not adequately accounting for 
relevant personal, economic and geopolitical influences. Instead, the thesis takes a 
narrative approach in which the development of particular features of Australian tax 
treaty practice and policy are identified from the process of telling the story of the 
negotiation of particular treaties and the development of Australian tax treaty policy in 
the period under review. This will enable the development of particular features and 
                                                          
86  See the discussion at 1.9 and at 1.13 to 1.15. 
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factors not only to be identified, but to be appreciated in the context of: the 
development of other features; the interplay of argument in the negotiation process; 
and relevant personal, economic and geopolitical influences. 
1.52 A contribution to knowledge of the thesis is the narrative itself; telling this story which 
has not, on the basis of archival material, been completely told before. The narrative 
is the story of when, how and why Australian taxation treaty policy and practice came 
to have some of its distinctive features. That will be the thesis’ second contribution to 
knowledge.  
1.53 The third contribution to knowledge will be the method itself. In telling the story by 
using archival evidence, the thesis aims to highlight the value of archival based, 
historical research for an understanding of the law in general and of taxation treaties 
in particular and for the development and reform of the law.  
1.54 The final contribution to knowledge will be the assessment of those features of 
Australian tax treaty policy and practice that should be re-evaluated having regard to 
the original reason why they were introduced and subsequent relevant changes in 
circumstances. 
The Remaining Chapters Of This Thesis 
1.55 The remaining chapters in this thesis are: 
Chapter Two: Australia’s First Comprehensive Tax Treaty 
Chapter Three: Australia’s Tax Treaties Negotiated in the 1950s 
Chapter Four: The 1959–1964 Official Review Of Australian Taxation Treaty Policy 
And Development Of The First Australian Model Tax Treaty 
Chapter Five: Australia’s Second Treaty With The UK, in 1967 
Chapter Six: The 1969 Treaty With Japan 
Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
 
In addition the thesis contains the following appendice which have been prepared as 
summaries of the archival and other material relied on in this thesis: 
Appendix One: Chronological Table Of Australian Comprehensive Tax Treaties, 
Amending Protocols, Exchanges Of Notes And Exchanges Of Letters 
Appendix Two: Current Australian Reservations In Relation To The OECD Model 
Convention 
Appendix Three: Variations In Currently Operative Australian Tax Treaties From The 
OECD Model Convention On Income And Capital  
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Appendix Four: Variations From The Current OECD Model Having Their Origins In 
The 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty And Variations From The 1945 UK – US Tax 
Treaty  
Appendix Five: Variations From The 1963 Draft OECD Model In The 1967 Australia – 
UK Tax Treaty 
Appendix Six: Features Of Australian Tax Treaty Practice Listed By K T Allen In 
1988–1990 
Appendix Seven: Analysis Of Deemed Source Rules In Currently Operative 
Australian Tax Treaties 
 
A bibliography of archival material and books and journal articles considered in completing 
this thesis follows the appendices. 
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CHAPTER TWO: AUSTRALIA’S FIRST COMPREHENSIVE TAX TREATY  
2.1 Australia’s first comprehensive tax treaty was concluded with the UK in 1946. 
Examination of the history of the negotiation and drafting of that treaty is important for 
two key questions investigated in this thesis.  
2.2 First, this chapter will demonstrate that several distinctive features of Australian 
taxation treaty practice have their origins in that treaty. The treaty had a structure 
which was maintained in Australian treaties throughout the period under 
consideration. It is argued at subsequent points in this thesis that this structure 
influenced the form of particular Australian variants on articles (particularly the other 
income article) after the structure itself was abandoned in Australian taxation treaties. 
Hence some distinctive features of Australian treaty practice were indirect products of 
the structure established in this treaty even though articles equivalent to them were 
not contained in the treaty itself.  
2.3 Secondly, examining the factors that influenced the negotiation (including the 
decision to negotiate) and drafting of this treaty is an essential step in investigating 
the key question of what those factors were and how they developed during the 
period reviewed in this thesis. 
2.4 To understand the factors that influenced the negotiation and drafting and the 
distinctive features of the 1946 UK Treaty, it is necessary to understand why both the 
UK and Australia wanted to enter into a comprehensive bilateral taxation treaty by 
1945. This will involve a brief description of the approaches to relieving international 
double taxation between Australia and the UK that preceded the treaty; namely, 
broad exemption for foreign source income in Australia’s case and the Dominion 
Income Tax Relief System in the case of the United Kingdom. It will also be 
necessary to explain the reasons why both the UK and Australia wanted Dominion 
Income Tax Relief discontinued by 1945. This will involve a brief discussion of the 
Australian economy in 1945 and key elements of the respective income tax systems 
in 1945 as they affected cross border transactions.  
The Australian Economy In 1945 
2.5 The Second World War produced major changes in the Australian economy and 
society. Manufacturing as a share of GDP increased at an unprecedented rate.1 
                                                          
1  A recent discussion is I W McLean, Why Australia Prospered: The Shifting Sources of 
Economic Growth (Princeton University Press, 2013) ch 8 ‘The Pacific War and the Golden 
Age’. At p180 McLean notes that whereas between federation and the First World War the 
share of GDP originating in manufacturing only increased from 12.1 to 13.5% then reached 
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Australian xenophobia as an Anglo-Saxon-Celtic outpost at the edge of Asia was 
heightened by the Japanese invasion of Papua and New Guinea and by air and 
naval attacks on the Australian mainland. Australia embarked on a post war policy of 
European immigration to provide the necessary manpower for manufacturing, nation 
building projects and increased defence security.2 During the period of the Chifley 
government, however, the policy intent was for immigration and investment to be 
predominantly from, and for the trade to be predominantly with, the United Kingdom.3 
2.6 Despite Australia’s reliance militarily on the US in the Second World War, the UK 
remained Australia’s major trading partner4 and its major source of portfolio and non-
portfolio investment. The Chifley government’s policy of UK/Commonwealth 
preference meant that Australia maintained long-term food contracts5 with the UK 
and participated in the ‘Sterling Area’.6  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16.7% by 1929 and 18.5% by 1939, it increased to 26.2% by 1949. While it did near 30% by 
1959, the rate of increase in the years of World War II was never subsequently matched 
before beginning, in McLean’s words at 180, ‘a secular decline’.  
2  See the discussions of the Chifley government’s policies in this respect in P L Robertson, 
‘The Decline of Economic Complementarity? Australia and Britain 1945–1952’ (1997) 37 
Australian Economic History Review 91, 92–4; T Rooth, ‘Imperial Self-Sufficiency 
Rediscovered: Britain and Australia 1945–1951’ (1999) 39 Australian Economic History 
Review 29, 30–3; T Rooth, ‘Australia, Canada, and the International Economy in the Era of 
Postwar Reconstruction, 1945–50’ (2000) 40 Australian Economic History Review 127, 129–
30; and McLean, above n 1, 186–7. A more detailed account is S J Butlin and C B Schedvin, 
War Economy 1942–45 (Australian War Memorial, 1977). 
3  This represented a continuation of policies developed in the later years of the Curtin 
government. Curtin, in the last two years of his prime ministership, had been distrustful of 
American plans for the Pacific and had returned to emphasising the British Empire as the 
base for Australia’s military and economic security. Curtin’s change of stance is discussed in 
David Day, John Curtin: A Life (Harper Perennial, 1999) ch 38 in particular 577–83. Rooth, 
above n 2, 129 argues that Australia was distrustful of the US because of issues arising out of 
the Anglo–American Trade Agreement in the 1930s. These issues are discussed in M R 
Megaw, ‘Australia and the Anglo-American Trade Agreement, 1938’ (1974–75) 3 Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 191. P L Robertson, ‘Official Policy on American Direct 
Investment in Australia 1945–1952’ (1986) 26 Australian Economic History Review 159 
argues that an additional factor was that Chifley was bitter about the terms that the US had 
imposed on its post war loans to the UK.  
4  In 1946, 27.3% of Australian exports were to the UK, with the next highest export destination 
being the US at 19% of exports. See John Singleton and Paul L Robertson, Economic 
Relations Between Britain and Australasia 1945–1970 (Palgrave, 2002) 9, Table 1.2. By 
1949–50, exports to the UK represented 39.4% of Australian exports while exports to the US 
had fallen to 8.25% of total exports. See R A Foster, Australian Economic Statistics, 1949–50 
to 1994–95 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1996) 9, Table 1.4. In 1949, imports from the UK 
represented 53.1% of all imports to Australia, with imports from the US being the second-
largest source of imports at 9.9% of total imports. See Foster, Australian Economic Statistics, 
13, Table 1.6. 
5  Long-term food contracts with the UK are discussed in Rooth, 1999, above n 2, 32; and 
Australia’s relatively poor record as a food supplier to Britain in this period are discussed in 
Rooth, 1999, above n 2, 33–8. 
6  The Sterling Area had been formed in the early years of World War II and included all British 
dominions and colonies other than Canada, Newfoundland and Hong Kong. A general 
description and analysis of the operation of the Sterling Area is in Singleton and Robertson, 
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The Australian Income Tax System In 19457  
2.7 In 1945 Australia had a nominal worldwide system of income taxation8 but exempted 
income that had been subject to tax in a foreign country.9 Non-residents were taxed 
on their Australian source income.10  
2.8 The Australian system of corporate-shareholder taxation, having previously been a 
dividend deduction system, then an imputation system and then a shareholder relief 
system, had been gradually converted to a classical system due to the increasing 
revenue demands imposed by Australia’s involvement in World War II. The inter-
corporate dividend rebate which had been available to all companies since 1915 
ceased to be available to non-resident companies in 1939. The system effectively 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
above n 4, 8. Robertson, 1997, above n 2, 94–5 argues that the two functions of the Sterling 
Area were to: (a) alleviate the effects of the dollar shortage by encouraging members to trade 
with and invest in each other; and (b) to act as a dollar pool in which members deposited their 
dollar earnings with the British who then allocated them as they were needed to pay for dollar 
imports.  
7  The development of the Australian income tax system to 1945 is discussed in C John Taylor, 
‘Development of and Prospects for Corporate-Shareholder Taxation in Australia’ (2003) 57 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 348 in particular 346–50. The Australian 
income tax system in 1945 is discussed in C J Taylor and A M C Smith, ‘Trans Tasman 
Taxation of Companies and Their Shareholders 1945–2005’ (Paper presented at the 4th 
Accounting History International Conference, Braga, Portugal, 2005) 8. The account of the 
Australian system up to and as at 1945 in the text is based in part on these two accounts.  
8  ITAA 1936 s17 levied income tax on the ‘taxable income’ of residents and non-residents. 
ITAA 1936 s6(1) defined ‘taxable income’ as ‘the amount remaining after deducting allowable 
deductions from assessable income’. ITAA 1936 s25(1)(a) included the gross income from all 
sources, whether in or out of Australia, in the assessable income of a resident. ‘Income’ was 
not exhaustively defined and the reference to gross income had been interpreted as including 
a reference to the meaning of ‘income’ under ordinary concepts and usages, an interpretation 
which excluded capital gains and relied heavily on UK precedents. The most comprehensive 
analysis of Australian case law on the ordinary concept of income remains R W Parsons, 
Income Taxation in Australia (Law Book Company, 1985) ch 2. ITAA 1936 s26 deemed 
several categories of receipt which might not otherwise be income under ordinary concepts 
and usages to be assessable income. ITAA 1936 s26 did not contain jurisdictional limits. Two 
views developed of the relationship between ITAA 1936 s26 (and other provisions deeming 
amounts to be included in assessable income) and ITAA 1936 s25(1). These were the 
‘parallel provisions’ analysis and the ‘central provision’ or ‘single meaning’ analysis. R W 
Parsons, Income Taxation in Australia [4.1] to [4.11] argued strongly in favour of the ‘central 
provision’ analysis under which amounts deemed to be included in assessable income via 
ITAA 1936 s26 (or most other but not all specific provisions) were included in ‘gross income’ 
for purposes of ITAA 1936 s25(1).  
9  The nominal worldwide system had been introduced by ITAA 1930 (Cth) Act No 50 of 1930, 
which amended s13 of ITAA 1922 (Cth) with the effect that, subject to exceptions, residents 
were taxed on their income from all sources, whether in Australia or elsewhere, while 
‘absentees’ (defined as persons who were not ‘residents’) were taxed on their income from 
Australian sources. Act No 50 of 1930 also amended s14(q) of the ITAA 1922 (Cth) to provide 
an exemption for foreign source income that was chargeable with income tax in any country 
outside Australia. By 1945, the exemption was under ITAA 1936 s23q. A definition of 
‘resident’ had been inserted in ITAA 1922 (Cth) by ITAA Act No 50 of 1930. By 1945, the 
definition was contained in s6(1) of ITAA 1936 (Cth). 
10  ITAA 1936 s25(1)(b) included the gross income from all sources in Australia in the assessable 
income of a non-resident. ITAA 1936 s23r exempted from Australian tax income derived by a 
non-resident from foreign sources.  
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became a classical system in November 1940 with the abolition of the dividend 
rebates previously given to individual shareholders.11  
2.9 Subject to certain exceptions, dividends paid by a resident or non-resident company, 
out of profits derived from any source, were included in the assessable income of a 
resident shareholder.12 Dividends13 paid out of profits derived from Australian 
sources were included in the assessable income of a non-resident shareholder.14 
Although several of the pass-through features of the imputation system were initially 
retained, previous exemptions for dividends funded from foreign source income, 
corporate capital profits and exempt Commonwealth loan interest were repealed in 
1941.15 From 1942, non-corporate shareholders were allowed a deduction for foreign 
tax paid on dividends.16  
2.10 Originally, the Commonwealth and the States had levied concurrent income taxes. In 
1942, under the Uniform Tax Scheme, the Commonwealth government effectively 
excluded the Australian States from the income tax field by collecting sufficient tax at 
the Commonwealth level to enable the Commonwealth to reimburse the States for 
the income tax they would have otherwise collected.17  
2.11 By 1945, the company tax rate was 30%. Non-private companies were subject to the 
higher of Super Tax or War-time (Company) Tax. Super Tax of 5% was payable by 
non-private companies on the excess, if any, of its taxable income over ₤5000. War-
time (Company) Tax was levied on the amount by which the company’s taxable profit 
                                                          
11  ITAA (No 2) 1940 cl 4 amended ITAA 1936 by omitting the rebate provision for individual 
shareholders in s46(1) and by amending the inter-corporate dividend rebate provisions in 
s46(2). 
12  ITAA 1936 s44(1)(a). 
13  ‘Dividends’ were given an expansive definition by ITAA 1936 s6(1) and certain liquidator’s 
distributions were deemed by s47(1) to be dividends paid by the company to shareholders out 
of profits derived by the company. 
14  ITAA 1936 s44(1)(b). 
15  ITAA 1941 cls 6 and 7. 
16  ITAA (No 2) 1942 inserted ITAA 1936 s72A. 
17  The Acts implementing the scheme were: Income Tax Act 1942 (Cth); ITAA 1942 (Cth); State 
Grants (Income Tax Reimbursement) Act 1942 (Cth); Income Tax (War-Time Arrangements) 
Act 1942 (Cth). The constitutional validity of the scheme was largely upheld in two 
subsequent High Court decisions: South Australia v The Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373; 
and State of Victoria v The Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575. The latter case held that 
ITAA 1942 (Cth) s222(1)(a), which required that Commonwealth income tax be paid before 
State income tax, was invalid but upheld the overall validity of the scheme. For a more 
detailed discussion of the Uniform Tax Scheme see R L Matthews and W R C Jay, Federal 
Finance: Intergovernmental Financial Relations in Australia since Federation (Thomas Nelson 
Australia, 1972), R K Fisher and J Mc Manus, ‘The Long and Winding Road: A Century of 
Centralisation in Australian Tax’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2004) vol 1, 313–38 and R Krever and P Mellor, ‘The Development of Centralised 
Income Taxation in Australia, 1901–1942’ in P Harris and D de Cogan (eds), Studies in the 
History of Tax Law (Hart Publishing, 2015) vol 7, 363–92. 
40 
 
exceeded 5% of its capital employed. The rate of War-time (Company) Tax was 24% 
on the portion of taxable profit that represented the next 7% of capital employed and 
48% on the balance of taxable profit. No inter-corporate rebate was available in 
respect of War-time (Company) Tax, which meant 2.56that it cascaded when the 
same income was distributed as a series of dividends through a chain of resident 
companies.  
2.12 Undistributed profits tax at the rate of 10% was payable by non-private companies, 
with the company being allowed a deduction for Australian and foreign income tax 
paid on the company’s income. Private companies, including non-residents carrying 
on business in Australia through a principal office or a branch, were subject to 
additional tax (calculated as the tax shareholders would have paid if a distribution 
had been made) on profits not distributed within specified time periods.  
2.13 As noted at 2.9, from 1942 foreign source dividends were included in the assessable 
income of Australian residents with a deduction being allowed for non-corporate 
residents for any foreign tax paid. In the case of dividends received from UK 
companies, tax deducted at source (representing tax paid by the company) was not 
included in the shareholder’s assessable income with the consequence that the 
shareholder was not entitled to a deduction for the tax deducted at source.18 Foreign 
source dividends received by Australian resident companies received an inter-
corporate dividend rebate. The effect of the rebate was that Australian companies 
receiving dividends from UK companies did not incur a net Australian tax liability.19  
2.14 Australia taxed domestic source income of non-residents without requiring any 
minimum business presence in Australia. Presumptive tax regimes applied to non-
residents deriving certain shipping income,20 film business income21 and insurance 
                                                          
18  This followed from the decision of Dixon J in Jolly v FCT (1934) 50 CLR 131 affirmed on 
appeal by the Full High Court and discussed in J L Gunn, O E Berger, J M Greenwood and R 
E O’Neill, Gunn’s Commonwealth Income Tax Law and Practice (Butterworth & Co Australia, 
2nd ed, 1948) 606, para 1010. 
19  Corporate residents were entitled to a deduction under ITAA 1936 (Cth) s72A, had tax 
calculated at the corporate rate, and were then entitled to an inter-corporate rebate at the 
corporate rate under ITAA 1936–1945 (Cth) s46. The rebate did not extend to undistributed 
profits tax. A further rebate allowed under s46(2A) was available where the dividend was paid 
out of profits which had borne super tax. The s46(2A) rebate produced anomalous results and 
a cascading of tax where dividends were paid though a chain of companies. 
20  ITAA 1936 div 12 had the effect of deeming 5% of the gross receipts for carriage of 
passengers, livestock, mails or goods shipped in Australia to be taxable income. 
21  ITAA 1936 div 14 had the effect of imposing a liability to pay income tax on a non-resident 
deriving income under a contract relating to a business carried on in Australia by the other 
party of distributing, exhibiting or exploiting motion picture films or from leasing or licensing 
others to exhibit or display them. Division 14 provided that 10% of the gross income so 
derived was included in the non-resident’s taxable income. Division 14 further deemed the 
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income.22 Both individual and corporate non-residents had always been assessable 
on a net basis on dividends paid to them by a company (whether an Australian 
resident or not) to the extent to which they were paid out of profits derived from 
sources in Australia. Where the paying company was an Australian resident, the 
Commissioner had some prospect of enforcing tax liabilities if the non-resident had 
property in the form of shares in Australia. Where the paying company was not an 
Australian resident and the shareholder did not have property in Australia, the 
Commissioner refrained from assessing the dividend.23  
2.15 In 1945, companies paying interest to non-residents, other than companies carrying 
on business in Australia, were taxed at a rate of 30% on the payment and were 
entitled to deduct the tax from the interest they paid. However, this provision did not 
apply where the paying company could establish to the satisfaction of the 
Commissioner that the creditor could enforce payment of the interest without 
deduction of tax at source.24  
2.16 Australian residents having the receipt, control or disposal of money belonging to a 
non-resident who derived income from sources in Australia were liable, when 
required by the Commissioner, to pay the tax due and payable by the non-resident 
and were authorised and required to retain, from moneys that came to the resident 
on behalf of the non-resident, sufficient funds to pay the tax.25 A company paying 
dividends to a non-resident had no personal liability to pay tax under these provisions 
in the absence of notification by the Commissioner of an assessment of the non-
resident.26  
2.17 The requirements discussed at 2.16 interacted with ITAA 1936 (Cth) s256 in relation 
to royalties.27 Under s256 where a resident paid a royalty to a non-resident the payer 
was required to advise the Commissioner of the amount of the royalty and to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
party carrying on business in Australia to be the agent of the non-resident and prohibited that 
party from making payments to the non-resident until satisfactory arrangements were made 
with the Commissioner in relation to the income tax imposed on the non-resident. 
22  ITAA 1936 div 13 deemed premiums paid or payable to non-resident insurers in respect of 
property situated in Australia or in relation to insured events which could only happen in 
Australia to have an Australian source. Where the actual profit derived by the non-resident 
insurer from these premiums could not be established to the satisfaction of the 
Commissioner, the non-resident was deemed to have derived taxable income equal to 10% of 
the total premiums paid or payable in the income year in respect of those contracts of 
insurance. The provisions did not apply to life insurance. 
23  See the discussion in Gunn et al, above n 18, 341–2, para 549. 
24  ITAA 1936–1945 (Cth) s125. See the discussion in Gunn et al, above n 18, 859–62, paras 
1363–71. 
25  ITAA 1936–1945 (Cth) s255. See the discussion in Gunn et al, above n 18, para 1849. 
26  See the discussion in Gunn et al, above n 18, 1135–6, para 1849. 
27  See the discussion in Gunn et al, above n 18, 1135–6, para 1849. 
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ascertain from the Commissioner the amount to be retained in respect of tax due by 
the non-resident.28 Royalties were taxed on a net assessment basis and at rates 
applicable to non-residents. 
Relevant Features Of The UK Income Tax System In 194529 
2.18 In 1945, the UK operated a system of corporate-shareholder taxation under which 
the company paid income tax at the standard rate of 50% and dividends were 
assumed to be paid out of taxed profits. As income tax was assumed to have been 
deducted from dividends at the standard rate, only those natural person shareholders 
who had a surtax liability would be liable to any further tax on the dividend. This was 
true for both resident and non-resident shareholders. The UK did not apply a 
withholding tax to dividends paid to non-residents, and practical difficulties were 
associated with the collection of surtax from non-residents. Various reliefs were 
allowed to resident natural persons which could mean that a natural person 
shareholder was entitled to some refund of tax in respect of a dividend in some 
circumstances. 
2.19 Annual interest and most royalties were not deductible in computing profits, but the 
payer deducted tax and retained tax from the payment. This was true whether or not 
the recipient was a resident or non-resident, and no separate withholding taxes 
applied to interest or royalties paid to non-residents.  
2.20 Companies also paid the higher of Excess Profits Tax and National Defence 
Contribution. Excess Profits Tax was introduced as a war-time measure and was 
abolished in 1946. Unlike income tax, neither Excess Profits Tax nor National 
Defence Contribution could be passed on to shareholders by way of deduction from 
dividends. For this reason, Australia viewed Excess Profits Tax and National Defence 
Contribution as equivalents to Australian company tax.30  
2.21 As will be seen at 2.129 to 2.130, issues about the operation of the credit article in 
the treaty in relation to excess profits tax were the subject of a significant amount of 
discussion in the treaty negotiations. For the purposes of the Seventh Schedule of 
the Finance Act (No. 2) 1945, as originally enacted, Excess Profits Tax included the 
National Defence Contribution.31 As the Seventh Schedule stood in 1945 foreign 
                                                          
28  See the discussion in Gunn et al, above n 18, 1136, para 1850. 
29  The description of the UK system in 1945 has been based on John F Avery Jones, ‘The 
History of the United Kingdom’s First Comprehensive Double Taxation Agreement’ [2007] 
British Tax Review 211 in particular 222–3. 
30  NAA, ATO Tax Credits, Notes on Article XII by Belcher and Mills, p43. 
31  Seventh Schedule, Clause 1(1), Finance Act (No 2) 1945. 
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excess profits taxes could only be credited against UK Excess Profits Tax and not 
against income tax. Similarly, foreign income tax could only be credited against UK 
income tax and not against Excess Profits Tax.32 
The System Of Dominion Income Tax Relief33 
2.22 To appreciate why both Australia and the UK wanted to enter into a comprehensive 
double taxation treaty by 1945, it is necessary to understand how the previous 
system of Dominion Income Tax Relief worked. 
2.23 In 1922, the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, following a report from a Sub-
committee which conferred with representatives of the Dominions, recommended the 
system of Dominion Income Tax Relief, which was implemented in the UK as s27 of 
the Finance Act 1921.34 
2.24 Under the system of Dominion Income Tax Relief, for income which had been taxed 
in a Dominion, the UK provided a credit against UK tax of the lesser of the rate of 
Dominion tax or one half of the relevant UK rate. The aim of the system of Dominion 
Income Tax Relief was that the total tax paid by a UK resident on Dominion sourced 
income should not exceed the greater of the UK or the Dominion rate. In other words, 
the total relief provided was required to equal the lesser of the relevant UK rate or the 
relevant Dominion rate. Where the relief provided by the UK did not produce this 
result, the expectation was that the relevant Dominion would provide a rebate of tax 
to make up the difference.  
2.25 The operation of the system can be illustrated by taking an example of a UK resident 
subject to UK tax at the standard rate of 50% receiving £1000 of Australian source 
interest which had been subject to Australian tax of £260 at the rate of 26%. The UK 
would gross up the interest for the Australian tax, would apply UK tax of £500 and 
                                                          
32  Seventh Schedule, Clause 2, Finance Act (No 2) 1945. 
33  The system of Dominion Income Tax Relief and Australia’s role in its development are 
discussed in detail in C John Taylor, ‘Send a Strong Man to England – Capacity to Put Up a 
Fight More Important Than Intimate Knowledge of Income Tax Acts and Practice: Australia 
and the Development of the Dominion Income Tax Relief System of 1920’ (2013) 11(2) E-
Journal of Tax Research 32. The following account is also based in part on C John Taylor, 
‘Twilight of the Neanderthals, or Are Bilateral Double Tax Treaty Networks Sustainable?’ 
(2010) 34(1) Melbourne University Law Review 268–312. 
34  Between 1803 and 1914 the United Kingdom, while taxing on a residence and source basis, 
had only taxed foreign source income when it was remitted to the United Kingdom. From 
1914, major types of foreign source income had been taxed in the UK independently of 
remittance. Temporary relief from international double taxation had been provided by s43 of 
the Finance Act 1916. See the discussion of the history of the jurisdictional scope of UK 
income tax laws in P A Harris, Corporate/Shareholder Income Taxation and Allocating Taxing 
Rights Between Countries (IBFD Publications, 1996) 287 and 294. 
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would allow a credit of £250, being one half of the applicable UK rate, which was less 
than the applicable Dominion rate of 26%. Hence UK tax of £250 would be payable. 
As the total tax paid of £510, being £260 Australian tax and £250 UK tax, would have 
exceeded £500 (being the tax that would have been payable if £1000 had been 
subject to UK tax at the rate of 50%, being the greater of the relevant UK and 
Dominion rates), Australia would then allow a rebate of £10 so that the total tax paid 
was £500. In this case, the UK would have provided relief of £250 while Australia 
would have provided relief of £10. The UK would have collected tax of £250 while, 
after allowing the rebate, Australia would have collected £260 less £10 = £250. 
2.26 Several Dominions decided not to participate in the scheme, and Dominions in 
Federal Systems (such as Australia and Canada) that provided reciprocal relief at 
one but not both levels of government were regarded as non-participating. Where a 
Dominion was not participating, in some circumstances, less UK tax was in fact 
assessed, but the process for calculating the relevant relief resulted in administrative 
complexities and depended on extra statutory concessions.35  
The United Kingdom’s And Australia’s Dissatisfaction With The System Of Dominion 
Income Tax Relief 
2.27 By the 1930s, the UK was dissatisfied with the system of Dominion Income Tax 
Relief as it meant that Dominions could increase their rates to equal one half of the 
UK rate without being required to provide reciprocal relief. The result was that the 
total burden of relief was provided by the United Kingdom. Neville Chamberlain, as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, made desultory efforts to negotiate amendments to the 
system with the Dominions in the 1930s, but these were met with stonewalling and 
came to nothing.36  
2.28 It seems likely that initially Australia was not entirely satisfied with Dominion Income 
Tax Relief.37 Nonetheless, Australia by the 1930s regarded the system as working 
                                                          
35  For discussions of the operation of Dominion Income Tax Relief where a Dominion was not 
participating see R Staples, Dominion Income Tax Relief and Practice (GEE & Co., 1925) 37–
9 and 65–72; W E Snelling, Dictionary of Income Tax and Sur-Tax Practice (Sir Isaac Pitman 
& Sons, 8th ed, 1931) 79 and R L Renfrew, The Practice of Dominion Income Tax Relief (The 
Solicitors’ Law Stationary Society, 1934) 14–23. The position was complicated by the inter-
dependence of the rate of relief and the amount of the gross up for Dominion tax paid and by 
the source by source (country by country) approach to providing relief. 
36  Chamberlain’s attempts to amend the system of Dominion Income Tax Relief in the 1930s are 
discussed in more detail in Taylor, above n 33, 69–70. 
37  At the 1920 conference with the Sub-committee of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, 
Australia had argued for the primacy of source basis taxation, had sought an unlimited foreign 
tax credit if mutual exemption was not possible, and had initially resisted providing additional 
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well.38 Australia’s dissatisfaction with the operation of the system corresponded with 
the conversion, discussed at 2.8, of Australia’s shareholder relief system to a 
classical system. Following these developments, as is illustrated in paragraph 2.29, 
the UK for purposes of calculating Dominion Income Tax Relief grossed up the 
Australian dividend for the shareholder tax but not, it appears, for the Australian 
corporate tax. Australia, in providing reciprocal relief, only took into account the 
Australian shareholder tax.39 
2.29 The effects of the procedures outlined at 2.28 can be seen once actual tax rates are 
taken into account, as is shown in the following table. The Australian corporate rate, 
including super tax, by 1945 was 35% and the shareholder tax payable on 
distribution to a foreign parent was 30%. The UK standard rate of tax was 50%.  
Pre Tax  
Income 
Australian  
Corporate 
Tax  
Australian  
Shareholder 
Tax 
United 
Kingdom 
Corporate 
Tax40 
Relief 
by UK 
at ½ 
UK 
rate 
Relief by 
Australia 
(excess of 
combined 
rate over 
standard 
UK rate)41 
Total 
Tax  
£1 7/- 3/-10d 6/-6d 3/-3d 7d 13/-6d 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rebates of tax to ensure that the total tax did not exceed the higher of the two countries’ rates. 
See the discussion in Taylor, above n 33. 
38  Numerous Australian government internal documents and correspondence in this period 
reflect this view. See for example: Earle Page (Australian Treasurer) to S M Bruce (Australian 
Prime Minister) 25th August 1928; S M Bruce (Australian Prime Minister) to Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs 30th August 1928; L S Jackson (Acting Australian Commissioner of 
Taxation) to Secretary Prime Minister’s Department, Canberra, 5th September 1934; Cable, 
Bruce (Australian High Commissioner, London) to Australian Treasurer and Treasury 30th 
April 1936. Cable, Bruce (Australian High Commissioner, London) to Australian Treasurer and 
Treasury 30th April 1936. NAA, PM file. 
39  An example of the interaction of the systems is contained in L S Jackson, Income Tax and 
Estate Duty. Double Taxation Between Australia and the United Kingdom. Report of Mission 
to London. 7th January 1946, 7–8, para 20. NAA, PM file, In Jackson’s example, the UK does 
not appear to gross up the dividend for underlying Australian corporate tax. 
40  In calculating UK corporate tax and relief under Dominion Income Tax Relief, the UK grossed 
up the dividend for the Australian shareholder tax but not for Australian corporate tax. 
41  In calculating relief, Australia regarded the total tax as the Australian shareholder tax of 30% 
and 25%, being one half the UK standard rate. Hence Australia regarded the total tax as 
being 55% and reduced its shareholder tax by 5% to 25%. 
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 The end effect was that UK companies deriving dividends from 100% subsidiaries in 
Australia were subject to an effective rate of tax approaching 66.25%.42  
2.30 By the mid 1940s, the perception of both UK business43 and the UK and Australian 
governments was that the economic double taxation being produced under the 
Dominion Income Tax Relief system would inhibit direct UK investment in Australia 
after World War II. Hence consideration had been given, both in the UK and in 
Australia, to reform of the system. 
The Consequences Of The UK – US Double Taxation Treaty Of 1945 
2.31 The key development that led to the 1946 UK Treaty was the United Kingdom’s 
Double Taxation Treaty with the US, negotiated in 1944–1945. As part of that treaty, 
the UK agreed to introduce a foreign tax credit into its domestic law. In one respect, 
credit would be more generous than the credit provided under the Dominion Income 
Tax Relief system as it would be up to the full amount of UK tax paid on the relevant 
income. On the other hand the credit would be less generous as it would only be 
available to UK residents. As the credit would not involve any additional credit being 
given by the treaty partner in relation to income of UK residents sourced in the treaty 
partner country, it was expected to be simpler in its operation than the Dominion 
Income Tax Relief system had proved to be.  
2.32 Previously, the UK Internal Revenue had considered that at least some modification 
of the Dominion Income Tax Relief system would be both desirable and necessary if 
and when the UK actually concluded a comprehensive Double Tax Treaty with the 
US.44 By January 1945, Inland Revenue officers stated that the credit provisions in 
the still proposed US treaty would eventually be extended to the world on a unilateral 
basis without a reciprocity condition. Relief provided under Dominion Income Tax 
Relief would be withdrawn, with credits thereafter only being available to UK 
residents. It was proposed to implement the US treaty in the Finance Bill and in the 
                                                          
42  Based on the example in Jackson, above n 39, 7–8, para 20. 
43  The Australian Secondary Industry Commissioner, following representations by UK 
industrialists, raised the issue with the Australian Treasurer in April 1945, urging that the 
Dominion Income Tax Relief provisions should be modified. An account of these discussions 
and submissions is contained in L S Jackson, above n 39, 1, para 2. 
44  John F Avery Jones, above n 29, 237 points out that the Inland Revenue had recognised as 
early as April 1944 that it would be necessary to offer a similarly favourable credit to the 
Dominions. The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Anderson), in a letter to Andrew 
Duncan (Minister of Supply) dated 15th June 1944, had previously indicated that it was 
intended to review the system of Dominion Income Tax Relief in conjunction with the 
negotiation of a double tax treaty with the US. The Chancellor indicated that it was likely that 
the arrangements with the US would take a simpler form and be more beneficial than the 
existing system of Dominion Income Tax Relief.  
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same Bill grant power to extend the credit provisions to the Dominions and 
Colonies.45 
The Negotiation And Drafting Of The 1946 UK Treaty 
The Initial UK Proposals  
2.33 Following preliminary correspondence and meetings, Sir Cornelius Gregg (Chairman 
of the UK Board of Inland Revenue) met formally with S G McFarlane (Secretary of 
the Australian Treasury, who was in London) on 29th May 1945 and outlined the UK 
proposals for a taxation treaty with Australia.46 These proposals were subsequently 
confirmed in writing on 1st June 1945.47 
2.34 Gregg’s covering letter stressed the importance of the treatment proposed for 
taxation of direct cross border investment. The UK proposed that the source country 
tax trading profits of investors of the other country at the same rate it applied to its 
own traders, that no further tax be levied by the source country on interest or 
dividends paid out of such profits; but that, the residence country would give credit for 
source country tax on the profits. Part of the logic in the United Kingdom’s position 
was that the UK did not allow a deduction for interest payments, but the payer 
deducted tax from the payment.48 Significantly, Gregg’s letter contains the following 
comment on these proposals: 
‘In the field of trade the consideration of taxing all businesses whether home 
or foreign at the same rate lends great weight to the “origin” theory and I 
imagine that our proposal will accord with Australian policy. It is the further 
taxation of the dividend and interest or other distribution of the profit that goes 
to the investing country which acts as a deterrent on investment and we 
pressed the US to accept the general proposal that we make to you to 
abandon any such taxation. They accepted it for interest and royalties but for 
political reasons could not go the whole way on dividends and only met us to 
the point of limiting their charge to a withholding rate of 15 per cent on 
                                                          
45  Minutes of the meeting of officers of Inland Revenue, Treasury, Dominions Office and 
Colonial Office, 15th January 1945. HM Treasury file 1403. 
46 Inland Revenue file, p39, notes by Willis of meeting between McFarlane, Gregg and Willis on 
29th May 1945. S G McFarlane was Secretary of the Australian Treasury from February 1938 
to January 1948 when he became Australian Executive Director of the International Monetary 
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Selwyn Cornish, 
‘McFarlane, Stuart Gordon (1885–1970)’ in Australian Dictionary of Biography (Melbourne 
University Press, 2000) vol 15. Accessed online at 
<http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mcfarlane-stuart-gordon-10951> 5 February 2016. 
47  Inland Revenue file, p54, Gregg to McFarlane. 
48  See the discussion of the UK’s treatment of interest payments at the time at 2.19. 
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dividends. We did not accept this at Washington but our Government decided 
to accept it on our return in view of the political considerations involved. I do 
hope that Australia and the other Dominions will find themselves able to go 
the whole way, for any system of taxation which seeks to obtain in addition to 
the ordinary tax on profits something additional by way of a personal tax from 
an outside investor is not calculated to promote the flow of investment from 
one country to the other which is for the good of both countries.’49 
2.35 McFarlane had previously pointed out to Gregg that under the Australian classical 
system of corporate-shareholder taxation, dividends paid to residents were treated as 
if they had borne no previous tax. The question of the appropriate treatment of 
dividends paid to non-residents was to prove to be possibly the major issue in the 
treaty negotiations.50  
2.36 The UK position was surely weakened by its previous treaty with the US, which 
merely limited US withholding tax to 15% on portfolio dividends and 5% on non-
portfolio dividends, and by the fact that it had not been able to get the US to agree to 
the position on dividends that it was now putting to the Dominions.51  
2.37 The full set of proposals put by Gregg to McFarlane at the meeting on 29th May was 
as follows: 
 Each country to have the right to tax income from trading profits sourced within 
its borders of residents of the other country. The residence country to retain the 
right to tax and would give full credit for source country tax. 
 Trading profits of residents of the other country not made through a permanent 
establishment to be exempt from tax in the source country. Both branch profits 
and parent and subsidiary profits to be computed on an arm’s length basis. 
 Shipping and Air Transport profits to be taxed only on a residence basis but, if 
Australia would not agree to this, then Australia should at least end its arbitrary 
method for calculating Australian profits. 
 That Australian tax on dividends paid to UK residents be abandoned with the UK 
foregoing the surtax on dividends from the UK to Australia. This would mean that 
Australia would also abandon attempts to tax dividends paid by British 
                                                          
49  Inland Revenue file, p54, Gregg to McFarlane.  
50  Inland Revenue file, p39, notes by Willis, above n 46. The differing treatments in the two 
systems of dividends paid by resident companies to residents may have led them to different 
conclusions as to the appropriate treatment of dividends paid to non-resident shareholders. 
Under modern terminology, each was applying a policy of non-discrimination but with 
opposite results. 
51  See the discussion in Avery Jones, above n 29, 226–9. 
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companies to British residents on the basis that the dividend was partly derived 
from Australian sources. The UK would give a full credit for underlying Australian 
corporate tax and that Australia, when taxing British dividends, would recognise 
for credit purposes the British tax deducted by the British paying company. 
 Interest to be taxed only in the country of residence52 except in the case of 
interest between a parent and subsidiary company. The exemption from tax 
would probably not apply to any non-resident trading in the source country. 
 Royalties to be taxed on the same basis as interest. 
 That an exchange of information provision, similar to that agreed to in the UK – 
US Double Taxation Treaty, would be included.53 
2.38 A memorandum on 1st June 1945 set out the UK proposals in more detail and 
included other proposals in relation to dual residence, corporate residence, the profits 
of inter-connected companies, film income, other types of income dealt with in the 
1945 UK – US Treaty, and giving credit for source country tax on income.54 The 
formal proposals contained several references to the terms of the recently concluded 
UK – US Double Taxation Treaty as examples of the type of article proposed.55  
2.39 The UK proposal in relation to dual residence was that provisions that gave exclusive 
right to tax certain types of income to one of the countries would not apply to dual 
residents.56 For corporate residence, the UK proposed a management and control 
test.57 Profits of ‘inter-connected’ companies were proposed to be determined on an 
arm’s length basis.58 The proposal in relation to film income was that Australia would 
not tax UK film producers who did not have a permanent establishment in Australia, 
and that where a permanent establishment existed its profit would be determined on 
an arm’s length basis and not on the arbitrary basis then adopted by Australia. A UK 
producer distributing through an Australian subsidiary would not be taxed, but the 
profits of the Australian subsidiary would be determined on an arm’s length basis.59  
                                                          
52  Both the UK and Australia at the time exempted interest on government securities paid to 
non-residents. 
53  Notes by Willis of meeting, above n 46. 
54  Inland Revenue file, pp50–3. Outline of UK proposals for a double taxation agreement with 
Australia (hereafter ‘Outline of UK proposals’). 
55  Outline of UK proposals. Reference to specific articles in the UK – US Double Taxation Treaty 
is made in paragraph 5 to Article 1(b), in paragraph 7 to Article III(3), paragraph 8 to Article 
IV, paragraph 10 to Article XV, paragraph 11 to Article XIII, and paragraph 15 referring to the 
treatment of other income generally in the US – UK Double Taxation Treaty. 
56  Outline of UK proposals, para 2. 
57  Outline of UK proposals, para 3. 
58  Outline of UK proposals, para 8. 
59  Outline of UK proposals, para 9. 
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The Initial Australian Response 
2.40 J B (Ben) Chifley, the Australian Prime Minister60 and Treasurer,61 replied to Gregg’s 
proposals by telegram on 23rd July 1945.62 The reply stressed that, since 1915, 
Australia had relieved international double taxation by not taxing foreign source 
income that had been taxed at source. The policy had been varied during World War 
II by taxing Australian shareholders on dividends from UK companies. As part of a 
general double taxation agreement, Australia was prepared to review the taxation of 
dividends derived by Australian residents from UK sources and to bear the whole 
burden of relieving Australian residents from double taxation of income derived from 
UK sources. It was, Chifley commented, open to the UK to adopt the same method of 
relief. 
2.41 Chifley stated that Australia was reluctant to consider any proposal which departed 
from the principle that the source country had first claim to tax and that the residence 
country should only tax if the source country did not. Australia would agree to 
taxation by the residence country provided it gave full credit for tax paid by its 
residents in the source country. Recognising that investment of UK capital in 
Australia would provide advantages to the UK and would promote the economic 
development of Australia, Chifley noted that an arrangement for avoiding double 
taxation particularly between UK parent companies and Australian incorporated 
subsidiaries might assist trade, commerce and the flow of capital. 
2.42 The telegram pointed out that, as Australia was a debtor nation relative to the United 
Kingdom, the proposed reduction in source country taxing rights would mean a loss 
of revenue to Australia. Because of the existing reciprocal relief provisions and ties 
between the two countries, Australia was prepared to consider proposals which 
would involve a smaller portion of net revenue loss for it. It was noted that the UK 
proposals were based on those agreed in the UK – US Treaty and that, while that 
treaty achieved a fair and reasonable result as between those two countries, they 
                                                          
60  Following the death of Prime Minister John Curtin on 5th July 1945, Chifley was sworn in as 
Prime Minister on 13th July. See David Day, John Curtin: A Life, above n 4, 633–5; David Day, 
Chifley (Harper Collins Publishers, 2001) 412–16; and Ross McMullan, ‘Joseph Benedict 
Chifley’ in Michelle Grattan (ed), Australian Prime Ministers (New Holland Publishers, 2000) 
256. 
61  Chifley had been Australian Treasurer since the swearing in of the first Curtin government on 
7th October 1940. See David Day, John Curtin: A Life, above n 4, 460–2; David Day, Chifley, 
above n 60, 369–70; and Ross McMullan, ‘Joseph Benedict Chifley’, above n 60, 253. 
62  Inland Revenue file, pp60–8 and 69. Telegraph from Chifley to High Commissioner London 
23rd July 1945 and copy forwarded to Gregg on 25th July 1945. Official Secretary, Australian 
High Commission, London, to Chairman, Board of Inland Revenue, 25th July 1945. 
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would, as between Australia and the United Kingdom, be heavily loaded to the 
detriment of the Australian revenue. 
2.43 In relation to the specific proposals on income tax63 made by the UK, Chifley 
commented that: 
 ‘Resident’ of either country should be defined suggesting, for example, that 
domicile could be used in the case of individuals and place of incorporation in the 
case of companies; 
 UK shipping companies which entered into contracts through Australian agents 
should be treated the same as other UK residents selling their goods in Australia 
through permanent establishments. As their actual profits were difficult to 
ascertain, Australia arbitrarily determined profit as 5% of freights and passenger 
fares. Although Chifley considered this to be fair and to be a simple solution to a 
difficult question, he indicated that Australia was prepared to discuss the 
ascertaining of actual profit and adopting that as the basis in lieu of the present 
arbitrary basis. 
 The proposals in relation to other trading profits made through a permanent 
establishment did not clash with principles maintained by Australia and in broad 
outline appeared to be acceptable. The proposals relating to dividends, however, 
appeared to be inconsistent with those relating to trading profits. Any equitable 
arrangement had to have regard to the admitted basic principles of source 
taxation. 
 Film producers who leased their films for distribution in another country were in 
partnership with the local distributor and hence their profits arose through a 
permanent establishment in the other country and should be taxed on the same 
basis as other trading profits. However, as the profit could not be ascertained on 
an arm’s length basis, Australia would not agree to change from assessing non-
resident film producers on an arbitrary percentage of rentals for films distributed 
in Australia. 
 Australia would not agree to the proposals for the source country to exempt cross 
border interest and royalties, because the source country should have first claim 
to tax this income, and would request that the residence country should provide a 
credit for the source country tax when imposing a residence country tax. 
                                                          
63  The UK had also made proposals for an Estate Duty Treaty. Chifley’s reply also commented 
favourably on proposals relating to salaries, pensions and annuities and taxation of 
government employees. Discussion of the Estate Duty Treaty and these provisions is outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
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 In view of the above, no specific comment was thought to be necessary in 
relation to tax credits. 
 The UK proposals on exchange of information were generally acceptable to 
Australia. 
2.44 The consistency of the attitudes in Chifley’s telegram with those of the Australian 
government at the 1920 conference (as discussed in note 37) with the Sub-
Committee of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax is notable. The first 
preference was still for mutual exemption of foreign source income followed by a 
second preference for an unlimited foreign tax credit. Source country taxing rights 
continued to be seen as primary. 
The Negotiations With The First Australian Delegation 
2.45 An Australian delegation, comprising the then Commissioner of Taxation, L S 
Jackson, and three of his staff, was sent to London and met with UK Inland Revenue 
officers and a representative from the Dominions Office64 in August 1945.65 At that 
meeting both sides generally adhered to positions that they had previously put, with 
Australia adhering to its emphasis on source basis taxation while the UK emphasised 
taxation on a residence basis. 
2.46 Robert Willis, Secretary of the UK Board of Inland Revenue, reported that ‘they won’t 
budge an inch on the main question of taxation of dividends paid by Australian 
companies to UK residents’, noting also that the States would never agree to 
concessions on dividends which would create obstacles for a uniform system if the 
States were to resume taxation after World War II.66 Willis’ statement is not entirely 
accurate as Australia did offer to reduce its taxation of dividends paid to UK residents 
by one half and regarded this reduction as being equivalent to the reductions in US 
withholding tax in the 1945 UK – US Double Taxation Treaty, having regard to 
relevant tax rates in the respective countries.67 Willis reported that Australia was 
                                                          
64  Willis to Sir Charles Dixon (Dominions Office) 26th July 1945. UK National Archives, Inland 
Revenue file. Gregg had suggested that Australia send a delegation to London as he had not 
regarded Chifley’s reply as very accommodating. 
65  Inland Revenue file, p59. Official Secretary, Australian High Commission, London to 
Chairman Board of Inland Revenue 23rd July 1945 indicates that the delegation left Sydney 
on 28th July 1945, but the actual date of arrival in London is not disclosed in archival material 
that the author has examined. Jackson was appointed Australian Commissioner of Taxation 
in May 1939 and continued in that role until May 1946. Leigh Edmonds, Working for All 
Australians: A Brief History of the Australian Taxation Office (Australian Taxation Office, 
Canberra, 2010) 57 and 76. 
66  Willis, ‘Australia’, 22nd August 1945, p74. Inland Revenue file. 
67  Jackson, above n 39, 6, paras 16 and 17. 
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tentatively prepared to overrule its Biddle case and to give credit to its residents for 
tax deducted from UK dividends.68  
2.47 Willis noted that Australia recognised that its taxation of dividends, funded from 
Australian source profits, paid by a non-resident company to a non-resident 
shareholder was largely unenforceable. However, Australia refused to drop it, 
because to do so would have been inconsistent with the principle of priority of source 
basis taxation,69 and merely undertook to convey the UK view to the Australian 
government. Australia also purported to apply its undistributed profits tax to non-
resident companies with Australian branches to the extent that the profits were 
Australian sourced.70 Australia considered that the tax should apply because the 
profits had an Australian source and exempting them would produce an anomaly with 
the treatment of Australian companies subject to the tax.71 
2.48 Willis viewed the Australians’ reiteration of the views in Chifley’s telegram at 2.43 on 
shipping and films as highly political. As Australia had virtually no international 
shipping industry, obtaining some tax from the shipowner meant that Australia ‘didn’t 
feel so bad’.72 Willis considered that the Australian use of an arbitrary basis for taxing 
film profits was also political, noting that ‘Americans getting big money out of 
Australia’.73  
2.49 The Australians had also indicated that Australia would not exempt interest and 
royalties flowing to a UK resident.74 Australia considered that Dominion Income Tax 
Relief had generally produced appropriate results in these cases and that the 
principal need was simplification of the procedures and the elimination of a few 
anomalies.75  
2.50 Consensus was reached on exchange of information where Willis described the 
Australian attitude as being ‘They seem keen on it; they have great powers of 
                                                          
68  Willis, above n 66, 74. In Biddle v Commissioner 302 US 573, a US resident individual was 
denied a foreign tax credit for tax deducted by the payer because the recipient had not paid 
the tax. Australia’s Biddle case was Jolly v FCT (1934) 50 CLR 131, where Dixon J held that 
only the net amount of a dividend received by an Australian shareholder from a UK company, 
which had deducted tax it had paid on the source of the dividend, was included in the 
assessable income of the shareholder.  
69  Willis, above n 66, Jackson above n 39, 7, para 18. 
70  Willis, above n 66. 
71  Jackson, above n 39, 7, para 19. 
72  Willis, above n 66, 73–4 and see Jackson, above n 39, 8–9, para 22. 
73  Willis, above n 66, 74 and Jackson, above n 39, 9–10, paras 25–8.  
74  Willis, above n 66. 
75  Jackson, above n 39, 11, para 33. 
54 
 
inquisition and, one gathered, would be glad to have all sorts of information from 
us.’76 
The Modified UK Proposals And The Breakdown Of Negotiations 
2.51 Considering that the meeting in August 1945 had not resolved anything, Gregg sent 
modified proposals to Jackson on 21st September 1945.77 Gregg submitted that the 
difficulties in their discussions to date had sprung from a clash between Australia’s 
‘origin’ theory of taxation and the United Kingdom’s ‘residence’ theory. Gregg argued 
that the original proposals were a compromise between the two theories as they 
conceded the origin basis for taxation of trading profits but retained the residence 
basis for dividends, interest and royalties. From discussions to date, a treaty was not 
likely on this basis as the proposal in relation to dividends, interest and royalties 
clashed with Australia’s emphasis on source basis taxation and would have an 
appreciable cost to the Australian exchequer. Gregg submitted that under the 
modified proposal there would be a slight gain to the Australian exchequer a greater 
loss to the UK exchequer and a gain accruing to the benefit of traders investing in 
Australia. 
2.52 The modified proposal was that the Double Tax Treaty only operate in relation to 
trading profits and that the existing system of Dominion Income Tax Relief operate in 
relation to investment income (including dividends paid outside a parent–subsidiary 
relationship) and personal taxation. The UK continued to propose that shipping and 
air transport be taxed on a residence basis but that, in broad terms, all other trading 
profits be taxed on an origin basis with credit being given by the residence country for 
any origin tax paid. More specifically, the UK proposed that: 
(a) UK companies trading though Australian branches would be subject to tax on 
their branch profits at the Australian corporate rate, with the UK giving credit 
for the Australian tax paid; 
(b) An Australian subsidiary of a UK company would be taxed at the Australian 
corporate rate, but Australia would not tax dividends paid by the subsidiary to 
the UK parent and the UK would give the parent company credit for any 
underlying Australian tax; 
                                                          
76  Willis, above n 66, 73. 
77  Gregg to Jackson, 21st September 1945, Inland Revenue file, pp101–04. The content of 
Gregg’s letter is discussed in paragraphs 2.51 to 2.55. 
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(c) Australia would not tax a UK company on dividends that it paid out of 
Australian source profits and would not charge undistributed profits tax on the 
Australian source profits of a UK company; 
(d) The profits of shipping and air transport ‘concerns’ of one country would be 
exempt from tax in the other country. 
There would also be a general provision that trading profits of a non-resident would 
only be taxable in the source country where they arose through a permanent 
establishment in that country.  
2.53 In Gregg’s view, the current Australian system discriminated against UK investment 
through the use of a subsidiary (evidently because of the taxation of dividends paid to 
parent companies) rather than a branch. Australian legislation that purported to tax 
dividends paid by UK companies that were sourced in Australian profits was 
unenforceable and was unjustifiable in principle as being extra-territorial taxation. If 
Australia wanted to encourage British, rather than foreign, subsidiaries to be 
established in Australia then, as the UK would give credit for Australian underlying 
tax, it was not too much to expect Australia to contribute by exempting the dividends 
themselves.  
2.54 Gregg noted that the proposal on shipping and air transport was in conflict with 
Australia’s source principles, but the UK regarded it as a matter of first importance 
and pressed it strongly. Residence basis taxation had been regarded as appropriate 
in agreements that the UK already had with the principal foreign countries and with 
Eire and Canada and by the League of Nations Fiscal Committee owing to difficulties 
associated with attributing this type of income to particular sources.  
2.55 In relation to other income (principally interest, dividends and royalties), Gregg 
proposed that the existing Dominion Income Tax Relief provisions continue, but he 
indicated that, if Australia wished, the UK was prepared to make special provision for 
salaries and pensions. 
2.56 Gregg had previously given a draft of his letter of 21st September 1945 to Jackson. 
After seeking instructions from Chifley, Jackson had advised Gregg informally of the 
Australian government’s response,78 which he subsequently formally confirmed by 
letter to Gregg on 25th September 1945.79  
                                                          
78  Gregg to Dixon (Dominions Office) 21st September 1945, Inland Revenue file, p106. 
79  Jackson to Gregg, 25th September 1945, Inland Revenue file, pp107–09. The content of 
Jackson’s letter is discussed at 2.59 to 2.65. 
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2.57 In brief, Chifley had advised that Australia would not accept the proposals. Australia 
would not entertain any departure from the source principle, would not agree to 
taxing shipping profits on a residence basis, and continued to claim the right to tax 
subsidiary companies on dividends paid to UK parents. Chifley advised that, in the 
event of Gregg not accepting the Australian proposals, Jackson was to report to H V 
Evatt (the Australian Minister for External Affairs and Attorney-General who was then 
Acting Australian Minister in London),80 who was to raise the matter with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Hugh Dalton).81  
2.58 Gregg advised Jackson that he could not agree to the Australian proposals and that 
the matter would have to be taken up at the ministerial level. Gregg suggested to 
Jackson that it would be unlikely that ministerial level discussions would lead to 
settlement as the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not give one Dominion what he 
denied to another.82  
2.59 Jackson’s 25th September letter to Gregg reiterated the Australian view that the 
responsibility for removing international double taxation rested entirely on the United 
Kingdom. The Australian view was that the source country had the primary right to 
tax income over the country of residence, a claim which, Jackson noted, was 
admitted by the US by allowing a unilateral credit for foreign tax paid.  
2.60 Jackson disputed the claim that Australia would suffer no financial loss under the 
amended proposals, because the claim: (a) assumed that the existing Dominion 
Income Tax Relief arrangements were fair even though they required Australia to 
provide relief in respect of Australian source income; and (b) ignored the loss of 
revenue to Australia from foregoing the right to tax shipping and air transport. The 
original proposals had contemplated the total abrogation of the existing Dominion 
Income Tax Relief proposals, and Australia considered it desirable that the original 
proposals in this regard be consummated.  
2.61 On the key question of Australia foregoing its tax on dividends paid by Australian 
subsidiaries to UK parents, Jackson commented that the UK request was not 
                                                          
80  Evatt had been Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs in the Curtin government 
and continued in these roles in the Chifley government. G C Bolton, ‘Evatt, Herbert Vere 
(Bert) (1894–1965) in Australian Dictionary of Biography (Melbourne University Press, 2000) 
vol 15. Accessed online at <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/evatt-herbert-vere-bert-10131>. 
81  Dalton became Chancellor of the Exchequer on the election of the Attlee government in 1945 
and remained in that position until his resignation in November 1947. Ben Pimlott, ‘Dalton, 
(Edward) Hugh Neal, Baron Dalton (1887–1962)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
Accessed online at 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com.wwwproxy0.library.unsw.edu.au/view/article/32697?docPos=1>. 
82  Gregg to Dixon, above n 78. 
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regarded as feasible because of the Australian incidence of tax upon company profits 
and dividends. In Jackson’s words, while the UK put the whole weight of its tax 
incidence on the company’s profits (apart from surtax on dividends), Australia put its 
incidence partly on the profits and partly on the dividends. If dividends paid to UK 
parent companies were exempted, then Australian tax on corporate profits would 
have to be increased and Australia would face claims from other countries and 
Australian shareholders for a similar exemption. Jackson noted that the US did not 
agree to exempting dividends but had agreed to reduce the rate of tax on dividends 
flowing to the UK. Australia had made a similar offer which would, in Jackson’s view, 
leave the burden of Australian tax on company profits and dividends comparable with 
that charged in the US.83 
2.62 The proposal that Australia not tax Australian source dividends paid by UK 
companies to UK residents was rejected as it ignored the priority of Australia to tax 
such dividends. Jackson admitted, however, that Australia could not enforce such 
taxation where the UK resident had no other Australian income.  
2.63 Nor could Australia agree to the proposal to exempt UK companies from Australian 
undistributed profits tax on their Australian source income as this would create an 
anomalous discrimination compared with the treatment of Australian companies and 
would deprive Australia of a portion of its tax on profits derived in Australia. 
2.64 Jackson indicated that political considerations and the principle of origin made it 
impossible for Australia to agree to taxation of shipping profits on a state of 
registration basis, alluding to the strong feeling of resentment by Australian exporters 
over exploitation of Australian freights by foreign shipping companies. Jackson 
indicated that no Australian government could hope to carry any exemption for any 
section of the shipping industry through Parliament. 
2.65 Jackson considered that Australia’s differential treatment of branches and 
subsidiaries of foreign direct investors was a product of the absence of international 
provisions to enforce another country’s tax laws. The fact that Australia could not, in 
certain circumstances, enforce the full effect of its taxation laws was no justification 
for departing from the principle of source basis taxation. To do so would undermine 
the foundations of its taxation structure. Taxing dividends paid by UK companies out 
of Australian profits was not admitted to be extra-territorial taxation; rather, it was 
regarded as a proper imposition of tax on Australian source income. Here Jackson 
                                                          
83  Jackson’s report to the Australian government on the negotiations contains an explanation of 
the reasoning behind this assertion. Jackson above n 39, 6, para 17. 
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appears to have conflated Gregg’s comparison of the Australian treatment of 
branches and subsidiaries with his criticism of Australia’s taxation of non-residents on 
dividends paid by non-resident companies funded from Australian source profits. The 
latter was unenforceable in practice, but Gregg’s criticism of the treatment of 
subsidiaries was more directed at the enforceable tax on non-resident shareholders 
on dividends paid by non-resident companies funded from Australian source profits.  
Evatt Meets With Dalton 
2.66 Prior to Evatt meeting with Dalton, he received a letter from Jackson.84 Stressing that 
the key item to be settled first was the treatment of dividends paid by an Australian 
subsidiary company to a UK parent company, Jackson pointed out that under 
Dominion Income Tax Relief the combined Australian and UK tax in this situation 
exceeded the UK standard rate of 50%.85 It was this aspect that ‘the commercial 
world’ and the Australian Secondary Industries Commission wanted corrected. It 
would be best to abrogate the whole present arrangement and to give Australia, as 
the country of origin, the prior right to collect taxes. If the UK wanted to tax on the 
basis of residence, then it should allow a foreign tax credit for the whole of the 
Australian tax.  
2.67 Jackson noted that the UK had been unable to persuade the US to agree to exempt 
dividends paid by a wholly owned subsidiary from source taxation and that the Board 
of Inland Revenue had been overruled by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir 
John Anderson). Australia had offered to reduce its tax on dividends by 50% which, 
when the Australian corporate tax rate (35% including super tax) was taken into 
account, gave a mean somewhere between the 15% and 5% rates in the 1945 UK – 
US Tax Treaty. Jackson noted that Gregg had refused to accept this offer. In 
Jackson’s view, the established precedent in the UK – US Treaty made Gregg’s 
position on this issue untenable.  
2.68 Jackson commented that the UK – US Treaty could not be adopted in toto in the UK 
– Australia context. He pointed out that both the UK and the US taxed on both a 
residence and source basis whereas Australia largely taxed only on a source basis, 
and that the reciprocal flow of income that existed between the UK and the US did 
not exist as between the UK and Australia. Even if a reciprocal flow of income did 
                                                          
84  Jackson to Evatt, 26th September 1945, Inland Revenue file, pp111 and 112. The content of 
Jackson’s letter is discussed in paragraphs 2.66 to 2.69. 
85  See the table at 2.29 and accompanying footnotes. 
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exist, Australia would, generally, not be imposing tax on UK source income and 
hence any question of Australia allowing a tax rebate would not arise.  
2.69 On the proposal that ‘personal items’ (portfolio dividends, interest, royalties, rents, 
salaries, pensions and annuities) continue to be covered under the Dominion Income 
Tax Relief system, Jackson admitted that it was the Australian revenue not the 
taxpayer that suffered under the present arrangements. In Jackson’s view, it was 
best to concentrate on trading profits and settle that item first rather than break down 
the whole negotiations.  
2.70 Correspondence followed between Gregg and B F Trend (the Private Secretary to 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer) in which Gregg enclosed a memorandum outlining 
what he saw as the key points of difference between the UK and Australia.86 Gregg 
emphasised three issues: (a) the taxation of dividends paid by an Australian 
subsidiary to a UK parent; (b) Australia’s levying of undistributed profits tax on the 
Australian profits of UK companies with Australian branches; and (c) shipping and air 
transport profits.  
2.71 Dalton met with Evatt and Jackson (but not with Gregg) somewhere between the 12th 
and 16th of October.87 Apparently, at that meeting Evatt handed Dalton the letter of 
26th September 1945 that Jackson had written to Evatt88 together with a short and 
blunt memorandum.89 The interesting feature of the memorandum is that, for the first 
time in Australian communications in the negotiations, it opens with a positive 
statement about what Australia requires from a treaty rather than with defensive 
statements about what Australia will not agree to.  
2.72 The memorandum, which began with the heading ‘What Australia Asks For’, 
requested that the UK grant a full rebate of tax on income of Australian origin 
applying not only to taxes on company profits but on dividends paid out of those 
profits. After noting that the US conceded this principle (of granting a full credit for 
foreign tax) in its tax laws, the memorandum pointed out that Australia was the only 
                                                          
86  Gregg to Trend, 12th October 1945, Inland Revenue file, p125 and ‘Double Taxation And 
Australia: Brief Summary’, Inland Revenue file, pp123 and 124. 
87  These conclusions can be drawn from Gregg to Trend, 16th October 1945, Inland Revenue 
file, p131.  
88  The original letter is in the UK National Archives. Jackson to Evatt, above n 83. 
89  ‘What Australia Asks For’, Inland Revenue file, pp126 and 127. The content of Evatt’s 
memorandum is discussed in paragraphs 2.72 to 2.76. 
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Dominion90 that shared relief from double tax on income of domestic origin. Dalton91 
marked this comment with red ink in the margin of the memorandum.  
2.73 The request for a full rebate, at least on business profits, was uncontroversial. A full 
rebate on business profits had been offered in the amended UK proposals, and a full 
rebate on all Australian tax paid had been part of the original UK proposals. This 
request, however, did accurately state what the real gain to Australia would be under 
a taxation treaty with the United Kingdom. It would mean that Australia would no 
longer have to contribute directly to relief from international double taxation of 
Australian source income by providing rebates to UK residents. Rather, the UK 
foreign tax credit would mean that the total tax paid would not exceed the greater of 
the combined Australian corporate and dividend tax and the UK tax on the dividend 
without Australia contributing to the overall relief other than through reductions in 
source taxation of some categories of income.  
2.74 Under the heading ‘Australia’s Minimum Position’, the memorandum noted the 
amended proposal that personal taxes continue to be dealt with under the Dominion 
Income Tax Relief provisions and commented that ‘Australia regards this as 
objectionable, but if we are forced, we will have to accept it.’ That Australia was 
prepared to accept the continuance of the Dominion Income Tax Relief system in 
relation to personal taxes, notwithstanding that it would rebate some tax on 
Australian source income, clearly indicates that Australia’s main concern was with 
providing more complete relief from the double taxation of business profits, corporate 
income and dividends.  
2.75 The memorandum stated that Australia would not forgo its tax on dividends paid by 
an Australian subsidiary to a UK parent but would reduce its tax on dividends by 
50%, pointing to the United Kingdom’s agreement to a reduction rather than an 
exemption in the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty. Dalton’s handwritten notes on the 
memorandum suggest that he thought that a two-thirds reduction would be more 
appropriate given that the US had reduced its dividend withholding tax in the 
subsidiary–parent situation from 30% to 5%.  
                                                          
90  While technically correct, this was somewhat misleading as India and the Colonies (as distinct 
from Dominions) all provided reciprocal relief. Australia only provided reciprocal relief at the 
Commonwealth level, none of the States ever having agreed to provide reciprocal relief. None 
of the Australian States were levying an income tax in 1945 following the introduction of the 
Commonwealth Uniform Tax Scheme in 1942. 
91  The ink appears to be the same as is used in other handwritten comments on the 
memorandum. The handwriting appears to be the same as subsequent handwritten notes in 
the file where, from the context, it is clear that the writer is Dalton. 
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2.76 In response to the request that Australia exempt overseas shipping profits,92 the 
memorandum bluntly stated, ‘this Australia refuses to do’. Similarly, the 
memorandum indicated that Australia refused to adhere to Gregg’s request to forgo 
its tax on undistributed profits.  
2.77 In a handwritten note on the memorandum, Dalton had written, ‘Try to settle this by 
Monday night.’ Evidently, Dalton told Evatt and Jackson that he would reach a 
decision on the matter by Monday.93 As it happened, no decision was forthcoming at 
this time. Jackson either surmised or was told that Dalton was concentrating on 
budgetary legislation and banking reform. Jackson and the rest of the Australian 
taxation delegation stayed in London for another fortnight and then returned to 
Australia.94 
2.78 Correspondence between Dalton’s office and Gregg followed the meeting between 
Dalton and Evatt. Gregg reiterated points he had previously made in relation to 
dividends and the 1945 UK – US Double Taxation Treaty and about the prospects for 
negotiations with other Dominions.95 
2.79 Dalton was clearly becoming annoyed at the whole process, and at Inland Revenue 
in particular, and wanted to take a more pragmatic approach. Dalton’s secretary, 
Trend, in a note to Dalton following the receipt of a lengthy draft letter for Dalton to 
send to Chifley, commented: ‘I doubt whether this is the sort of subject on which you 
will wish to write an ordinary letter, and I think it might be better for you to send a 
Memorandum, outlining the points at issue, with a short personal covering letter, 
asking Mr Chifley to come as far to meet you as you have come to meet him.’ Dalton 
wrote ‘Yes!’ in the margin in response to this suggestion. On the bottom of the file 
note Dalton wrote: ‘I suppose I must have more [indecipherable] discussion on this 
dreary subject. I think I.R. is being too stiff necked about the whole thing.’ Dalton 
went on to note that ‘we have left the Australian [tax official] hanging about in London 
for months’ and asked, ‘how much money is there in it anyway?’.96  
2.80 Trend received from Gregg a further draft note and memorandum for Chifley,97 which 
he forwarded to Dalton. He suggested to Dalton, ‘you will probably want to expand 
                                                          
92  Dalton made handwritten notes on the memorandum outlining the formula by which Australia 
taxed shipping profits. 
93  Gregg to Trend, above n 86, 131. 
94  Jackson, above n 39, 3, para 9. 
95  Gregg to Trend, 24th October 1945, Inland Revenue file, pp134–5. 
96  ‘Chancellor of the Exchequer’, 2nd November 1945, signed ‘BT’. Handwriting in red is signed 
‘HD’ and evidently is Dalton’s. Gregg to Trend, above n 82, 140. Inland Revenue file. 
97  Gregg to Trend, 28th December 1945, Inland Revenue file, p148. 
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the draft letter yourself, as one Socialist minister writing to another’. Trend was 
frustrated at Dalton’s response, which was ‘settle something with some other 
Dominions first’.98 Nonetheless, it appears that Dalton’s decision at this point may 
have been critical in eventually producing an agreement with Australia because the 
treaties that the UK then agreed with Canada and South Africa involved 
compromises by both sides and set some precedents that appear to have been 
significant in resolving the deadlock in the United Kingdom’s negotiations with 
Australia.  
The Politicians Reach A Compromise 
2.81 At Australia’s initiative, Dalton then met with Jack Beasley (Australian Minister in 
London) on 18th April 1946, and then Dalton and Gregg met with Chifley (who arrived 
in London on 19th April 1946), Evatt, Beasley, H C Coombs (Director General of the 
Department of Post War Reconstruction) and R J Mair (Australian Second 
Commissioner of Taxation) on 3rd May 1946. Prior to the meeting on 3rd May 1946, 
Gregg had met with Coombs to discuss the issue.99  
2.82 Gregg’s brief to Dalton for the meeting with Beasley reiterated the points Gregg had 
made previously but added comments noting key points in the agreements that the 
UK had recently reached with South Africa and Canada.100 On air and shipping, 
Australia (contrary to international practice and the United Kingdom’s treaties with 
Canada, South Africa, Eire and the US) would not agree to exclusive taxation by the 
country of the shipowner. While there was agreement on the non-taxation at source 
of independent agents, Australia (uniquely in Gregg’s view) taxed independent 
insurance agents at source.  
                                                          
98  ‘Chancellor of the Exchequer’ 1st January 1946, signed ‘BT’. Handwritten notes in red by 
Dalton are signed ‘HD 3/1’. Inland Revenue file, p155. See also the exasperated note from 
Trend to Gregg, 4th January 1946, Inland Revenue file, p154. 
99  The date of Dalton’s meeting with Beasley is evident from Dalton’s letter to ‘My dear Jack’, 
18th April 1946, Inland Revenue file, page number obscured. The meeting with Coombs is 
referred to in Board of Inland Revenue, ‘Chancellor of the Exchequer: Double Taxation – 
Australia’, 29th April 1946, signed ‘CG’. ‘Double Taxation – Summary of Points for Discussion’, 
Inland Revenue file, p167. The date and attendees at the meeting of 3rd May 1946 are set out 
in Board of Inland Revenue, ‘Double Taxation – Australia’, 7th May 1946, Inland Revenue file, 
p171. H C (Nuggett) Coombs had been an economist at the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia, had joined the Australian Treasury in 1939 and had been appointed by Chifley as 
Director General of the Department of Post-war Reconstruction in 1943. Coombs’ career is 
discussed in Tim Rowse, Nuggett Coombs: A Reforming Life (Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
100  Gregg to Trend, 16th April 1946, Inland Revenue file, p161 and Board of Inland Revenue, 
‘Summary of differences with Australia’, 16th April 1946, signed ‘CG’. Inland Revenue file, 
pp159 and 160. 
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2.83 On dividends paid by subsidiaries to parent companies, the US had agreed to reduce 
source taxation to 5%, Canada and South Africa had agreed to an exemption and NZ 
did not tax dividends at all. Both the US and South Africa had agreed to not impose 
their undistributed profits tax on non-residents, and Canada did not tax undistributed 
profits. Australia, by contrast, had refused to budge on subsidiary–parent dividends 
and undistributed profits tax.  
2.84 The position was different in the case of interest and royalties. There, although the 
US had agreed to exemption from tax at source, Canada had not and the UK was to 
give full credit for Canadian tax paid. The Dominion Income Tax Relief provisions 
were to continue to apply to interest and royalties under the treaty with South Africa. 
Gregg conceded that Australia would not follow the US precedent on interest and 
royalties and that the UK was prepared to concede Australia’s claim to tax these 
types of income.  
2.85 In the case of film royalties, the US had agreed to exempt British film royalties but 
Canada had not, nor had South Africa. Gregg commented: ‘We shall certainly have 
to concede to Australia as good a treatment as we have conceded to Canada and 
South Africa.’  
2.86 Gregg’s covering letter to Trend added that Australia wanted to ‘“pick the eyes” out of 
the U.S. – U.K. agreement, to take what she likes and to leave out what she doesn’t 
like on the ground that the interflow of income between the U.K. and Australia is 
different from that between the U.S. and the U.K. and that Australia is not a big 
industrial country.’ If the treaty with the US was not seen as the standard that should 
apply between the mother country and a Dominion, it did not follow that the mother 
country should give more. This was especially so in relation to the core point of 
withholding tax on which the UK was unable to get the US to agree to its view.101 
2.87 For his meeting with Beasley on 18th April 1946,102 Dalton forwarded a summary of 
the points on double taxation that were outstanding as between the UK and 
Australia.103 The UK was largely holding to the negotiating position set out in Gregg’s 
amended proposals of 21st September 1945. No modifications to that position had 
been made to reflect the agreements that had been reached with Canada and South 
Africa. However, the UK had returned to its original position, of requesting residence 
based taxation, in relation to interest and royalties and film royalties. Dalton indicated 
                                                          
101  Gregg to Trend, above n 100, 161. 
102  Dalton to ‘My dear Jack’, above n 99. 
103  ‘Double Taxation – Summary of Points for Discussion’, Inland Revenue file, page number 
obscured. 
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that he looked forward to having discussions with Chifley very soon, stating, ‘I am 
sure we shall be able to settle [outstanding issues] without much difficulty.’  
2.88 The United Kingdom’s assessment of the Australian negotiating position at this time 
was that Australia would probably: (a) continue to dispute the treatment of shipping 
and air transport; (b) agree on agency profits with exceptions for particular cases; (c) 
agree on exemption of subsidiary to parent dividends; (d) agree not to levy tax on 
dividends paid by U.K. companies out of Australian profits and not to impose 
undistributed profits tax on U.K. companies; (e) agree to exempt royalties but not 
interest; and (f) refuse to give way on film royalties.104  
2.89 At his meeting with Coombs, referred to at 2.81, Gregg provided details of the United 
Kingdom’s recent treaties with Canada and South Africa. Gregg stressed that the 
points of greatest significance to the UK were: (a) the exemption of dividends paid by 
an Australian subsidiary to a UK parent, at least in the case of a wholly owned 
subsidiary; (b) the exemption of dividends and undistributed profits of UK companies; 
and (c) the exemption of shipping and air transport profits. Gregg noted that Coombs 
appreciated that the vital question was to relieve trade from double taxation. Gregg’s 
assessment was that the following solution might be able to be reached at Dalton’s 
proposed meeting with Chifley:  
‘Australia to  
Exempt shipping and air transport. 
Exempt dividends paid by the wholly owned subsidiary. 
Halve its rate on other dividends (as previously offered). 
Exempt U.K. companies from tax on dividends and undistributed profits. 
U.K. to 
Concede Australia’s claim to tax interest and royalties. 
Concede film royalties. 
If necessary concede the point about insurance profits made through an 
Australian agent (they ought to be prepared to meet us on this, but it is not a 
point to make a stand on). 
                                                          
104  ‘Double Taxation – Summary of Points for Discussion’ with handwritten marginal notes, Inland 
Revenue file, p160 and ‘Double Taxation – Summary of Points for Discussion’ with typed 
marginal notes. ‘Double Taxation – Summary of Points for Discussion’, Inland Revenue file, 
p166. 
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Give full credit for Australian tax in all remaining cases of double taxation of 
U.K. residents; “personal income” as well as trading income.’ 
The reference to conceding Australia’s claim to tax royalties is crossed out in a 
handwritten annotation to Gregg’s memorandum, and the word ‘No’ is written above 
‘royalties’.105 
2.90 The recent taxation treaties between the UK and Canada and South Africa made it 
more difficult for both Australia and the UK to hold to their previous negotiating 
positions. At the ministerial meeting between Dalton and Gregg (representing the 
United Kingdom) and Chifley, Evatt, Beasley, Coombs and Mair some further 
compromises were made. The agreement reached at that meeting was: 
 Taxation of trading profits on a source basis with full credit being given by the 
residence country; 
 Taxation of shipping and air transport profits on a residence basis; 
 Independent agents to be exempt from source basis taxation but with Australia 
permitted to tax insurance agencies and certain pastoral agencies; 
 Australia to retain its right to tax films, with credit being given by the United 
Kingdom; 
 Australia to not tax dividends paid by a 100% subsidiary of a UK company 
holding all shares other than qualifying shares;  
 UK companies trading in Australia to be exempt from Australian tax on dividends 
paid to Australian non-residents but to be subject to Australian undistributed 
profits tax. 
 Australia to reduce its tax on other dividends paid by Australian companies to UK 
residents by one half; 
 Literary and industrial royalties to be taxed on a residence basis; 
 Australia to tax rents and mineral royalties, with the UK giving a full credit for the 
tax paid at source; 
 Except in the case of government securities, interest to be taxed at full rates on a 
source basis, with the UK giving full credit [this was a concession made by the 
UK that was foreshadowed by Gregg in his meeting with Coombs]; 
 Taxation of pensions and purchased annuities on a residence basis.106 
                                                          
105  Board of Inland Revenue, ‘Chancellor of the Exchequer: Double Taxation – Australia’, 29th 
April 1946, signed ‘CG’. ‘Double Taxation – Summary of Points for Discussion’, Inland 
Revenue file, p167. 
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2.91 Both sides, in 1946, must have been satisfied with some aspects of the agreement 
reached at this meeting, although most of the concessions had been foreshadowed 
at the meeting between Gregg and Coombs. One additional concession, favouring 
Australia, was obtained at the meeting of ministers, namely: levying Australian 
undistributed profits tax on Australian source profits of UK companies. Australia 
retained source taxation of film and mineral royalties, in contrast to the treatment of 
these royalties foreshadowed at the meeting between Gregg and Coombs.  
2.92 From an Australian perspective, most importantly, the system of Dominion Income 
Tax Relief was to be replaced by a foreign tax credit which extended to giving credit 
for underlying Australian corporate tax to all UK resident shareholders. Australia had 
successfully resisted the UK proposals to exempt dividend, interest and royalty 
payments entirely from tax at source. The omission of an interest article was an 
important difference from the 1945 UK – US Treaty. The effect was that full source 
country taxing rights were retained in relation to interest. 
2.93 On the other hand, the compromise reached on dividends was arguably more 
favourable to the UK than the one achieved in the 1945 UK – US Treaty. In the 1946 
UK Treaty the exemption from dividend taxation at source was confined to the 100% 
subsidiary situation, Australian tax on other dividends was halved and Australia 
retained the right to levy undistributed profits tax. By comparison, in the 1945 US – 
UK Treaty, US withholding tax on non-portfolio dividends paid to a company with a 
95% or more voting interest was reduced to 5% and US withholding tax on all other 
dividends was reduced to 15%.  
2.94 The UK had a victory over Australia on literary and industrial royalties. It seems clear 
from a comparison of the discussions between Gregg and Coombs on the one hand, 
with the agreement reached by the politicians at the meeting of 3rd May 1946, that 
this concession was made by Australia at the latter meeting, possibly in the context 
of Australia retaining source country taxing rights in respect of film and mineral 
royalties.  
2.95 Australia conceded taxation on a residence basis in the politically sensitive area of 
shipping profits and in the nascent area of international air transport. Given the 
international practice that had developed in these areas, and given the terms of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
106  ‘Double Taxation – Australia: Conference At 11 Downing Street, on 3rd May 1946; Heads Of 
Agreement’ dated 4th May 1946. ‘Double Taxation – Summary of Points for Discussion’, 
Inland Revenue file, p169. The Heads of Agreement were drawn up by Gregg. See, Board of 
Inland Revenue, ‘Double Taxation – Australia’ 7th May 1946, ‘Double Taxation – Summary of 
Points for Discussion’, signed ‘CG’, Inland Revenue file, p171. 
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agreement that the UK had recently reached with Canada, an Australian concession 
on these areas was perhaps inevitable if Australia wanted to achieve significant 
objectives such as obtaining full foreign tax credits from the UK and preserving its 
source country taxing rights in other areas.  
Detailed Drafting Begins And Technical Issues Emerge 
2.96 Although the meeting of 3rd May 1946 had resolved most of the significant issues, 
some points were left for further negotiation as was the detail of the drafting. The UK 
Inland Revenue appears to have prepared a draft treaty dated 6th May 1946, which 
was progressively amended in consultation with Mair107 who had remained in London 
for the detailed drafting and was subsequently joined by the Australian Crown 
Solicitor H E F (Fred) Whitlam.108  
2.97 Technical drafting continued until late August 1946, and in that period a total of five 
drafts (including the final version) were developed.109 Throughout the drafting 
process Mair sent regular, almost daily, cables to Patrick McGovern, the new 
Australian Commissioner of Taxation, who sent back less frequent replies with 
drafting suggestions. As the draft was progressively received in Australia, it was 
forwarded for comment to two ATO committees and to two Deputy 
Commissioners.110 The comments made on progressive stages of the draft were 
collated and were utilised by McGovern in making drafting suggestions to Mair and 
Whitlam. 
                                                          
107  The draft dated 6th May 1946 is contained in NAA, ATO, Progressive draft of agreement. 
Mair’s initial cable of amendments to McGovern was dated 9th May 1946 and contains 
provisions which differ from the draft dated 6th May 1946. Mair describes the content of his 
cable as the ‘first instalment of the draft settled with inland revenue’, which appears to 
indicate that the UK produced the draft of 6th May 1946 and it was then progressively 
amended and settled in consultation with Mair. Mair’s initial cable is Mair to McGovern, 9th 
May 1946, NAA, ATO, Cables of draft agreement. 
108  See Evatt to Holloway, 9th May 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p20, and 
McGovern, 22nd May 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p41. 
109  The drafts are contained in NAA, ATO, Progressive draft of agreement. The first draft worked 
on in Australia was titled Draft II and was dated 22nd May 1946. This was followed by an 
untitled draft dated 19th July 1946. There were two versions of Draft III with one, apparently, 
being the London draft of 1st August 1946 and the other the Canberra draft of 8th August 
1946. Differences between the London draft and the Canberra draft are noted in handwriting 
in the Canberra draft. The final version of the Treaty largely, but not entirely, followed the 
London version of Draft III. 
110  See McGovern to Mair, 22nd May 1946, NAA, ATO, Cables of draft agreement, p41. 
McGovern was appointed as Australian Commissioner of Taxation in May 1946 and held that 
position until April 1961. Edmonds, above, note 65, 76 and 133. 
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2.98 The original UK offer of a double taxation treaty had made explicit reference to 
particular articles in the UK – US Taxation Treaty of 1945. The influence of the UK – 
US Treaty is apparent in this first draft prepared by the United Kingdom.  
2.99 Of the 22 variations from the OECD Model in currently operative Australian tax 
treaties that can be traced to the 1946 UK Treaty, eleven were the result of the initial 
UK draft following the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty,111 however, one of these was 
modified as a result of Australian negotiations in the drafting process.112 Some of 
these eleven variations can still be found in Australia’s most recent treaties. Two of 
the eleven can be found in the 2010 Turkey Treaty and in the 2013 Switzerland 
Treaty.113 A further one of these is found in the 2013 Switzerland Treaty and in the 
2015 Germany Treaty.114 An additional three of these are found in the 2010 Turkey 
Treaty only.115  
2.100 One further variation from the OECD Model contained in the initial UK draft was 
modified at Australia’s request to align the final draft with the equivalent article in the 
1945 UK – US Tax Treaty. As discussed in Chapter 5, the September 1966 UK draft 
reverted to similar language to that used in the 1946 UK draft, and this variation from 
the OECD Model can still be found in Australia’s most recent treaties.116  
2.101 The 10 remaining variations from the OECD Model were also variations from the 
1945 UK – US Tax Treaty. Of these, four (which can still be found in at least one of 
Australia’s most recent treaties) were initiated by Australia.117 The remaining six 
                                                          
111  AV1 (omission of OECD Art 2(1)); AV2 (omission of OECD Art 2(2)); AV4 (approach to 
defining resident cf OECD Art 4(1)); AV21 (no equivalent to OECD Art 7(6)); AV29 (no 
equivalent to OECD Art 8(3)); AV31 (no equivalent to OECD Art 9(2)); AV41 (absence of 
definition of dividend); AV80 (no equivalent to OECD Art 17); AV 82 (no equivalent to OECD 
Art 21), AV87 (no equivalent to OECD Art 22) and AV105 (no equivalent to OECD Art 25). 
112  AV4 (approach to defining resident – basic approach in 1945 UK – US Treaty retained but 
details modified at Australia’s request). 
113  AV21 and AV29. 
114  AV82. 
115  AV1, AV2 and AV4. Articles 2(1) and 2(2) of the 2013 Australia – Switzerland Tax Treaty, 
while varying from the equivalent articles in the OECD Model do so in a different manner to 
previous Australian tax treaties. Articles 2(1) and 2(2) are closer to the equivalent articles in 
the OECD Model than are the equivalent articles in previous Australian tax treaties. 
116  AV24. As shown in Appendix 4, at the request of Australia, the shipping profits article in the 
initial UK draft was varied to align it with the equivalent article in the 1945 UK – US Tax 
Treaty. As shown in Appendix 5, the September 1966 UK draft reverted to similar language to 
the 1946 UK draft. This was a variation from the language in the 1963 OECD Model and is a 
variation from the language in the current OECD Model. As shown in Appendix 3, this 
variation, AV24, still appears in the 2010 Turkey Treaty and in the 2013 Swiss Treaty and the 
2015 German Treaty. 
117  AV13 (deeming a dependent agent who habitually fills orders to be a permanent 
establishment – still in 2010 Turkey Treaty and with modifications in 2015 German Treaty); 
AV20 (addition to OECD Article 7 allowing application of domestic law where information is 
inadequate to determine arm’s length – still in 2010 Turkey Treaty); AV22 (savings clause of 
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variations (some of which can still be found in at least one of Australia’s most recent 
treaties) were initiated by the United Kingdom,118 but five of these were further 
modified at Australia’s request in the drafting process.119  
2.102 Some of the more significant differences between the UK draft and the 1945 UK – 
US Tax Treaty were: (a) the UK draft defined ‘industrial or commercial profits’ in 
terms that excluded specific items only, some of which were dealt with under the 
distributive rules; (b) the definition of ‘permanent establishment’ in the 1945 Treaty 
included ‘a factory’, but the UK draft did not (although it included ‘a farm’, something 
which the definition in the 1945 Treaty did not include); (c) the Industrial or 
Commercial Profits article in the 1945 Treaty adopted the ‘force of attraction’ 
principle, but the UK draft only permitted source taxation of profits attributable to a 
permanent establishment; (d) the ships and aircraft provision in the 1945 Treaty 
referred to the place of documentation of a ship or registration of an aircraft but the 
UK draft did not; (e) the credit provisions in the UK draft were considerably more 
detailed than those in the 1945 Treaty and became more detailed through the 
drafting process; (f) the 1945 Treaty contained an interest article, but the UK draft did 
not; (g) the 1945 Treaty contained an article exempting a UK resident (other than one 
engaged in a trade or business in the US) from US tax on gains from the sale or 
exchange of capital assets, but there was no equivalent provision in the UK draft; and 
(h) the 1945 Treaty contained a non-discrimination article, but the UK draft did not. Of 
these items (a), (b) and (e) were modified by Australia in the drafting process. Item 
(c) was also modified by Australia in the drafting process, to align it more closely with 
the equivalent article in the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty.120  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
domestic law dealing with insurance at the time the Treaty is signed – still in 2010 Turkey 
Treaty and 2015 German Treaty); AV33 (addition to OECD Art 9 allowing application of 
domestic law where information is inadequate to determine arm’s length – still in 2010 Turkey 
Treaty). 
118  AV3 (definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ in exclusionary terms); AV6 (inclusion of 
‘agricultural or pastoral property’ in definition of permanent establishment – still in 2013 Swiss 
Treaty and in 2015 German Treaty); AV 15 (modification to independent agent provision – still 
in 2015 German Treaty); AV36 (inclusion of beneficial ownership requirement in OECD Art 
10(1) – still in 2010 Turkey Treaty, 2013 Swiss Treaty and 2015 German Treaty); AV88 
(foreign tax credit provisions – still in 2010 Turkey Treaty, 2013 Swiss Treaty and 2015 
German Treaty); and AV91 (omission of non-discrimination article). 
119  AV3 (definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ in exclusionary terms); AV6 (inclusion of 
‘agricultural or pastoral property’ in definition of permanent establishment); AV15 (modification 
of independent agent provision); AV36 (inclusion of beneficial ownership requirement in 
OECD Art 10(1)); and AV88 (foreign tax credit provisions). 
120 The UK draft of 6th May 1946 exempted from source taxation profits of a resident of one of the 
territories derived from operating ships or aircraft. This was amended by Draft II dated 22nd 
May 1946 so that the exemption was confined to profits from operating ships whose port of 
registry is in that territory, or aircraft registered in that territory. A note by Willis dated 22nd 
May 1946 comments that he conceded the additional test of registration in the country of 
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2.103 Neither treaty contained an ‘other income’ article. The original United Kingdom offer 
of a taxation treaty had proposed to include provisions dealing with other types of 
income, but it is clear from the context that the intention was that what was 
contemplated was a series of specific provisions dealing with particular categories of 
income, not a general ‘other income’ article.121  
2.104 Some of the variations from the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty appear to be the products 
of the ministerial agreement discussed at 2.90. This is clearly the explanation for the 
absence of an interest article as giving effect to the decision that full source country 
taxing rights would be retained in relation to interest; this was something that 
Australia had pressed for at the ministerial meeting and in the negotiations leading up 
to it. The structure of the 1946 UK Treaty that defined industrial or commercial profits 
did not contain articles dealing with categories of income where full source country 
taxing rights were to be retained and which did not contain an ‘other income’ article 
as one, but not the only possible, means of giving effect to the ministerial agreement 
to allow source country taxation of certain categories of income. The structure is 
found in the first UK draft of 6th May 1946 and appears to have been initiated by the 
United Kingdom.  
2.105 No documents that the author has examined in either the National Archives of 
Australia or the UK National Archives provide any indication as to why the UK draft of 
6th May 1946 did not contain a capital gains article, a non-discrimination article nor an 
‘other income’ article.122 The absence of an ‘other income’ article can be explained by 
the overall structure of the treaty as a means of giving effect to the ministerial 
agreement discussed at 2.90. Full source country taxing rights in respect of income 
not otherwise dealt with would have been inconsistent with the presence of an ‘other 
income’ article which gave taxing rights to the residence country.  
2.106 At the time, neither the UK nor Australia taxed capital gains as income.123 Although a 
gain could be income as a business profit, some gains made by a business were 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
residence, as in the US agreement and the South African draft. ‘Australia: Draft II’ RW 
22/5/46 in UK Inland Revenue file. 
121  See the discussion at 2.38. 
122  As discussed at 2.38 and the accompanying note, the original UK proposals referred to the 
1945 UK – US Treaty as containing examples of the types of article proposed. No express 
mention was made at that point of excluding the articles referred to at 2.105. 
123  An Australian view of the position under both Australian and UK tax law as at 1947 is in Gunn 
et al, above n 18, paras 293 and 293A. The United Kingdom position is discussed in P G 
Whiteman and D C Milne, Wheatcroft and Whiteman on Capital Gains Tax, 2nd edition, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1973 at 1–13 to 1–26 and in P G Whiteman and G S A 
Wheatcroft, Whiteman and Wheatcroft on Income Tax and Surtax, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1971 at 1–17 to 1–20. 
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classified as capital gains and not taxed. Hence it would be understandable that 
neither the UK nor Australia would see the need for an article dealing with capital 
gains. This interpretation is supported by the narrow scope and non-reciprocal nature 
of the capital gains article in the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty.  
2.107 The absence of a non-discrimination article could be explained by the fact that, at the 
time, both countries did to some extent discriminate against non-residents. However, 
it is also possible that neither the UK nor Australia saw a non-discrimination article 
based on nationality as relevant to the relations between them. Prior to the British 
Nationality Act 1948 and the Nationality and Citizenship Act (Cth) 1948, there was no 
separate legal concept of an Australian national and Australians were British subjects 
for nationality purposes.124  
2.108 In general, changes from the initial UK draft and/or the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty that 
emerged as the drafting process progressed were initiated by Australia, although the 
final product of the drafting usually involved compromise between the delegations. 
Some of the drafting work done from May to August 1946 was concerned with 
refining the language of the initial UK draft so as to avoid ambiguity and with 
technical arguments based on syntactic presumptions. Only articles which were the 
subject of extensive discussion will be examined in detail here.  
Undistributed Profits Tax Of Private Company Wholly Owned Subsidiaries Of UK Companies 
2.109 Mair wrote to Gregg on 6th May 1946,125 pointing out that the agreement to exempt 
dividends paid by Australian 100% subsidiaries to their UK parent made problematic 
the imposition of undistributed profits tax on Australian private companies that were 
100% subsidiaries of a UK company. This was due to the method of calculating 
Australian undistributed profits tax on private companies.126 In this situation, if the 
dividend to the UK parent were exempt from Australian tax, then no Australian 
undistributed profits tax would be payable either.  
                                                          
124  In Attorney-General (Cth) v Ah Sheung [1906] HCA 44; (1906) 4 CLR 949 Griffith C.J., Barton 
and O’Connor JJ at 949 said: ‘We are not disposed to give any countenance to the novel 
doctrine that there is an Australian nationality as distinguished from a British nationality, so 
that, while the term “immigration” as used in sec. 51 of the Constitution admittedly includes 
the power of exclusion of British subjects in general, it would not extend to persons of 
Australian nationality, whatever that may mean.’ The Nationality Act (Cth) 1920 had codified 
the concept of British subject for purposes of Australian law. The concept of Australian citizen 
was created by the Nationality and Citizenship Act (Cth) 1948. 
125  Mair to Gregg, 6th May 1946, Inland Revenue file, p168. 
126  As discussed at 2.12, at the time Australia levied undistributed profits tax on the undistributed 
profits of private companies at the same rate the tax shareholders would have paid if a 
distribution had been made. 
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2.110 Anomalously, because undistributed profits tax on public companies was at a flat rate 
of 10%, where the Australian subsidiary was a public company as then defined, it 
would continue to be liable to 10% undistributed profits tax notwithstanding that 
under the proposed treaty any dividends that it paid to its UK parent would be exempt 
from Australian tax.  
2.111 Under the definition of ‘private company’ for Australian tax purposes at the time, the 
key issue in the 100% subsidiary situation was whether the UK parent was a private 
company for Australian tax purposes. This turned on: 
 Whether seven or fewer persons controlled it in the relevant sense; 
 Whether the public held ordinary shares carrying 25% or more voting power; and  
 Whether it was not a subsidiary of a public company, which turned on whether it 
was owned by one or more companies none of which was a private company.127  
2.112 Mair proposed that the exemption for dividends not apply in the case of an Australian 
private company that was a 100% subsidiary of a UK company, but that Australia 
halve its rate of tax on the dividend and hence halve its rate of undistributed profits 
tax; a proposition which Willis appears to have found attractive. Where a UK private 
company was trading in Australia through a branch, Mair proposed that Australia 
would halve the nominal but uncollectible tax that it levied on dividends paid to its UK 
shareholders and consequently would halve the undistributed profits tax levied on the 
UK company. Willis’ conclusion was that there was not ‘very much in the dividend 
tax’ in both these cases and that the reduction in undistributed profits tax that would 
result from conceding these points was worth having.128 
2.113 However, McGovern disagreed with Mair and favoured Willis’ earlier suggestion ‘that 
full rates of tax on undistributed profits be specifically provided for and that we 
(Australia) consent to exempt all dividends paid to UK parents’.129 Following a 
meeting with Gregg, Mair cabled a draft paragraph to McGovern which gave effect to 
Willis’ suggestion but which included a proviso the intent of which was evidently to 
ensure that the rate of undistributed profits tax on private companies would not 
exceed the Australian rate of tax on dividends paid to a non-resident company.130  
2.114 McGovern rejected the proviso as it merely set a maximum rate but not a minimum 
rate for undistributed profits tax; he noted that, ‘Prime Minister advised Cabinet … 
                                                          
127  Memorandum ‘Australian tax on “Private Companies”’ by Willis, 15th May 1946, Inland 
Revenue file, pp179–80. 
128  Memorandum ‘Australian tax on “Private Companies”’ above n 127. 
129  McGovern to Mair, above n 110, 41. 
130  Mair to McGovern, 30th May 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p44. 
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that nothing in the treaty would give a UK company a trading advantage over an 
Australian company. This principle must be observed.’131 McGovern cabled a 
suggested draft, which became Article VI(4) of the treaty and stated that 
notwithstanding the earlier provisions in the article, the undistributed profits tax 
assessed to a private company was to be the amount that would have been 
assessable if those provisions had not been included in the treaty.  
 
Arm’s Length Computations And ITAA 1936 (Cth) s136 
2.115 Mair also pointed out to Gregg that the meeting of ministers had left the special 
position of oil companies open for further discussion.132 Australian Board of Review 
decisions had determined the profits of oil companies on what Mair had argued was 
arm’s length basis. The determination, however, had been made under the then s136 
of ITAA 1936 (Cth).133 The UK was concerned that s136 did not in terms require the 
use of arm’s length principles in determining taxable income.  
2.116 Australia was concerned that the draft Treaty would require the Commissioner to 
show that the relevant transaction was not for an arm’s length price whereas the 
Australian appeal provisions required the taxpayer to show that the s136 assessment 
was excessive. Hence Australia wanted the ‘arm’s length’ provisions in the draft 
treaty modified so as to leave the operation of s136 unaffected. In discussion Mair 
assured Willis that s136 was not invoked in normal cases if the profit ascertained was 
home consumption value, which Mair regarded as equivalent to arm’s length and 
stated that, for all practical purposes, the section was applied only in the case of oil 
companies.134  
                                                          
131  McGovern to Mair, 7th June 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, pp8–50 at p49. 
132  Mair to Gregg, 6th May 1946, Inland Revenue file, p168. 
133  As it stood at the time, s136 empowered the Australian Commissioner to determine the 
taxable income of a business carried on in Australia that was either: (a) controlled principally 
by non-residents; (b) carried on by a company in which the majority of shareholders were 
non-residents; or (c) carried on by a company which (directly or through nominees) held the 
majority of the shares of a non-resident company. These powers could be exercised where it 
appeared to the Commissioner that the business either produced no taxable income or 
produced less taxable income than might be expected from that business. On appeal, 
Australian Boards of Review had power to make assessments under s136. The progenitor to 
ITAA 1936 s136 was s23 of ITAA 1915, which was inserted by Act No 31 of 1921. This 
section became s28 in the 1922 consolidation ITAA 1922. The provisions were based on the 
UK legislation of 1918. For a brief discussion of the case law on s136 and its progenitors see 
R J Vann, ‘Transfer Pricing Disputes in Australia’, in Eduardo Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan 
(eds), Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes: A Global Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 
2012) 359–414. 
134  Mair to McGovern, above note 107, p18. 
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2.117 Cables between Mair and McGovern followed in which McGovern argued that the 
formula applied by the Boards of Review was in not truly arm’s length but was an 
attempt to arrive at what would be an arm’s length basis if sufficient information were 
available. Nonetheless, McGovern instructed Mair to ‘insist upon having the 
protection of arbitrary provisions to cover oil companies and the like, asking the UK to 
rely on the fact that any arbitrary Australian basis which did not reasonably 
approximate to what the result might be of a true arm’s length basis would not 
survive the taxpayer’s appeal to the Board of Review or the Australian Courts.’135  
2.118 Following further discussions with Gregg (in which Gregg expressed concern that 
s136 created uncertainty on whether an arm’s length basis was being applied), Mair 
pointed out to McGovern that, if the operation of s136 were not preserved in the 
treaty, the Commissioner could still make a determination under it but would be 
required to apply an arm’s length principle. While Mair thought it desirable to have 
s136 embodied in the treaty, he did not think that the case was sufficiently strong to 
make ‘divergence of views an issue between us’.136  
2.119 Willis wrote to Mair on the issue on 20th June 1946. Willis began by noting that it was 
common ground between Australia and the UK that the arm’s length basis was the 
right principle in computing profits of branches and subsidiaries, and pointed out that 
this was the League of Nations principle and that the UK regarded it as fundamental 
to any double taxation agreement dealing with trading profits. Although Willis 
understood that Australia adopted an arm’s length principle in applying s136, he 
noted that s136 did not actually state the principle and went to summarise the United 
Kingdom’s objection to a saving clause in relation to s136 as being: 
‘If … the agreement were to provide that Section 136 should remain 
unaffected by the arm’s length provisions, it would be equivalent to saying 
that those provisions could be ignored by the Commissioner. Indeed it might 
be taken as implying that Section 136 was not founded on the arm’s length 
principle. We know that neither the Commissioner nor the Board of Review 
would ignore the principle in practice, but the point is that they would be 
entitled to, and might even be expected to, and that is a position which we 
                                                          
135  McGovern to Mair, above note 108, p41. See also McGovern to Mair, 6th June 1946, NAA, 
ATO Cables of draft agreement, pp45 and 46. 
136  Mair to McGovern 7th June 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p51. 
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could not possibly accept. The agreement would be indefensibly one-sided if 
we were bound to observe the principle and you were not.’137 
Willis argued that, consistently with the broad requirements of the treaty provision, 
the Commissioner could still continue to make assessments under s136 and that in 
fact the taxpayer was required to show that the assessment was not on an arm’s 
length basis.138 
2.120 In a cable to McGovern dated 20th June 1946, Mair raised a further argument to the 
effect that the arm’s length principle as expressed in Article III(3) appeared to be too 
narrow. Article III(3) would not deal appropriately with the situation where a head 
office purchased from a related entity at an inflated price. Here, an independent party 
purchasing at arm’s length from the head office would not be expected to pay any 
less than the head office had paid for its purchases. In computing the profits of the 
permanent establishment, Article III(3) would produce a purchase price at least equal 
to the price paid by the head office. These were the circumstances existing in the 
Shell case where s136 had been able to be applied. Mair noted that the UK was 
agreeable to Article III(3) being widened so as to deal with this perceived problem.139 
2.121 Mair’s cable to McGovern of 20th June 1946 also included Whitlam’s opinion on the 
powers of the Commissioner under s136. The conclusion of Whitlam’s advice was 
that Article III(3) would impose no limitation on the existing practice in relation to s136 
but would prevent the Commissioner from adopting a narrower practice which, 
presumably, the Commissioner would not want to do. Hence, Whitlam considered 
that there was no justification at all for any qualification of Article III in relation to 
s136. If there was difficulty in accepting these views, Whitlam suggested that the 
matter be submitted to Dr Evatt (as Attorney-General) for his opinion.140 
                                                          
137  Willis to Mair 20th June 1946, Inland Revenue file, pp197ff. 
138  Willis to Mair, above n 137, 197ff. Mair cabled Willis’ letter to McGovern on the day of its 
receipt. Mair to McGovern, 21st June 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p67. 
139  Mair to McGovern, above n 138. The reference to ‘the Shell case’ is likely to be to Shell 
Company of Australia v FCT (1930) 44 CLR 530, a decision of the Privy Council on appeal 
from the decision of the Australian High Court in British Imperial Oil Co Ltd v FCT (1925) 35 
CLR 422 which concerned the validity of the appeal process and of s28 of ITAA 1922 (Cth), 
the predecessor section to ITAA 1936 s136. The cases on ITAA 1936 s136 are discussed in 
Gunn et al, above n 18, 1392–7 and in N E Challoner and C M Collins, Income Tax Law and 
Practice (Commonwealth) (The Law Book Co. of Australia, 1953) 896–912. See also the 
discussion in Vann, above n 131, 360–1. 
140  Mair to McGovern, above n 138, 70. 
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2.122 McGovern then sought the advice of the Australian Solicitor-General (Kenneth 
Bailey) on several questions in relation to the issue.141 Bailey’s opinion was that a 
covenant for ascertaining the quantum of taxable income of a taxpayer had been 
expressly contained in the original UK proposal of June 1945, and that Australia was 
bound to include the covenant in the treaty. Bailey drafted a provision which would 
have excluded taxpayer rights in relation to Article III(3) so that the article only had 
effect as an agreement between the contracting governments. In Bailey’s opinion, 
while the criteria applicable under Article III(3) and in s136 were broadly the same, 
one important difference was that the assessment of taxable income under s136 
rested on the judgment or determination of the Commissioner whereas Article III(3) 
depended on what the Commissioner was able to establish. This appeared to shift 
the onus from the taxpayer to the Commissioner. Nor was Bailey confident that the 
considerations for the application of the arm’s length basis under Article III(3) were as 
flexible as those under s136, for example, in the case of inflated prices paid by an 
English parent organisation that supplied goods to an Australian branch. Bailey’s 
opinion included a draft saving clause in relation to s136 which included the 
following: 
‘that discretion shall be exercised or that estimate shall be made with the 
object that the amount so liable to tax shall be determined, as nearly as the 
information available to the taxing authority permits, in accordance with 
paragraph (3) of this Article, but the application of that law and liability of any 
taxpayer shall not otherwise be affected by that paragraph.’142 
2.123 Given this advice, McGovern suggested that Mair request a re-expression of Article 
III(3) and Article IV as suggested by Bailey. McGovern considered that this should be 
acceptable to the UK officials in view of their previous comments.143  
2.124 The UK would not accept Bailey’s redraft of Article III(3) or his draft of the saving 
provision in relation to s136. The UK did not like the closing words of the saving 
provision as they might have prevented the taxpayer from exercising appeal rights to 
have profit determined in accordance with Article III. Mair indicated to McGovern that 
the UK would agree to extension of the original paragraph in the manner that Mair 
had foreshadowed in his cable of 20th June.144 This was achieved in the draft of 19th 
July 1946 by omitting the words ‘under the same or similar conditions’ from Article 
                                                          
141  The advice is quoted in full in McGovern to Mair 14th July 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft 
agreement, pp96–100. 
142  McGovern to Mair, above n 141, 100. 
143  McGovern to Mair, above n 141, 101. 
144  See the discussion at 2.120. 
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III(3) and rephrasing the requirement for adopting the arm’s length fiction in relation 
to dealings. This represented a further instance of variation, initiated by Australia, 
from the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty.  
2.125 To meet Australia’s concerns in relation to s136, the UK suggested that the following 
be added to Article III(3): 
‘If the information available to the Taxation Authority concerned is inadequate 
to determine the profits to be attributed to the permanent establishment 
nothing in this paragraph shall affect the application of the law of either 
territory in relation to the liability of the permanent establishment to pay tax on 
the amount determined by the exercise of a discretion or the making of an 
estimate by the Taxation Authority of that territory provided that such 
discretion shall be exercised or such estimate shall be made so far as 
information available to the Taxation Authority permits in accordance with the 
principle stated in this paragraph.’145 
2.126 Mair advised McGovern that Whitlam’s opinion was that the proposed addition fully 
safeguarded the powers of the Commissioner to exercise discretion or to make an 
estimate under s136. Mair suggested that, in order to reach finality the UK proposal 
be accepted.146 On 27th July 1946, McGovern advised Mair that the proposed saving 
provision in relation to s136 was acceptable.147 On 30th July, Mair cabled an 
amended Article IV, which included an equivalent saving provision in relation to 
s136.148 Hence both Article III(3) and Article IV(3) contained saving provisions, in the 
terms suggested by the UK as quoted at 2.125 The process that led to the insertion 
of these provisions was initiated by Australia, but the final form of the provision was a 
result of compromise between the negotiators. 
Foreign Tax Credits  
2.127 The treaty required that both the UK and Australia give a foreign tax credit to their 
residents in respect of tax paid in the other country on income sourced in the other 
country. However, the Australian obligation was limited to the situation where 
Australian tax was payable by the resident on income derived from sources in the 
United Kingdom.  
                                                          
145  Mair to McGovern, 25th July 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p115. 
146  Mair to McGovern, above n 145, 116. 
147  McGovern to Mair, 27th July 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, Mair to McGovern, 
above n 145, 119. 
148  Mair to McGovern, 30th July 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p123. 
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2.128 At the time, only foreign source dividend income and foreign source income which 
was exempt from tax in the source country was included in an Australian resident’s 
assessable income.149 Hence, the effect of the drafting was that, while this continued 
to be Australian domestic law, Australia was only required to apply a foreign tax 
credit in relation to dividends (and other income which was exempt from tax at 
source). Article XII(2) had been deliberately drafted so as to be able to require 
Australia to provide a foreign tax credit for all forms of income if Australia 
subsequently changed its domestic law and taxed residents on their worldwide 
income.150 
2.129 In the case of an ordinary dividend151 the UK was obliged, irrespective of the level of 
shareholding, to give credit for underlying Australian corporate tax against UK 
income tax in addition to credit for any Australian tax on the dividend itself.152 
Australia argued that all UK taxes on income which Australia had taxed on a source 
basis should be available for absorption of the tax credit. Australia was concerned 
that otherwise excess credits (arising, for example, from Australian undistributed 
profits tax liabilities) would not be able to be offset against UK excess profits tax 
liabilities.  
2.130 Although not agreeing to this suggestion, the UK indicated that as from 1st January 
1947 excess profits tax would be abolished and national defence contribution would 
be treated as an income tax for the purposes of the foreign tax credit provisions. As a 
consequence, Australia requested an exchange of letters between the High 
Commissioner and the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this issue.153 
2.131 In the case of a UK dividend, an Australian resident shareholder was only entitled to 
a credit if the shareholder elected to have the UK tax on the dividend (as reduced by 
                                                          
149  See the discussion at 2.7 and 2.13.  
150  NAA, ATO Tax Credits, ‘Article XII’ signature illegible p39 and NAA, ATO Tax Credits, 
McGovern to Chifley, 3rd October 1946, p121. 
151  In the case of preference shares the same treatment was given to Australian corporate tax to 
the extent that the dividend exceeded the fixed share of profits to which the preference 
shareholder was entitled.  
152  Under Article XII(1) of the Treaty, the UK was obliged to give credit for underlying Australian 
corporate tax to both UK companies and individuals irrespective of the level of shareholding. 
Although the Explanatory Memorandum to Income Tax Assessment Bill 1947, which gave the 
force of Australian law to the Treaty, contained examples at pp87–9 illustrating the Australian 
government’s understanding of the effect of Article XII(1). Example 3 at pp88–9 dealt with the 
situation where a dividend was paid by an Australian resident company to a UK resident 
individual. In Example 3, the dividend is grossed up for the nominal rates of Australian 
underlying corporate tax and Australian tax on the dividend itself. The UK practice, however, 
was to allow a gross up and credit at the lesser of the effective rate of UK tax on the dividend 
or the Australian effective tax rate (including underlying corporate tax) on the dividend. The 
UK practice is explained in Gunn et al, above n 18, 1164–6, para 1881AD. 
153  NAA, ATO Tax Credits, McGovern to Chifley, 3rd October 1946, p122. 
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any applicable UK reliefs) included in assessable income.154 If the election were not 
made, the High Court decision in Jolly v FCT (1934) 50 CLR 131155 would have 
meant that the UK tax was not included in the shareholder’s assessable income.  
2.132 The effect of the credit article and of its implementation in Australian law was that, 
irrespective of the level of shareholding, an Australian resident shareholder receiving 
a dividend who made the election was allowed a foreign tax credit for underlying UK 
tax levied on the company. Australia was obliged to give credit for UK tax deducted 
from the gross dividend but not for so much of the amount deducted as exceeded the 
net UK tax applicable to the dividend as reduced by reliefs allowed by the United 
Kingdom.  
2.133 Australia was concerned that the effect of the gross up was that an Australian 
resident investing in a UK company would be in a better after tax position than if the 
investment had been made in an Australian company or in a UK company with 
Australian source profits. Australia argued that the limit of the Australian credit should 
therefore be the excess of the UK standard rate (at that time 9/- in the £) over the 
Australian corporate rate (at that time 6/- in the £). The United Kingdom, 
understandably, would not agree because in all existing taxation treaties the credit 
allowed was up to the limit of the residence country’s own tax. Australia then 
requested that the Chancellor of the Exchequer give an assurance, to the effect that 
Article XII would be amended if the advantage gained by an investment in UK 
companies with only UK source income was being exploited by Australian 
investors.156  
2.134 Australia also raised questions as to how the UK would interpret what would 
eventually become Article XII(1) dealing with credit being given by the UK for 
Australian tax on Australian source income. Mair wrote to Gregg on 5th August 
1946157 outlining the situations in which Australia wanted assurances as to what the 
UK interpretation of the provision would be.  
2.135 One situation was where: (a) a dividend was paid to a UK resident by a company 
resident in a third country out of Australian source profits; and (b) interest was 
                                                          
154  Implemented in Australian law as ITAA 1936–1947 (Cth) s160L.  
155  See the discussion in notes 18 and 68 above. 
156 NAA, ATO Tax Credits, ‘Article XII’ signature illegible, p39 and NAA, ATO Tax Credits, 
McGovern to Chifley 3rd October 1946, p123. Under then current rates, the effect of the 
Australian request would have been that the limit of the credit would have been 3/- in the £ 
(being the difference between the UK standard rate and the Australian corporate rate) rather 
than 6/- in the £ (being the Australian corporate rate). 
157  Inland Revenue file, p221 (two pages), Mair to Gregg, 5th August 1946. 
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received by a UK resident on money secured by a mortgage over Australian real 
property. Here Australia was concerned about a potential conflict of source rules, 
recognising that, while particular types of income might be regarded as having an 
Australian source for Australian tax law purposes, it was possible that ‘the general 
law’ would determine that the source of the relevant income was in some other 
country. Mair noted that the understanding had been reached in discussions that the 
UK would give credit for the Australian tax paid in this situation. 
2.136 The second situation was where an Australian holding company was interposed 
between an Australian subsidiary and its UK parent. The Australian inter-corporate 
tax rebate would mean that the recipient Australian holding company would not have 
any net Australian tax liability on the inter-corporate dividend. Mair sought 
assurances that, in calculating the amount of creditable Australian tax, the UK would 
take into account the underlying tax paid by the Australian subsidiary on its profits. 
2.137 The third situation concerned the case of a dual resident company paying a dividend 
from profits which Australia regarded as having an Australian source but which the 
UK did not. Mair sought assurances that the UK would give credit for the Australian 
tax paid in this situation. 
2.138 Gregg’s reply gave the requested assurances in the second and third cases but not 
in the first, commenting: ‘The credit system on which the Draft Treaty is founded 
relates to income flowing from one country to the other and I do not like the idea of 
extending it to income flowing to other countries which may be a contributory to a 
pool of profits that may be distributed by that other country in the form of dividend.’ 
Gregg went on to describe this as a ‘rather freak case’ and noted that Australia’s 
claim to tax such a dividend was rarely enforceable anyway because of its extra-
territorial character. Gregg indicated that if a case arose where there were special 
circumstances, the UK would be prepared to consider it on its merits.158  
2.139 The exchange of letters providing the assurances requested at 2.130 and at 2.134 
took place on 29th October 1946 between the High Commissioner and the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer.159 
Exchange Of Information  
                                                          
158  Inland Revenue file, p223 (two pages), Gregg to Mair, 6th August 1946. On 23rd September 
1946 Mair also sought certain assurances from Gregg in relation to shipping profits, but the 
author has not yet located correspondence from Gregg giving the assurances requested. 
159  Beasley to Dalton, 29th October 1946, Inland Revenue file, pp294–6 and Dalton to Beasley, 
29th October 1946, Inland Revenue file, page number obscured.  
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2.140 The 1946 Treaty also contained an exchange of information article. In the initial 
negotiations, Australia had accepted the offer of an exchange of information article 
with alacrity.160 The exchange of information article in the original UK draft followed 
the equivalent article in the 1945 UK – US Treaty. In a cable to McGovern dated 20th 
May 1946, Mair noted that the UK was not prepared to unequivocally exchange 
information required by each taxing authority.161  
2.141 Australia requested the deletion of the reference to ‘against legal avoidance’. The UK 
would not agree to this as it was strongly opposed to the extension of the purposes 
for which information could be exchanged. One of the United Kingdom’s main 
concerns was that continental countries with which they expected to conclude double 
tax treaties would require an exchange of information article in similar terms and that, 
as a consequence, they would carry a heavy administrative burden in disclosing 
information about taxpayers to continental authorities.  
2.142 The UK did agree to amendments to the article which ensured that information could 
be divulged to a Court in addition to a Board of Review. These amendments were 
implemented in the draft of 19th July 1946, and amounted to another variation, 
initiated by Australia, from the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty. Mair’s view remained that 
Australia could relate the great majority of its enquiries to one of the purposes stated 
in the article and that the matter of extending the purposes for which information 
could be sought should not be pressed.162 
Residence Issues 
2.143 The definitions of ‘UK resident’ and ‘Australian resident’ in the treaty as finally signed 
referred to persons who were residents for the purposes of UK or Australian tax 
respectively and who were not residents of the treaty partner country for its tax 
purposes. The basic approach to defining ‘resident’ by reference to the domestic law 
of each treaty partner was contained in the UK draft of 6th May 1946, which followed 
the approach that had been used in the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty. However, the end 
result of the drafting process was that dual residents were not treaty residents 
although, as will be seen below, the treaty did provide benefits to dual residents in 
particular circumstances. Drafting devices163 were used to avoid some dual residence 
problems that were identified by the ATO administrative committee, but the treaty did 
not contain any general dual residence tie-breakers.  
                                                          
160  ‘Australia’ by Willis, above n 66, 73–4. 
161  Mair to McGovern, 20th May 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p36.  
162  Mair to McGovern, 8th July 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p92. 
163  See the discussion at 2.149 and 2.150. 
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2.144 Unlike every other taxation treaty that the UK entered into in this period, the treaty did 
not contain the second limb of the definition which had the effect of deeming a 
company to be resident where it was managed and controlled.164 The provision had 
been contained in the original draft submitted by the United Kingdom165 and was then 
amended in Draft II dated 22nd May 1946166. The amended provision reflected the 
test of Australian corporate residence in ITAA 1936 (Cth) s6(1).  
2.145 When the amended provision was circulated within the ATO, several comments 
noted that dual corporate residence was possible under the amended provision, for 
example, in the situation where an Australian incorporated company was managed 
and controlled in the United Kingdom. Mair also noted this in a cable to McGovern on 
9th May 1946, observing that dual residence would not cause difficulty where taxation 
was on a source basis as the other residence country would give credit, but that the 
position where a residence basis applied would be considered further when dealing 
with the tax credit article.167  
2.146 McGovern cabled Mair suggesting that the definition could be broken up into 
separate paragraphs dealing with: 1. UK residents other than a company; 2. 
Australian residents other than a company; 3. UK companies; and 4. Australian 
companies.168 Prior to receiving the comments from Australia, however, Mair and 
Willis had agreed to delete the provision referring to corporate residence entirely.  
2.147 Mair noted that Willis ‘was experiencing difficulty in deciding what, under U.K. law, is 
a company. They use the term ‘body of persons’ in their Act. We eventually decided 
that it was unnecessary to include therein any reference to a company’. Mair 
commented in the same cable, ‘It is not practicable to make a rule to avoid ‘double 
residency’ cases, as neither U.K. nor Australia could give up its existing principles of 
determining whether an individual or a company is resident of its territory. We must, 
therefore, accept as inescapable the case of the double resident. The proportion of 
such cases will, I feel sure, prove to be very small.’169  
                                                          
164  See the discussion of UK tax treaties of the time in Avery Jones, below note 169. 
165  NAA, ATO Progressive Draft, p21. 
166  NAA, ATO Progressive Draft, p50. A handwritten note on p52 (the first page of the draft) 
states, ‘This was first draft worked on in Australia’. 
167  Mair to McGovern, 9th May 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p16. 
168  McGovern to Mair 30th May 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, p42. 
169  ‘Extract from letter of Second Commissioner dated 11th June 1946, NAA, ATO Tax Credits, 
pp73–4. See also Mair to McGovern, 11th June 1946, NAA, ATO Cables of draft agreement, 
pp53–4. John Avery Jones has pointed out that all other UK tax treaties of the time had no 
difficulty in defining a company and suggests that either Willis used this as an excuse for not 
agreeing to an Australian proposal, possibly the redrafted provision referred to at 2.109, or 
that this was an excuse by Mair to McGovern as Commissioner for not achieving a dual 
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2.148 The ATO administrative committee of Belcher and Mills then comprehensively 
analysed double taxation possibilities that might arise in cases of dual corporate 
residence. Differing source rules on dividends between Australia and the UK could 
result in cases of unrelieved double taxation where the paying company was a dual 
resident. Belcher and Mills suggested that, while the problem would be overcome if 
the United Kingdom, for purposes of the treaty, adopted the Australian source rule for 
dividends, they noted that this might produce another potential double taxation 
problem if an Australian company paid a dividend to a UK resident where part of the 
profits of the paying company were derived in a third country such as NZ.170 Belcher 
and Mills noted that it appeared that the UK would agree to allow a credit in the first 
case and that, in the circumstances, an exchange of letters on the point would be 
sufficient considering the relative importance of the matter.171 This suggestion 
ultimately led to the third of the assurances sought from Gregg to Mair on 6th August 
1946.172 
2.149 A further problem that was recognised was where a dual resident received income 
that had been derived in a third country. Here Article XII(3) provided that a 
proportional credit would be allowed by each contracting government. The drafting 
device used in this situation was to refer to ‘a resident of Australia for the purposes of 
Australian tax, who is also a resident of the UK for the purposes of UK tax’ and not to 
‘Australian resident’ nor to ‘UK resident’ as defined in Article II. The intention was that 
dual residents would have the benefit of a proportionate credit in this situation but as 
they were neither Australian residents nor UK residents as defined would not have 
treaty benefits generally.  
2.150 Similarly, the reductions in source taxation in the dividend article applied where the 
paying company was a ‘resident of Australia (whether or not also a resident of the UK 
or elsewhere)’ or a ‘resident of the UK (whether or not also a resident of Australia or 
elsewhere)’. Again, the effect of the drafting was that relief would still be available 
where the paying company was a dual resident even though a dual resident was not 
a treaty resident. As Belcher noted, however, the distinction between ‘Australian 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
residence tie-breaker. John F Avery Jones, ‘Defining and Taxing Companies 1799 to 1965’ in 
John Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law (Hart Publishing, 2012) vol 5, 1 at fn 2 and 
accompanying text. 
170  Article XII(2) of the Treaty, although not the original draft, deemed, for the purposes of the 
credit provisions, a dividend paid by a company resident in the UK to be derived from sources 
in the UK, thus applying the same source rule for inbound dividends to Australia as the UK 
applied to dividends. 
171  ‘Dual Residence’, signed ‘Belcher’ ‘Mills’. NAA, ATO, Tax Credits, p75. 
172  See the discussion at 2.137. 
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resident’ and ‘UK resident’ on the one hand and ‘resident of Australia’ and ‘resident 
of the United Kingdom’ was not apparent from the treaty itself.173 
The Signing Of The Treaty And Its Entry Into Force In Australian Law 
2.151 The treaty was signed in London on behalf of the UK by Hugh Dalton, as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and on behalf of Australia by John (Jack) Beasley, as Australian 
Minister in London on 29th October 1946. The treaty was given the force of law in 
Australia as the Third Schedule to ITAA 1936 (Cth) by s37 of ITAA (No 1) 1947 (Act 
No 11 of 1947). Article XV of the Treaty provided that it had effect in Australia as 
respects tax for the year beginning on 1st July 1946 and all subsequent years. 
Significance Of The Treaty For Australia’s Subsequent Taxation Treaty Policy And 
Practice  
2.152 The significance of the 1946 UK Treaty for Australia’s subsequent treaty policy and 
practice cannot be overstated. The perception as to why the treaty was necessary 
and the terms that Australia agreed to under it made a significant contribution to 
Australia’s reluctance to enter into further taxation treaties at least until the early to 
mid 1960s.  
2.153 Although the UK initiated the negotiations for the treaty, Australia saw it as preferable 
to the previous system of Dominion Income Tax Relief, which by 1945 was no longer 
fully relieving international double taxation of non-portfolio dividends and was seen 
as inhibiting UK post war investment in Australia.174 From this perspective, the most 
significant benefit that Australia obtained was the granting of a full foreign tax credit, 
including a credit for Australian underlying corporate tax irrespective of the level of 
shareholding.175 However, the most significant concession that Australia made in 
obtaining this benefit, exempting dividends paid by wholly owned Australian 
subsidiaries of UK companies from source taxation, was a key factor in inhibiting 
Australia from entering into tax treaties with the US, Canada and NZ in the 1940s 
despite receiving requests for tax treaties from each of those countries in that period.  
                                                          
173  ‘Dual Resident’, signed by Belcher, 24/6/1946, NAA, ATO Definitions, pp32–3. It is unclear 
whether the UK or Australia initiated the inclusion of this provision. Mair advised McGovern of 
the addition of Article XII(3) by cable dated 8th July 1946 and indicated that he considered the 
provision equitable but gave no clear indication of who initiated the amendment. Mair to 
McGovern, 8th July 1946, NAA, ATO, Cables of draft agreement. McGovern on 12th July 1946 
advised Mair of agreement with the principle of Article XII(3) and suggested amendments 
clarifying the method for calculating the credit, which were reflected in the final version of the 
article. McGovern to Mair, 12th July 1946, NAA, ATO, Cables of draft agreement. 
174  See the discussion at 2.28–2.30. 
175  See the discussion at 2.92 and 2.129. 
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2.154 The Treaty also established a structure which was to persist virtually intact in 
Australian treaties until the end of the 1960s and which did not entirely disappear 
until 1980. This structure involved: defining industrial or commercial profits in terms 
that excluded other items of income which were not necessarily dealt with under the 
distributive articles of the treaty; not having an interest article; not having a capital 
gains article; and not having an ‘other income’ article.  
2.155 Throughout the negotiations leading to the ministerial agreement, Australian 
politicians, while wanting to encourage direct UK investment in Australia, reaffirmed 
the Australian emphasis on source basis taxation and, while conceding significant 
reductions in source taxation of dividends paid to parents of wholly owned 
subsidiaries and a residence basis on shipping and aircraft profits, maintained full 
source country taxing rights on other key areas such as interest and mineral 
royalties.176 Chifley, at least, was aware of the economic reality of Australia as a net 
capital importer underpinning the emphasis on source basis taxation.177  
2.156 The politicians were also concerned with preserving the operation of Australia’s 
domestic law on the taxation of film business and of insurance business controlled 
abroad; an attitude that was to persist in subsequent Australian taxation treaty policy 
and practice. 
2.157 It is arguable that the terms on which the UK had recently negotiated treaties with 
Canada and South Africa appear to have influenced the overall bargain that Australia 
agreed to in the 1946 UK Treaty.178 
2.158 Similar but not identical influential factors are evident in discussions between officials 
and between officials and ministers prior to the ministerial agreement. In briefing 
Evatt, Jackson had stressed the importance of obtaining full relief from international 
double taxation in the parent–subsidiary situation.179 The importance of relieving 
trade from double taxation was also recognised by Coombs in his meeting with 
Gregg.180 A clear emphasis on source taxation can be seen at several points.181 The 
status of Australia as a net capital importer is raised in Jackson’s briefing of Evatt,182 
                                                          
176  See the discussion at 2.40–2.43, 2.57, 2.72–2.76 and 2.90.  
177  See the discussion at 2.42. 
178  See the argument to this effect in 2.80 and 2.90. 
179  See the discussion at 2.66. 
180  Coombs meeting with Gregg is discussed at 2.89. 
181  See the discussion at 2.47, 2.59 and 2.62–2.66. 
182  See the discussion at 2.68. 
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and Gregg’s letter to Trend also indicates that Australia referred to its status as a net 
capital importer.183  
2.159 Jackson, in his meetings and correspondence with Gregg and Willis, also raises the 
different structures of the Australian and UK systems of corporate-shareholder 
taxation as an argument against exempting dividends paid by wholly owned 
subsidiaries.184 In discussions with Gregg and Willis, but not with Australian 
politicians, Jackson argued against provisions which would have resulted in 
discrimination against Australian companies185 and raised political considerations as 
a reason for not agreeing to a shipping exemption.186 Although Gregg had justified 
residence basis taxation of shipping as a League of Nations principle and as 
something with which Canada and Eire had agreed,187 Jackson does not appear to 
have been influenced by these arguments.  
2.160 At the technical drafting level, a desire to maximise source basis taxation, a concern 
to preserve the operation of domestic law provisions having that effect, and concerns 
about anticipated technical problems relating to the interaction of the Treaty with 
Australian domestic law all intertwine with no clear dominant emphasis on any one of 
these objectives in particular being evident. Australian officials were concerned with 
preserving the operation provisions of domestic law (such as ITAA 1936 s136188) and 
with dealing with anticipated technical problems that were products of the interaction 
of the treaty with Australian domestic law. This could be seen in the extended 
correspondence and negotiations in relation to undistributed profits tax,189 credit 
issues190 and dual residence issues.191 Both the attitude and, to varying degrees, the 
drafting techniques were to influence subsequent Australian treaty practice 
particularly to the end of the 1950s but, to a lesser extent, under the entire period 
reviewed in this thesis.  
2.161 A large proportion of variations from the OECD Model in currently operative 
Australian tax treaties can be traced directly to the 1946 UK Treaty. Half of these 
were the result of following the UK draft following the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty. Six 
of the variations from the OECD Model which were not the result of following the 
                                                          
183  Gregg’s letter to Trend is discussed at 2.86. 
184  See the discussion at 2.61. 
185  As discussed at 2.63, this was Jackson’s argument in response to the UK request to exempt 
UK companies from Australian undistributed profits tax on Australian sourced income. 
186  See the discussion at 2.64. 
187  See the discussion at 2.54. 
188  See the discussion at 2.115–2.126. 
189  See the discussion at 2.109–2.114. 
190  Discussed at 2.127–2.139. 
191  Residence issues in the Treaty are discussed at 2.143–2.150. 
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1945 UK – US Tax Treaty were initiated by the UK, although five of these were 
modified by Australia in the drafting process, and the remaining four were initiated by 
Australia. Therefore, of the ten variations from the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty, nine 
were either initiated or modified by Australia.  
2.162 All of the structural features of the treaty described at 2.102 to 2.103 were found in 
the first UK draft and were readily accepted by Australia. Australia’s acceptance of 
the structure is explained by its consistency with the emphasis on the primacy of 
source basis taxation made by both Australian politicians and officials throughout the 
negotiations. The absence of an equivalent to OECD Model Article 21 was initiated 
by the UK and, like 80% of the variations from the current OECD Model initiated by 
the United Kingdom, was consistent with the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty.  
2.163 In one respect, however, a variation, although appearing in the initial UK draft, 
appears to have been the product of the ministerial agreement discussed at 2.90. 
This was the absence of an ‘interest’ article. The initial UK proposals192 and the 1945 
UK – US Tax Treaty both included an ‘interest’ article.  
2.164 A variation from the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty that was part of the initial UK draft but 
which does not appear to have been the subject of any discussion was the absence 
of a capital gains article. The most likely explanation for both the absence of the 
article and discussion of its omission is that, at the time, neither the UK nor Australia 
had a general capital gains tax.193  
2.165 The final structure of not having an interest article, not having a capital gains article 
and not having an ‘other income’ article enabled effect to be given to the ministerial 
agreement discussed at 2.90 in relation to items where full source country taxing 
rights were retained; in that sense, the structure was indirectly initiated by Australia. 
Other than the omission of an interest article and restricting the scope of residence 
taxation of royalties, the variations that Australia initiated or modified were all 
concerned with the intertwining of concerns to maximise source basis taxation, to 
preserve the operation of certain domestic law provisions and to avoid anticipated 
technical problems associated with the interaction of domestic law with the Treaty. 
2.166 Unlike the negotiations that led to the system of Dominion Income Tax Relief,194 this 
was a bilateral negotiation in which concessions on particular articles could be traded 
                                                          
192  The initial UK proposals were discussed at 2.33–2.39. 
193  See the argument to this effect at 2.106. 
194  The negotiations leading to the system of Dominion Income Tax Relief were discussed at 
2.22–2.26. 
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against each other and in which the practice of the treaty partner (the UK in this 
instance) and of third countries (particularly the US) or of international organisations 
(in this instance the League of Nations) could be and was used as a precedent for 
the appropriate treatment. Australian politicians and officials learnt that hard 
bargaining, intransigence and reference to precedents could produce favourable 
results. These attitudes were to be evident in varying degrees in most of Australia’s 
subsequent taxation treaty negotiations in the period examined in this thesis.  
2.167 Finally, the negotiation and drafting of the Treaty established a process which, in 
broad terms, was followed in subsequent Australian taxation treaties in the period 
reviewed in this thesis. Politicians were responsible for and interested in the broad 
framework of the Treaty as it affected Australian revenues and foreign direct 
investment. Up to this point there is little evidence (other than the involvement of H C 
Coombs195) in the archives examined by the author of the Australian Department of 
the Treasury having a significant advisory role in relation to these broad policy 
issues. The ATO team, led by either the Commissioner or a Second Commissioner, 
was to be the principal technical negotiator with drafting assistance being provided by 
the Crown Solicitor’s office and with technical issues and revenue estimates being 
referred to ATO committees and Deputy Commissioners for comment. The major 
change in process that occurs in the period reviewed in this thesis is the increasing 
role of the Department of the Treasury in relation to broad policy issues. That 
increase in role began to become evident when Australia considered how to respond 
to requests for tax treaties received from the US and other countries in the 1940s and 
1950s. 
 
2.168  The next chapter discusses the negotiation and drafting of the two Australian tax 
treaties entered into in the 1950s.  Emphasis is placed on the negotiation and 
drafting of the 1953 US  Tax Treaty   but brief consideration is also given to the  1957  
Canada Tax Treaty.    The  chapter includes a discussion of: (a)  the economic and 
strategic background  to these treaties; (b)   Australia’s reluctance to enter into 
further  tax  treaties between  1946 and 1953;  and   (c)   the  distinctive  features of 
Australian tax  treaty practice that can  be  traced to these treaties.
                                                          
195  Coombs’ involvement is discussed at 2.81, 2.89 and 2.90. As discussed above note 99, 
Coombs had previously been a Treasury economist. 
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CHAPTER THREE: AUSTRALIA’S TAX TREATIES NEGOTIATED IN THE 1950s 
3.1 Following the 1946 UK Treaty, Australia did not enter into another tax treaty 
until the 1953 US Treaty. The 1957 Canada Treaty was the only other tax 
treaty that Australia entered into in the 1950s, although the negotiation and 
drafting of the 1960 NZ Treaty commenced in the 1950s. This was 
notwithstanding the fact that the United States, Canada and NZ first offered to 
enter into a tax treaty with Australia in 1947 and 1945 respectively.1 Australia 
also received offers of tax treaties from several European countries in the 
1950s.2  
3.2 Clearly, Australia was reluctant to enter into any tax treaties at all between 
1946 and 1950, and for the rest of the 1950s Australia took a cautious 
approach to entering into tax treaties. This raises a question which this 
chapter shall endeavour to answer: What factors influenced Australia’s 
cautious approach to tax treaties in this period?  
3.3 Some of the distinctive features of Australian tax treaty practice emerged in 
this period, while other distinctive features having their origins in the 1946 UK 
Treaty were consolidated and refined in this period. Chapter 4 will show that 
the Australian model circulated to potential treaty partners in the early 1960s 
was influenced by the Australian treaties of this period. 
3.4 Australia’s three tax treaties negotiated in the 1950s have many features in 
common. The 1953 US Treaty formed the basis for the 1957 Canada Treaty 
and the 1960 NZ Treaty. This chapter begins with a discussion of the history 
of the development of the Australian economy and taxation system and 
                                                          
1  Correspondence on a potential tax treaty with the US is summarised in Australian 
Department of External Affairs memorandum to the Minister for External Affairs dated 
20th December 1949, NAA, External Affairs file, Part 1. The 1947 Canadian request 
for a bilateral tax treaty with Australia is discussed in C John Taylor, ‘The Negotiation 
and Drafting of the First Australia–Canada Taxation Treaty (1957)’ (2013) 61 
Canadian Tax Journal 915 at 922–8. The negotiations in the 1940s with New Zealand 
are summarised in a memorandum by E M W Visbord to Mr Pryor dated 28th 
November 1958. The earliest correspondence on a possible tax treaty was Tom 
D’Aton, High Commissioner for New Zealand to H V Evatt, Minister for External 
Affairs (no date, but from a memorandum forwarding copies of the letter to other 
departments, it appears that the date received was 21st August 1945). All these 
documents are in ‘Taxation With Other Countries – Australia – New Zealand Double 
Taxation’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 1956/1469 Pt 1. 
2  ‘Confidential for Cabinet: Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries: 
Submission 305: Harold Holt, Treasurer, 16th July 1962’, NAA, Series Number A5818, 
Control Symbol: Volume, Agendum 305 submission noted that requests for tax 
treaties had been received from several countries including Japan, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Denmark, Greece, Malaya, Singapore, South Africa and Egypt. 
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discusses Australian strategic policy in the period from 1945 to 1950. It then 
examines the Australian reluctance to enter into tax treaties in the period 
between 1945 and 1950 and the change of policy with the election of the 
Menzies government in 1949.  
3.5 The chapter then examines the negotiating and drafting of the 1953 US 
Treaty. Rather than discussing the negotiation and drafting of the 1957 
Canada Treaty in detail, the chapter discusses the significance of the 1957 
Canada Treaty for the key questions examined in this thesis. The chapter, 
due in part to a paucity of archival material, does not discuss the negotiation 
and drafting of the 1960 NZ treaty.3  
The 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty: Economic And Strategic Background – 
Australian Economic And Strategic Policy, 1945–50 
3.6 The US–Australia alliance is popularly regarded as beginning in 1941 with 
Prime Minister John Curtin’s declaration: 
‘Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia 
looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or 
kinship with the UK.’4 
 Nonetheless, in the last two years of his prime ministership, Curtin had been 
distrustful of American plans for the Pacific and had returned to emphasising 
the British Empire as the base for Australia’s military and economic security, 
emphases that were to be continued by the Chifley government.5 
                                                          
3  Files have been located at the National Archives of Australia and at Archives New 
Zealand relating to the negotiation and drafting of the treaty, but the major content of 
these files relates to an earlier Heads of Agreement for a tax treaty which would have 
attempted to resolve problems associated with the use at the time of different 
systems of corporate-shareholder taxation by Australia (classical) and NZ (dividend 
exemption). Difficulties in reconciling different types of corporate-shareholder taxation 
systems will be identified in Chapter 7 as one of the factors that influenced Australian 
tax treaty policy and practice during the period reviewed in this thesis. The files in the 
National Archives of Australia and Archives New Zealand clearly show that difficulties 
in reconciling the systems of corporate-shareholder taxation and disagreements as to 
how this should be done were the major reasons why Australia did not enter into a tax 
treaty with NZ until 1960. 
4  Herald, Melbourne, 27th December 1941 as quoted in D Day, John Curtin: A Life 
(Harper Perennial, 1999) 485. 
5  Curtin’s change of stance is discussed in Day, above n 4, ch 38 in particular 577–83. 
The continuity of the Chifley government’s policies with those of the Curtin 
government in this respect is discussed in D Day, Chifley (Harper Collins Publishers, 
2001) 451. 
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3.7 Australian policymakers during the Second World War had low expectations 
for the anticipated post war recovery.6 Notwithstanding the Chifley 
government’s restrictive approach to sources of funding for economic 
expansion, Australia’s economic performance in the years 1945 to 1949 
significantly exceeded these expectations. What had been a complementary 
relationship between Australia as a producer of raw materials and agricultural 
produce and the UK as a producer of manufactured goods and a consumer of 
agricultural products had been significantly challenged by the expansion of 
Australia’s manufacturing industry.7 
3.8 High wool prices led to Australia having a balance of payments surplus with 
the UK. This coupled with immigration and UK capital investment led to 
continued economic growth, inflation and a surge in demand for both capital 
and consumer goods which the UK was unable to satisfy fully by 1949.8 The 
restoration of the convertibility of the pound sterling in 1947 brought on a 
dollar crisis in consequence of which, following the suspension of 
convertibility, countries in the Sterling Area (such as Australia) resolved to 
reduce their dollar imports.9  
3.9 In the late 1940s, the US was the only reliable supplier of capital and 
consumer goods; however, the import restrictions on dollar goods, introduced 
following the convertibility crisis, meant that sufficient US goods could not be 
imported.10 By 1949, Australia needed both debt and equity investment in 
dollars if it were to continue with a policy of economic growth through 
immigration and the development of its manufacturing industry. The Chifley 
                                                          
6  Historians argue that the pessimism was based on the short boom and long 
depression that followed the First World War. See the discussion in P L Robertson, 
‘The Decline of Economic Complementarity? Australia and Britain 1945–1952’ (1997) 
37 Australian Economic History Review 91 at 93; T Rooth, ‘Imperial Self-Sufficiency 
Rediscovered: Britain and Australia 1945–1951’ (1999) 39 Australian Economic 
History Review 29 at 31; T Rooth, ‘Australia, Canada, and the International Economy 
in the Era of Postwar Reconstruction, 1945–50’ (2000) 40 Australian Economic 
History Review 127 at 129. 
7  See the discussion at 2.5 and 2.6. 
8  See the discussion in Robertson, above n 6 and in particular Rooth, 1999, above n 6. 
9  The response of Australia and other countries in the Sterling Area to the 1947 
convertibility crisis is discussed in Robertson, above n 6, 96–8 and in P L Robertson, 
‘Australia, Britain and the Sterling Area, 1945–52’ (2997) 37 Austrailan Economic 
History Review 91. 
10  See the discussion in John Singleton and Paul L Robertson, Economic Relations 
Between Britain and Australasia 1945–1970 (Palgrave, 2002) 54–6. 
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government, however, was averse to borrowing from the US or Canada or 
from international institutions such as the World Bank.11 
3.10 Prior to its election in 1949, the Menzies Liberal/Country Coalition argued that 
‘acute dollar restrictions’ were limiting Australia’s development and that 
Australia should borrow dollars from either the World Bank, the Export-Import 
Bank of the United States or the New York market.12 Following the Coalition 
victory in 1949, Menzies consulted with UK ministers in London for advice, 
then visited Washington and secured a loan of $100 million on favourable 
terms from the World Bank.13 In other respects, however, particularly with its 
emphasis on development of the manufacturing industry and immigration, the 
initial economic policies of the Menzies government represented a 
development of, rather than an abrogation of, those of the Chifley 
government.14  
The Australian Income Tax System Between 1945 and 1951 
3.11 No fundamental changes were made in the basic structure of the Australian 
income tax system between 1950 and 1953 from that described in Chapter 
2.15 The deduction for foreign tax paid on dividends received by individuals 
had been replaced with a rebate of foreign tax in 1947.16 The rebate under 
s46(2A)17 for dividends paid out of profits which had borne super tax was 
repealed with the abolition of super tax discussed below. Undistributed profits 
tax on non-private companies was abolished in 1951.18  
                                                          
11  See the discussion in Robertson, above n 6, 100–01. See also the discussion at 2.5 
of the background to the Australian and particularly the Chifley government’s distrust 
of the United States. 
12  See the discussion in Robertson, above n 6, 100–01. 
13  See the discussion in Robertson, above n 6, 100–03 and in Singleton and Robertson, 
above n 10, 59–63. 
14  For a summary, see the discussion in Singleton and Robertson, above n 10, 72–4, 
who note, however, that there was a shift to a greater emphasis on agriculture from 
1952 onwards. R G Menzies had previously been Prime Minister in a United Australia 
Party government from 1939 to 1941. Menzies and others formed the Liberal Party of 
Australia in December 1944. Menzies was Prime Minister in a Liberal–Country Party 
Coalition for a record term from December 1949 to his retirement in January 1966. 
Allan Martin, ‘Sir Robert Gordon Menzies’ in Michelle Grattan (ed), Australian Prime 
Ministers (New Holland Publishers, 2000), 175–205. 
15  See the discussion at 2.7 to 2.17. 
16  ITAA 1936 former s45 introduced by ITAA 1947 (Cth). 
17  The rebate was discussed at note 19 in Chapter 2. 
18  The provisions dealing with further tax on undistributed income of non-private 
companies had been contained in ITAA 1936 Part IIIA, which was omitted by s18 of 
the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1951 (Cth). 
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3.12 Tax rates changed during the period. Super tax and the corporate rate were 
unchanged between 1945 and 1948, but War-Time (Company) Tax ceased to 
apply from 30th June 1947.19 A progressive rate for companies applied 
between 1948 and 1950, with tax being levied at a rate of 25% on the first 
£5000 of taxable income and at a rate of 30% thereafter. Super tax was not 
applied from 1st July 1951, but non-private companies were taxed at a flat rate 
of 35% and in addition were required to pay a special levy of 10%. The 
progressive rate scale was continued for private companies in 1951, with the 
rate on taxable income above £5000 increasing to 35%.20  
The 1951 Decision To Negotiate A Taxation Treaty With The United States 
3.13 The decision to negotiate a taxation treaty with the US has to be seen against 
the more general economic policy background outlined above and against 
Australia’s somewhat negative experience in negotiating the 1946 UK Treaty. 
While that treaty contained provisions which became distinctive features of 
Australian treaty practice, it exempted from source taxation dividends paid by 
wholly owned subsidiaries. Australian agreement to such a restrictive 
approach to source taxation of dividends occurred because this was part of a 
total package of offsetting compromises which, taken as a whole, was 
                                                          
19  War-Time (Company) Tax Assessment Act 1940 (Cth) s13 as amended by War-Time 
(Company) Tax Assessment Act 1942 (Cth) had imposed war-time (company) tax ‘up 
to and including the financial year in which the present war terminates’. War Time 
(Company) Tax Assessment Act 1942 (Cth) included a definition of ‘the present war’ 
in s3 of the War-Time (Company) Tax Assessment Act 1940 (Cth). The definition of 
‘the present war’ was removed by War-Time (Company) Tax Assessment Act 1947 
(Cth), which amended s13 of the Principal Act by replacing the words ‘next 
succeeding that in which the present war terminates’ with the words ‘which 
commenced on the first day of July, One thousand nine hundred and forty six’. In 
addition, s3 of the War-Time (Company) Tax Act 1947 (Cth) amended s6 of the War-
Time (Company) Tax Act 1940 (Cth) stating, in effect, that the tax was to be imposed 
up to and including the financial year which began on 1st July 1946.  
20  Company rates applying between 1945 and 1951 are summarised in N E Challoner 
and C M Collins, Income Tax: Law and Practice (Commonwealth) (Law Book Co. of 
Australasia Pty Ltd, 1953) 317. The House of Representatives Explanatory Note to 
the Sixth Schedule of the Resolution to Declare the Rates of Income Tax and Social 
Services Contribution for the Financial Year 1951–1952 mentions that for the financial 
year 1950–51, public companies were liable to pay super tax at the rate of 5% on 
income above £5000. The Sixth Schedule did not impose super tax as such for the 
1951–52 financial year, but paragraph 10 of the Sixth Schedule imposed additional 
tax at the rate of 20% on the taxable income of companies other than private 
companies, trustees, mutual life assurance companies, co-operative companies, and 
non-profit companies prohibited from making distributions to their members. 
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perceived to place Australia in a better position than had been the case under 
the UK ’s system of Dominion Income Tax Relief.21 
The Chifley Government’s Reluctance To Negotiate 
3.14 The US informally raised the possibility of a taxation treaty with Australia as 
early as 1945. A formal approach was made by the US in October 1947, 
followed by the submission of a detailed proposal in September 1948. On 24th 
February 1949, the Australian government advised the US that Australia was 
not disposed to enter into a treaty which went beyond formalising the existing 
arrangements and that there appeared to be little scope for an agreement 
which could show a balancing of advantages in any apparent form.22  
3.15 In this period, the technical answer of the Australian Treasury and ATO to 
these offers was that the Australian exemption system and the US unilateral 
foreign tax credit system meant that double taxation did not really exist 
between Australia and the US. While Australia saw advantages in a bilateral 
treaty which preserved the existing mechanisms in each country for 
preventing international double taxation, it did not favour any treaty which 
involved further adjustments. The view of Australian officials was that any 
double taxation that did occur was caused by differences in tax rates between 
the two countries rather than the absence of appropriate mechanisms for 
relieving international double taxation. Therefore, any double taxation could 
only be relieved by reducing Australian tax rates, particularly on dividends 
paid to foreign shareholders. Based on the precedent of the 1946 UK Treaty, 
Australia believed that the required concessions, particularly in relation to 
dividends paid to parents by wholly owned subsidiaries, would cost revenue 
and would to some extent provide benefits to the US treasury and not to US 
investors.23 
3.16 Exacerbation of Australia’s dollar difficulties through a repatriation of profits by 
US direct/non-portfolio investors was another factor that the Chifley 
government and officials took into account. The attitude was that good 
                                                          
21  See the argument to this effect at 2.166. 
22  The history of the correspondence is summarised in an Australian Department of 
External Affairs memorandum to the Minister for External Affairs dated 20th December 
1949, NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 1.  
23  See Acting Commissioner of Taxation to The Secretary of the Treasury, 4th January 
1950 in NAA, External Affairs file Pt 1 and McGovern, Commissioner of Taxation, to 
the Commonwealth Treasurer (Arthur Fadden), 26th January 1950, NAA, External 
Affairs file, Pt 1. 
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relations between Australia and the US would not depend on the existence of 
a bilateral taxation treaty in which the US obtained an annual monetary 
advantage.24 The US Ambassador considered that the Labor government 
generally, and Chifley in particular, focused too much of the revenue cost of a 
treaty to Australia and were insufficiently aware of the wider benefits that the 
US considered would flow from a taxation treaty.25  
The Menzies Government’s Reconsideration Of The Position 
3.17 Several factors in combination led to a reconsideration of Australia’s attitude 
following the election of the Menzies government. One was certainly the more 
positive attitude, discussed above, of the Menzies government to US 
investment generally. Nonetheless, for a time, concerns remained about the 
effect of profit repatriations by direct investors on Australia’s limited dollar 
reserves.26 Concerns also lingered about the inflationary effects of increased 
US direct investment given the shortages in labour, raw materials and 
essential services produced by the rapid post war growth in Australia.27 
3.18 The general geopolitical context was also relevant. The Australian 
Department of External Affairs was in favour of entering into a double tax 
treaty with the US to maintain good relations with Australia’s important World 
War II ally.28 The victory of the Communists in China in 1949 focused US 
                                                          
24  See McGovern to Fadden, 26th January 1950, above n 23. The letter also mentions 
that the former Treasurer (J B Chifley) took this view. Similar views are expressed in 
Acting Commissioner of Taxation to The Secretary of the Treasury, 4th January 1950, 
above n 23. 
25  American Ambassador, American Embassy, Canberra to the Honorable [sic] 
Secretary of State, Washington, 17th November 1948, US National Archives and 
Records Administration, General Records of the Department of State, RG59 (67D 
258) (OMA/IP) Double Taxation: Australia, ARC Identifier 2507614, MLR Number A1 
1597-C. 
26  An internal memo dated 23rd March 1950 of the Australian Department of External 
Affairs to the Minister notes that the second report of the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Dollar Receipts (on which the Department of External Affairs was not 
represented) tentatively recommended against a taxation treaty with the US on the 
grounds of revenue cost and diminution of scarce dollar reserves. NAA, External 
Affairs file, Pt 1.  
27  See the discussion in Singleton and Robertson above n 10, 60–1. 
28  On 22nd December 1949 Norman Makin, the then Australian Ambassador to the 
United States, in the context of discussing a possible double taxation treaty with the 
US (among other issues) had recommended to the Australian Minister for External 
Affairs that ‘Australia’s efforts should be directed towards making itself an important, if 
not essential, country in the US strategic, commercial and financial thinking.’ Norman 
Makin, Ambassador, Australian Embassy, Washington, DC to External, 22nd 
December 1949, The draft submission to Cabinet for the Minister for External Affairs 
dated approximately 22nd February 1951 began with the following comment: ‘An 
urgent decision by Cabinet is desirable on the question of a Tax Convention with the 
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strategic attention to the Asia-Pacific where Australia as a European outpost 
assumed greater strategic and economic importance than the size of its 
population and economy would have otherwise warranted. The Korean War 
broke out on 25th June 1950 and, following involvement of the US and 
pursuant to a United Nations Security Council resolution, Australia announced 
that it would contribute militarily to the conflict. The early commitment of 
Australian forces to the Korean War enhanced US goodwill towards 
Australia.29 
3.19 Research based on archival sources from the period argues that the US 
actively sought regional military treaties as part of overall resistance to 
Communism and that Australia too, since the Chifley government, had 
desired a formal military alliance with the US as a means of ensuring its own 
security. These mutually compatible objectives led to the 1951 ANZUS Treaty 
between Australia, the US and NZ.30  
3.20 The Korean War led to a boom, fuelled by a steep rise in wool prices, in the 
Australian economy which lasted until May 1951.31 The resulting inflation was 
to be a contributing factor to the Fadden ‘horror budget’ of 1951–52.32   
                                                                                                                                                                      
USA. In view of the current negotiations with the US on a Japanese peace settlement 
and security arrangements in the Pacific area, the importance of demonstrating to the 
US Government that we are approaching outstanding problems in a co-operative 
spirit is more than ever apparent. The negotiation of a convention for the avoidance of 
double taxation, which for more than three years has been constantly urged on us as 
a mutually beneficial arrangement is an important means of achieving this object.’ 
Both documents are contained in NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 1. 
29  Points made by Singleton and Robertson, above n 10, 73. 
30  D McLean, ‘Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical Review’ (2001) 23 
International History Review 253 at 307–08 outlines the conventional interpretation of 
historians that Australia’s early military involvement in the Korean War, ahead of the 
British commitment of ground forces, enhanced US goodwill towards Australia and 
led a somewhat reluctant US to the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. McLean’s own research (D 
McLean, ‘ANZUS Origins: A Reassessment’ (1990) Australian Historical Studies 64 
and D McLean, ‘From British Colony to American Satellite?: Australia and the US 
during the Cold War’ (2006) 52 Australian Journal of Politics and History 64), which 
was based on subsequently released archival material, argues that Australia saw a 
formal military alliance with the US as fundamental to its national security and would 
have agreed to one during the period of the Chifley government. McLean further 
argues that the archival evidence indicates that the US favoured membership of 
regional treaties as a means of consolidating US leadership of the smaller Pacific 
powers in the fight against Communism. The ANZUS Treaty was concluded on 1 
September 1951 and came into force on 29 April 1952. McLean (2001) provides a 
critical review of the extensive literature (much of it partisan) on the Australia–US 
alliance.  
31  The boom in this period is analysed in A M C Waterman, Economic Fluctuations in 
Australia 1948 to 1964 (Australian National University Press, 1972) 76–82. The 
importance of the US as a trading and investment partner for Australia increased 
significantly during this period. Australian exports to the US were 8.2% of total 
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3.21 Menzies’ 1950 visit to Washington to negotiate a dollar loan coincided with 
the outbreak of the Korean War and Australia’s military commitment to it. 
Apparently, the US deliberately refrained from mentioning the taxation treaty 
issue during Menzies’ visit. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that the 
assistance given by the US in the obtaining of that loan could have been 
absent from the minds of Australian ministers and officials considering 
whether to agree to the US request for a taxation treaty.33 Indeed, Percy 
Spender34 reported to the US State Department officials that J W Hughes35 
had expected that Menzies would be pressed for a tax treaty during his visit 
and was disappointed that he had not been.36 
3.22 There was also significant lobbying by US businesses and their existing 
Australian subsidiaries in favour of a double tax treaty with Australia. US 
business and to some extent US officials were more concerned with the 
discrimination against US business when compared with UK business than 
with double taxation on non-portfolio investment, an attitude that Australian 
External Affairs officials were cognisant of.37  
                                                                                                                                                                      
exports in 1949–50, a figure that increased to 15.2% in 1950–51 and then started to 
decline to 11.4% in 1951–52. R A Foster, Australian Economic Statistics: 1949–1950 
to 1994–95 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1996) 9, Table 1.4. The UK was still the 
major source of imports to Australia in 1949–50 at 53.1% of total imports; the US was 
second at 9.9% of total imports, but by 1966–67 imports from the US at 25.8% of total 
imports outstripped imports from the UK at 23.8% of total imports. In 1952–53, the US 
was Australia’s second-largest source of imports at 16.5% of total imports compared 
with the UK at 41.7% of total imports. Foster, Australian Economic Statistics: 1949–
50 to 1994–95, 13, Table 1.6. As far as foreign investment was concerned, in 1949–
50 the UK represented 48.2% of inflow of foreign investment at $106 million while the 
US (including Canada in this period) represented 9.5% at $21 million. The UK 
remained the major source of inbound foreign investment throughout the 1950s but 
was first surpassed by the US in 1961–62 when the UK represented 41.4% of 
inbound foreign investment ($125 million) and the US 47.4% ($143 million). Foster, 
Australian Economic Statistics: 1949–50 to 1994–95, 42, Table 1.17.  
32  For the background to the ‘horror budget’ of 1951–52 see Waterman, above n 31, 
82–90 and G Whitwell, The Treasury Line (Allen & Unwin, 1986) 104–10. 
33  A draft Cabinet submission for the Minister for External Affairs written on 
approximately 22nd February 1951 notes that ‘while the question had not been raised 
with the Prime Minister during his visit to Washington this omission was deliberate in 
order to avoid any suggestion of a bargain in connection with his financial 
negotiations’, NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 1. 
34  At the time, Spender was Minster for External Affairs in the Menzies government. 
35  Hughes was an Australian Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. As discussed at 3.23, 
he and E S Spooner were appointed by Fadden to report on whether Australia should 
enter into a tax treaty with the United States. 
36  Office Memorandum, US Government, Confidential, To: GFD – Mr Spiegel, From Mr 
Livesey, ‘Failure to Press Australia for a Tax Treaty’, August 9, 1950, General 
Records of the Department of State, RG59, Accession No. 611.4392/2-2152. 
37  See E S Spooner and J W Hughes to A W Fadden M.P., Commonwealth Treasurer, 
30th August 1950. NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 1. Numerous letters and memoranda 
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3.23 Against this background the Australian treasurer, A W Fadden, commissioned 
J W Hughes38 and E S Spooner39 to report on whether Australia should enter 
into a double tax treaty with the United States. Hughes and Spooner 
concluded that Australia should do so and estimated that the likely revenue 
loss to Australia of £1,750,000 would be offset somewhat by taxing dividends 
at the rates that the US had agreed with other British Commonwealth 
countries – namely, 5% for non-portfolio and 15% for other dividends – and 
by increased revenues flowing from greater US investment in Australia. The 
report noted that the US was seeking a closer relationship with Australia and 
that many large organisations were interested in permanently establishing or 
in expanding business in Australia.40  
3.24 The Treasurer’s submission to Cabinet was less optimistic, noting that 
existing US businesses operating in Australia would introduce additional 
capital in the absence of a treaty and that new US investment in Australia was 
likely to be of a transient nature and of restricted value to the Australian 
economy. The submission stated that negotiation of a taxation treaty with the 
US could not be justified on taxation principles, but it was necessary to 
consider political implications arising out of the relationships between the two 
countries in the then current circumstances;41 this was a possible reference to 
the dollar loan, the Korean War and the ANZUS alliance. On 15th March 1951, 
Cabinet resolved to commence taxation treaty negotiations with the United 
States.42 
The Negotiation And Drafting Of The 1953 Australia – US Taxation Treaty 
                                                                                                                                                                      
from businesses and from businesses groups are contained in several of the National 
Archives of Australia and the US National Archives and Records Office files relevant 
to this treaty. Companies and organisations making submissions included: General 
Motors-Holden’s; Ferro Enamel; Automatic Totalisators Inc; American Australian 
Association & Chamber of Commerce Inc; National Foreign Trade Council Inc; 
Chrysler, Dodge, De Soto; Pan Am American World Airways Inc; Julius Kayse & Co; 
The Lincoln Electric Company; Standard Vacuum Oil Company; and Bristol-Myers 
Company. 
38  At the time, Hughes was a Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. 
39  At the time, Spooner was Chairman of the Commonwealth Committee on Taxation. 
40  Spooner and Hughes, above n 37. 
41  A W Fadden, Treasurer, ‘For Cabinet Sub-Committee, Income Tax and Estate Duty, 
Double Taxation of Income Flowing Between Australia and the US of America; 
Double Estate Duty Imposed on Assets Having Their Situs in Australia Owned by 
Persons Dying Domiciled in the United States’, 2nd March 1951. NAA, External Affairs 
file, Pt 1. Fadden became Treasurer with the election of the Menzies government in 
1949. He had previously, briefly, been Prime Minister from August to October 1941. 
Brian Costar and Peter Vlahos, ‘Sir Arthur Fadden’, in Michelle Grattan (ed), 
Australian Prime Ministers (New Holland Publishers, 2000), 207–15. 
42  NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 1 copy of Cabinet decision dated 15th March 1951. 
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The Excess Foreign Tax Credit Problem For US Non-Portfolio Investors 
3.25 A key consideration leading government and business in Australia and the US 
to favour a taxation treaty between the countries was the excess foreign tax 
credit problem that US non-portfolio investors encountered. The Spooner and 
Hughes report concluded that this problem was significantly impeding direct 
investment by US companies in Australia.43  
3.26 The excess credit position of US companies investing in Australia through 
subsidiaries44 was a product of the interaction of Australian rates of tax on 
corporate profits and dividends with limitations on the direct and indirect 
foreign tax credit allowed by the US to non-portfolio outbound foreign 
investment.45  
3.27 In 1952, the US relieved international juridical double taxation through a 
foreign tax credit system. US taxpayers were required to use the lesser of an 
overall or a per country limitation. In the former case, the credit was limited to 
the same proportion of the taxpayer’s overall US tax liability as was the 
proportion that foreign source income represented of the taxpayer’s global 
income. In the latter case, separate calculations were made in relation to 
each foreign jurisdiction in which the taxpayer invested, with the credit limit for 
income from each jurisdiction being the proportion of the taxpayer’s overall 
US tax liability that was the same proportion that income from that foreign 
jurisdiction represented of the taxpayer’s global income.46  
3.28 Indirect credits were available where a US corporation owned 10% or more of 
the voting stock of a foreign corporation from which it received a dividend. An 
                                                          
43  Spooner and Hughes, above n 37. 
44  In practice, equivalent problems did not exist when the US investment was through 
an Australian branch as the absence of a branch profits tax in Australia meant that 
Australian tax did not generate excess foreign tax credits for US companies. 
Memorandum from P S McGovern, Commissioner of Taxation to the Commonwealth 
Treasurer (A W Fadden) 15th April 1952, NAA, ATO file, Pt 3, 3, paras 14 and 17 and 
4, para 19. 
45  Memorandum from P S McGovern, above n 44, 3, paras 15 and 16 and 4, paras 19–
21. 
46  See the discussion of the history of the US foreign tax credit limitation in Michael J 
Graetz and Michael M O’Hear, ‘The “Original Intent” of US International Taxation’ 
(1997) 46 Duke Law Journal 1021 in particular at fn 141. For a discussion of US rules 
in 1957–58 see B Magill and WC Schaab, ‘American Taxation of Income Earned 
Abroad’ (1957–1958) 13 Tax Law Review 115. Shortly after the signing of the 
Australia – US taxation treaty of 1953, the overall limitation on the foreign tax credit 
was repealed in 1954. In 1960, taxpayers were given the option to use an overall 
limitation or a per country limitation. The per country limitation was repealed in 1976. 
A basket system of limitation was introduced in 1986. The number of baskets was 
reduced to two in 2006. 
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indirect foreign tax credit was also available for underlying tax on dividends 
received from a second-tier foreign corporation when 50% or more of its 
voting stock was owned by a first-tier foreign corporation in which a US 
corporation held 10% or more of the voting stock.47  
3.29 Australia recognised that this problem could be dealt with by a reduction in 
Australian taxes on dividends paid to US companies making direct 
investments in Australia. However, Australia wanted to ensure that the 
reduction was only to such a level as would benefit the US investor rather 
than the US Treasury.48  
The Initial Negotiations In Canberra In 1952 
3.30 Negotiations for the treaty began in Canberra on 17th March 1952. Eldon P 
King, Special Deputy Commissioner of the US Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
led the US delegation, which also included Peter J Mitchell and Earl A Ruth.49 
The Australian delegation was led by the Commissioner of Taxation, Patrick 
McGovern. Other members of the Australian delegation were Mair, Belcher, 
Hunt, Worland, Orriell, and Beikoff from the ATO and Pryor and Garrett from 
the Australian Treasury.50 The following discussion of the negotiations is 
based on McGovern’s report to Fadden and on the first draft of the treaty 
produced in those negotiations.51 
3.31 McGovern reported that the US position was that the 1946 UK Treaty should 
be regarded as setting the pattern of Australia’s agreements with nations from 
whom investment capital for development was to be encouraged. Exceptions 
were in areas where the US legislature had established a precedent in 
previous US treaties that it was unlikely to be willing to vary.52  
                                                          
47  The history of the US indirect foreign tax credit to 1975 is discussed in E A Owens 
and G T Ball, The Indirect Credit: A Study of Various Foreign Tax Credits Granted to 
Domestic Shareholders Under U.S. Income Tax Law (International Tax Program, Law 
School of Harvard University, 1975) 31–3. 
48  McGovern, above n 44, 5, paras 27–8. 
49  McGovern, above n 44, 1, paras 1 and 2. 
50  ‘List showing names of persons attending the discussions between US and Australian 
Tax Officials’ Federal Taxation Office, 20/3/52. NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 3. 
Belcher was Assistant Commissioner of Taxation at the time.  
51  The author has not been able to locate a day to day record of the negotiations, in 
either the National Archives of Australia in Canberra or the US National Archives and 
Records Administration. The draft annexed to McGovern’s letter to Fadden is the 
earliest draft of the treaty that the author has been able to locate in either the National 
Archives of Australia or the US National Archives and Records Administration at 
College Park, Maryland, USA. 
52  McGovern, above n 44, 4, para 22. 
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3.32 The Australian objective was to ascertain the minimum terms acceptable to 
the US that would remove the deterrent to direct investment by US 
companies in Australia. The reduction in Australian tax on direct investment 
by US companies in Australia was governed by the US corporate rate, 
because Australian taxes at this level would not deter US investment in 
Australia and reductions below this level would, through the US foreign tax 
credit system, produce benefits for the US Treasury rather than the US 
investor.53  
3.33 Australia opposed provisions which ‘violated the prior right of the country of 
origin of the income to tax’ and which could do little or nothing to encourage 
US investment in Australia. Nonetheless, McGovern considered that in some 
areas, most importantly shipping and aircraft profits, taxation on a residence 
basis had become so widely recognised as to be the conventional method of 
taxing rather than being based on any principle of taxation.54 
3.34 Notwithstanding these differences in objectives and approach, McGovern 
noted that the initial discussions produced ‘a very substantial degree of 
agreement upon the matters which might be confidently submitted to the two 
Governments for their consideration and a draft Convention was prepared’.55 
The Draft Of The Treaty Developed In The Initial Negotiations56 
3.35 The following discussion of the draft of the treaty developed during the 
negotiations in Canberra in 1952 will highlight similarities to and differences 
from the 1946 UK Treaty, particularly in relation to provisions that are relevant 
to distinctive features of Australia’s taxation treaty policy or practice or which 
are evidence of factors influencing that policy or practice.  
Definitions  
Resident 
3.36 The definition of ‘Australian resident’ in the draft was substantially the same 
as in the 1946 UK Treaty; however, as the US taxed on the basis of 
                                                          
53  McGovern, above n 44, 5 paras 27 and 28. 
54  McGovern, above n 44, 4 para 29. 
55  McGovern, above n 44, 6 para 30. 
56  This draft of the treaty is Annexure C to McGovern’s Memorandum above n 44. A 
summary of the result of the negotiations is contained in McGovern’s letter to Fadden. 
The author has to date been unable to locate a daily record of the negotiations either 
in the National Archives of Australia or in the US National Archives and Records 
Administration. 
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citizenship, a US citizen was expressly excluded from being an Australian 
resident. While McGovern considered that it would have been preferable to 
have avoided this result, he noted that it had been achieved by the US in all 
of its previous treaties and that it was a principle on which the US was likely 
to be unyielding. As the effect on Australian revenue would necessarily be 
negligible, he did not consider that it warranted Australian rejection.  
3.37 Following the definition in the 1946 UK Treaty meant that dual residents were 
not treaty residents. This was because, as was the case with the 1946 UK 
Treaty,57 a taxpayer would only be a resident of one of the contracting states 
if the taxpayer were resident in that contracting state for tax purposes but was 
not resident in the other contracting state for its tax purposes. 
3.38 Unlike the 1946 UK Treaty,58 the draft contained a specific provision dealing 
with the residence of companies. Under the draft, a ‘US corporation’ was not 
an Australian resident. A ‘US corporation’ was defined as meaning ‘a 
corporation, association or other like entity created or organized in or under 
the laws of the United States’. A ‘US resident’ included ‘any US corporation … 
being a corporation … which is not a resident of Australia for purposes of 
Australian tax’.  
3.39 The combined effect of the definitions of ‘Australian resident’, ‘US corporation’ 
and ‘US resident’ appears to have been that a US corporation which carried 
on business in Australia and was centrally managed and controlled in 
Australia was not an Australian resident for treaty purposes; however, as it 
was a resident of Australia for purposes of Australian tax, it was not a US 
resident for treaty purposes either. On the other hand, as the US determined 
corporate residency solely on the basis of place of incorporation, a company 
incorporated in Australia could only be an Australian resident for treaty 
purposes. McGovern merely commented that the reference to ‘US 
corporation’ in the definition of ‘Australian resident’ was consistent with the 
Australian approach and was included for ease in drafting.59 
Industrial And Commercial Profits  
                                                          
57  See the discussion at 2.143. 
58  See the discussion at 2.144 to 2.147.  
59  McGovern, above n 44, 7, para 42. The statement that the reference to ‘US 
corporation’ was consistent with the Australian approach was presumably a reference 
to the fact that one of the tests of corporate residency under Australian tax law at the 
time was incorporation in Australia. See ITAA 1936 (Cth) s6(1) definition of ‘resident 
of Australia’.  
 
 
 
102 
102 
3.40 As was the case with 1946 UK Treaty, industrial and commercial profits were 
defined in terms which specifically excluded dividends, interest, rent and 
royalties. In addition, the definition excluded ‘management charges’ and 
‘remuneration for personal services’.  
Permanent Establishment 
3.41 The definition of ‘permanent establishment’ was similar to the equivalent 
definition in the 1946 UK Treaty, but, in McGovern’s words, it had been 
‘broadened in conformity with Australian aims’.60 Clearly, Australia’s aims in 
this respect were to maximise source based taxation of the Australian 
branches of foreign enterprises.61 In addition to indicia of a permanent 
establishment under the 1946 UK Treaty, the draft proposed that a permanent 
establishment should include a workshop, oilwell, office, an agency, a 
management and the use of substantial equipment or machinery.  
3.42 The most interesting addition to the definition of ‘permanent establishment’ 
was the specific reference to the use of substantial equipment.62 The same 
reference had been included in the 12th June 1950 Supplementary 
Convention to the 1942 US – Canada Taxation Treaty,63 but had not been 
included in any other US treaty up to 1952 and was not included in any other 
US treaty for the rest of the 1950s. However, specific reference to ‘substantial 
equipment’ was included in several other Canadian treaties of the 1950s.64  
3.43 It is unclear whether the broadening of the definition in this respect ‘in 
conformity with Australia’s aims’ was initiated by Australia or the United 
States. Canada had apparently requested the inclusion of the substantial 
equipment provision in the 1950 Supplementary Convention between the 
                                                          
60  McGovern, above n 44, 7 para 46. 
61  McGovern had noted, above n 44, 5 para 29, that in the negotiations Australia had 
offered opposition to provisions which violated the prior right of the source country to 
tax and which could do little or nothing to encourage US investment in Australia. 
McGovern also noted, above n 12, 7 para 44, that it was in the interests of Australia 
to have the term ‘permanent establishment’ cover a wide variety of the means by 
which a resident of one country can conduct business operations in the other country. 
62  Previous scholarship has traced the origins of the inclusion of substantial equipment 
provisions in Australian treaties to the 1953 US Treaty. See R J Vann, ‘Hill on Tax 
Treaties and Interpretation’ (2013) 28 Australian Tax Forum 87. The question of 
whether the inclusion was at the request of the US or at the request of Australia does 
not appear to have been the subject of detailed analysis previously. 
63  See paragraph ‘o’ of Supplementary Convention 12th June 1950 to US – Canada 
Taxation Convention of 1942.  
64  Canada – South Africa Taxation Treaty, 1956, Article II(1)(j); Australia – Canada, 
1957, Article II(1)(l); Belgium – Canada, 1958, Article II(1)(i)(bb); Finland – Canada, 
1959, Article II(1)(j). 
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United States.65 A reasonable conclusion is that Australia argued for the 
inclusion of a substantial equipment provision on the basis that the US had 
agreed to such a provision in its Supplementary Convention with Canada in 
1950.66 
The Industrial Or Commercial Profits Article 
3.44 This article was similar to its equivalent in the 1946 UK Treaty, and, like that 
article, specifically reserved Australia’s right to continue its existing methods 
of taxing film business and profits of non-resident insurance companies.67 
Consistent with the 1946 UK Treaty, the article included a saving provision 
preserving the right to apply domestic law where information was inadequate 
for determining an arm’s length price. 
3.45 In some respects, the Industrial or Commercial Profits article in the draft 
treaty differed from the equivalent article in the 1946 UK Treaty. 
3.46 At the request of the United States,68 the draft applied a force of attraction 
principle in taxing industrial or commercial profits once a permanent 
establishment was found to exist in the source country. McGovern 
commented that, while not materially affecting Australian revenue, over a 
period of time, the force of attraction principle was likely to be more 
favourable to Australia, and hence Australia did not oppose the US request.69  
                                                          
65  This would appear to be the case from the comments on the ‘substantial equipment’ 
provisions in the 1950 Supplementary Convention in the letter of transmittal by the 
Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) to the Senate, Tax Analysts, Worldwide Tax 
Treaties, United States, Canada, Report of the Secretary of State, 29th June 1950. 
66  To date the author has been unable to locate archival evidence, in either the National 
Archives of Australia, the US National Archives or the Canadian National Archives in 
Ottawa, indicating which country was the originator of the inclusion of a substantial 
equipment provision in the definition. 
67  McGovern, above n 44, 8, para 57. Division 14 of Part III of ITAA 1936 included 10% 
of the gross income of film businesses controlled by non-resident controllers in the 
taxable income of the relevant non-resident controller. Division 15 of Part III of ITAA 
1936 included 10% of gross premiums in the taxable income of non-resident 
insurance companies carrying on business in Australia but which did not have a 
principal office or branch in Australia. These provisions, as they applied in 1953, are 
discussed in N E Challoner and C M Collins, above n 20, 907–28. 
68  McGovern, above n 44, 8, para 55, makes it clear that the request to tax industrial or 
commercial profits using a force of attraction principle was made by the United 
States. This was US taxation treaty practice at the time. See the discussion of the 
rationale behind the practice in David R Tillinghast, ‘The Revision of the Income Tax 
Convention between the US and the Federal Republic of Germany’ (1965–66) 21 Tax 
Law Review 399 at 420–9. 
69  McGovern, above n 44, 8, para 56.  
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3.47 The article provided for deduction of all deductible expenses, including 
executive and general administrative expenses reasonably attributable to the 
permanent establishment in calculating its income. The article specified that it 
was ‘subject to the principle underlying Section 38 of the Income Tax and 
Social Services Contribution Assessment Act’, although McGovern did not 
expressly mention this point in his report to Fadden.70 McGovern commented 
that the provision provided a safeguard to enterprises of both countries but 
would not involve revenue cost to Australia as it was consistent with existing 
practice under Australian domestic law.71 Equivalent provisions had been 
included in US taxation treaties from 1948 onwards, although the provision in 
the draft omitted the words ‘wherever incurred’ and in this respect followed an 
earlier variant of the US provision.72 
Inter-connected Companies/Associated Enterprises 
3.48 This Article was similar to the equivalent Article in the 1946 UK Treaty. A 
substantive variation, made at the request of the United States, was that both 
countries were prohibited from taxing under the treaty any greater amount 
than would be possible under their domestic tax law. McGovern commented 
that this had been requested for administrative reasons and that as it would 
be open to Australia to amend its domestic tax laws its right to tax was not 
restricted and the proposal was not opposed.73 
                                                          
70  Section 38 of the ITAA 1936 dealt with the importation and sale in Australia by a 
manufacturer of goods, and read as follows:  
‘Where goods manufactured out of Australia are imported into Australia and the 
goods are, either before or after importation, sold in Australia by the 
manufacturer of the goods, the profit deemed to be derived in Australia from 
the sale shall be ascertained by deducting from the sale price of the goods 
the amount for which, at the date the goods were shipped to Australia, goods 
of the same nature and quality could be purchased by a wholesale buyer in 
the country of manufacture, and the expenses incurred in transporting them 
to and selling them in Australia.’ 
A contemporary commentary on s38, N E Challoner and C M Collins, above n 20, 303, noted 
that it appeared to embody the principle laid down by the High Court in FCT v W 
Angliss & Co Pty Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 417. This view would see the principle of s38 as 
being concerned with how much of a profit from an international sale of goods 
transaction was sourced in particular jurisdictions. Challoner and Collins went on to 
comment at p303, ‘The effect of s38 is that overseas manufacturing profit, i.e., the 
difference between the overseas manufactured cost and the wholesale purchase 
price, is not derived from a source in Australia.’  
71  McGovern, above n 44, 8, para 59. 
72  US treaty practice in relation to this provision in this period is discussed in R J Vann, 
‘Do We Need 7(3)? History and Purpose of the Business Profits Deduction Rule in 
Tax Treaties’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law (Hart Publishing, 2012) 
vol 5, 393–425 at 411–13. 
73  McGovern, above n 44, 9, para 64. 
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Shipping And Aircraft Profits 
3.49 Australia, in negotiating the 1946 UK Treaty, had argued strongly but 
unsuccessfully against taxing shipping on a residence/place of registration 
basis. McGovern described the US representatives as being persistent in 
pressing for a similar article to the one in the 1946 UK Treaty and took this as 
illustrating the importance to the US of taxing shipping and aircraft profits on a 
residence basis. In McGovern’s view, even if the US negotiators could be 
persuaded to tax these profits on a source basis, the US Congress would 
‘almost certainly’ decline to ratify the treaty.74  
3.50 McGovern reported that, while he had pressed the US representatives to 
have regard to the fact that, as Australia had no ships trading with the United 
States, the proposal would merely benefit the US at the expense of Australia, 
he admitted that residence basis taxation of shipping and aircraft profits had 
now become so common as to have become traditional. He could see no 
prospect of obtaining a treaty which did not concede a residence basis for the 
taxation of these profits.75 The resultant annual loss of revenue to Australia 
was estimated to be £100,000.76 McGovern’s position is an early example of 
Australia reluctantly modifying its preference for source based taxation in 
response to developing international practice.  
Concessional Rate Of Tax On Dividends 
3.51 In 1952 Australia still taxed dividends paid to non-residents on an assessment 
basis at the then current rate of 35%. Taking into account the special levy of 
10%, the Australian tax rate on non-private companies was 45%. In the 1946 
UK Treaty with the UK, Australia had agreed to exempt from Australian tax 
dividends paid by wholly owned subsidiaries and to reduce its tax rate on 
other dividends paid to UK residents by 50%.77 Hence in 1952 the rate of 
Australian tax payable on dividends paid by Australian companies, other than 
wholly owned subsidiaries, to UK residents was 17.5%.78  
3.52 In negotiations, the US argued for a 5% limit on source country taxation of 
dividends paid by 95% Australian subsidiaries to their US parents. Australia 
successfully argued for a uniform 15% source country tax rate on all 
                                                          
74  McGovern, above n 44, 9, para 67. 
75  McGovern, above n 44, 9–10, para 68. 
76  McGovern, above n 44, 10, para 69. 
77  See the discussion at 2.90.  
78  McGovern, above n 44, 10, para 76. 
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dividends.79 One of the arguments put by Australia was that differential rates 
in the parent – 95% subsidiary situation would discourage US companies 
from proposals for joint participation with Australian residents in Australian 
companies.80  
3.53 McGovern commented that a uniform rate on all dividends flowing from 
Australia to the US would mean that US–Australian ventures could operate 
without the US shareholders suffering taxation disadvantages.81 This was 
because the US corporate tax at the time was 52% but was increased to 
55.7% when a subsidiary paid a dividend to its parent, although the rate was 
reduced to 54% if both companies elected to file a joint return.82  
3.54 The combined effect of the Australian corporate rate of 45% and the treaty 
rate of 15% on dividends was an overall Australian tax rate on dividends 
flowing from a subsidiary to a parent company of 53.25%.83 In these 
circumstances, the effect of the US indirect foreign tax credit was that very 
little additional US tax was payable when an Australian subsidiary paid a 
dividend to its US parent. McGovern noted that prior to recent rate increases, 
when the corresponding Australian rate had been approximately 54%, there 
had been a substantial flow of US capital to Australia.84  
3.55 McGovern understood that the US had not previously agreed to a rate of 15% 
on parent–subsidiary dividends.85 In McGovern’s view, if Australia had not 
agreed to the 15% rate or had obtained a higher rate of source taxation of 
dividends, the treaty with the US could have had little or no beneficial effect 
on capital investment in Australia.86 Imposing a uniform rate of 15% on 
dividends was clearly perceived to be a key benefit of the treaty by promoting 
US non-portfolio investment without creating the ‘Treasury effect’.87 
                                                          
79  McGovern, above n 44, 10–12 in particular paras 77 and 90. 
80  McGovern, above n 44, 11, para 84. 
81  McGovern, above n 44, 11, para 85. 
82  McGovern, above n 44, 11, para 80. 
83  McGovern, above n 44, 11, para 81. 
84  McGovern, above n 44, 11, para 82. 
85  McGovern, above n 44, 12, para 90. 
86  McGovern, above n 44, 12, para 92. 
87  What was described as the ‘Treasury effect’ exists when a source country reduces its 
rate of tax below the rate of tax in the residence country when the residence country 
uses a foreign tax credit system for preventing international juridical double taxation. 
In these circumstances, the foreign tax credit system will mean that residence country 
tax equal to the excess of the residence country rate over the reduced source country 
rate will be payable by the investor. This means that the benefit of the reduction in 
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3.56 Reduction in source taxation on all dividends paid to the US would have a 
revenue cost, which McGovern estimated at £1,000,000 per annum,88 but this 
compared favourably with the revenue cost of £1,650,000 that would have 
applied if the rates on dividends in the 1946 UK Treaty had been followed.89  
Undistributed Profits Tax 
3.57 Article VIII stated that the Australian undistributed profits tax on private 
companies was the amount that would have been assessable if Articles VI(1) 
and VII(1) (which imposed limitations on source taxation of dividends) had not 
been included in the treaty. An equivalent provision had been included in the 
1946 UK Treaty.90 McGovern pointed out that undistributed profits tax in 1952 
was calculated as though the undistributed profits were distributed as 
dividends. Hence the article meant that the reductions in source taxation of 
dividends in Articles VI and VII did not operate to reduce the undistributed 
profits tax payable at source. McGovern commented that the sole purpose of 
Article VIII was to protect Australian revenue.91  
3.58 At the time, the US also imposed an accumulated earnings tax on 
corporations (other than personal holding companies, foreign personal 
holding companies and tax exempt corporations), imposed an undistributed 
profits tax on personal holding companies and included a share of the income 
                                                                                                                                                                      
source country tax below the residence country rate has flowed to the Treasury of the 
residence country rather than to the investor. 
88  McGovern, above n 44, 11, para 87. 
89  McGovern, above n 44, 11, para 88. 
90  See the discussion at 2.109 to 2.114. 
91  McGovern, above n 44, 12, paras 94–6. Undistributed profits tax was amended by the 
Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act (No 3) 1952, the Bill 
for which was introduced into Parliament on 18th September 1952. The effect of the 
amendments was that from the year ending 30th June 1952, Part III Division 7 of the 
ITAA 1936 imposed tax on the undistributed profits of private companies after 
allowing a deduction of a retention allowance. For the 1951–52 year, undistributed 
profits tax was levied at a flat rate of 10/- in the £ or 50%. Undistributed profits tax as 
it applied in the 1951–52 year of income is discussed in N E Challoner and C M 
Collins, above n 20, 725–79. At the time McGovern was writing, the rate of 
undistributed profits tax on private companies was based on the tax that would have 
been payable by its shareholders if a distribution had been made. Hence the drafting 
of Article VIII reflects a concern which would have applied prior to the 1951–52 year, 
namely that, as the rate of tax was based on the tax that would have been payable if 
a dividend distribution had been made, the limitations on source taxation of dividends 
in Articles VI and VII of the treaty would have applied to undistributed profits tax in the 
absence of Article VIII. Undistributed profits tax on private companies as it applied 
prior to the 1951–52 year is discussed in J A L Gunn, O E Berger, J M Greenwood 
and R E O’Neill, Gunn’s Commonwealth Income Tax Law And Practice (Butterworth 
& Co (Australia), 2nd ed, 1948) 1212. As noted at 3.11, undistributed profits tax on 
public companies had been repealed in 1951. 
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of foreign personal holding companies in the gross income of their US 
shareholders. While these taxes were calculated on a different basis to the 
Australian undistributed profits tax, they reflected a shared understanding 
between Australia and the US of problems in classical corporate-shareholder 
tax systems associated with the avoidance of shareholder tax through 
accumulations of profit at the corporate level.92  
Cultural Royalties And Industrial Royalties 
3.59 The treatment of royalties differed from that in the 1946 UK Treaty and 
provides an example of Australia arguing that the treatment in the earlier 
treaty should be distinguished. Initially, the US had argued for residence 
taxation of all royalties including industrial royalties.93 Australia had agreed to 
taxation of cultural (other than film) and industrial (but not mineral) royalties 
on a residence basis in the 1946 UK Treaty.94 McGovern estimated that 
taxing all royalties on a residence basis in the Australia–US context would 
have produced an annual Australian revenue loss of £350,000.95  
3.60 Australia distinguished the 1946 UK Treaty because UK businesses, unlike 
US businesses, did not frequently exploit their patents by granting licences to 
Australian residents. As a result, no great Australian revenue loss had 
resulted from the royalty article in the 1946 UK Treaty. The Australians had 
                                                          
92  US accumulated earnings tax, undistributed profits tax on personal holding 
companies and the treatment of undistributed profits of foreign personal holding 
companies as they stood at this time are discussed in Boris I Bittker, Federal 
Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders (Federal Tax Press, 1st ed, 1959) ch 6. 
Liability for accumulated earnings tax depended on a finding that the corporation was 
formed for the purpose of avoiding income tax on its shareholders by accumulating 
earnings rather than distributing them as dividends. That earnings and profits were 
allowed to accumulate beyond the ‘reasonable needs of the business’ was 
determinative of this purpose unless the corporation proved the contrary through a 
preponderance of evidence. Accumulated earnings tax was imposed at the rate of 
27.5% on the first $100,000 of accumulated income and at the rate of 38.5% on 
accumulated income above $100,000. Accumulated income was defined as the 
corporation’s taxable income minus the dividends paid deduction and an accumulated 
earnings credit under which a corporation was permitted to accumulate $100,000 
during its lifetime. Undistributed profits tax on personal holding companies was 
imposed at the rate of 75% on the first $2000 of the company’s undistributed personal 
holding company income and at the rate of 85% thereafter. A company’s 
undistributed personal holding company income was its taxable income less 
dividends paid and some other adjustments. Companies were able to pay dividends 
after their undistributed personal holding company tax liability had been determined 
and to then obtain a refund of the tax paid. US shareholders in foreign personal 
holding companies included their proportionate share of the undistributed profits of 
the foreign personal holding company in their gross income. 
93  McGovern, above n 44, 15, para 124. 
94  See the discussion at 2.90. 
95  McGovern, above n 44, 15, para 124. 
 
 
 
109 
109 
pointed out to the US delegation that a £350,000 per annum revenue loss 
was likely to be far in excess of what the Australian government was willing to 
concede.96 When pressed, the US delegation withdrew their insistence on 
residence basis taxation of industrial royalties but continued to insist on 
residence basis taxation for cultural royalties.97 Hence Australia could 
continue to tax industrial royalties on a source basis while the US would give 
a foreign tax credit for the Australian tax thus bearing the cost of relieving 
international juridical double taxation.98  
3.61 McGovern estimated the Australian revenue cost of taxing cultural royalties in 
the Australia–US context on a residence basis as being £50,000 per annum.99 
As the country in which the creator of a cultural work resided was normally 
the country in which the cultural work was performed, in McGovern’s view, 
taxation of cultural royalties on a residence basis was ‘not unduly divergent in 
principle’ from taxation of the income on a source basis.100  
3.62 Article VIII did not apply where a resident of one of the countries carried on 
business through a permanent establishment in the other country. Nor, 
consistently with the 1946 UK Treaty, did the article apply to royalties and 
other payments relating to motion picture films.101  
Mineral Royalties  
3.63 Article XII taxed royalties for minerals and other natural resources on a 
source basis. No article in the 1946 UK Treaty dealt with mineral royalties. 
McGovern considered that, under that treaty, such income could be taxed by 
the source country with the residence country giving a foreign tax credit to 
relieve double taxation.102 The main function of Article XII was to ensure that 
the country of source only levied tax on a net basis on mineral royalties.103 At 
the time, Australia taxed royalties on a net basis,104 but the US imposed a 
                                                          
96  McGovern, above n 44, 16, para 125. 
97  McGovern, above n 44, 16, para 126. 
98  McGovern, above n 44, 16, para 127. 
99  McGovern, above n 44, 16, paras 127–128. 
100  McGovern, above n 44, 16, paras 128 and 129. 
101  McGovern, above n 44, 16, para 131. 
102  McGovern, above n 44, 16, para 134. 
103  McGovern, above n 44, 16, para 135. 
104  McGovern, above n 44, 17, para 136. In 1952, s26(f) of the ITAA 1936 included ‘any 
amount received as or by way of royalty’ in a taxpayer’s assessable income. 
Jurisdictional limits were not expressly stated in s26(f). Expenses relevant to the 
derivation of royalty income were allowable as deductions under s51(1) of the ITAA 
1936. Although no withholding tax applied to payments of royalties to non-residents 
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30% gross basis withholding tax on rents and royalties.105 Article XII permitted 
Australian residents deriving mineral royalties from the US to continue to be 
taxed on a 30% gross withholding tax basis or to lodge a return claiming 
expenses and to have tax imposed at a rate appropriate to the net income.106 
McGovern commented that the article favoured Australia and was considered 
satisfactory.107 
Tax Credits  
3.64 Article XVI obliged the residence country to allow a foreign tax credit in 
respect of income derived in the source country. The limit of the credit was 
the lower of the tax in the source country or the tax payable in the residence 
country. McGovern commented that the article corresponded, in principle, 
with the equivalent article in the 1946 UK treaty, but there were significant 
differences in the drafting due to differences in the taxing codes of the 
countries concerned.108  
3.65 The US proposed to allow such credits as its own laws in operation as at the 
date of signature permitted. McGovern commented that this would ensure 
that the US would not in the future impose a less favourable basis for granting 
credits for Australian tax.109 McGovern also pointed out that ‘Article XXI would 
require the US to allow any liberalized basis of credit which it may adopt in 
the future.’110 
3.66 McGovern commented that, as Article XVI would not apply where income was 
taxed in only one of the countries, Australia would not allow a credit for 
exempt foreign source income as no double taxation would, in fact, exist.111 
Hence the article would have little or no effect on Australian revenue, except 
in the case of dividends received by individuals who received a foreign tax 
                                                                                                                                                                      
under ITAA 1936 s256(1), the Commissioner could require the payor to retain an 
amount from the royalty in respect of tax due or which might become due by the non-
resident. Section 256(1) as it applied in 1952 is discussed in N E Challoner and C M 
Collins, above n 20, 1365. 
105  McGovern, above n 44, 17, para 137. 
106  McGovern, above n 44, 17, para 138. 
107  McGovern, above n 44, 17, para 139. 
108  McGovern, above n 44, 18, para 151. 
109  McGovern, above n 44, 18, para 152. 
110  McGovern, above n 44, 18, para 152. Article XXI of this draft read as follows: 
‘The provisions of this Convention shall not be construed to restrict in any manner, 
any exemption, deduction, credit or other allowance now or hereafter 
accorded by the laws of one of the Contracting States in the determination of 
the tax payable in that State.’ 
111 McGovern, above n 44, 18, para 154. 
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credit under ITAA 1936 s45, but it would bind the US to continue to allow 
credits thus reducing taxation deterrents to overseas investment by US 
residents and corporations.112  
3.67 Article XVI also contained source rules for remuneration for services and 
rules which deemed film profits and profits from insurance with non-residents 
that were taxed in Australia under specific provisions to have an Australian 
source. Both source rules were consistent with the 1946 UK Treaty. 
McGovern commented that the former rule would assist in the application of 
the credit provisions,113 and that the latter rule was inserted because of 
Australia’s representations. The latter rule would ensure that the US granted 
an appropriate credit for Australian tax assessed under the specific provisions 
and placed no obligations on Australia.114 
3.68 McGovern considered that the credit provisions as they applied to 
undistributed profits tax were not entirely satisfactory.115 Australian 
undistributed profits tax would be credited against US tax on the profits of the 
company. In situations where Australia would be levying corporate tax and 
undistributed profits tax, the overall limitation on the US foreign tax credit 
might mean that the full amount of the Australian tax paid would not be 
allowed. When profits which had been subject to undistributed tax were 
distributed as a dividend Australia did not, in effect, tax the dividend and 
hence the US would tax the whole of the dividend without allowing any 
credit.116  
3.69 In McGovern’s view undistributed profits tax was, in effect, a substitute for the 
tax on the ultimate dividend. Hence Australia had argued that the US should 
so treat it in granting credits. The US delegation had not conceded the point, 
but it was known that Canada was pressing the US on ‘an almost identical 
matter’. McGovern did not consider that the issue would justify holding up the 
treaty, but if there were to be further discussions, then it might be appropriate 
to reopen the issue with a view to reversing the US attitude.117 
Reciprocal Collection Of Taxes 
                                                          
112  McGovern, above n 44, 19, para 158. 
113  McGovern, above n 44, 18, para 155. 
114  McGovern, above n 44, 18, para 156. 
115  McGovern, above n 44, 19, para 159. 
116  McGovern, above n 44, 19, para 160. 
117  McGovern, above n 44, 19, para 161. 
 
 
 
112 
112 
3.70 Article XVII required each country to collect on behalf of the treaty partner 
taxes due because of incorrect allowance of a concession provided for in the 
treaty. McGovern considered that the issue would arise principally in relation 
to the concessional rate of tax of 15% on dividends under the treaty. A 
Canadian resident could, in the absence of the article, take advantage of this 
concession by having the dividend paid to an address care of a US bank or 
sharebroker and pay Australian tax at the treaty rate of 15% instead of paying 
Australian tax as high as 35% on dividends received. In converse 
circumstances the US would suffer the loss of revenue.118 McGovern 
characterised the article as an ‘acknowledgment of a principle’ and 
recognised that its expression and its means of implementation might raise a 
number of legal difficulties which would require its revision.119 No equivalent 
article had been included in the 1946 UK Treaty and the UK had successfully 
resisted US requests for the inclusion of an equivalent provision in the 1945 
US – UK Tax Treaty.120 
Exchange Of Information 
3.71 Article XVII was an exchange of information article. McGovern commented 
that no information which would disclose a trade secret or trade process could 
be exchanged, and that the secrecy provisions of each country would prohibit 
disclosure of information obtained from the other country.121 An identical 
provision had been included in the 1946 UK Treaty and McGovern regarded it 
as being required for the satisfactory operation of any treaty that might be 
entered into with the United States.122  
3.72 It is interesting that neither Australia nor the US appears to have pressed for 
a broader exchange of information article. The US had originally wanted a 
broader article in its 1945 treaty with the UK,123 and Australia in negotiating 
the 1946 UK Treaty had unsuccessfully sought to extend the purposes for 
which information could be exchanged but had successfully broadened the 
persons to whom disclosure could be made.124 As Australia had eventually 
                                                          
118  McGovern, above n 44, 19, para 163. 
119  McGovern, above n 44, 19, paras 165 and 166. 
120  See the discussion of this aspect of the negotiation of the 1945 US–UK Tax Treaty in 
John F Avery Jones, ‘The History of the United Kingdom’s First Comprehensive 
Double Taxation Agreement’ [2007] British Tax Review 211 at 239. 
121  McGovern, above n 44, 19–20, para 167. 
122  McGovern, above n 44, 20, para 168. 
123  See the discussion in Avery Jones above n 120, 237–9. 
124  See the discussion at 2.140 and 2.142. 
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come to the conclusion in the 1946 negotiations that the provision was 
adequate for its needs, it possibly decided to not press for any change from 
the article. It is also notable that, while the article appears to have been 
regarded as normal and required, there is no indication in any of the 
correspondence that it was regarded as being one of the key benefits of a 
taxation treaty.  
Other Provisions  
3.73 Article XIX was the equivalent of what is now the Mutual Agreement article in 
the OECD Model Treaty. McGovern indicated that Article XIX had been 
requested by the US delegation, who regarded it as a ‘desirable gesture to 
taxpayers’.125 Article XX authorised the taxation authorities in the two 
countries to consult directly with each other (as opposed to consultation at the 
taxpayer’s request) for the purpose of giving effect to the treaty. 
Notwithstanding the absence of an equivalent article in the 1946 UK Treaty, 
communication had taken place and was considered to be essential for the 
smooth carrying out of the obligations under that treaty. In McGovern’s view, 
the article was not essential but was considered desirable.126 Article XXI 
provided for the continuation of exemptions, deductions, credits and other 
allowances, and in the event that more liberal provisions were introduced into 
either country’s domestic law, for the new provisions to apply. McGovern 
commented that the article would have little effect on Australia but was 
considered desirable in relation to tax credits granted by the United States.127 
The Australian Cabinet Decision  
3.74 On 3rd June 1952 the draft treaty was submitted to the Australian Cabinet, 
which decided: 
(a) that the Government should enter into agreements with the US of America 
for the relief of double taxation by the two countries in respect of income 
tax, estate duty and gift duty; 
(b) that the proposals outlined in the Treasurer’s submission and in the 
supporting documents should be the basis of the agreements with the 
United States. 
                                                          
125  McGovern, above n 44, 20, para 170. 
126  McGovern, above n 44, 20, paras 173 and 174. 
127  McGovern, above n 44, 20, para 177. 
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The supporting documents included McGovern’s memorandum to the 
Treasurer dated 15th April 1952.128 
The Australian Second Draft Treaty 
3.75 McGovern sent the first draft of the treaty to the Deputy Commissioners in 
each Australian State.129 Extensive written comments were made by each 
Deputy Commissioner.130 In March 1952 a memorandum titled ‘Australia–US 
Draft Income Tax Agreement – Matters Requiring Attention’ (hereafter 
referred to as ‘the Memorandum’) was prepared in Canberra, evidently by the 
ATO Central Office.131   
3.76 McGovern advised Fadden on 21st November 1952 that an Australian review 
of the draft had disclosed that a ‘considerable number of detailed matters will 
require further consideration’. McGovern regarded the more important of 
these as relating to: (a) credits; (b) the rate of tax on dividends; (c) collection 
of tax; (d) shipping and aircraft profits; and (e) Governmental remuneration.132 
There were also ‘some 30 to 40 matters of detail’ on which McGovern 
considered further face to face negotiation would be desirable.133  
3.77 McGovern recommended advising the US that Australia would sign a treaty 
on the broad lines agreed at the meeting in Canberra in March 1952 and 
would be willing to have the remaining matters discussed between officials to 
prepare a document to be dealt with as early as practicable in the new year. 
McGovern suggested that Fadden point out that senior Australian taxation 
officials would be visiting Canada in about April 1953 and that it would be 
possible for them to have negotiations in Washington either before or after 
that.134  
                                                          
128  The terms and date of the Cabinet resolution are set out in McGovern to Fadden 21st 
November 1952, ATO file, Pt 4, p1. Copies of the Cabinet submission are contained 
in NAA, ATO file, Pt 3, and in NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 4. 
129  This was consistent with McGovern’s practice during the negotiation of the 1946 UK 
Treaty, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
130  This correspondence is contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 3.  
131  NAA, ATO file, Pt 3, 94–9. In the footnotes this document is hereafter referred to as 
‘Strictly Confidential’.  
132  McGovern, above n 128, 1–4. 
133  McGovern, above n 128, 4. 
134  McGovern, above n 128, 4–5. 
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3.78 McGovern then wrote to the Commonwealth Solicitor General (Kenneth 
Bailey) requesting that the draft be examined, and invited comments on legal 
and drafting aspects which might require further consideration.135  
3.79 A second, undated, draft of the treaty was then prepared in Australia. The 
draft also included comments (evidently by the drafter) on the changes that 
had been made from the first draft.136 Only those comments relevant to the 
questions examined in this thesis will be discussed here. 
Article II – Interpretation 
3.80 Several significant changes were made to this article. 
‘resident of Australia’ and ‘Australian resident’ 
3.81 A definition of ‘resident of Australia’ was not included in the first draft. The 
definition in the second draft was that the term ‘has the meaning which it has 
under the laws of Australia relating to Australian tax’. The definition was 
identical to the definition of ‘resident of Australia’ in the 1946 UK Treaty.137 
The drafter commented that the definition was included ‘to ensure that it has 
the same meaning as in Commonwealth income tax law’.138 As was the case 
with the 1946 UK Treaty, the term ‘Australian resident’ was separately 
defined, although slightly more concisely than in that treaty, in terms which 
                                                          
135  McGovern to Bailey, 24th November 1952, NAA, ATO file, Pt 4. Bailey’s reply 
indicated that he had arranged for H F E Whitlam, who had been involved in drafting 
the 1946 Treaty with the UK and who was still a consultant to the Department, to take 
primary responsibility for examining the treaty from a legal viewpoint. Whitlam would 
be available for discussions with officers of the ATO and would confer with the 
Parliamentary Draftsman and the Crown Solicitor. Bailey also indicated that he would 
personally be available for consultation at any time. Bailey to McGovern, 25th 
November 1952, NAA, ATO file, Pt 4. 
136  The correspondence from Bailey to McGovern, discussed in the text accompanying 
above note 135, would indicate that H F E Whitlam was primarily responsible for 
commenting on the first draft from a legal and drafting viewpoint. It is not clear, 
however, that Whitlam made the actual drafting changes in the second draft. Clearly, 
the principal assistant parliamentary draftsman C Comas drafted Article XVII of the 
second draft because Comas sent J Q Ewens (the Parliamentary Draftsman) a 
memorandum dated 1st April 1953 on a draft of Article XVII that he had prepared 
following a conference between Comas, Ewens, D D Bell (the Crown Solicitor) and 
Mr Belcher (the Assistant Commissioner of Taxation). The draft of Article XVII 
attached to the memorandum is identical with Article XVII in the second draft of the 
treaty. The memorandum and draft Article XVII are contained in NAA ATO file, Pt 4. 
The second draft is also contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 4. Hereafter, the second draft 
will be referred to as ‘the second draft’ and references will be given to page numbers 
within the second draft itself.  
137  See the discussion at 2.149 and 2.150. 
138  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p6. The drafter also commented that this meant it 
was practicable to omit the words ‘for the purposes of Australian tax’ at a number of 
points in the treaty. Second draft, drafter’s comments, p6. 
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excluded persons who were residents of the US for treaty purposes. Hence, 
under the second draft, as was the case with the 1946 UK Treaty,139 a dual 
resident could not be an ‘Australian resident’ (or, for that matter, a ‘US 
resident’) but could be a ‘resident of Australia’.  
‘Industrial or Commercial Profits’ 
3.82 The definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ in the second draft expressly 
excluded ‘income from the operation of ships or aircraft’. Income in the form 
of dividends, interest, rent, royalties, management charges, or remuneration 
for personal services had been excluded from the definition in the first draft. 
Capital gains were not expressly excluded from the definition in either draft.  
3.83 The drafter commented that the exclusion of income from the operation of 
ships or aircraft from the definition was ‘in order to ensure that Article III 
(Industrial or Commercial Profits) does not apply to those profits’.140 Article V 
of the second draft provided for exclusive taxation of shipping and aircraft 
profits on a residence basis. The exclusion of such profits from the definition 
of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ was aimed at simplifying the drafting of 
Article V, but both the exclusion and the original drafting of Article V reflected 
a concern that, in the absence of express exclusions, shipping and aircraft 
profits could be taxed as part of industrial or commercial profits despite the 
exclusive residence basis of taxation adopted in Article V. 
‘Permanent Establishment’ 
3.84 The second draft changed the wording ‘or the use of substantial equipment or 
machinery’ to ‘a place where or in the locality of which— (i) operations 
involving the use of substantial equipment or machinery are conducted; or (ii) 
substantial equipment is installed for the purposes of a contract’. The drafter’s 
comment on this change was merely, ‘expression “use of substantial 
equipment” expanded and broadened’.141  
3.85 The memorandum of March 1952 indicates that another consideration 
motivating the change referred to in 3.84 was that ‘a US company may fulfil a 
contract to erect, say, a powerhouse, by having machinery manufactured in or 
delivered to Australia and then installing it’. The Memorandum noted that the 
                                                          
139  See the discussion at 2.143. 
140  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p6 
141  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p6. 
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US company would not make ‘use’ of the plant and hence might not have a 
permanent establishment in Australia under the first draft.142 This explains the 
express reference to substantial equipment being ‘installed’ in the second 
draft.  
Article III – Industrial or Commercial Profits  
3.86 The second draft made four changes to the Industrial or Commercial Profits 
article. Paragraphs (1) and (2) were redrafted so that ‘profits’ rather than the 
entity that made them were exempted. The drafter commented, ‘This accords 
with the U.K.– Australia agreement and with the Commonwealth income tax 
law, which exempts income, not businesses.’143  
3.87 Paragraphs (1) and (2) were amended so that the reference to a permanent 
establishment being ‘situated therein’ now referred, in paragraph (1), to a 
permanent establishment ‘in the United States’ and, in paragraph (2), to a 
permanent establishment ‘in Australia’. The drafter commented, ‘It is not 
desired to imply that a permanent establishment needs to be situated at one 
site.’144  
3.88 The proviso to paragraph (3) was transferred to Article XXI. The purpose of 
the transfer was to ensure that Article XI (dealing with royalties other than film 
royalties) would not interfere with the application of ITAA 1936 (Cth) Part III 
Division 14 (films).145 The proviso became paragraph (b) of Article XXI, which 
read as follows: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not – 
(a) be construed as restricting in any manner any exemption, 
deduction, credit or other allowance now or hereafter accorded by 
the laws of one of the Contracting States in the determination of the 
tax payable in that State; or 
(b) affect the operation of Divisions 14 and 15 of Part III of the 
Australian Income Tax and Social Services Contribution 
Assessment Act 1936–1953 (or that Act as amended from time to 
time) relating to film business controlled abroad and insurance with 
                                                          
142  ‘Strictly Confidential, Australia – US Draft Income Tax Agreement – Matters Requiring 
Review’, p2, NAA, ATO file, Pt 4. 
143  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p8. 
144  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p8. 
145  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p8. 
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non-residents, or the corresponding provisions of any statute 
substituted for that Act. 
3.89 The fourth change concerned the saving provision in paragraph (5) of the 
article preserving the operation of discretionary powers in domestic law which 
applied in non-arm’s length transactions where information was insufficient to 
determine the profit of a permanent establishment. The change omitted the 
words ‘in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Article’. The drafter 
merely commented that the omitted words were not included in the 1946 UK 
Treaty.146  
Article IV – Inter-Connected Companies/Associated Enterprises 
3.90 The second draft amended the deemed source rule in the inter-connected 
companies article. In the first draft, the deemed source rule was: 
(2) Profits included in the profits of an enterprise of one of the 
Contracting States under paragraph (1) of this Article shall, unless 
contrary to the laws of that Contracting State, be deemed to be 
income derived from sources in that Contracting State and shall be 
taxed accordingly. [Emphasis added] 
In the second draft, paragraph (2) of Article IV was replaced by: 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Article XXI of this Convention, profits 
included in the profits of an enterprise of one of the Contracting States 
under paragraph (1) of this Article shall be subject to tax by that State 
as income of that enterprise. 
(3) For the purposes of Article XVI (credits) of this Convention, profits 
taxed in accordance with this Article shall be deemed to be income 
derived from sources in the Contracting State which imposes that tax. 
3.91 Both the Memorandum and the drafter’s comments indicate that the US 
pressed for the words ‘unless contrary to the laws of that Contracting State’ to 
be retained.147 The US gave the example of a US parent company with an 
Australian subsidiary which traded both in Australia and NZ. If Article IV 
applied, Australia would tax the adjusted profits, which in the absence of the 
                                                          
146  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p8. The drafting of the corresponding saving 
provision in the 1946 UK Treaty was discussed at 2.115 to 2.126. 
147  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p10; Strictly Confidential, p3. 
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words ‘unless contrary to the laws of that Contracting State’ would be deemed 
to have an Australian source. However, NZ might also tax the same amount 
and, the drafter commented, in equity ITAA 1936 (Cth) s23q should have 
applied but could not because the adjustment would be deemed to be 
Australian source income.148  
3.92 The drafter’s comments on the redraft regarded the words ‘unless contrary to 
the laws of the Contracting State’ as nullifying the whole paragraph, and 
indicated that the proposed amendments aimed to ensure that Australia had 
the right to tax the adjusted income and deemed it to have an Australian 
source when it had not been taxed in the country of origin.149 The operation of 
the deemed source rule was confined to the credit provisions. 
Article VII – Dividends 
3.93 The drafter indicated that a policy issue requiring resolution was whether the 
15% tax envisaged should be on gross dividends, on dividends included in 
taxable income, or on gross dividends less direct deductions and a proportion 
of concessional deductions. The same question had been raised by the ATO 
Memorandum, which argued that ‘The present Australian method of 
determining the tax payable is to have different rates of tax on various income 
brackets. Article VII should not specify a maximum rate of 15% and so leave 
a lower rate to be charged on the lower income brackets – that is, it should be 
an overall rate not exceeding 15%.’150 The comment reflects the fact that 
Australia still assessed dividends paid to non-residents on a net assessment 
basis, not on a gross withholding basis. 
Article VIII – Australian Undistributed Profits Tax 
3.94 The second draft made no substantive changes to this article, but the drafter 
and the Memorandum commented that, as Australian undistributed profits tax 
was now at a flat rate, the article had become redundant.151 The drafter 
commented that retention of Article VIII could only be justified as protection 
against [sic] a possible return to the previous method of assessing 
                                                          
148  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p10 and Strictly Confidential, p3. 
149  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p10. 
150  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p12 and Strictly Confidential, p4. 
151  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p12 and Strictly Confidential, p4. The comments 
reflect the effect of amendments to undistributed profits tax enacted in 1952, as 
discussed above n 91. 
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undistributed profits tax based on the tax that shareholders would have paid if 
the undistributed profit had been distributed.152 
 
 
Article XI – Cultural Royalties 
3.95 The second draft completely redrafted the royalty article. The article in the 
first draft was: 
Royalties for the right to use copyright of, or in respect of the right to 
produce or reproduce, any literary, domestic, musical or artistic work 
(but not royalties or other payments relating to motion picture films) 
derived from sources within one of the Contracting States by a 
resident of the other Contracting State not engaged in trade or 
business in the former State through a permanent establishment, shall 
be exempt from tax by the former State. 
The article in the second draft was: 
Royalties (not being royalties in relation to motion picture films or the 
reproduction by any means of images or sound produced directly or 
indirectly from those films) for the use, production or reproduction of, 
or the privilege of using, producing or reproducing a literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work in which copyright subsists shall, if derived 
from sources within one of the Contracting States by a resident of the 
other Contracting State not engaged in trade or business in the former 
State through a permanent establishment in that State, be exempt 
from tax in the former State. 
The drafter commented that it was inappropriate to refer to royalties for the 
right to use copyright or the right to produce or reproduce. The drafter noted 
that the right to tax under Part III Division 14 of ITAA 1936 (Cth) was 
preserved by Article XXI, and pointed out that the redrafted article aimed to 
make it clear that film royalties were not exempt from source basis taxation. 
An attempt had been made, presumably by the inclusion of the clause ‘or the 
reproduction by any means of images or sound produced directly or indirectly 
                                                          
152  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p12. 
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from those films’ to cover royalties relating to the adaption of films for 
television purposes, but the drafter indicated that the matter was still being 
looked into.153  
 
 
Article XVI – Credits  
3.96 The second draft substituted a new opening clause in paragraph (2) for the 
original paragraph (2). The original opening clause in paragraph (2) read: 
(2) Subject to provisions in force in Australia on the date of signature 
of this Convention and to such provisions (which shall not affect the 
general principle hereof) as may be enacted in Australia,  
The new opening clause read: 
(2) Subject to any provisions of the law of Australia which may from 
time to time be in force and which –  
(a) relate to the allowance of a credit against Australian tax of 
tax payable outside Australia; and 
(b) do not affect the general principle of this paragraph. 
The drafter commented that in the original draft the granting of the credit was 
subject to existing Australian credit provisions, including ITAA 1936 (Cth) s45, 
even if such provisions were contrary to the general principle of the credit 
article. Section 45 conflicted with the principle of the credit article because 
s45 would not allow credit for US tax paid by an Australian resident on a 
dividend paid by a US company out of Australian source profits.154 Section 45 
only allowed a credit for foreign tax paid where the whole or part of the 
dividend was paid out of ex Australian source profits. Where part was paid 
from ex Australian source profits, the credit was the amount which bore the 
same proportion to the credit otherwise allowable as the ex Australian source 
profits bore to the total profits of the paying company.155 The drafter 
commented that the redraft would not permit the application of any Australian 
provision which affected the general principle of the credit article.  
                                                          
153  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p16. 
154  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p18. 
155  See the discussion of s45 in 1953 in N E Challoner and C M Collins, above n 20, 336. 
 
 
 
122 
122 
 
 
 
3.97 The drafter went on to list the following points for further discussion with US 
officials: 
(a) allowance of Division 7156 (undistributed profits) tax in US 
assessments of US shareholders;  
(b) allowance of credit by the US for tax paid under s125 (dealing with 
interest paid by a resident company to a non-resident157) with credit 
being allowed to US residents entitled to the interest which had been 
taxed under s125; 
(c) the basis for allowing credit for provisional tax.158 
Crediting Division 7 tax had been raised at the earlier discussions in Canberra 
with US officials, and the drafter noted that the US was unlikely to concede 
this point.159 
Article XVII – Assistance In Collection 
 3.98 The Assistance in Collection article in the original draft read as follows: 
‘Each Contracting State shall collect on behalf of the other Contracting 
State an amount, due to that other State in relation to taxes which are 
the subject of this Convention, sufficient to ensure that an exemption 
or reduced rate of tax granted under this Convention shall not be 
enjoyed by persons not entitled thereto.’ 
The second draft proposed to substitute the following for the original article: 
‘Each of the Contracting States may collect such amounts in respect 
of taxes, which are the subject of this Convention, imposed by the 
other Contracting State as are sufficient to ensure that an exemption 
or reduced rate of tax granted under this Convention by that other 
                                                          
156  See the discussion of Australian undistributed profits tax above n 91. 
157  For a discussion of s125 in 1953 see N E Challoner and C M Collins, above n 20, 
869–80. 
158  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p18. 
159  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p18. 
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Contracting State shall not be enjoyed by persons not entitled to that 
benefit.’ 
Australia had previously indicated to the US officials that, from Australia’s 
perspective, the original article might need to be redrafted completely and that 
its form might need to be determined ‘in the light of constitutional questions 
and the need, if any, of Australia to give effect to the article by legislation’.160 
The drafter pointed out that the redrafted article was not mandatory.161 This 
was evident by the substitution of the word ‘may’ for ‘shall’ in the first line. It is 
also notable that the redraft omits the phrase ‘due to the other State’ and 
instead refers to taxes, the subject of the treaty, which are ‘imposed by the 
other State’. The change of wording would appear to be to avoid an implied 
admission that the taxes referred to were actually due to the other State. 
Article XXI – Savings Provision 
3.99 The second draft amended this article to read: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not –  
(a) [as per the original draft]; or  
(b) affect the operation of Division 14 and 15 of Part III of the Australian 
Income Tax and Social Services Assessment Act 1936–1953 (or that 
Act as amended from time to time) relating to film business controlled 
abroad and insurance with non-residents, or the corresponding 
provisions of any statute substituted for that Act. 
The drafter commented that a proviso from Article III(3) had been transferred 
to Article XXI to ensure that neither Article III(3) nor Article XI would impinge 
on Division 14.162  
3.100 The drafter also commented that paragraph (a) might cause Article IV 
(dealing with inter-connected companies) to be ineffective except to permit 
ITAA 1936 s136163 to continue to operate. The drafter’s reasoning was that 
                                                          
160  This is consistent with the view expressed in N E Challoner and C M Collins, above n 
20, 327, that under English Private International Law no action lies for the recovery of 
foreign taxes.  
161  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p19. 
162  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p21. 
163  ITAA 1936 s136 empowered the Australian Commissioner to determine the taxable 
income of a business carried on in Australia that was either: (a) controlled principally 
by non-residents; (b) carried on by a company in which the majority of shareholders 
were non-residents; or (c) carried on by a company which (directly or through 
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paragraph (a) might prohibit Australia from taxing any income which it did not 
now tax.164 The drafter’s concern may have been that the absence of 
Australian tax under domestic law in the circumstances dealt with in Article 
IV(1), other than under s136, might be construed as an ‘exemption’ for the 
purposes of Article XXI(a). Alternatively, the drafter may have thought that the 
calculation of profit under domestic law in the absence of Article IV(1) and 
s136 may have involved a ‘deduction’ for the purposes of Article XXI(a).  
3.101 In addition, the drafter commented that paragraph (a) in conjunction with 
Article IV(2) as revised might require Australia to continue to apply the 
exemption in s23q165 (dealing with foreign source income of residents not 
exempt from tax in the source country) to the adjustments made in Article IV 
notwithstanding a subsequent repeal of s23q.166  
3.102 It appears that the drafter considered that a resident company that was an 
inter-connected company for purposes of Article IV might be able to argue 
that the s23q exemption167 should continue to apply in calculating its profit 
under Article IV(2) notwithstanding its subsequent repeal on the basis that the 
Convention could not be construed as restricting the operation of the existing 
exemption. Only in a determination and taxing the profit of the company on an 
arm’s length basis (without taking into account the s23q exemption) under 
Article IV(2) could it be said that the Convention was restricting the 
exemption.  
3.103 Notwithstanding these concerns, the drafter did not propose any changes to 
paragraph (a) of Article XXI. 
The Negotiations In Washington, 1953 
3.104 McGovern and King corresponded between 20th November 1952 and January 
1953 to arrange a second round of negotiations to be held in Washington. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
nominees) held the majority of the shares of a non-resident company. ITAA 1936 
s136 is discussed in more detail at note 133 accompanying 2.115. 
164  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p21. 
165  ITAA 1936 s23q exempted foreign source income (other than dividends) which was 
not exempt from tax in the source country. 
166  Second draft, drafter’s comments, p21. 
167  ITAA 1936 s23q provided that income was exempt from tax where it was derived by 
an Australian resident from foreign sources provided it was not exempt from tax in the 
source country or where the Australian resident was liable to pay royalty or export 
duty in any foreign country in respect of any sale of goods from which the income was 
derived. 
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Eventually, following suggestions by King,168 arrangements were made for an 
Australian delegation comprising McGovern, Belcher and Bell to visit 
Washington, New York and Ottawa in March and April of 1953 to discuss the 
US and Canadian treaties and to attend the meeting of the United Nations 
Fiscal Committee. McGovern was given plenipotentiary powers to sign the 
treaties.169  
3.105 On 28th April 1953, McGovern advised that the text of the treaties had been 
settled at Washington and that only formal steps in preparation of the 
documents for approval and signing remained to be completed.170 The 
treaties were signed on 14th May 1953 by Sir Percy Spender and Mr Bedell 
Smith.171  
The Final Version Of The Treaty 
3.106 The ATO file on negotiation of the treaty currently does not contain any 
document forwarding the second draft of the treaty to US officials. Nor does 
the file contain any account of the content of the negotiations. The author has 
been unable to locate any account of the content of the negotiations in files 
relating to the treaty in the US National Archives and Records Administration. 
Hence it is necessary to make inferences as to the content of the negotiations 
by comparing the final version of the treaty with the first and second drafts. 
                                                          
168  King to McGovern, 23rd January 1953 and King to P S McGovern, 19th February 
1953, NAA, ATO file, Pt 4. 
169  Several items of correspondence in combination support the statements made in the 
text. These are: Fadden to Casey, 5th March 1953; G A Jockel, for a Secretary, 
Department of External Affairs, Memorandum for Commissioner of Taxation, 
Department of the Treasury, 19th March 1953; Copy, Casey to His Excellency Mr 
Pete Jarman, Ambassador of the US of America, Canberra, 12th March 1953; 
McGovern to The Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 27th March 1953; J 
Plimsoll (Acting Secretary) Memorandum for the Australian Embassy, Washington, 1st 
April 1953; Copy Note, Department of External Affairs to Embassy of the US of 
America, 31st March 1953; Cablegram, Department of External Affairs to Australian 
Embassy, Washington, 14th April 1953. All of these documents are contained in NAA, 
ATO file, Pt 4. 
170  Cablegram, Australian Consulate General, New York, for Mair, 28th April 1953, NAA, 
ATO file, Pt 4. Mair was Acting Commissioner of Taxation at the time. 
Correspondence from Mair to the Commonwealth Treasurer on 29th April 1953 
indicates that the sender of the cable was McGovern.  
171  ‘For Press, Embargo – Not for release before midnight Thursday, 14th May 1953, Tax 
Convention With USA’, Cablegram, from Australian Embassy, Washington to Min & 
Dept EA, Treasury, Taxation, PM’s, 14th May 1953; and Department of State, For the 
Press, No.261, Signing of Three Tax Conventions With Australia, 14th May 1953. All 
these documents are contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 4. Spender was Australian 
Ambassador to the US at the time and Bedell Smith was Acting US Secretary of 
State.  
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The following comparison will be confined to the articles previously discussed 
in this chapter. 
 
Definitions  
‘Resident’ 
3.107 The definitions of ‘resident of Australia’ and ‘Australian resident’ and the 
definition of ‘US resident’ follow the second draft. As a consequence, the 
words ‘for the purposes of Australian tax’ were omitted at several points 
throughout the final version of the treaty. 
‘Industrial or Commercial Profits’  
3.108 The change described at 3.83 to the definition of ‘industrial or commercial 
profits’ in the second draft was incorporated into the final version of the treaty.  
‘Permanent Establishment’ 
3.109 The stylistic changes to the ‘substantial equipment’ provision in the second 
draft were not found in the final version of the treaty, which corresponds with 
the first draft except that it refers to substantial equipment being ‘installed’. 
Thus, the final version of the treaty accommodated the principal concern 
about the substantial equipment provision expressed in the memorandum of 
March 1952. 
Industrial Or Commercial Profits 
3.110 The change described at 3.86 was not adopted in the final version of the 
treaty, which followed the first draft in this respect. The change described at 
3.87 was adopted in the final version of the treaty. Presumably, the Australian 
argument mentioned in the drafter’s notes, namely to avoid an implication that 
a permanent establishment needed to be situated at one site, was effective 
here. Consistently with the second draft, the proviso to paragraph (3) was 
omitted and transferred to Article XX (the renumbered Article XXI). The 
change discussed at 3.89 was implemented by omitting the words, ‘in 
accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Article’. 
3.111 The final draft differed from both the first and second drafts in that, 
understandably, the proviso to paragraph (3) which applied the principle 
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underlying s38 of ITAA 1936 was confined in its operation to determinations 
by Australia. 
 
Article IV – Inter-connected Companies 
3.112 The final version of the article differed from both the first and second drafts. 
Consistent with the second draft, the words ‘unless contrary to the laws of the 
Contracting State’ were omitted. The difficulty identified by the drafter in 
relation to paragraph (2) of the first draft, as discussed at 3.91,172 was dealt 
with by deleting the deemed source rule and by making the paragraph subject 
to Article XX, which preserved the operation of certain domestic law 
provisions. 
Article VII – Concessional Rate Of Tax On Dividends 
3.113 Paragraph (1) of Article VII (dealing with Australian tax on dividends) differed 
from both the first and second drafts by adding the words ‘of the dividend’ 
after ’15 percent’. The addition only related to Australian tax on dividends and 
implies that the tax would be 15% of the gross dividend thus resolving one of 
the questions raised in the Australian drafter’s comments. 
Article VIII – Undistributed Profits Tax 
3.114 The final version of Article VIII differed from both the first and second drafts 
by covering US undistributed profits tax. The extension is not the subject of 
specific comment in either the US or Australian files that have been examined 
by the author. The US may have asked for the article to be extended to its 
undistributed profits tax in case the US changed to the former Australian 
method of calculation173 at some future time.  
Article X – Cultural Royalties  
3.115 Article X adopted the wording of the second draft discussed at 3.95.  
Article XV – Tax Credits  
                                                          
172  As discussed at 3.91, the perceived difficulty was that ITAA 1936 s23q could not 
apply in a situation where, in equity, it should, because of the deemed source rule in 
the article. 
173  The former Australian method of calculating undistributed profits tax was discussed at 
2.12 and at note 91 to 3.57. 
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3.116 The amendment to paragraph (2) of the article proposed in the second draft174 
was adopted in the final version. No changes were made to either the first or 
second draft versions of the article to deal with the additional issues175 raised 
in the drafter’s comments on the article.  
Article XVI – Assistance In Collection 
3.117 The Assistance In Collection article differed from both the first and second 
drafts. As was the case with the equivalent article in the first draft, it used the 
mandatory verb ‘shall’ instead of the permissive verb ‘may’ used in the 
second draft. The article in the final draft read: 
‘Each Contracting State shall, so far as it is practicable to do so, 
collect, and pay to the other Contracting State amounts equivalent to 
the amounts due to the other Contracting State by way of taxes which 
are the subject to this Convention, being amounts the collection of 
which is necessary in order to ensure that the benefit of exemptions 
from tax, or of reductions in rates of tax, provided for by this 
Convention is not received by persons not entitled to that benefit.’ 
Changes from the previous drafts reflect awareness of technical and practical 
difficulties associated with collecting tax for the other contracting state and 
also aim to clarify operational aspects. Practicalities are evident in the 
insertion of the words ‘so far as it is practicable to do so’. The drafting reflects 
the technicality that what was to be collected was an amount equivalent to the 
tax due to the other contracting state, not the tax itself. The obligation now 
only applied where the assistance in collection was ‘necessary’ to ensure that 
the benefits of the Convention were not received by persons not entitled to 
them. In the first two drafts, by contrast, the obligation had applied where 
assistance in collection was ‘sufficient’ for those purposes. 
Article XX – Savings Provision For Exemptions, Deductions, Credits and Allowances 
in Domestic Law 
                                                          
174  As discussed at 3.97, this proposed amendment aimed to overcome difficulties 
associated with the application of ITAA 1936 s45. 
175  As discussed at 3.98, the drafter’s comments related to: credit for US shareholders 
for Australian undistributed profits tax; credit for US residents for Australian tax paid 
under ITAA 1936 s125; and the basis for allowing credit for provisional tax. 
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3.118 The final version of this article adopted the changes proposed in the second 
draft discussed at 3.99 but did not make any change to paragraph (a) in 
response to the drafter’s comments discussed at 3.100 and 3.101.  
 
Inferences Drawn From Comparing The Final Treaty With The Earlier Drafts 
3.119 With the exceptions of the gross basis taxation of dividends,176 the failure to 
adopt all the suggested changes to the tax credit provisions177 and the 
changes made to the assistance in collection article,178 all of the changes 
from the second draft can be regarded as alternative drafting approaches to 
the problems identified in the drafter’s comments on the second draft. The 
changes are all consistent with an acknowledgement of the validity of the 
Australian concern, but they adopt a different drafting approach to deal with 
the problem.  
3.120 The changes to Article VIII dealing with undistributed profits tax acknowledge 
the validity of the Australian argument by making the article reciprocal. The 
changes to the Assistance in Collection article give the distinct impression of 
redrafting being done during the negotiations, reflecting the accumulated 
wisdom of experienced tax administrators. Applying the flat rate of source tax 
to the gross dividend179 was inconsistent with Australian domestic law and the 
Memorandum, but it was an option that the drafter’s comments had left open.  
3.121 The only other point of substance in which the Australian revisions in the 
second draft did not carry the day were in relation to the conceptually difficult 
issue of characterising the Australian undistributed profits tax, s125 tax and 
Australian provisional tax for US foreign tax credit purposes.180  
The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report  
3.122 The President submitted the signed treaty to the US Senate on 3rd June 
1953181 and the Senate ratified the treaty on 19th July 1953.182 The Senate 
                                                          
176  See the discussion at 3.93 and 3.113.  
177  See the discussion at 3.97, 3.98 and 3.116. 
178  See the discussion at 3.98 and 3.117. 
179  See the discussion at 3.113.  
180  See the discussion at 3.97.  
181  Cablegram, from Australian Embassy, Washington to Min & Dept EA, Treasury, 
Taxation, PM’s, 3rd June 1953. Copy contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 4. 
182  King to McGovern, 21st July 1953, NAA, ATO file, Pt 4. 
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Foreign Relations Committee submitted a report (hereafter ‘the Report’) on 
the treaty to the Senate. The Report highlights aspects in which the treaty 
was consistent with and varied from then current US taxation treaty practice. 
3.123 The Report noted, with obvious approval, that the treaty, unlike some US 
treaties such as the 1945 US – UK Tax Treaty, did not contain any provisions 
for the exemption from US tax of capital gains or taxes on accumulated 
earnings. The Report noted that the treaty was substantially identical with US 
treaties then in force, but drew attention to distinctive features of the treaty.183 
3.124 Principal among the unusual features, from both the US and Australian 
perspectives, was the flat rate of 15% of source taxation on dividends. The 
Committee commented: 
 ‘This omission is one to which American taxpayer groups may take 
exception and, as a matter of fact, several witnesses commented on 
this point. It is understood, however, that US representatives in their 
negotiations with Australia made determined efforts to secure the 
reciprocal exemption. They were unable to do so because of the 
Australian position that reciprocal reduction of the tax on dividends to 
15 percent provides more favorable [sic] treatment generally than 
does the corresponding provision of Australia's tax convention with the 
UK.’184 
3.125 McGovern and King had corresponded on this issue prior to the Committee’s 
hearing. McGovern had forwarded a memorandum which explained the 
context (as discussed in Chapter 2) in which Australia had made the 
concession of the exemption from source taxation on dividends paid by wholly 
owned subsidiaries to their parents in the 1946 UK Treaty. McGovern pointed 
out that the 15% rate in the Australia–US treaty represented a greater 
concession to dividends other than those paid by subsidiaries than in the 
1946 UK Treaty, where the rate of source taxation on such dividends was 
reduced by one half to a rate of 17.5% on dividends paid to UK companies 
and a rate of up to 37.5% on dividends paid to UK individuals.  
3.126 In addition, difficulties had been experienced in the UK treaty in defining a 
wholly owned subsidiary (particularly on the question of the appropriate 
                                                          
183  Tax Analysts, Worldwide Tax Treaties, United States, Australia, Belgium, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Report (S. Exec. Rpt. No.2, 83-1, July 2, 1953.) 
184  Ibid. 
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treatment of preference shares in a definition) and due to the fact that having 
a preferential rate on dividends paid by wholly owned or 95% owned 
subsidiaries would mean that such companies would not seek Australian 
equity investment.185 In reply, King commented that McGovern’s explanation 
‘stood me in good stead in the final stages of the income tax convention’.186 
3.127 The Committee noted that, in contrast to some other US taxation treaties, the 
reciprocal exemption in the royalty article in the Australian treaty did not 
extend to industrial royalties or film rentals; the Committee pointed out that a 
similar exclusion of film rentals from the reciprocal exemption for cultural 
royalties was found in the United States’ treaties with Canada and Finland. 
Nor did the Australian treaty, unlike some other US treaties, provide for the 
reciprocal reduction of source taxation of interest. It is reasonably clear from 
this comment and the general tenor of the Committee’s report that the 
Committee’s view was that source countries retained full taxing rights in 
relation to categories of income not specifically dealt with in the relevant 
treaty.187 
3.128 The Committee also noted that under both the Australian and Belgian treaties 
(which it was also examining at the same time): 
‘the articles providing for the mutual assistance in the collection of 
taxes extends [sic] only to such cooperation as will insure that the 
exemption or reduced rates of tax granted under the convention shall 
not be enjoyed by persons not entitled to such benefits.’188 
Date Of Entry Into Force  
3.129 In Australia, the treaty became the Second Schedule to Income Tax 
(International Agreements) Act 1953 (Cth), which came into force on 11th 
December 1953. The effect of s6 of the Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Act was that the treaty had the force of law in Australia as from 
                                                          
185  The undated memorandum, titled ‘Taxation of Dividends Paid by US Corporations’, 
and McGovern’s covering letter, McGovern to King, 19th June 1953, are both 
contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 4. 
186  King to McGovern, above n 182. It seems likely that the reference to the ‘final stages 
of the income tax convention’ is to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing 
at which King appeared. In the next sentence of the same letter, King refers to the 
Senate’s advice and consent to ratification as ‘final action’. 
187  Tax Analysts, above n 183. 
188  Tax Analysts, above n 183. 
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1st July 1953, being the first day of July next succeeding the date on which 
the treaty became effective for US tax purposes. 
The Significance Of The 1953 US Treaty For The First Two Questions Identified 
At 1.4 
3.130 The 1953 US Treaty, while consolidating and refining the structure and some 
of the distinctive features of the 1946 UK Treaty, contained additional features 
which influenced Australian taxation treaty practice for the balance of the 
period under review in this thesis. The overall Australian objectives, as stated 
by McGovern in his report to Fadden, were to remove, at minimum revenue 
cost, the deterrent to US direct investment in Australia and to emphasise the 
primacy of source basis taxation.189  
 3.131 The basic structure of the treaty was a carry-over from the 1946 UK Treaty. 
The structure was not unique. The approach taken in this treaty to defining 
‘industrial or commercial profits’ can also be seen in several US taxation 
treaties in this period,190 but not in all of them.191 It is also common for US 
taxation treaties in this period to not contain an ‘other income’ article. It is 
reasonable to infer that this structure was one that the US would agree to 
even if it might not have asked for it.  
3.132 In the case of the 1953 US Treaty, McGovern reported that the US attitude 
was that, in general, the 1946 UK Treaty should be regarded as setting the 
pattern of tax treaties between Australia and countries from whom investment 
capital was sought.192 One consequence of allowing the 1946 UK Treaty to 
set the pattern may have been the adoption of the overall structure of that 
treaty.  
3.133 Although the ATO would subsequently describe taxation treaties that had 
these characteristics as following a ‘Colonial Model’,193 the better view 
appears to be that these structural features were also common in US taxation 
                                                          
189  See the discussion at 3.32. 
190  See, for example, US–Canada 1942; US–NZ 1948; US–Ireland 1948; US–Germany 
1954. 
191  See for example: US–UK 1945; US–Netherlands 1948. 
192  See the discussion of this aspect of McGovern’s report at 3.31. 
193  See Taxation Ruling TR 2001/12 Income tax and capital gains tax: capital gains in 
pre CGT tax treaties. 
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treaties in the 1940s and 1950s and in the taxation treaties of other English 
speaking countries of that period.194  
3.134 Other features that were carried over from the 1946 UK Treaty included: (a) 
the savings provisions in respect of ITAA 1936 s136, the taxation of film 
income, and the taxation of profits of foreign controlled insurance companies; 
(b) the approach to dealing with residence issues (enhanced in the case of 
corporate residence); (c) quarantining Australian undistributed profits tax from 
the limitations on source taxation in other distributive articles; and (d) the 
deletion of the phrase ‘same or similar conditions’ from the arm’s length 
adjustment provisions. It does seem likely that these particular features, like 
the overall structure of the treaty, were a product of following the 1946 UK 
Treaty. 
3.135 Several respects in which the treaty differed from the 1946 UK Treaty were to 
become part of Australian taxation treaty practice for the period reviewed in 
this thesis. The most important difference was agreeing to a flat 15% gross 
source tax on all dividends. From an Australian perspective, this rate 
encouraged the right level of US equity participation in Australian companies 
without producing the ‘Treasury effect’. It is clear that this was a product of 
Australia’s argument in original negotiations with the US for a 5% rate on non-
portfolio dividends.195  
3.136 Another development was the broadening of the definition of ‘permanent 
establishment’, particularly by the inclusion of a ‘substantial equipment’ 
provision. Although the author has not located direct documentary evidence 
on the point, US tax treaty practice in the 1940s and 1950s and subsequent 
Australian tax treaty practice make it likely that the request for the inclusion of 
a ‘substantial equipment’ provision came from Australia. The final form of the 
provision was a composite of the original draft and the second draft 
developed by Australia.  
3.137 A third feature that was to continue to be part of Australian treaty practice in 
the period under review was the express reference to either ITAA 1936 s38 or 
to its content in the calculation of industrial or commercial profits. While 
                                                          
194  If anything, the model might be called the ‘Baby Boomer Model’ rather than the 
‘Colonial Model’. The post World War II baby boom is usually regarded as beginning 
with births in 1945 and ending with births in 1965 thus corresponding almost exactly 
with the period in which Australian treaties have all the features of the model. 
195  See the discussion at 3.51 to 3.56. 
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McGovern reported on the inclusion of the provision, he did not specify which 
country initiated the insertion.196 As similar provisions had been included in 
other US tax treaties from 1948 onwards, it seems likely that the initiative 
came from the United States. It is highly likely, though, that the express 
reference to the principle underlying s38 was initiated by Australia.  
3.138 The negotiation and drafting of the treaty consolidated an approach that had 
been used in negotiating and drafting the 1946 UK Treaty,197 although, so far 
as can be judged from the correspondence, the negotiations appear to have 
been much more convivial. In part, this may have been due to the greater 
similarity between the Australian and US income tax systems at the time 
(both classical systems with undistributed profits taxes and only allowing such 
deductions as the legislation permitted) as compared with the Australian and 
UK taxation systems (same common law concept of income but different 
corporate-shareholder tax systems and different approach to allowing 
deductions in respect of business income).  
3.139 The involvement of politicians was less direct, with there being no directly 
relevant meetings involving ministers of both countries. Nonetheless, the 
Australian decision to enter into negotiations was clearly made by politicians, 
and geopolitical considerations appear to have been relevant factors 
influencing that decision.198  
3.140 As might be expected, there is also some evidence that Australian negotiators 
paid attention to previous US taxation treaty practice (for example, the 
substantial equipment provision might be derived from the 1950 US – Canada 
Supplementary Convention199) and certainly expected the US to have regard 
to the 1946 UK Treaty. The negotiators and drafters continued to be 
concerned with technical problems associated with the interaction of the 
treaty with Australian domestic law in the areas of residence200 and credits.201  
3.141 Unlike the case with the 1946 UK Treaty, the primary motivation for entry into 
the treaty was not to prevent international double taxation; rather it was to 
prevent credit overspill in the US and to encourage US direct investment in 
Australia by reducing source basis taxation.  
                                                          
196  See the discussion at 3.47. 
197  See the discussion at 2.167. 
198  See the discussion at 3.17 to 3.24. 
199  See the argument to this effect at 3.42. 
200  See the discussion at 3.81. 
201  Discussed at 3.97. 
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3.142 Both of the objectives referred to in 3.142 could have been achieved by a 
comprehensive and unilateral lowering of Australian tax rates; however, in the 
economic and political environment of the early 1950s, the most viable source 
of additional direct foreign investment in Australia was the United States. 
Hence a targeted approach through a bilateral treaty, which minimised 
revenue cost, was favoured over unilateral and comprehensive rate 
reductions. Encouraging investment while at the same time minimising 
revenue cost and the erosion of source basis taxation were again the major 
policies that influenced both politicians and officials.  
The Significance Of The 1957 Australia – Canada Tax Treaty For The First Two 
Questions Identified At 1.4 
3.143 Although the negotiation and drafting of the 1957 Canada Treaty is not 
discussed in detail in this thesis, the author has, as a result of research 
undertaken towards this thesis, previously published an article on that 
subject.202 In several respects, examining archival material relating to the 
1957 Australia – Canada Tax Treaty has significance for the first and second 
questions identified at 1.4.  
3.144 The request for a treaty was initiated by Canada,203 which sought a treaty 
dealing with shipping profits and air transport. Australia, concerned about a 
potential loss of revenue and with its emphasis on the primacy of source 
basis taxation, rejected this approach outright as providing advantages to 
Canada and no corresponding advantages to Australia. Australia advised 
Canada that, given the unilateral provisions in both countries for relief of 
international double taxation, there ‘did not appear to be any great need for 
such an agreement’.204 Australia was still seeing the primary purpose of tax 
treaties as the prevention of international juridical double taxation.  
3.145 After the election of the Menzies government in 1949, the Australian attitude 
changed and Cabinet authorised commencing negotiations with Canada. The 
considerations that influenced the Australian Cabinet and officials were the 
promotion of closer relations with Canada and possible encouragement of 
                                                          
202  The author has discussed the negotiation and drafting of the 1957 Australia – Canada 
Tax Treaty in detail in Taylor, above n 1. In the discussion that follows, references will 
be made to this publication to support the analysis and argument. 
203  In every treaty that Australia entered into in this period, the initial request for a tax 
treaty came from the potential treaty partner. 
204  The initial approach by Canada is discussed in detail in Taylor, above n 1, 922–8.  
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Canadian investment in Australia based, in part, on lobbying by significant 
Canadian businesses.205 From a foreign relations perspective, the Treasurer’s 
submission to Cabinet observed that it would be difficult and perhaps 
embarrassing in any treaty to deny broadly comparable terms to Canada to 
those proposed to be agreed with the United States.206  
3.146 The Australian Treasury played a greater advisory role in relation to the 1957 
Canada Treaty than it had in relation to Australia’s previous tax treaties. The 
Cabinet submission, drafted by Treasury, saw the negative aspects of a tax 
treaty with Canada as a loss of revenue and a loss of dollars due to increased 
remittances by Canadian companies taking advantage of the lower treaty rate 
of source taxation.207 After the broad terms of the treaty had been finalised, 
but before settlement of the final draft, a clear division emerged between the 
Australian Treasury, which, unconvinced that direct Canadian investment 
would be encouraged or was desirable, now opposed entering into the treaty, 
and the ATO, which considered that the treaty might encourage Canadian 
direct investment in Australia at a relatively small revenue cost and that it 
would now be embarrassing to not enter into the treaty.208 The Australian 
Minister for External Affairs was in favour of the treaty throughout, for foreign 
                                                          
205  Most notably the Ford Motor Company of Canada, which was the parent company of 
the Ford Motor Company of Australia. The Ford Motor Company of Canada was 49% 
Canadian owned and operated relatively independently from the Ford Motor 
Company of the United States. Another significantly affected Canadian company was 
Massey Harris Ferguson. Lobbying of Australian ministers by major Canadian 
companies is discussed in Taylor above n 1, 962. An apparent reference to the Ford 
Motor Company in Fadden’s 1952 Cabinet submission is noted in Taylor, above n 1, 
932. Lobbying of Canadian ministers and officials by Ford and Massey Harris 
Ferguson, and by Canadian shipping interests, is discussed in Taylor, above n 1, 
950, 958 and 975. 
206  ‘For Cabinet, Income Tax, Estate Duty and Gift Duty, Proposal By Canadian 
Government for Agreements to Relieve Double Taxation Between Australia and 
Canada’ A W Fadden, Treasurer, November 1952. A copy of the submission is 
contained in ‘Budget and Taxation, Double Tax Agreement, Australia and Canada’, 
Series Number A571, Control Symbol, 1968/6374 Pt 1.  
207  The Treasurer’s submission to the Australian Cabinet Administrative Committee is 
discussed in Taylor, above n 1, 931–2. 
208  In August 1956, the Commissioner of Taxation drafted a submission to the Treasurer 
(Arthur Fadden) to submit to Cabinet. After receiving a letter from the First Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury (R J Randall), the Treasurer withdrew the Cabinet 
submission and asked the Commissioner of Taxation and the Secretary of the 
Treasury to prepare a statement of pros (prepared by the Commissioner of Taxation) 
and cons (prepared by Randall) in relation to entering into a taxation treaty with 
Canada. The correspondence, the statement of pros and cons and the subsequent 
Australian decision are discussed in Taylor, above n 1, 962–7. 
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relations reasons, and also believed that the treaty might encourage 
Canadian direct investment in Australia.209  
3.147 Several aspects of the negotiation and drafting of the treaty highlight the 
importance that Australian tax officials placed on the primacy of source 
taxation and on a desire to protect the operation of specific features of 
Australian domestic law. Principal among these was Australia’s desire to 
preserve its undistributed profits tax on private companies. Disagreement on 
this issue was the major cause of the delay between the initial negotiations in 
Ottawa in May 1953210 and the eventual signing of the treaty in October 
1957211 even though undistributed profits tax was unlikely to ever apply to 
subsidiaries of major Canadian companies. 212  
3.148 These emphases can also be seen in technical features of the treaty such as: 
the inclusion of a ‘substantial equipment’ provision in the definition of 
‘permanent establishment’;213 a saving provision in respect of Australian 
domestic law on film business controlled abroad and insurance with non-
residents;214 and a saving provision for domestic law in the industrial or 
commercial profits and associated enterprises articles in cases where 
information was inadequate to ascertain an arm’s length profit.215 While each 
of these features was a carry-over from either or both of Australia’s two earlier 
tax treaties, their presence in both drafts prepared by Australia in relation to 
the 1957 Canada Treaty shows that in this instance the initiative for each of 
them came from Australia.  
3.149 The provision having its origin in this treaty which remains a distinctive feature 
of Australian tax treaty practice was Article II(2).216 This was inserted at 
Australia’s request in response to the Australian Board of Review decision in 
Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656 and was consistent with an emphasis on 
the primacy of source basis taxation and with the previous Australian 
                                                          
209  The involvement of R G Casey as Minister for External Affairs in supporting entry into 
a tax treaty with Canada is discussed in Taylor, above n 1, 930–1, 947 and 962. 
210  See the discussion of the Ottawa negotiations in Taylor, above n 1, 933–43. 
211  See the discussion of the signing of the treaty in Taylor, above n 1, 974–5. 
212  See the discussion of disagreements concerning Australian undistributed profits tax in 
Taylor, above n 1, 938–42 and 946–9. 
213  The inclusion of a substantial equipment provision in the treaty is discussed in Taylor, 
above n 1, 938. 
214  This aspect of the treaty is noted in Taylor, above n 1, 981. 
215  This aspect of the treaty is noted in Taylor, above n 1, 982. 
216  Article II(2) is discussed in Taylor, above n 1, 968–9 and 981. 
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practice217 of drafting treaty provisions in response to Australian court and 
board of review decisions.  
3.150 The 1957 Canada Treaty continued the ‘baby boomer’ structure that had 
been established in Australia’s two earlier tax treaties.218 In this instance, 
clearly Australia initiated that structure, which was adopted in the two drafts 
that Australia sent to Canada. The structure was consistent with the principle 
of the priority of source taxation that Australia stressed.219 
3.151 The treaty also consolidated the approach of uniform source country taxation 
of dividends at 15% that Australia had argued for in the 1953 US Treaty.220 
That Canada, understandably given its own prior tax treaty practice, agreed to 
this without apparent difficulty may have reinforced the belief of Australian 
negotiators that rates at this level could consistently be achieved in bilateral 
treaty negotiations. 
3.152 The negotiation and drafting of the 1957 Canada Treaty also shows that 
Australian officials were willing to modify their initial stance in relation to items 
which were important to Canada (such as shipping and aircraft profits and 
undistributed profits tax) as a means of obtaining concessions on items (such 
as a uniform rate on source taxation of dividends) which were important to 
Australia. Australia bowed to the emerging international standard on shipping 
profits, characterising not using its arbitrary domestic basis for taxing them as 
a major concession.221 In the case of undistributed profits tax, Australia’s 
concession was limited to omitting the equivalent of Article VIII of the 1953 
US Treaty222 from the 1957 Canada Treaty without prohibiting Australia from 
levying undistributed profits tax.223  
3.153 The respects in which the 1957 Canada Treaty differed from the 1953 US 
Treaty are instructive. The inclusion of a ‘force of attraction’ rule in the first 
Australian draft and its apparently ready agreement to omit that rule from the 
                                                          
217  See, for example, the discussion at 2.161. 
218  The ‘baby boomer’ structure of the treaty is discussed in Taylor, above n 1, 984–5 
and the discussion at 3.132.  
219  See the argument to this effect at 2.162. 
220  A point noted in Taylor, above n 1, 981–2. See also the discussion of this aspect of 
the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty at 3.51 to 3.56, 3.93 and 3.113. 
221  See, for example, the discussion of McGovern’s correspondence with Canadian 
officials on this issue in Taylor, above n 1, 951. 
222  Article VIII of the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty was discussed at 3.57, 3.93 and 
3.113. 
223  For a more detailed analysis of this aspect of the treaty see Taylor, above n 1, 982. 
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second draft shows that Australia was not particularly concerned with the 
presence or absence of the rule.224  
3.154 The provisions relating to royalties also differed from those in the 1953 US 
Treaty. No specific provision in the 1957 Canada Treaty preserved the 
operation of Australian domestic legislation in relation to film royalties, 
although the credit article deemed income covered by those provisions to 
have an Australian source. As the royalty article in these treaties did not 
extend to film and television royalties, thus leaving full taxing rights with the 
source country, the end effect of the two treaties was substantially the 
same.225  
3.155 In the case of mineral royalties, the draft that Australia sent to Canada did not 
contain an equivalent to Article XI of the 1953 US Treaty,226 which had 
apparently been inserted to counteract the effect of provisions in US domestic 
law. It may be that Australia did not have similar concerns about provisions in 
Canadian domestic law.227  
3.156 Unlike the 1953 US Treaty the 1957 Canada Treaty, consistent with prior 
Canadian tax treaty practice, did not contain even a limited assistance in 
collection article nor had one been included in the Australian draft sent to 
Canada. This omission of this article from the Australian draft reinforces the 
impression that the assistance in collection provision in the 1953 US Treaty 
was inserted at the request of the United States.228 
3.157 The negotiations with Canada show that for most of the 1950s Australia was 
still developing its process for negotiating tax treaties. Negotiating tax treaties 
was still a novel experience for Australia, and officials clearly believed that 
authorisation from Cabinet was required to enter into negotiations and for the 
draft to be used in negotiations. Shortly after they were concluded, McGovern 
provided a detailed report of the initial negotiations to Fadden. The author has 
found no evidence of action by Fadden in response to a key recommendation 
by McGovern at the time on the article dealing with the calculation of 
                                                          
224  See the discussion of the initial inclusion and subsequent omission of the ‘force of 
attraction’ rule in Taylor, above n 1, 935–7, 969 and 981. 
225  See the discussion in Taylor, above n 1, 982–3. 
226  See the discussion at 3.63. In the version of the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty 
discussed at 3.63, this article was numbered XII. 
227  See the discussion in Taylor, above n 1, 982–4. 
228  See the discussion at 3.70, 3.97 and 3.116.  
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undistributed profits tax which, if acted upon, may have led to an earlier 
conclusion of the treaty.229  
3.158 The factors that influenced the decision to enter into a tax treaty with Canada, 
the long delay in making that decision, the delay in reaching agreement with 
Canada, the division between Australian government departments on the 
issue, and the lack of clarity as to roles of officials and ministers in the 
process are all evidence of the nascent state of Australian tax treaty policy, 
practice and processes at the time. Economic, revenue, tax technical, foreign 
policy and political factors were all interacting without any of them assuming 
decisive significance and without any of the departments which championed 
particular factors becoming clearly dominant. 
 
3.159 Having  now entered into three tax treaties Australia in the late   1950s, 
through the Department of the Treasury working with the ATO, began to 
develop formal policies in relation to concluding tax treaties and developed an 
Australian model treaty.  Chapter 4 discusses   the  1959  - 1964 review of  
Australian tax treaty  policy and the   development of the first  Australian 
model tax treaty.
                                                          
229  Taylor, above n 1, 985–7, discusses this issue and contrasts the Australian process 
with the Canadian process at the time. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE 1959–1964 OFFFICIAL REVIEW OF AUSTRALIAN 
TAXATION TREATY POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST AUSTRALIAN 
MODEL TAX TREATY  
The 1959–1964 Official Review Of Australian Taxation Treaty Policy 
4.1 In mid 1959, the Australian Treasury commenced a general review of policy 
on concluding further tax treaties.1 That review led ultimately to the 
development of the first Australian model tax treaty, which was sent to several 
European countries. The model was also used as the basis for the ATO’s 
review of the draft tax treaty that the UK sent to Australia in 1966 as part of 
the negotiations which led to the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty. The model 
also was a reference point and a source of precedents for Australian 
negotiators during that negotiation.2 This chapter will discuss the 
correspondence, meetings, Cabinet submissions, Cabinet decisions, reviews 
and drafts which led up to the development of this first Australian model tax 
treaty.  
4.2 The review process began when M W O’Donnell3 wrote to the Commissioner 
of Taxation4 on 3rd December 1959 indicating that Treasury was preparing a 
draft Cabinet submission on the general approach that should be taken in 
response to requests for tax treaties. O’Donnell requested that McGovern 
provide a statement in relation to countries which had made or were likely to 
make approaches for tax treaties with Australia, indicating: (a) the nature and 
extent of the double taxation which existed; (b) the difficulties (including loss 
of revenue) associated with concluding tax treaties with such countries; and 
(c) the advantages in concluding such treaties. O’Donnell also indicated that 
Treasury would welcome any comments concerning the general policy on 
concluding tax treaties.5  
 
 
                                                          
1  M W O’Donnell, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to The Treasurer 
(Harold Holt) 16th August 1962, 2, para 6. ‘General Review of Double Tax Proposals, 
Part 1’ NAA, Series Number A7073, Control Symbol J245/68 Pt 1. The review was 
initiated following a request from Japan for a tax treaty. 
2  See the discussion at 5.12, 5.14, 5.30 and 5.56. 
3  M W O’Donnell was First Assistant Secretary of the Australian Treasury at the time. 
4  Patrick McGovern was still Australian Commissioner of Taxation in 1959. 
5  M W O’Donnell, above n 1. 
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The Commissioner Of Taxation’s 1959 Assessment Of Tax Treaties 
4.3 McGovern made a lengthy reply to the Secretary of the Treasury on 8th April 
1960.6 McGovern identified residence–source conflicts as the principal cause 
of international double taxation, noting that, while the burden of taxation could 
be increased in dual residence situations and by conflict of source rules, 
these cases were ‘infrequent’ and did not call for consideration in a general 
review of double taxation.7 McGovern identified the five ‘recognised means’ 
for the relief of double taxation as: (a) exemption at source; (b) exemption by 
the state of residence; (c) allowance of credit by the residence state for 
source tax; (d) exemption of a portion of the income by each state; and (d) 
allowance of the source country tax as a deduction by the residence state.8  
4.4 McGovern summarised the almost complete unilateral relief from international 
double taxation which Australia provided under domestic law. In the case of 
the ITAA 1936 s45 credit,9 McGovern conceded that where the dividend was 
funded from Australian source profits, the lack of availability of the s45 credit 
meant that double taxation was not relieved in the absence of a tax treaty. 
McGovern pointed out that Australian companies receiving dividends from 
foreign companies did not (except for private companies in rare 
circumstances) pay tax on the dividend, but that redistributions of the dividend 
to Australian shareholders bore tax at the shareholder level. While the 
position was modified where a tax treaty reduced the foreign tax on the 
dividend received by the Australian company, there were ‘few cases of this 
nature’ and the need for Australian residents in this situation to be relieved 
from international double taxation was ‘not pressing’. 
                                                          
6  Patrick McGovern, Commissioner of Taxation to The Secretary, Department of the 
Treasury, Canberra, ACT, 8th April 1960. ‘General Review of Double Tax Proposals, 
Part 1’ NAA, Series Number A7073, Control Symbol J245/68 Pt 1. McGovern’s reply 
was based on information received from Deputy Commissioners. McGovern had 
written to each Deputy Commissioner on 15th December 1959. Memorandum to the 
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation from Commissioner of Taxation, 15th December 
1959. ‘General Review of Double Tax Proposals, Part 1’ NAA, Series Number A7073, 
Control Symbol J245/68 Pt 1. In addition to the information that O’Donnell had 
required, McGovern also requested that the information supplied include: (a) the 
classes of income which flowed between Australia and the country in question; (b) an 
estimate of the revenue gain or loss to Australia of entering into a tax treaty with the 
country in question, assuming that the treaty followed the lines of the Australia–
Canada tax treaty; and (c) any other factor which the relevant Deputy Commissioner 
might consider relevant. 
7  McGovern, above n 6, paras 3 and 4. 
8  McGovern, above n 6, para 5. 
9  The unilateral provisions providing relief from international double taxation were 
discussed at 2.7, 2.9 and 2.13. 
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4.5 McGovern then summarised the unilateral relief from international double 
taxation provided by selected foreign countries10 and provided estimates of 
the revenue cost to Australia of concluding a tax treaty with each of these. All 
the countries discussed (other than Greece and Egypt11) provided relief using 
one or a combination of methods; however, McGovern noted that, in some 
instances, the unilateral relief provisions in the foreign country did not 
completely eliminate international double taxation.12 
4.6 McGovern then observed that ‘it has become conventional in double taxation 
agreements to relieve the weight of tax on dividends flowing between the two 
countries that conclude an agreement’. McGovern opined that this was ‘the 
most important feature of the agreement so far as concerns overseas 
investors wishing to place their capital with Australia and enterprises 
operating through subsidiary companies incorporated in Australia. It is 
thought to have done much more to attract capital to Australia than all the 
other provisions in the agreement.’13 McGovern considered that the non-
treaty level of Australian tax on distributions ‘may well deter investment in 
Australia by an overseas enterprise wishing to establish a subsidiary in this 
country’, but that the rates of company tax in other countries were generally 
high enough to not encourage companies (for tax reasons) to keep their 
capital at home rather than invest in Australia at treaty rates.14 
4.7 McGovern’s overall conclusion was that: (a) there was little unrelieved double 
taxation for Australian taxpayers; (b) countries seeking treaties with Australia 
did not provide unilateral relief on a basis as satisfactory as that provided in 
treaties; and (c) in the absence of treaty rates on dividends the weight of 
Australian tax on company profits distributed to non-residents (particularly to 
parent companies) was a deterrent to overseas investment in Australian 
companies.15 
                                                          
10  The countries discussed (in this order) were the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Japan, Sweden, The Netherlands, France, Norway, Italy, Switzerland, Ireland, 
Denmark, Greece and Egypt. 
11  No information was available on the domestic law provisions for unilateral relief in 
these countries. 
12  McGovern, above n 6, paras 8–44. McGovern made specific mention of the position 
of Dutch and Swedish investors. 
13  McGovern, above n 6, para 45. 
14  McGovern, above n 6, paras 47–50. McGovern had provided information about the 
effects of the reduction in source taxation of dividends under Australia’s existing tax 
treaties and of the effect of dividend withholding tax. 
15  McGovern, above n 6, para 51. 
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4.8 McGovern considered that the principal difficulty in concluding tax treaties 
had been the cost to Commonwealth revenue. It was estimated that the cost 
of entering into tax treaties with the countries that had requested them would 
be £640,000 per annum and that of this, £544,000 would be attributable to 
taxing shipping profits on a residence basis and £82,000 would be attributable 
to reducing the tax on dividends to 15%. Statistics were not available to make 
a reliable estimate of the cost of Australia’s existing tax treaties, but on a 
comparable basis of estimation, the cost would have been several times 
£640,000. The cost of the NZ tax treaty was estimated to be £150,000. Tax 
treaties with Malaysia, Pakistan and Burma would be expected to result in a 
small revenue gain for Australia. McGovern observed that virtually the whole 
revenue cost of tax treaties was attributable to taxing shipping profits on a 
residence basis and reducing the rate of withholding tax on dividends.16  
4.9 McGovern then outlined the classes of income that were taxed on a residence 
basis in Australia’s existing tax treaties and pointed out that, except in the 
case of taxation of industrial royalties in the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty, 
all but a negligible portion of the revenue costs associated with residence 
basis taxation were attributable to taxation of shipping profits on a residence 
basis.17 McGovern then outlined the policy arguments for and against 
residence basis taxation and the particular arguments put in favour of 
residence basis in the case of shipping profits.18 McGovern noted that, where 
a foreign tax credit system was in operation, taxation on a residence basis 
frequently provided more assistance to the foreign Treasury than it did to 
foreign investors. In the case of shipping profits, in some situations double 
taxation still arose in the absence of a treaty because Australia imposed tax 
at 5% on gross freights while residence countries typically allowed credit 
against and up to their own tax, which was calculated on the basis of profits.19  
4.10 There are indications in the letter that McGovern did not favour continuing 
Australia’s arbitrary approach to taxing shipping profits stating:  
‘There would be few countries today, however, and possibly only 
those without a merchant marine service of their own, who would be 
sympathetic with the policy at present followed by Australia in relation 
                                                          
16  McGovern, above n 6, paras 52–8. 
17  McGovern, above n 6, paras 59–60. 
18  McGovern, above n 6, paras 61–4. 
19  McGovern, above n 6, paras 66 and 67. 
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to shipping profits. All the model double tax agreements emerging 
from United Nations agencies and other international advisory bodies 
accept without exception the doctrine of assessment of profits on a 
residence basis.’20 
Given that Australia had already, through its existing treaties, considered it 
not appropriate to tax a large proportion of ships visiting Australia, ‘rejection of 
proposals for agreements on the grounds of revenue costs in relation to ships 
has become more difficult to justify, especially where an agreement could be 
expected to encourage an inflow of capital or to assist trade’.21 
4.11 Turning to the effect of reduced treaty rates on dividends on Australian 
revenues, McGovern pointed out that the cost to the Australian revenue of 
these concessions in the UK and US treaties was £3,850,000 per annum as 
compared with the estimated cost to Australian revenue of £82,000 if similar 
concessions were made to all the other countries currently seeking tax 
treaties with Australia.22 Since the conclusion of the 1953 tax treaty with the 
US, the profits of General Motors-Holden’s Ltd had increased from £689,154 
in 1948 to £15,343,107 in 1958, and its dividend distributions had increased 
from nil in 1948 to £7,437,500 in 1958. The total dividends paid to US 
residents had also increased during the period in which the 1953 treaty had 
been in operation.23 While acknowledging that there could be other 
explanations for General Motors-Holden’s Ltd’s dividend policy, McGovern 
considered that the better view was that, ‘General Motors Holden regarded 
the pre-double tax agreement rate of tax on distributed profits as excessive 
and it was content to use its profits for development purposes in the almost 
certain knowledge that Australia’s need to attract development capital would 
in the long term make it necessary to reduce the tax rates’.24 Whatever the 
reason for the change in the General Motors-Holden’s Ltd’s dividend policy, 
Australia was now collecting more tax from dividends paid to US residents 
than it did before the treaty was concluded, notwithstanding that the rate of 
tax was limited to 15% on the dividends.25  
                                                          
20  McGovern, above n 6, para 69. 
21  McGovern, above n 6, para 70. 
22  McGovern, above n 6, para 72. 
23  McGovern, above n 6, para 74. 
24  McGovern, above n 6, para 75. 
25  McGovern, above n 6, para 76. 
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4.12 McGovern then commented on the extent to which the ‘Treasury effect’ was, 
or was likely to be, produced in Australia’s current and proposed tax treaties. 
In most cases, McGovern’s conclusion was that relevant foreign companies 
would obtain at least some benefit from the rate reduction but that usually 
individuals would not.26 
4.13 McGovern concluded with several general observations about treaty practice 
and policy. One difficulty associated with concluding a treaty could be co-
ordination with the laws of the country concerned. McGovern cited difficulties 
that had been encountered in attempting to conclude a tax treaty with NZ 
when NZ exempted dividends from taxation and had a higher level of 
corporate tax.27  
4.14 McGovern believed that Australia’s tax treaties with the UK, the US and 
Canada had improved the climate for the flow of investment capital from 
those countries into Australia. In part, this was because the ‘more or less 
permanent’ nature of the treaties ‘engendered a feeling of confidence’ that 
both countries were determined to avoid double taxation and that there would 
not be dramatic changes in taxation principles affecting foreign investors 
without notice to amend or abandon the treaty being given.28  
4.15 McGovern also considered that tax treaties were an indication to foreign 
investors that Australia no longer saw them as exploiters to be penalised by 
the taxation law. In McGovern’s view, it was only with the negotiation of tax 
treaties that Australia provided modest encouragement in its taxation laws for 
the foreign investor who, ‘because he makes no claims upon Australia for 
social services, education or personal protection, requires relatively little 
Commonwealth expenditure in his interest’.29  
4.16 McGovern explained that the zero rate of source taxation on dividends paid 
by Australian wholly owned subsidiaries to UK parent companies in the 1946 
UK Treaty was a means of providing neutrality of tax treatment for UK branch 
and subsidiary operations in Australia, given that UK companies had 
traditionally invested through branches. By contrast, US and Canadian 
companies had not tended to use branches to invest in Australia, and hence a 
                                                          
26  McGovern, above n 6, paras 78–84.  
27  McGovern, above n 6, para 86. 
28  McGovern, above n 6, paras 88 and 89. 
29  McGovern, above n 6, para 90. 
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zero rate had not been adopted in these treaties nor in the proposed tax 
treaty with New Zealand.  
4.17 McGovern did not favour exempting dividends paid by wholly owned 
subsidiaries of foreign companies, as this discouraged the formation of 
companies with joint Australian and foreign equity participation.30  
4.18 Since the reduction in Australian tax on dividends under the treaties, 
McGovern noted that there had been an increase in the number of foreign 
companies conducting business in Australia through subsidiaries. He saw this 
as a step towards a position in which Australian residents would increase 
their influence in such companies through management and equity 
participation.  
4.19 In McGovern’s view, treaty rates of taxation on dividends would not 
discourage foreign investment and, at the same time, would provide a 
substantial contribution to Australian revenues without prohibiting subsequent 
increases in Australian corporate tax.31 McGovern’s concluding paragraph 
was highly supportive of tax treaties: 
‘The flow of capital and consequent expansion of the Australian 
economy lead to greater industrial knowledge and develop new 
manufacturing techniques. Double taxation agreements have, I 
believe, contributed in part to those advantages to Australia and it 
does not seem too much to suggest that, in some circumstances, they 
have advantages in the fields of trade, defence and diplomacy.’32 
The Process Of Drafting The Cabinet Submission 
4.20 Treasury officials were more sceptical of the value of tax treaties. On receipt 
of McGovern’s letter, E M W Visbord33 prepared a summary of it, which he 
sent to F C Pryor34 with the comment: 
‘I do not think that we would be entirely in agreement with this general 
attitude on double taxation agreements. The main value of the 
Commissioner’s document seems to be in the facts that it sets out 
                                                          
30  McGovern, above n 6, para 92. 
31  McGovern, above n 6, paras 93 and 94. 
32  McGovern, above n 6, para 95. 
33  The author has been unable to ascertain the precise position that Visbord held in the 
Australian Treasury at the time, but it is clear from the correspondence that he was a 
Treasury official. 
34  Pryor was Acting First Assistant Secretary in the Australian Treasury at the time. 
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rather than in its analysis. I think that what is needed is an analytical 
paper based, to some extent, on the Commissioner’s document, but 
transferring much of the detailed information to attachments. I have 
prepared a draft document on this basis and it also is attached to this 
minute.  
In view of the character of the Commissioner’s document, I think it 
would be preferable for a paper based on my draft, rather than the 
Commissioner’s document, to be made the subject of discussion 
between ourselves and the taxation branch.’35 
4.21 A draft Cabinet submission was subsequently prepared by R Daniel36, settled 
by R J Randall37 and forwarded to the Commissioner of Taxation on 23rd 
September 1960 asking for suggestions to ensure that the facts were ‘fairly 
stated’ and seeking any general comments that the Commissioner had.38 
Through a long process of inter-departmental correspondence and meetings 
involving Treasury, the ATO, External Affairs, Trade and the Prime Minister’s 
Department, the submission was further developed and was ultimately made 
available to Cabinet by the then Treasurer39 on 16th July 1962. Despite the 
inter-departmental consultation, the Treasury view dominated the overall 
argument of the final submission. 
                                                          
35  Minute Paper, Visbord to Pryor, 17th May 1960, paras 3 and 4, in ‘Double Taxation 
Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control 
Symbol 63/3972 Pt 1. A document which is evidently the draft that Visbord refers to is 
also contained in this file.  
36  Minute Paper, R Daniel to Acting Secretary (Richard Randall) 21st September 1960, 
in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number 
A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 1. The Minute Paper indicates that Daniel had 
prepared a draft submission for Randall’s approval and suggested that it be sent to 
the Taxation Office to ensure that the factual statements within it were accurate. What 
was evidently Daniel’s draft is filed immediately after his Minute Paper. From 
Visbord’s report to Randall, referred to at 4.20, it may be that Visbord’s draft referred 
to in that report may have formed the basis for Daniel’s draft. 
37  Randall was Acting Secretary of the Treasury at the time. Selwyn Cornish, ‘Randall, 
Sir Richard John (Dick) (1906–1982)’ in Australian Dictionary of Biography 
(Melbourne University Press, 2000) vol 18. Accessed online at 
<http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/randall-sir-richard-john-dick-14287/text25352> 5 
February 2016. 
38  R J Randall, Acting Secretary of the Treasury, to the Commissioner of Taxation, 
Canberra, ACT, 23rd September 1960, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other 
Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 1. 
39  Harold Holt was Treasurer at the time. Ian Hancock, ‘Harold Edward Holt’ in Michelle 
Grattan (ed), Australian Prime Ministers (New Holland Publishers, 2000) 271–84 at 
276 to 277. 
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4.22 Treasury officials were not persuaded by the written responses of the other 
departments (particularly those of the Department of External Affairs and the 
Department of Trade) to the draft submission.  
4.23 The Prime Minister’s Department was regarded as agreeing with the general 
tenor of the draft submission, as making some minor suggestions for 
additional information and as not offering any major criticism.40  
4.24 Jarasius, a Treasury official, considered that the responses from the 
Department of External Affairs and the Department of Trade did not take into 
account the three main arguments in the submission. These were that: (a) 
there was not much benefit to Australia in entering into tax treaties and there 
would be a loss of revenue if concessions were made; (b) Australian domestic 
law provided residents with almost complete protection against international 
double taxation; and (c) the main objective of European countries wanting tax 
treaties with Australia was to obtain a shipping exemption.41 The suggestion, 
incorrectly attributed to the Department of External Affairs instead of the 
Prime Minister’s Department, that other countries’ experiences could form a 
guide to Australia’s attitude was characterised as ‘rather far-fetched’ on the 
basis that treaties would have to be negotiated on the basis of mutual benefit 
and ‘could not be guided by the past experiences of any other country’.42  
4.25 Various considerations were seen as making a policy of having special 
provisions for migrant supplying countries difficult to implement.43  
4.26 A Department of Trade argument that, despite the ‘Treasury effect’, foreign 
investors still wanted tax treaties because of the certainty they provided was 
characterised as being ‘not quite clear’ on the basis that rates of tax did ‘not 
appear’ to be covered in treaties and that, in Jarasius’ view, a treaty could not 
be a deterrent to policy changes by the contracting parties.44  
4.27 Jarasius concluded that the Department of External Affairs and the 
Department of Trade wanted tax treaties for the purpose of better foreign 
                                                          
40  Minute Paper, B Jarasius to Mr Visbord, 8th March 1962, p1, in ‘Double Taxation 
Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control 
Symbol 63/3972 Pt 2. 
41  Jarasius to Mr Visbord, above n 40, 1. 
42  Jarasius to Mr Visbord, above n 40, 1. 
43  Jarasius to Mr Visbord, above n 40, 1. The considerations mentioned were: 
discrimination, pressure from other countries, differing characteristics of various 
migrant supplying countries, and the changing mix of migrant supplying countries. 
44  Jarasius to Mr Visbord, above n 40, 2. 
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relations and that while this was a ‘highly commendable objective, the price 
seems nevertheless too high’.45 
4.28 Treasury then convened a meeting on 4th May 196246 between officials from 
Treasury, External Affairs, Trade, Prime Minister’s and Taxation Departments 
to discuss the draft submission with a view to reaching consensus on the 
recommendations to be made to Cabinet.47 Craik, of Treasury, opened the 
meeting by explaining the Treasury view that Australia should be prepared to 
enter into negotiations but that its objective should be to enter into 
agreements which offered advantages (in the widest sense) to Australia. 
Craik acknowledged that the draft submission would need to be revised to 
make this attitude ‘quite clear’.48 The Treasury ‘Note for File’ of the meeting 
records that all present agreed to this general policy.49  
4.29 The meeting then discussed advantages (such as Commonwealth relations, 
civil aviation, immigration, and intangibles in the form of goodwill) to Australia 
from tax treaties not measurable in financial terms and agreed that these 
should be covered in the submission. It was recognised that indirect gains 
could not be expected after treaties had been entered into and hence would 
need to be sought at the time a treaty was being negotiated.50  
4.30 Kemp, of the Department of Trade, indicated that it might be possible to use 
tax treaty negotiations to secure benefits for shipping lines trading with 
                                                          
45  Jarasius to Mr Visbord, above n 40, 2. 
46  ‘Note for File, Inter-Departmental Discussion of Policy on Double Taxation 
Agreements’, E.M.W.V. 5th May 1962, p1, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With 
Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 2. 
47  ‘General Attitude to Further Double Taxation Agreements’, no author, no date, p1, in 
‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number 
A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 2. The document indicates what Treasury’s 
purpose was in calling the meeting, and it is clear from its content that it was written 
prior to the meeting. The document largely reiterates previous Treasury views 
expressed in the draft submission. Treasury was represented by Mr Craik, Mr Stone 
and Mr Visbord, External Affairs by Mr Peachey, Trade by Mr Kemp, Prime Minister’s 
by Mr Salter and Miss Seawright and Taxation by Mr Belcher and Mr Hill. ‘Note for 
File’, above n 46, 1. 
48  ‘Note for File’, above n 45, 1. The ‘Note for File’ above n 46 indicates that notes used 
in Craik’s presentation were attached to it. These notes appear to be the document 
titled ‘General Attitude to Further Double Taxation Agreements’, above n 47. A one-
page summary of these notes, titled ‘Double Taxation Agreements’ and likely used for 
the purposes of an oral presentation, is also contained in ‘Double Taxation 
Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control 
Symbol 63/3972 Pt 2. 
49  ‘Note for File’, above n 46, 1.  
50  ‘Note for File’, above n 46, 1.  
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Australia with associated freight reductions.51 It appears likely that Kemp had 
in mind special tax treatment of shipping companies in their country of 
residence in exchange for Australia agreeing to taxation of shipping on a 
residence basis.52  
4.31 Peachey, of the Department of External Affairs, emphasised that a willingness 
to enter into negotiations was almost from a diplomatic perspective even if a 
treaty was not ultimately entered into. It was agreed that the submission 
should emphasise that Australia was willing to enter into negotiations with 
countries that sought treaties with it.53  
4.32 The meeting recognised that negotiations would have to be authorised by 
Cabinet, that treaties would have to be ratified by Cabinet and that inter-
departmental discussions would be necessary on the wider aspects 
associated with particular treaties. Notwithstanding this, it was also 
recognised that bargaining ‘on financial lines’ would have to be carried out by 
expert representatives.54  
The Cabinet Submission Of July 1962 
4.33  Harold Holt55 presented the finalised submission to Cabinet.56 The 
submission pointed out that Australia’s four existing treaties reflected ties with 
countries ‘with which our political and economic relationships are especially 
close’. The submission argued that Australia’s existing treaties should not 
necessarily provide a model for treaties with other countries requesting 
treaties with whom Australia did not have the same close ties. The 
                                                          
51  ‘Note for File’, above n 46, 2.  
52  This point had been made in A T Carmody, Deputy Secretary, Department of Trade 
to M W O’Donnell, First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Canberra, 
ACT, 5th February 1962, p1, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, 
Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 2. as representing the 
view of the Department of Trade. The relationship between tax treaties and landing 
rights that Qantas had in other countries was also discussed. ‘Note for File’, above n 
46, 2. 
53  ‘Note for File’, above n 46, 1. 
54  ‘Note for File’, above n 46, 2. 
55  Holt was Federal Treasurer at the time. 
56  ‘Confidential for Cabinet: Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries: 
Submission 305: Harold Holt, Treasurer, 16th July 1962’, NAA, Series Number A5818, 
Control Symbol: Volume, Agendum 305. (hereafter ‘Cabinet Submission 305’). A 
copy of the submission is also contained in ‘General Review of Double Tax 
Proposals, Part 1’ NAA, Series Number A7073, Control Symbol J245/68 Pt 1. The 
submission noted that requests for tax treaties had been received from several 
countries, including: Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Greece, 
Malaya, Singapore, South Africa and Egypt. This inclusive list of countries that had 
requested taxation treaties with Australia is on page one of the submission. 
 
 
 
153 
153 
submission also considered that the countries that it listed were not so 
dissimilar in their relationships with Australia that Australia could agree to 
enter into treaties with one or two of them and not with the others.57 As a 
matter of general principle, Australia should enter into treaty negotiations with 
countries seeking treaties even if the prospects of a satisfactory treaty being 
concluded were limited. The submission argued, however, that it was 
necessary to determine the general approach that would be taken in future 
negotiations. The overarching approach argued for was that Australia should 
enter into taxation treaties when advantages, associated with taxation and of 
other types, would be gained by Australia.58  
4.34 After outlining the system of double taxation relief through credits, the 
submission noted that to arrive at an acceptable apportionment of tax on 
income between two contracting countries, it was customary for the source 
country to reduce the tax on, or to exempt some classes of income from, tax 
thus increasing the tax that the residence country collected. The submission 
observed that, ‘it is in the interests of the country towards which there is a net 
flow of income to have such limitations included’.59 As there was a substantial 
outflow of income between Australia and its existing treaty partners and most 
of the countries requesting tax treaties, there would be a loss of Australian 
revenue when limitations on source taxation were inserted into Australia’s 
taxation treaties.60 The submission observed that, ‘almost without exception’, 
the countries seeking taxation treaties with Australia, wanted Australia to 
reduce or eliminate tax on ‘certain important items of income which, as the 
country of origin of income, it has the prior right to impose’.61 
4.35 The submission considered that Australia’s existing treaties contained 
substantial concessions by Australia, and that while these, in part, reflected 
the closeness of Australia’s relationship with the countries concerned, 
concessions made in the UK treaty (which influenced subsequent treaties) 
‘probably arose from the rudimentary double taxation arrangements which 
had been entered into with the UK in 1922’.62 The view was that Australia had 
                                                          
57  The list of the countries in the submission is set out in note 56 above. 
58  Cabinet Submission 305, p1. 
59  Cabinet Submission 305, p3. 
60  Cabinet Submission 305, p3. 
61  Cabinet Submission 305, p4. 
62  Cabinet Submission 305, p4. An ATO internal memorandum, by J Hill, had 
questioned whether the concessions made in the UK, US, Canada and New Zealand 
treaties arose, as the draft submission had suggested, from the ‘rudimentary’ 
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entered into its existing taxation treaties notwithstanding the loss of revenue 
that they entailed, because they were perceived to provide other benefits 
mainly in the form of increased foreign investment in Australia. The 
submission pointed out, however, that to the extent that increased foreign 
investment would have occurred in the absence of the treaties and would only 
be marginally affected by them, the costs of that marginal effect was high in 
terms of revenue foregone.63  
4.36 The submission largely repeated the analysis of the revenue costs of tax 
treaties that had been provided in McGovern’s letter. The main causes of 
revenue losses were identified as the shipping exemption and reduced source 
tax rates on dividends. The revenue losses arising from the introduction of 
dividend withholding tax were noted. McGovern’s comments on whether the 
foreign investor or the foreign Treasury benefitted from reductions in source 
taxation were largely repeated.64  
4.37 While recognising that some investment into Australia would not have 
occurred without Australia’s four existing taxation treaties, the submission 
asserted that tax considerations did not appear to be a major determining 
factor for the bulk of overseas investment into Australia. Investment from non-
treaty countries (such as Germany, The Netherlands, France and Japan) had 
been increasing rapidly for the three years from 1957/58 to 1959/60 and 
represented roughly one-eighth of total direct investment other than retention 
of profits.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
arrangements that had previously existed with the UK. Hill expressed the view that 
the UK treaty followed the League of Nations London and Mexico drafts, and that the 
only significant departure from them was the exemption of dividends paid to UK 
parent companies by wholly owned Australian subsidiaries and that this originated 
from ‘the practical application of Australian Income Tax Law to profits of Australian 
branches of U.K companies’. Hill considered that the submission as it stood 
suggested, incorrectly, that there had been ‘sloppy thinking’ by the Australian 
negotiators of the 1946 UK Tax Treaty. Memorandum by J Hill, 7/9/61. ‘General 
Review of Double Taxation Policy, Revised Draft Cabinet Submission’ in ‘General 
Review of Double Tax Proposals, Part 1’ NAA, Series Number A7073, Control 
Symbol J245/68 Pt 1. It appears that view was not conveyed to the Treasury officials 
drafting the submission or, if it was, it did not produce an alteration in the submission. 
The statement that the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty followed the League of 
Nations London and Mexico drafts is not consistent with the research in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis. The only direct reference to the League of Nations in archival materials 
relating to those negotiations was discussed at 2.54 and 2.119. The archival material, 
as noted at 2.98 to 2.108, does indicate that the UK proposals were based on the 
1945 UK – US Tax Treaty.  
63  Cabinet Submission 305, p4. 
64  Cabinet Submission 305, p6. McGovern’s letter was discussed at 4.3 to 4.19. 
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4.38 The exemption of shipping profits, in the view taken in the submission, 
involved a direct and visible loss of revenue without any offsetting benefits.65 
If the direct loss of revenue, from the concessional rate on dividends, were 
seen as a cost of obtaining inbound investment then, the submission 
observed, that cost would continue for the life of the treaties and would 
progressively increase with the flow of dividends. In addition, it was an 
unrequited cost where the investment would have been made in the absence 
of the concessional rates.66 
4.39 The submission noted that little revenue would be lost by entering into further 
treaties which did not include concessions on shipping profits and dividends. 
This raised the question of whether Australia, in further treaties, should 
extend the same concessions on shipping profits and dividends as it had 
previously.67  
4.40 The submission argued that European countries wanted taxation treaties with 
Australia principally to obtain an exemption from Australian tax on shipping 
profits. The arguments in favour of source country concessions on shipping 
profits in taxation treaties were: (a) models from the United Nations and ‘other 
international advisory bodies’ accepted residence basis taxation of shipping 
profits; (b) a strong element of discrimination currently existed because more 
than 50% of the cargoes shipped from Australia were carried in ships 
registered in one of Australia’s four existing taxation treaty countries; and (c) 
as shipping profits arose almost exclusively from carriage on the high seas, 
did not have a source in any particular country and as ships paid port dues 
and related charges in ports of call, exclusive taxation on a residence basis 
was appropriate.68 While these arguments would be attractive to a country 
wishing to have its shipping profits exempted from Australian taxation, the 
submission considered that there were no compensating benefits to be 
gained from the Australian viewpoint, noting that foreign shipping still seemed 
to find it profitable to trade in Australia despite the profits being subject to 
double taxation.  
4.41 The submission further argued that, in the absence of a binding undertaking, 
significant reductions in fares and freights for Australian passengers and 
                                                          
65  Cabinet Submission 305, p7. 
66  Cabinet Submission 305, p7. 
67  Cabinet Submission 305, p9. 
68  Cabinet Submission 305, p10. 
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cargoes would not follow from agreeing to taxing shipping profits on a 
residence basis.69 The submission recommended that, as a starting point in 
negotiations, Australia should maintain its present method of source taxation 
of shipping profits. At the same time, the submission recognised that, in the 
course of negotiations, some concessions, short of total exemption, could be 
made where there were commensurate advantages to Australia.70 
4.42 The submission noted that, prior to the introduction of dividend withholding 
tax in Australia, foreign resident shareholders in non-treaty countries were 
taxed on an assessment basis at normal rates. Following the introduction of 
dividend withholding tax, these shareholders were now taxed at a rate of 6/- 
in the £ (that is, 30%). However, under the treaties with the US, Canada and 
NZ the rate of withholding tax was reduced to 3/- in the £ (that is, 15%), and 
the UK tax treaty, which reduced source taxation of dividends by 50% (except 
for dividends paid by wholly owned subsidiaries that were exempt from 
source taxation), had substantially the same effect.71  
4.43 Countries that were capital exporters to Australia would be likely to seek 
similar concessions in taxation treaties with Australia, arguing that the 
concessions would promote further investment in Australia by their residents. 
This argument was regarded as valid in situations where the domestic law of 
the potential treaty partner exempted foreign source dividends. However, 
where the potential treaty partner relieved international juridical double 
taxation using a credit system, the benefit of reductions in dividend 
withholding tax was seen as accruing to the foreign Treasury rather than to 
the foreign investor.72 
4.44 In relation to non-portfolio foreign investment in Australia, the submission 
pointed out that the investment could either be through branch or subsidiary 
operations. In the former case, the non-resident was taxed on income from 
Australian sources in the same way and at the same rates as Australian 
residents with no concession being allowed under Australia’s existing taxation 
                                                          
69  Cabinet Submission 305, p11. 
70  Cabinet Submission 305, p11. 
71  Cabinet Submission 305, p11. Dividend withholding tax was introduced by Income 
Tax and Social Services Contribution Act (No 3) 1959 and applied to dividends paid 
by Australian companies to non-resident shareholders on or after 1 July 1960. 
72  Cabinet Submission 305, pp11–12. 
 
 
 
157 
157 
treaties,73 although there was no further taxation of remissions of branch 
profits to the parent organisation. By contrast, in the absence of a taxation 
treaty an Australian subsidiary of a foreign company bore Australian 
corporate tax and was then subject to Australian dividend withholding tax of 
6/- in the £ (30%) on dividends remitted to a foreign parent, bringing the total 
Australian tax to 11/- 7d in the £ (approximately 58%). Under Australia’s 
existing taxation treaties, the withholding tax was reduced to 3/- in the £ with 
the effect that the total Australian tax was reduced to 9/- 9d in the £ (48.75%).  
4.45 The submission then commented that ‘the relative magnitude of the 
withholding tax concession arising from the present agreements is, therefore, 
somewhat less than it might appear to be at first sight’.74 This assumed that 
dividends paid to foreign parents were wholly funded from profits subject to 
Australian corporate tax.  
4.46 The submission considered that reductions in withholding tax in further 
taxation treaties would be likely to make investment via subsidiaries more 
attractive relative to investment via branches and to increase remittances by 
Australian subsidiaries to foreign parents (with the benefit of increased 
collections of withholding tax but at the expense of net foreign investment), 
particularly where little unilateral relief from international juridical double 
taxation was currently granted by the foreign parent’s country.75  
4.47 The submission argued that the price at which portfolio foreign investors 
purchased Australian equities reflected investment returns to Australian 
investors, which took account of the absence of credit for Australian corporate 
                                                          
73  While true in the case where the non-resident was trading through an Australian 
branch, this was misleading as, in the absence of a taxation treaty, Australia claimed 
the right to tax Australian source business profits whether or not they were 
attributable to a permanent establishment.  
74  Cabinet Submission 305, p13. At the time, Australia applied progressive scales to 
companies and applied different scales to public and private companies and to 
resident and non-resident public companies. For resident public companies, the rate 
was 35% on the first £5000 of taxable income and 40% thereafter. For non-resident 
pubic companies, the rate was: (a) 30% on so much of the taxable income consisting 
of dividends as did not exceed £5000; (b) 35% on so much of the taxable income not 
consisting of dividends as did not exceed the amount (if any) by which the taxable 
income consisting of dividends was less than £5000; and (c) where neither (a) nor (b) 
applied, the rate was 40%. For private companies (whether resident or non-resident), 
the rates were 25% on the first £5000 of taxable income and 35% thereafter. 
Undistributed profits tax at the rate of 50% was payable by private companies. The 
rates of corporate tax at the time are discussed in J A L Gunn and O E Berger, 
Gunn’s Commonwealth Income Tax Law and Practice (Butterworths, 7th ed, 1963) 
1211 and 1212. 
75  Cabinet Submission 305, pp13–14. 
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tax. Therefore, the only tax that foreign portfolio investors paid was dividend 
withholding tax at 6/- in the £. Hence, the submission argued, reductions in 
withholding tax under taxation treaties ‘was an outright concession in the case 
of this type of investment’.76 The submission also noted that the UK system of 
corporate-shareholder taxation meant that UK portfolio investors in Australian 
equities obtained credit for Australian corporate tax and that this gave them 
advantageous returns when compared with Australian investors in Australian 
equities.77 The submission’s conclusion on the treaty treatment of dividends 
was that, if concessions were to be offered in future, then, so far as was 
practicable to do so, they should only be offered to non-portfolio investors.78  
4.48 The overall conclusion in the submission on the concessional treatment of 
dividends in taxation treaties was negative. While it might be that the 
concessions would lead to some increase of foreign direct investment into 
Australia, they would add significantly to the cost to Australia of that 
investment, a cost which would be likely to increase over the life of treaties 
with a ‘more or less interminable nature’. As Australia had recently provided 
tax benefits to all foreign investors through the introduction of the system of 
withholding taxes on dividends, the submission considered that Australian 
taxpayers would not welcome a further reduction in the tax paid by foreign 
investors, particularly portfolio investors.79 The emphasis in the submission is 
on pragmatic revenue considerations rather than on a theoretical or principled 
analysis of taxing rights in the international context. 
4.49 The submission concluded with a nine-point summary derived from the earlier 
arguments within it. The nine points were: 
1.  Australian residents were already provided (via ITAA 1936 s23q) 
with almost complete protection from double taxation of foreign 
source income. 
2. The especially close ties that Australia had with its existing treaty 
partners meant that those treaties were not necessarily precedents 
for Australian treaties with other countries. 
                                                          
76  Cabinet Submission 305, p14. 
77  Cabinet Submission 305, pp14–15. 
78  Cabinet Submission 305, p15. 
79  Cabinet Submission 305, pp15–16. 
 
 
 
159 
159 
3. The recently introduced dividend withholding tax limited Australian 
tax on dividends and thus benefitted investors resident in non-treaty 
countries deriving Australian source dividends. 
4. The chief purpose of relieving double taxation through treaties was 
served by defining the areas of income to be taxed by each country 
and the relief to be given by each country to its residents for income 
derived in the treaty partner; this meant that there was no need for 
‘concessions’ by either country but that there was ‘everything to be 
said’ for treaties ‘as an aid to ordering the flow of income derived 
from everyday trade and commerce’. 
5. The effectiveness of treaties in relieving double taxation would not 
be impaired if they did not exempt foreign shipping profits from 
Australian tax and did not reduce the rate of tax on dividends. 
6. Exemption of shipping profits from Australian tax, the main object of 
many approaches Australia had received, would have a 
considerable revenue cost to Australia and, at least in relation to 
taxation, would not produce offsetting benefits. 
7. Reduction of Australian tax on dividends, particularly non-portfolio 
dividends, might provide some encouragement to foreign 
investment in Australia, but, as much of the benefit of the 
reductions would flow to foreign Treasuries, the effect on the inflow 
of capital would ‘undoubtedly be marginal’.  
8. Australia should ‘stand ready’ to enter into negotiations with any 
country seeking a treaty with Australia subject to the proviso that, if 
preliminary bilateral discussions made it clear that no useful 
purpose would be served by formal negotiations as there would be 
no hope of success, then formal negotiations should not be 
proceeded with. 
9. Before the conclusion of any treaty, particularly if it contains 
significant concessions, the government should satisfy itself that the 
treaty would offer a balance of advantages to Australia. Up to a 
point, such advantages could be non-tax advantages.80 
                                                          
80  Cabinet Submission 305, pp16–18. 
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The submission argued that it would usually be in Australia’s interest to enter 
into further treaties which did not exempt shipping profits and did not reduce 
the rate of tax on dividends derived in Australia. The submission identified 
Commonwealth countries (such as Malaysia) with whom Australia did not 
have existing treaties and other Asian countries (other than Japan) as 
potential partners for such treaties on the basis that to them ‘these two 
aspects are of little importance’.81  
4.50 For other countries, the submission stated that some concessions on shipping 
profits and on the rate of Australian tax on dividends could be considered at 
least where commensurate direct advantages, some of which might be 
unrelated to taxation, could be negotiated for Australia. Negotiations would 
always require Cabinet’s authorisation, and the treaties themselves would 
require Cabinet’s approval and would be preceded by discussions between 
officials. The stages in the process should mean that all considerations 
associated with treaties would be taken into account.82 Nonetheless, the 
submission then stated:  
 ‘As a starting point, however, I think that we should endeavour to 
avoid having concessions in respect of shipping profits and dividends 
included in any further double taxation agreements and, unless there 
are compelling reasons for doing so, I certainly think that we should 
avoid including in further agreements concessions going so far as 
those in our existing agreements.’83 
The submission recommended that this general approach be used when the 
question of negotiating a tax treaty with a potential partner arose and that, 
following departmental consideration, proposals to open negotiations, and the 
basis on which they were to be conducted, be submitted to Cabinet for 
approval.84 
                                                          
81  Cabinet Submission 305, p18. The statement is consistent with the recognition by the 
Department of External Affairs during the drafting of Cabinet Submission 305 that 
there would be little loss of revenue in granting concessions to countries where 
Australia was a net capital exporter. R A Peachey, for The Secretary, Department of 
External Affairs, to The Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Canberra, ACT, 9th 
January 1962, p1, para 2, in Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, 
Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Part 2, pp1–2, paras 3 
and 4. 
82  Cabinet Submission 305, p18. 
83  Cabinet Submission 305, p19. 
84  Cabinet Submission 305, p19. 
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4.51 The submission noted that a further relevant consideration was the UK’s 
moves to join the EEC. As entry of the UK into the EEC would affect 
Australia’s relations with European countries generally, the submission 
recommended that further discussions on treaties with the ‘countries 
concerned’ should be deferred until the result of the UK’s moves was clear.85  
The 1962 Cabinet Decision 
4.52 On 10th August 1962 the Australian Cabinet agreed that, in deciding whether 
Australia should enter into any further tax treaties, the government should be 
guided by the considerations discussed at paragraph 4.49, with individual 
cases being examined carefully on their merits as they arose. The same 
approach was to apply to renegotiation of existing treaties. Any proposals to 
open negotiations and the basis on which negotiations were to be conducted 
were to be submitted to Cabinet for approval.86 
4.53 Following the Cabinet decision, M W O’Donnell87 wrote to Holt 88 pointing out 
that, in view of the Cabinet decision discussed in 4.52, approaches by the 
European countries identified in the Cabinet submission could be ‘put aside 
for the time being’.89 This left Japan, South Africa and the countries of South-
East Asia as countries with which ‘negotiations might be pressed forward’.90  
4.54 The immediate problem was seen as opening negotiations with Japan, given 
that the review of policy had been initiated when a request for a tax treaty was 
received from Japan in mid 1959 and that Japan was ‘probably the most 
important trading nation for Australia with which we do not have an 
agreement’.91 A Japanese mission was currently visiting New Zealand to 
negotiate a tax treaty, and the Japanese Embassy had ‘expressed a strong 
                                                          
85  Cabinet Submission 305, p19. For a comprehensive discussion of Australia and New 
Zealand’s responses to Britain’s first attempt to join the EEC see John Singleton and 
Paul L Robertson, Economic Relations Between Britain and Australasia 1945–1970 
(Palgrave, 2002). See also Robertson, P L and Singleton, J, ‘The Old Commonwealth 
and Britain’s First Application to Join the EEC’ (2000) 40 Australian Economic History 
Review 153. 
86  Cabinet Minute, 10th August 1962, Decision Number 386. A copy of the Cabinet 
minute is contained in ‘General Review of Double Tax Proposals, Part 1’ NAA, Series 
Number A7073, Control Symbol J245/68 Pt 1.  
87  O’Donnell was then Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury. 
88  Holt was Treasurer at the time. 
89  M W O’Donnell, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to The Treasurer 
(Harold Holt) 16th August 1962, p2, para 4. ‘General Review of Double Tax 
Proposals, Part 1’ NAA, Series Number A7073, Control Symbol J245/68 Pt 1. 
90  M W O’Donnell, above n 89, 2, para 5. 
91  M W O’Donnell, above n 89, 2, para 6. 
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desire’ for its officers to discuss the possibility of a tax treaty with Australia 
when the mission was passing through Canberra en route to Japan.92 
O’Donnell recommended that there be a preliminary exchange of information 
about the Japanese and Australian tax systems with the Japanese delegation 
when it visited Canberra, to be followed by inter-departmental discussions of 
the issues involved in negotiating a tax treaty with Japan.93 The discussions 
would be ‘very preliminary’ and would not amount to opening negotiations 
with Japan but rather would be taking advantage of an opportunity to obtain 
information on Japanese tax law.94  
4.55 O’Donnell also recommended the reopening of the subject of tax treaties with 
South Africa and with South-East Asian countries with a view to an early 
commencement of negotiations.  
4.56 O’Donnell’s third recommendation was that, in accordance with Cabinet’s 
decision, any action on approaches by European countries be deferred.95 Holt 
then made decisions giving effect to these recommendations.96 
Australia’s First Assessment Of The 1963 Draft OECD Model 
4.57 During this period, the OECD was in the process of developing what was to 
become the 1963 draft OECD Model Convention. On 27th February 1963, 
O’Donnell requested that the Commissioner of Taxation advise on the 
acceptability to Australia of the various articles already adopted by the OECD. 
The Commissioner was asked to distinguish between the effects of accepting 
the OECD draft on Australia’s existing tax treaties and on those yet to be 
negotiated.97 
                                                          
92  M W O’Donnell, above n 89, 2, para 6. 
93  M W O’Donnell, above n 89, 2, para 8. 
94  M W O’Donnell, above n 89, 2, para 7. 
95  M W O’Donnell, above n 89, 2, para 8. 
96  M W O’Donnell, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to The Secretary, 
Department of External Affairs, Canberra, ACT, 20th August 1962 and M W O’Donnell 
(Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury) to the Commissioner of Taxation, 
Canberra, ACT, 20th August 1962, note the Treasurer’s affirmative decision in relation 
to each of the recommendations made in O’Donnell’s letter to the Treasurer dated 
16th August 1962. ‘General Review of Double Tax Proposals, Part 1’ NAA, Series 
Number A7073, Control Symbol J245/68 Pt 1. 
97  M W O’Donnell, First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to the 
Commissioner of Taxation, Canberra, ACT, 27th February 1963, ‘Double Taxation 
Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control 
Symbol 63/3972 Pt 3. 
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4.58 M J Belcher, Assistant Commissioner of Taxation, replied on 5th March 1963. 
Belcher’s reply was based on the OECD material then available to the ATO, 
namely four reports of the Fiscal Committee published between September 
1958 and August 1961. After outlining the methods by which the OECD draft 
provided for avoiding double taxation, Belcher went on to examine the effect 
of modifying Australia’s existing tax treaties to accord with the OECD draft.98  
4.59 Belcher’s analysis began by noting that there might be advantages in 
extending the scope of Australia’s treaties to include sub-national taxes in line 
with the OECD draft as a counter to a tax planning strategy that had been 
developed by professors and teachers visiting the US who were exempt from 
US tax under the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty but who argued that they 
were exempt from Australian tax under ITAA 1936 s23q when they paid a 
small amount of State Income Tax in the US.  
4.60 Belcher considered that an extension of taxes covered to payroll tax as 
envisaged under the OECD Model would involve some loss of Australian 
revenue but that this would be likely to be small. Belcher noted that the OECD 
draft included taxes on capital, and observed that the intention was evidently 
to prepare model treaties on death and estate duties but that there was no 
indication of what the content of these would be.99 
4.61 Belcher made interesting comments concerning the definition of ‘permanent 
establishment’ in the OECD draft and in Australia’s existing treaties, noting 
that the definitions were ‘not constant’, had been ‘developed in the light of 
experience’ and reflected the viewpoint both of Australia and the relevant 
treaty partner. Belcher then commented: ‘In the case of the UK a wider 
definition would have been adopted if the UK had agreed but in the case of 
NZ it was not in Australia’s interest to seek a wide definition.’100 Belcher then 
observed that the definition in the OECD draft appeared to favour capital 
exporting countries and that it would be advisable to have a definition at least 
as wide as that in Australia’s existing tax treaties with the US, Canada and 
New Zealand.101  
                                                          
98  M J Belcher, Assistant Commissioner of Taxation, to M W O’Donnell, First Assistant 
Secretary, Department of the Treasury, 5th March 1963, pp1–2, in ‘Double Taxation 
Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control 
Symbol 63/3972 Pt 3. 
99  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 2–3. 
100  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 3, para 13. 
101  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 3, para 14. 
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4.62 Paragraph 1 of Article II of the OECD draft, in Belcher’s view, was ‘clearly 
designed’ to attribute to a permanent establishment the ‘essential 
characteristic of having a distinct situs; a fixed place of business’. Noting that 
the OECD Commentary described the examples referred to in paragraph 2 as 
‘prima facie’ instances of a permanent establishment, Belcher considered that 
this raised the possibility that a branch or an agency might not, in some 
cases, ‘due to the strongly explicit terms of paragraph 1’, be considered to be 
a permanent establishment. Belcher did not regard the possibility as strong 
but considered that the article as a whole was sufficiently ambiguous for the 
point to be argued.102  
4.63 Belcher commented that Article II(2)(g), which regarded a building site or 
construction project that existed for twelve months as a permanent 
establishment, was satisfactory from an Australian viewpoint.103  
4.64 On balance, Belcher concluded, the OECD draft definition of permanent 
establishment was less favourable to Australia than the equivalent definition 
in any of Australia’s existing tax treaties.104  
4.65 Turning to the definitions of ‘resident’ in the OECD draft, Belcher noted the 
tie-breaker provisions but considered that some of the tests could give rise to 
practical difficulties and differences of opinion with the relevant treaty partner. 
Belcher commented that the OECD definitions would clearly ‘be major 
departures from the definition in our law and from the concept of residence as 
it applies to some aspects of existing agreements’.105 
4.66 Belcher was concerned that the non-discrimination article might prevent 
Australia from discriminating against non-residents by denying them an inter-
corporate rebate under ITAA 1936 s46(1). Belcher observed that this would 
have a ‘tremendous impact’ on revenue if applied to Australia’s existing tax 
treaties as, under those treaties, only dividends paid by a wholly owned 
subsidiary to a UK parent were exempt from Australian tax at source.106 
                                                          
102  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 3, para 15. The 1977 OECD Commentary was 
subsequently to make clear that the examples contained in OECD Art 5(2) only 
constitute permanent establishments if they meet the requirements of OECD Art 5(1) 
and that to meet the requirements of Art 5(1) the place of business must be ‘fixed’. 
1977 OECD Commentary on Article 5(1) paragraph 5 of the commentary and 1977 
OECD Commentary on Article 5(2) paragraph 12 of the commentary. 
103  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 3, para 16. 
104  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 3, para 16. 
105  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 3–4, paras 17–18. 
106  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 4, para 19. 
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Belcher considered that this interpretation of the non-discrimination article 
might not have been intended and that it would be important to have the 
position clarified before agreeing to the article.107 
4.67 The OECD draft shipping and aircraft profits article provided for exclusive 
taxation by the country where the place of effective management of the 
relevant enterprise was located.108 Under existing Australian tax treaties, 
shipping and aircraft profits were exempt from tax at source if the ship or 
aircraft was registered in the relevant treaty partner country in which the 
owner or charterer resided. Belcher noted that the provision in the draft 
OECD Model would widen the exemption, because only the place of effective 
management of the relevant enterprise and not the place of registration of the 
ship or aircraft would be relevant.109  
4.68  Agreeing to a provision of this nature would, on Belcher’s calculations, be 
likely to produce an annual loss of revenue to Australia of £100,000 per year 
under Australia’s existing agreements without any compensating tax gain to 
Australia.110 If Australia were to enter into tax treaties containing this provision 
with several identified European countries, the additional loss of Australian 
revenue would be £500,000 per year.111 
4.69 Belcher noted that the income from the Immovable Property article would 
enable Australia to continue to tax rents of foreign owned property situated in 
Australia and royalties from foreign owned natural resources situated in 
Australia. Belcher considered that the article was satisfactory to Australia.112 
4.70 Turning to the business profits article, Belcher noted that source taxation of 
profits attributable to a permanent establishment in the source state broadly 
corresponded with the basis adopted in Australia’s existing tax treaties with 
the UK, the US and Canada.113 The comment appears to be odd in relation to 
the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty under which, as noted at 3.46 a force of 
attraction basis applied to source taxation of industrial or commercial profits 
once a permanent establishment existed in the source country. The same 
                                                          
107  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 4, para 20. 
108  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 4, para 21. 
109  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 4, para 22. 
110  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 4, para 23. 
111  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 4, para 24. 
112  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 5, para 28. 
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basis also applied to taxation of industrial or commercial profits under the 
1960 Australia – NZ Tax Treaty.  
4.71 Belcher pointed out that Australia’s existing tax treaties preserved Australia’s 
rights to tax film businesses controlled abroad and insurance with non-
residents under ITAA 1936 divs 14 and 15 respectively, and that this 
protection of Australian revenue would be lost if the OECD draft were 
adopted.  
4.72 Belcher anticipated that there would be large annual revenue losses for 
Australia if the Business Profits article in the OECD draft were applied without 
reservation.114 On the computation of business profits attributable to a 
permanent establishment, Belcher commented that existing Australian tax 
treaties gave ‘a greater degree of protection to Australia’ than did the draft 
OECD provisions. Belcher pointed out that the OECD draft articles would 
probably prevent the application of ITAA 1936 s136,115 the operation of which 
had been expressly preserved in Australia’s existing tax treaties. Belcher also 
considered that the OECD draft articles might interfere with the operation of 
the Australian general anti-avoidance provision, ITAA 1936 s260. Loss of 
Australian revenue in both these cases was indeterminate.116  
4.73 Similarly in relation to the income of Associated Enterprises article, Belcher 
commented that the provision was broadly comparable to equivalent 
provisions in existing Australian tax treaties but, for the reasons stated in 
relation to the Business Profits article, provided less protection for Australian 
revenue than those provisions.117  
4.74 Belcher contrasted the maximum rate of source country tax of 5% on non-
portfolio dividends allowed under the dividend article in the OECD draft article 
with the 15% rate that applied in Australia’s existing tax treaties other than the 
1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty where dividends paid by a wholly owned 
subsidiary were exempt from source country tax while source country tax on 
all other dividends was reduced by one half.118 Belcher noted that the loss to 
Australian revenue of adopting the OECD draft article would, on the basis of 
                                                          
114  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 5–6, paras 32–4. 
115  The background to the insertion of the saving provision for ITAA 1936 s136 in the 
1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty was discussed at 2.124 to 2.126.  
116  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 6, para 36. 
117  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 6–7, paras 37–8. 
118  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 7–8, paras 43–8. 
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1960–61 statistics, be £1.75m per year, and considered that the revenue cost 
could be ‘very appreciably’ above £1.75m per year in the future.119  
4.75 Belcher also pointed out that the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty allowed 
Australian shareholders to gross up dividends for underlying UK corporate tax 
and to receive a credit for that tax, a procedure that was not required under 
the OECD draft. Adoption of the OECD draft would require revision of the 
basis of Australian tax on dividends paid by UK companies to Australian 
shareholders.120 
4.76 Belcher pointed out that the Interest article in the OECD draft had no 
equivalent in Australia’s existing tax treaties, which allowed interest to be 
taxed on a source basis with the residence country providing a credit for the 
source tax. Belcher’s comment on the 10% limit on source country taxation of 
interest in the draft OECD Model was: ‘This is obviously disadvantageous 
from an Australian revenue viewpoint and the article would, if revenue is the 
sole yardstick, be unacceptable.’121 Belcher estimated the revenue loss from 
agreeing to the OECD draft article as being tentatively £1.0 million per 
year.122 
4.77 The royalty article in the OECD draft only permitted source taxation of 
royalties if they were effectively connected with a permanent establishment in 
the source country. Belcher noted that this was the position in relation to both 
industrial and cultural royalties in the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty, but that 
in the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty and in the 1957 Australia – Canada 
Tax Treaty only cultural royalties were taxed on a residence basis. Belcher 
pointed out that, under all of Australia’s existing tax treaties, motion picture 
films were specifically excluded with the result that Australia was able to tax 
them under ITAA 1936 div 14. Belcher considered that the OECD draft article 
would generally be less advantageous to Australia, particularly in relation to 
film royalties. An estimate of the loss of Australian revenue in relation to 
industrial royalties if the OECD draft article were implemented was not 
available, but Belcher commented that, ‘for all practical purposes’, there 
would be no loss of revenue in relation to cultural royalties.123 
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4.78 Belcher observed that the other income article, which provided for exclusive 
taxation in the residence country, contrasted with the position under existing 
Australian treaties where full source country taxing rights were retained in 
respect of such income. Belcher commented that the approach under existing 
Australian treaties was favourable to Australia in situations where there was a 
net outflow of income from Australia.124 Australia’s previous treaties had not 
contained any article dealing with other income, and Belcher’s conclusion as 
to the effect of that omission is clearly based on the view that full source 
country taxing rights were retained in relation to all types of income not 
expressly mentioned in a tax treaty. 
4.79 Belcher then discussed the alternative methods in the OECD draft for 
relieving double taxation. After identifying exemption with progression, 
Belcher commented that its adoption would preclude the use of the credit 
method but would not involve a revenue loss for Australia.125 Belcher noted 
that exemption of foreign source income other than dividends corresponded 
with the then current Australian domestic law, but commented that Australia in 
its existing tax treaties had deliberately restrained from committing to 
continuing the exemption and had agreed that if Australia taxed foreign 
source income, a credit would be allowed for foreign tax paid.126 Belcher 
commented that the limitation on the credit for foreign tax on interest and 
dividends in the credit provisions in the draft, namely the amount of residence 
tax otherwise payable, corresponded with the limitations in Australia’s existing 
tax treaties and in s14 of the Income Tax (International Agreements) Act (Cth) 
1953.127 Belcher noted that Australia had sought and obtained a credit basis 
of relief for all types of income in its existing tax treaties, notwithstanding that 
Australian domestic law only adopted a credit basis in relation to dividends. 
Belcher’s conclusion was that, based on Australia’s past attitude, an overall 
credit basis would be preferred and that no loss of revenue would be 
involved.128 
4.80 Belcher described the mutual agreement article in the OECD draft as ‘a 
machinery provision’ and ‘unobjectionable’, noting that the article was 
permissive and did not detract from appeal rights of a taxpayer under 
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Australian domestic law even if the taxpayer had exercised rights under the 
mutual agreement procedure. Belcher noted that, in relation to domestic law 
appeal rights, time periods in domestic legislation would still have to be 
observed.129 
4.81 Belcher considered that in the case of some OECD countries there would be 
a real possibility of Australia obtaining more favourable tax treaties than the 
draft OECD Model. In particular, Belcher considered that agreement might be 
obtained for a 15% rate on all dividends, source taxation of royalties and, in 
some cases, a willingness for Australia to collect some of its tax on shipping 
profits.130 Australia’s prior experience in negotiating tax treaties would have 
provided cause for hope in relation to dividends and royalties. In relation to 
shipping profits, the only aspect in which Australia’s prior tax treaty 
experience would have provided grounds for believing that greater source 
country taxing rights were obtainable was by making the exemption only 
available where the ship was registered in the treaty partner country. In 
Belcher’s view, it was unclear whether Australian membership of the OECD 
would preclude it from seeking such provisions in tax treaties, but he 
considered that if Australia became a member of the OECD it might be more 
difficult to obtain favourable results on these points.131  
4.82 In relation to non-OECD countries, Belcher commented that the most 
important case was Japan. In Belcher’s view, acceptance by Australia of the 
draft OECD Model would make it more difficult for Australia to persuade 
Japan to agree to allowing Australia to levy approximately 50% of its present 
tax on shipping and to accept a source basis of taxation in relation to other 
types of income, particularly interest.132  
4.83 Belcher also noted that the draft OECD Model did not contain tax sparing 
provisions and commented that, while acceptance of the OECD Model would 
not weaken Australia’s position in negotiating with Singapore and Malaya 
                                                          
129  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 10, paras 63–5. As noted in Appendix One of 
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130  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 11, para 67. 
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(both of whom sought tax sparing provisions) it was doubtful that it would 
provide any positive assistance.133  
4.84 Belcher’s overall conclusion on the draft OECD Model was that its provisions 
were more favourable to the capital exporting and maritime nations than they 
were to a capital importing country like Australia and were less favourable to 
Australian revenue than those in Australia’s existing tax treaties.134 Adoption 
of the draft OECD Model would involve departure in several respects from the 
principles approved in Cabinet decision 386. To justify the revenue losses, 
there would need to be non-tax benefits of OECD membership.135 
The 1963 Reassessment Of Australian Tax Treaty Policy 
4.85 Following the suspension of negotiations concerning the UK’s initial bid to join 
the EEC,136 Treasury officials, in August 1963, prepared a further submission 
on future policy relating to tax treaties.137 The submission noted that, 
independently of whether the UK joined the EEC, there was likely to be 
significant change in the tax systems of countries in the EEC because it had 
started a program of ‘fiscal harmonisation’.138  
4.86 The submission also noted the development of model tax treaty articles by 
the OECD and expressed concern that the OECD draft might introduce some 
rigidity into the negotiations. This was seen as undesirable because several 
provisions in the OECD draft were regarded as not being acceptable to 
Australia.139  
4.87 Neither the uncertainty about the future of the tax systems of European 
countries nor the possibly widespread future use of the OECD Model (both of 
                                                          
133  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 11, para 69. Australia had, by this point, received 
draft treaties from Singapore and Malaya. The negotiations relevant to those treaties 
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134  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 98, 11, para 70. 
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which had been characterised as being ‘some distance away’) were seen as 
constituting sufficient grounds for refusing to negotiate with European 
countries. On the contrary, the submission suggested that there might be 
advantages in negotiating tax treaties with European countries before their 
tax systems and their attitudes to articles usually included in tax treaties 
became too rigid.140  
4.88 After pointing out that officials had held preliminary discussions with Japan 
and anticipated holding discussions with Malaysia once the Federation was 
established, the submission considered that Australia could hardly decline to 
negotiate tax treaties with European countries until the pattern of European 
economic relations had been more firmly established.141  
4.89 Hence the submission recommended that Cabinet remove the barrier, 
introduced by Cabinet decision 386, against entering into negotiations with 
European countries so that proposals from whatever source would, in future, 
be examined on their individual merits.142 On 10th September 1963, Cabinet 
accepted the recommendations in the submission.143 
The Development Of The 1965 Australian Model Tax Treaty 
4.90 In anticipation of the Cabinet decision of 10th September 1963, O’Donnell 
wrote to the Commissioner of Taxation noting that Japan (as discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6), Singapore and Malaya, in the recent preliminary 
discussions on tax treaties, had provided draft treaties to serve as a starting 
point. O’Donnell considered that there would be advantages if initial 
negotiations were based on a draft that reflected Australia’s viewpoint. While 
recognising that there could be no ‘universal draft’, as Australia’s interests 
would differ for different countries, O’Donnell believed that suitable initial 
drafts should be prepared for negotiations with European countries and with 
Malaysia.144  
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4.91 In the case of European countries, if Cabinet agreed to the recommendations 
in the submission of 26th August 1963, then Australia might be faced with a 
large number of requests for tax treaties at short notice. If so, O’Donnell 
considered, there would be advantages in having a draft treaty which could 
be sent to European countries. As the European countries might consider that 
any tax treaty should be based on the draft OECD Model, it would be 
desirable for the Australian draft to embody as much of the OECD Model as 
was ‘acceptable to us’. O’Donnell pointed out that, of course, any draft would 
have to take into account the review of tax treaty policy by Cabinet decision 
386. O’Donnell closed by requesting the Commissioner’s views on the 
subject.145 
The Draft By M J Belcher 
4.92 In response to O’Donnell’s request, Belcher prepared a draft for use as the 
basis for Australian tax treaty negotiations with European countries.146 While 
Belcher’s covering letter included comments on some articles in his draft,147 it 
did not systematically catalogue differences between his draft and the OECD 
Model and did not draw O’Donnell’s attention to the history of many of the 
distinctive features of his draft.  
4.93 The substantive content and overall structure of Belcher’s draft closely 
resembles the 1960 tax treaty between Australia and NZ, but in some 
presentational aspects and with some, probably not significant, verbiage it 
follows the 1963 draft OECD Model. In some instances, Belcher’s draft gives 
greater source country taxing rights to Australia than had been the case 
under prior Australian treaties. This is most notably the case with the 
treatment of dividends, interest and royalties as a consequence of complying 
with Australian Cabinet decision 386. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
both Malaya and Singapore but advice had been received that the Malayan 
government would prefer to defer the commencement of negotiations until after the 
formation of Malaysia. O’Donnell considered that this delay provided the opportunity 
to develop a suitable draft to send to Malaysia, thus transferring the initiative in the 
negotiations to Australia.  
145  M W O’Donnell, above n 144, 1. 
146  Belcher’s draft is contained in General Review of Double Tax Proposals, Part 1’ NAA, 
Series Number A7073, Control Symbol J245/68 Pt 1. The document is hereafter 
referred to as ‘Belcher’s draft’.  
147  M J Belcher, First Assistant Commissioner to W M O’Donnell, First Assistant 
Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Canberra, ACT, 9th March 1964, in ‘General 
Review of Double Tax Proposals, Part 1’ NAA, Series Number A7073, Control 
Symbol J245/68 Pt 1. 
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4.94 Belcher began by commenting that his draft followed the OECD Model 
Convention in that it permitted source taxation of industrial or commercial 
profits only to the extent that they were attributable to a permanent 
establishment in the source country. This, Belcher noted, was consistent with 
Australia’s existing treaties with the UK and Canada but differed from 
Australia’s treaties with the US and NZ, which applied a force of attraction 
approach. Belcher’s comment on the two approaches was: ‘No strong 
preference as between the two approaches is felt and if European countries 
wish to adopt the OECD model there seems no reason for Australia to 
resist.’148  
4.95 Belcher’s letter does not point out that Article III(2) of his draft preserved the 
operation of divs 14 and 15 of ITAA 1936 dealing with film businesses 
controlled abroad and insurance with non-residents respectively. Nor does 
Belcher point out that Article III(5) of his draft preserved the right to apply 
domestic law provisions giving tax authorities power to determine industrial or 
commercial profits attributable to a permanent establishment using discretion 
or on the basis of estimates in situations where information was inadequate to 
determine them. 
4.96 Belcher also noted that the OECD Model contained a broadly corresponding 
provision to Article III(4) of his draft that allowed for deductions of expenses, 
reasonably attributable to the permanent establishment, in calculating 
industrial or commercial profits. Belcher merely commented that the 
paragraph ‘does not go any further in allowing deductions than is the practice 
under the present Australian law’149 and did not point out that the paragraph 
included a savings provision in relation to ‘the principle underlying’ s38 of 
ITAA 1936. 
4.97 Belcher’s draft reflected the policy decisions made in Cabinet decision 386. 
Thus Belcher’s draft did not contain provisions limiting source taxation of 
dividends or shipping or aircraft profits. The definition of industrial or 
commercial profits expressly excluded dividends and profits from the 
operations of ships or aircraft.150 Belcher considered that this meant that, in 
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Belcher’s draft and expressly excluded, inter alia, ‘dividends’ and ‘income from 
operating ships or aircraft’. 
 
 
 
174 
174 
combination with the absence of an ‘other income’ article in the draft, full 
source country taxing rights would be maintained in relation to dividends and 
to shipping and aircraft profits.151  
4.98 Belcher did not appear to be in favour of this aspect of the policy Cabinet 
decision 386, commenting that European countries might expect concessions 
by the source country in relation to these items of income and might not enter 
into treaties consistent with Belcher’s draft in these respects.152 He did 
consider that some European countries might permit Australia to retain some 
of the tax that it had been collecting from ships carrying passengers and 
cargo from Australia.153  
4.99 Belcher’s draft did not contain a provision dealing with the taxation of 
royalties, with the consequence, in Belcher’s view, that full source country 
taxing rights would be retained. Belcher noted that European countries might 
be opposed to the Australian position. Belcher considered that Australia could 
offer to adopt a residence basis in relation to copyright royalties but that ‘[i]t 
has not been thought necessary to offer this at the outset’.154 
4.100 Belcher’s draft contained the same structural features as earlier Australian 
treaties, with industrial or commercial profits being defined in terms that 
excluded particular categories of income, with no interest article, no capital 
gains article and no other income article. The definition of ‘industrial or 
commercial profits’ was critical to this structure and was identical to the 
definition in the Australia – NZ Tax Treaty of 1960, which itself had developed 
the definition in earlier Australian tax treaties by adding to the list of types of 
income excluded from being industrial or commercial profits; that is, ‘income 
arising from, or in relation to contracts or obligations to provide the services of 
public entertainers such as stage, motion picture, television or radio artists, 
musicians and athletes’.155 
4.101 Consistent with earlier Australian treaties, under Belcher’s draft dual residents 
were not treaty residents and there was no dual residence tie-breaker. The 
                                                          
151  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 147, para 3 (comment on reflecting principles in 
Cabinet decisions), paras 7 and 8 (shipping and aircraft profits), para 9 (dividends), 
and para 16 (other income). 
152  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 147, para 8 (shipping and aircraft profits) and para 9 
(dividends). 
153  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 147, para 8. 
154  Belcher to O’Donnell, above n 147, para 15. 
155  Belcher’s draft, Article II(1)(h), which was identical to Article II(1)(h) in the 1960 NZ 
Treaty. 
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provisions dealing with residence in Belcher’s draft were identical to those in 
the 1957 Australia – Canada Tax Treaty and in the 1960 Australia – NZ Tax 
Treaty.156 Like those two treaties and the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty, 
Belcher’s draft did not contain an equivalent to the provision for proportional 
credits for tax on third country income contained in the 1946 Australia – UK 
Tax Treaty.157 
4.102 The definition of ‘permanent establishment’ in Belcher’s draft represented a 
consolidation, refinement and extension of definitions in earlier Australian 
treaties. It opened with language that largely followed Article 5(1) of the 1963 
draft OECD Model.158 The definition included, as an example of a permanent 
establishment, a provision identical to Article 5(2)(g) of the 1963 draft OECD 
Model with the addition of a reference to ‘supervisory activities for such a site 
or project for more than twelve months’. Earlier Australian treaties had merely 
referred to a ‘construction project’ as an example of a permanent 
establishment. Belcher’s draft narrowed the scope of the definition in prior 
Australian tax treaties by requiring the project to exist for more than twelve 
months. On the other hand, Belcher’s draft broadened the definition by 
referring to a ‘building site’ and to ‘supervisory activities’. As had been the 
case with Australia’s tax treaties with the US, Canada and NZ, the list of 
examples of permanent establishment in Belcher’s draft included a 
‘substantial equipment’ provision identical in language to the provision in 
those treaties but set out as a separate paragraph in the definition.  
                                                          
156  Article II(1)(c) of Belcher’s draft stated that Australian resident ‘means a person who 
is a resident of Australia and is not a resident of (X country)’. This was identical to the 
definition of ‘Australian resident’ in Article II(1)(c) of the 1957 Australia – Canada Tax 
Treaty and to the definition in Article II(1)(c) of the 1960 NZ Treaty. ‘Resident of 
Australia’ was defined in Article II(1)(n) of Belcher’s draft as having the meaning that 
it had under the laws of Australia relating to Australian tax. The definition was 
identical to the definitions of ‘resident of Australia’ in Article II(1)(n) of the 1957 
Canada Treaty and in Article II(1)(n) of the 1960 NZ Treaty. 
157  See the discussion at 2.149.  
158  The opening words of the definition of ‘permanent establishment’ in Article II(1)(l) of 
Belcher’s draft were: ‘“permanent establishment” in relation to an enterprise means a 
fixed place of business in which the business of the enterprise is wholly or partly 
carried on and includes …’. By contrast, the opening words of the definition in Article 
II(1)(m) of the 1960 NZ Treaty were: ‘“permanent establishment” means a branch, 
agency or other place of business and includes …’. The opening words of the 
definition in Article II(1)(h) of the 1957 Canada Treaty and in Article II(1)(o) of the 
1953 US Treaty were: ‘“permanent establishment” means a branch, agency, 
management or fixed place of business and includes …’. The opening words in 
Article II(1)(j) of the 1946 UK Treaty were: ‘The term “permanent establishment”, 
when used with respect to an enterprise of one of the territories, means a branch or 
other fixed place of business and includes …’. 
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4.103 It is unclear whether Belcher understood the separate paragraphs in his draft 
as merely being examples of fixed places of business which would be 
permanent establishments or as being business operations which were 
deemed to be permanent establishments notwithstanding that they might not 
be fixed places of business. The specific paragraphs followed on immediately 
from the opening words of Article 2(l) of Belcher’s draft and were proceeded 
merely by the words ‘and includes’. This was in contrast to Article 5(2) of the 
1963 draft OECD Model, where the examples are contained in a separate 
paragraph that opens with the words, ‘The term permanent establishment 
shall include especially’. Later comments by officials suggest that the ATO 
may have understood the sub-paragraphs in Article 5(1) of Belcher’s draft as 
deeming provisions.159 
4.104 The definition of ‘permanent establishment’ in Belcher’s draft, other than in 
presentational aspects, also followed the Australia–Canada and Australia–NZ 
treaties and differed from the 1963 draft OECD Model Article 5(3) by stating 
that where the activities specified in Article II(l)(x) to (xiii) of the draft occurred, 
‘the enterprise shall not, merely by reason thereof, be deemed to have a 
permanent establishment in that other Contracting State’. By contrast, Article 
5(3) of the 1963 draft OECD Model stated that ‘The term “permanent 
establishment” shall be deemed not to include’ before proceeding to list 
excluded activities. Moreover, the list of activities in Belcher’s draft followed 
the Australia–Canada and Australia–NZ treaties in being narrower than the 
list of excluded activities in Article 5(3) of the 1963 draft OECD Model.  
4.105 Belcher’s draft followed the Australia–Canada160 and Australia–NZ treaties by 
including a specific provision deeming there to be a permanent establishment 
in the situation in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656. No equivalent provision 
was in the 1963 draft OECD Model. 
4.106 Consistent with prior Australian treaties from the 1953 tax treaty with the US 
onwards, and in contrast to the 1963 draft OECD Model, the credit article in 
Belcher’s draft contained deemed source rules in relation to personal 
(including professional) services, and amounts included in taxable income 
                                                          
159  See the discussion by O’Reilly (as Acting Second Commissioner of Taxation) of this 
aspect of the 1966 UK draft treaty at 5.16. 
160  As discussed at 3.149, the first Australian tax treaty to contain a provision of this 
nature was the 1957 Canada Treaty. 
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under either div 14 or 15 of ITAA 1936 relating to film businesses controlled 
abroad and insurance with non-residents. 
4.107 Belcher’s draft contained exchange of information and communication 
between taxation authorities articles identical to the equivalent articles in the 
Australia–Canada and Australia–NZ tax treaties. However, like those treaties 
and unlike the Australia–US tax treaty, his draft did not contain an assistance 
in collection article; and unlike the US tax treaty and the 1963 draft OECD 
Model, it did not contain a mutual agreement procedure article in addition to 
the article dealing with communication between taxation authorities. 
The Revised Draft 
4.108 Following the receipt of Belcher’s draft, A D Ross from the Treasury and J Hill 
from the ATO developed a revised draft which largely followed Belcher’s draft 
in language and technical content but followed the OECD draft in the order of 
articles and other presentational matters.161 Ross and Hill prepared a 
schedule comparing the OECD draft, Belcher’s draft and the revised draft. 
The schedule included comments by Hill on variations between the OECD 
draft and Belcher’s draft.  
4.109 In forwarding the schedule and the revised draft to Visbord, Ross commented 
that he preferred the wording of Belcher’s draft, which he regarded as far 
more specific than the OECD draft. Adhering more closely to the OECD draft 
would have, in Ross’ view, involved a ‘waste of roundabout verbiage’ in many 
areas. Ross also commented that the revised draft, like Belcher’s draft, did 
not contain any provisions dealing with dividends, interest, royalties, shipping 
and transport profits, but that Australia’s attitude on these issues would be 
best conveyed in a covering letter when the final draft was sent to potential 
tax treaty partners.162 The comments in the schedule on articles relevant to 
this thesis will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
                                                          
161  Early and final versions of the revised draft (hereafter referred to as the ‘revised 
draft’) and the schedule (hereafter referred to as the ‘comparative schedule’) 
comparing the OECD draft, Belcher’s draft and the revised draft are contained in 
‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number 
A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
162  E A Ross to Mr Visbord, 22nd March 1965, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With 
Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
This memorandum makes it clear that Ross consulted with Hill in developing the 
revised draft and the schedule and that Hill wrote the comments in the comparative 
schedule.  
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4.110 The comments reflected the continued Australian practice of excluding dual 
residents from being treaty residents and its unwillingness to include tie-
breaker provisions on dual residence. Thus, in relation to Article 1 of the 
OECD draft the comment was made: ‘The article does not appear to add to 
the effectiveness of the convention. By virtue of its reference to persons who 
are residents of both Contracting States it necessitates the procedures and 
definitions of article 4. The taxation draft does not seek to remove the 
problem of dual residence.’163  
4.111 The dislike for dual residence tie-breakers continued with the following 
comment on paragraph 1 of article 4 of the OECD draft: ‘The OECD draft, like 
the Taxation draft, defines residence by reference to national taxation 
practice, but in attempting to cater for dual residence involves itself in the 
complexities of para. 2.’164 The full disdain of the ATO for dual residence tie-
breakers was apparent in the following comment on paragraph 2 of article 4 
of the OECD draft: ‘This provision is reminiscent of the trouble-shooting 
charts issued to non-mechanically minded troops, even down to the referral to 
Third Line Workshops in (d).’165 
4.112 The comments confirm the emphasis on source taxation underlying the 
Australian approach to defining ‘industrial or commercial profits’: ‘The 
Taxation definition, as opposed to normal definitions of “industrial or 
commercial profits”, sets out those classes of income which Australia wishes 
to tax even where a permanent establishment exists.’166  
4.113 The definition of ‘permanent establishment’ in the revised draft was identical 
to the definition in Belcher’s draft. The comment was simply that the list in 
Belcher’s draft was more extensive to cater for Australian conditions.167  
                                                          
163  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 1. 
164  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 4(1). 
165  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 4(2). 
166  Comparative schedule comment on article II(1)(h) in Belcher’s draft. It appears likely 
that the author of the schedule meant to insert the word ‘no’ immediately before 
‘permanent establishment’ in the comment. Belcher’s draft and the revised draft, 
consistent with previous Australian treaties, define ‘industrial or commercial profits’ in 
terms which exclude items such as dividends, interest, rent royalties, etc. Belcher’s 
draft and the revised draft would have given Australia the right to tax these items in 
the absence of them being effectively connected with an Australian permanent 
establishment. As gross basis withholding tax in Australia at that time only applied to 
dividends, it seems unlikely that the comment would have referred to taxation of the 
excluded items on a gross basis rather than on a net basis as industrial or 
commercial profits.  
167  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 5(1).  
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4.114 On the exclusions from the definition of permanent establishment in Article 
5(3) of the OECD draft, the comment was that ‘the OECD draft takes four 
paragraphs … to cover what is dealt with (on a verbally more economic and 
more readily intelligible basis) by the single Taxation clause’.168 The 
comments then go on to criticise each of the paragraphs in OECD draft Article 
5(3).  
4.115 The comment on Article 5(3)(e) of the OECD draft reflects the usual 
Australian concern with maximising source basis taxation: ‘The activities 
listed are said to be so far antecedent to the actual realisation of profits by the 
parent body that no profits can be allocated to the place of business which 
performs them. The OECD recognises, however, that such a place of 
business could shift from an ancillary function to a profit making function 
(selling or order-taking, for example, or manufacture in the case of a 
laboratory).’169  
4.116 The revised draft followed Article 5(5) of the OECD draft by adding the words 
‘or any other agent of an independent status’ immediately after the word 
‘broker’ in Belcher’s draft. The comment was that the use of this phrase in the 
OECD draft was a ‘useful addendum’.170  
4.117 The revised draft included the additional provision in Belcher’s draft171 which 
aimed to deal with the situation that arose in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 
656. That this was the intent of the inclusion is confirmed by the comment that 
this provision was necessary ‘to protect Australian revenue against such 
operations as those of the electric light trade’.172 
4.118 Several of the distributive articles in the OECD draft did not have equivalents 
in either Belcher’s draft or the revised draft. As a consequence of Australian 
Cabinet decision 386, articles on dividends, royalties and shipping profits 
were not included. In the case of each of these articles in the draft OECD 
Model, a comment was made that they had been deliberately excluded from 
the definition of industrial or commercial profits and that mention of them was 
not necessary in the credit article in the revised draft. The comment is also 
                                                          
168  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 5(3). 
169  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 5(3)(e). 
170  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 5(5). 
171  See the discussion at 4.105. 
172  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article IV(4) of the revised draft. It is 
understood that Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656 concerned a company which 
manufactured light bulbs.  
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made that Australia’s attitude in relation to these types of income could be 
best expressed in a covering letter. In the case of the dividend article, where 
both Belcher’s draft and the revised draft contained the equivalent to Article 
10(5) of the draft OECD Model, the comment was made that the reference in 
the OECD paragraph to taxation of undistributed profits had been intentionally 
omitted from Belcher’s draft.173 The revised draft followed Belcher’s draft in 
this respect.  
4.119 In addition, neither Belcher’s draft nor the revised draft included articles on 
capital gains, income from immovable property or capital taxes. In relation to 
the OECD draft capital gains article, the comment was simply: ‘This is not 
relevant to Australia’s present taxation provisions.’174 Similarly, in the case of 
OECD draft Article 22, the comment was that Australia did not impose 
taxation on capital of any kind, but that if a treaty partner imposed a tax on 
capital which might bear heavily or disadvantageously on Australian 
residents, consideration would have to be given to the desirability and 
practicality of relieving Australian residents of such taxation.175  
4.120 In relation to the income from immovable property article, the comment was 
that the principle embodied in the OECD draft article176 was implicit in 
Belcher’s draft, but that including an immovable property article in the 
Australian model would raise the question of whether income covered by it 
would be identical to the Australian equivalent. A note in brackets suggested 
a comparison between the Australian concepts of real and personal property 
as opposed to movable and immovable.177  
4.121 Neither the revised draft nor Belcher’s draft included an ‘other income’ article. 
The comment on Article 21 in the draft OECD Model was that Canada had 
reserved its position on the article because it wished to maintain its right to 
tax certain payments by residents to non-residents. The comment suggested 
that Australia might take the same attitude towards the article.178  
                                                          
173  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 10(5). Article VII of the revised 
draft was identical to Article 10(5) of the 1963 OECD draft article 10(5). 
174  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 13. 
175  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 22. 
176  It would appear that the reasoning was that by not having provisions dealing with 
income from immovable property, full source country taxing rights were retained, 
which produced the same result as Article 6 in the OECD draft Model. 
177  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 6. 
178  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 21. 
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4.122 Like Belcher’s draft, the revised draft did not include a non-discrimination 
article. The comment on OECD Draft Model Article 24 was that the article 
conflicted with existing (unspecified) provisions of Australian income tax law 
and could extend to other taxing statutes including State statutes.179 
4.123 The provisions dealing with methods of relieving double taxation in the 
revised draft were identical to those in Belcher’s draft. The comment was 
made that the OECD draft evidently assumed that if the exemption method 
were adopted, it would be adopted by both contracting states but that the 
Australian practice of tax credit made the symmetrical relationship of the 
OECD draft irrelevant.  
4.124 On the credit article, the comment was made that the OECD draft allowed 
credit only in the case of income (and capital) taxable under the convention, 
whereas Belcher’s draft allowed credit for all income (subject to the provisions 
of the law in force). The comments noted that there might not be much 
practical difference between the two drafts of the credit article in this respect, 
given the width of the taxes covered in the OECD draft. The comment was 
also made that the OECD draft referred explicitly to the limit of the credit, 
while the limit was only implicit in Belcher’s draft. The comments also pointed 
out that Belcher’s draft explicitly excluded credit for any penalty element.180 
4.125 Belcher’s draft did not contain an article on mutual agreement procedure. The 
comments note that an equivalent provision to Article 25(1) of the OECD draft 
had been contained in the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty but that the 
exchange of information provision in Belcher’s draft provided adequate 
coverage. Nonetheless, an equivalent to OECD Article 25(1) (based on Article 
XVI of the Japanese draft used in preliminary negotiations between Australia 
and Japan in Tokyo in 1964) was included in the revised draft. The comment 
pointed out that the article in the revised draft required proof rather than 
postulating an alleged cause for complaint.  
4.126 Neither Belcher’s draft nor the revised draft included equivalents to OECD 
Draft Article 25(2) and (3), with comments stating that OECD Draft 25(3) 
could operate to curtail the existing rights of Australian taxpayers. In 
substitution for Article 25(4) of the OECD draft, the revised draft used the 
communication between taxation authorities provision from Belcher’s draft, 
                                                          
179  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 24. 
180  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft articles 23A and 23B. 
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the comment being that Belcher’s draft was regarded as covering the whole 
of the provisions of OECD Article 25.181 
4.127 The revised draft adopted the exchange of information article in Belcher’s 
draft, with the comments stating that Belcher’s draft covered more concisely 
all that the OECD draft did (with the exception of the reference to public 
order) and made specific allowance for disclosure to judicial authorities, 
something that was only in the supplementary drafting provisions of the 
OECD draft. The comments also considered that OECD Draft Article 26(2)(b) 
appeared to limit exchange of information to what was possible in the state 
with the poorer information facilities.182 
4.128 The revised draft was forwarded by O’Donnell to the Commissioner of 
Taxation for comment on 24th March 1965.183 W J O’Reilly, as First Assistant 
Commissioner, replied on 14th April 1965 commenting that, subject to an 
understanding that there would be flexibility to negotiate in relation to a 
paragraph on government remuneration which appeared in the revised draft 
but not in Belcher’s draft and subject to the minor drafting matters being taken 
into account, the revised draft was considered suitable for submission to 
countries seeking tax treaties with Australia.184 F C Pryor, as Acting First 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, then sent the final draft to the 
Commissioner of Taxation for final checking on 27th April 1965.185 O’Reilly 
replied on 6th May 1965, indicating that the final draft had been checked and 
found to be satisfactory so far as the ATO was concerned and that the office 
did not desire to offer any further comments.186 
                                                          
181  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 25. The relevant provision in 
Belcher’s draft was discussed at 4.125 and 4.126. 
182  Comparative schedule comment on OECD draft article 26. 
183  M W O’Donnell, First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to the 
Commissioner of Taxation, Canberra, ACT, 24th March 1965, in ‘Double Taxation 
Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control 
Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
184  W J O’Reilly, First Assistant Commissioner, ATO to The Secretary, Department of the 
Treasury, Canberra, ACT, 14th April 1965, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With 
Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
185  F C Pryor, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to the 
Commissioner of Taxation, 27th April 1965, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With 
Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
186  W J O’Reilly, First Assistant Commissioner, ATO to The Secretary, Department of the 
Treasury, Canberra, ACT, 6th May 1965, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other 
Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
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4.129 O’Donnell then wrote to the Treasurer, Harold Holt, enclosing a copy of the 
draft Australian model tax treaty.187 O’Donnell commented that the Australian 
model adhered, so far as practicable, to the 1963 draft OECD Model, 
explaining: 
‘The reason for this is that members of the OECD naturally look to the 
OECD model when considering proposals for new agreements. 
Further, the OECD model appears to be in increasing use 
internationally as a guide to the form and content of double taxation 
agreements, so that our adoption of elements of it, principally relating 
to format, which were compatible with our interests, would serve to 
minimise the area of potential disagreement on relatively insubstantial 
matters and to point up the matters of real substance.’188 
4.130 O’Donnell pointed out that the content of the Australian model reflected the 
considerations set out in Cabinet decision 386 of August 1962 and 1009 of 
September 1963 on the renegotiation of existing tax treaties and the 
negotiation of new tax treaties.189 O’Donnell considered that, given the 
Cabinet decisions, Australia’s interests would be best served by commencing 
from a ‘no concessions’ basis with concessions to be made during 
negotiations to be for Cabinet’s consideration, depending on the offsetting 
advantages offered to Australia in particular negotiations.190  
4.131 O’Donnell sought the Treasurer’s approval for forwarding the Australian 
model to the Department of External Affairs. The department would then be 
directed to send the model to countries that had sought tax treaties with 
Australia, along with a covering letter detailing Australia’s position on 
dividends and shipping and aircraft profits but stating that Australia was not 
‘wholly inflexible and unwilling to consider mutually satisfactory changes’.191 
Holt gave his consent to this approach.192  
                                                          
187  M W O’Donnell, First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to The 
Treasurer, 27th May 1965, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, 
Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
188  O’Donnell to The Treasurer, above n 187, 1, para 3. 
189  O’Donnell to The Treasurer, above n 187, 1, para 4. 
190  O’Donnell to The Treasurer, above n 187, 1–2, para 5. 
191  O’Donnell to The Treasurer, above n 187, 2, para 6. 
192  This is confirmed in O’Donnell to Mr Craik (D Steele Craik, Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury), Department of the Treasury, Minute Paper, 8th June 1965, in ‘Double 
Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, 
Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
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4.132 The model was sent to the Department of External Affairs with instructions 
consistent with those outlined in O’Donnell’s memorandum to Holt of 27th May 
1965.193 A legal officer from the Department of External Affairs then 
suggested minor drafting changes, only some of which appear to have been 
incorporated in the Australian model.194 The model was then sent to several 
European countries,195 accompanied by a letter making the points suggested 
in O’Donnell’s memorandum to Holt of 27th May 1965.196 
The Subsequent Use Of The 1965 Model 
4.133 The Australian model tax treaty of 1965 was not directly used in the actual 
negotiations of any Australian tax treaties between 1965 and 1972. Although 
the model was sent to Germany in 1965, a later model, influenced by the 
1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty, was sent to Germany in 1969 and was used 
in the negotiations which led to the 1972 Tax Treaty with Germany. Similarly, 
as discussed in Chapter 6, the 1969 Australian model used in the 
negotiations with Japan had also been influenced by the 1967 Australia – UK 
Tax Treaty.  
4.134 It would be a mistake, however, to discount the influence of the 1965 
Australian model and of the 1959 to 1964 review of tax treaty policy. As will 
be seen in Chapter 5, the 1965 model provided a reference point and source 
of drafting precedents for Australian officials in analysing the 1966 UK draft 
                                                          
193  M W O’Donnell, Acting Deputy Secretary, Department of the Treasury to The 
Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, ACT, 22nd June 1965, in ‘Double 
Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, 
Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
194  External Affairs Minute Paper, Cavan Hague to indecipherable 13/7 encloses a copy 
of the model with handwritten annotations by the Department of External Affairs legal 
advisor, A H Body. A ‘Note for the File’ by A D Ross dated 19th July 1965 indicates 
that External Affairs had been told that the model had been approved by the 
Treasurer, had been sent to External Affairs for distribution not for comment, and 
could not be changed. A subsequent file note by Ross dated 16th July 1965 indicates 
that Body still wanted his changes incorporated, and a handwritten note at the foot of 
the file note indicates that Body would have a further look at the draft and would 
indicate any points on which he felt strongly and would advise how the issue could be 
resolved. All these documents are contained in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With 
Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
195  F C Pryor, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to The 
Secretary, Department of Civil Aviation, 499 Little Collins Street, Melbourne, C1, Vic, 
23rd September 1965, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, 
NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5, indicates that the 
Australian model was sent to: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  
196  A draft of the letter and suggested amendments are contained in ‘Double Taxation 
Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control 
Symbol 63/3972 Pt 5. 
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used as part of the negotiations which led to the 1967 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty. The pragmatic emphasis on maximising source taxation rights was 
also to be evident in that negotiation and in Australia’s subsequent 
negotiations with Japan although, as will be seen in Chapter 5, Australian 
negotiations were to find that some of the more extreme positions in 
Australian Cabinet decision 386 would have to be abandoned if Australia 
wanted to enter into any further bilateral tax treaties. 
Significance Of The Review Of Australian Tax Treaty Policy 1959 to 1964 For 
The First Two Questions Identified At 1.4 
4.135 The increasing influence of the Department of the Treasury on tax treaty 
policy is evident in the 1959 to 1964 review of Australian tax treaty policy.197 
While the ATO, the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Trade 
and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet were all consulted in the 
process of drafting Cabinet Submission 305,198 Treasury generally discounted 
their views and was the department primarily responsible for the drafting of 
the submission. Of these departments, Treasury was shown to be the most 
sceptical of the value of tax treaties and the least willing for Australia to enter 
into further tax treaties.199  
4.136 A concern to protect Australian revenue was central to Treasury’s attitude to 
tax treaties. Believing that Australian domestic law provided virtually complete 
protection against international double taxation,200 and sceptical about the 
effect of tax on decision-making by potential foreign direct investors,201 
Treasury saw the typical reduction in source basis taxation in tax treaties as 
both costly to Australian revenue and unlikely to produce a significant 
increase in inbound investment to Australia. That Australia’s four existing tax 
treaties were with countries with which Australia had particularly close ties 
was seen as being a reason why those treaties could not provide a model for 
future Australian tax treaties.202  
                                                          
197  The review is discussed at 4.1 to 4.56. For a discussion of the rise of the Department 
of the Treasury as the principal source of economic advice to Australian governments 
post World War II see G Whitwell, The Treasury Line (Allen & Unwin, 1986) ch 1. 
198  The Cabinet submission was discussed at 4.33 to 4.51. 
199  See the discussion at 4.20 to 4.32. 
200  See the discussion at 4.49. 
201  See, for example, the discussion of this aspect of Cabinet Submission 305 at 4.37. 
202  See point (2) in the nine-point summary in the submission discussed at 4.49. 
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4.137 There does not appear to have been significant appreciation in Treasury (in 
contrast to the ATO) of the need to reduce source taxation to prevent double 
taxation arising from credit overspill. Treasury saw tax treaties as relieving 
double taxation by defining the areas of income to be taxed by each country 
and the relief to be given by each country to its residents for income derived 
in the treaty partner. This meant that concessions to the potential treaty 
partner were viewed as unnecessary.203  
4.138 As the greatest revenue cost arose from conceding residence basis of 
taxation on shipping and from reductions in source taxation of dividends, the 
Treasury view was that Australia could enter into tax treaties which did not 
concede exclusive residence basis taxation of shipping and did not reduce 
source rates on dividends without adversely affecting the means by which tax 
treaties prevented international double taxation.204  
4.139 It is notable that other relevant Australian departments, including the ATO, 
had a more positive attitude to tax treaties but had little influence on 
Submission 305. The Department of External Affairs205 and the Department of 
Trade206 had both pointed to wider benefits of tax treaties, as did McGovern’s 
letter.207 Understandably, the ATO appears to have had the greatest 
appreciation of the ‘Treasury effect’,208 while Trade saw tax treaties as a 
means of obtaining trade concessions and saw the absence of relief from 
source taxation of dividends as inhibiting Australia’s ability to attract future 
capital. The Department of External Affairs cautioned that investment might 
flow towards less-developed Asian countries as they developed tax treaties 
and became more economically developed. The assurance function of tax 
treaties was also recognised in correspondence by these departments, but it 
was discounted by Treasury. The Prime Minister’s Department put the issue 
                                                          
203  See point (4) in the nine-point summary in the submission discussed at 4.49. 
204  See points (5), (6) and (7) in the nine-point summary of the submission discussed at 
4.49. 
205  The Department of External Affairs comments on the first draft of what was to be 
Cabinet Submission 305 are contained in R A Peachey, for The Secretary, 
Department of External Affairs to The Secretary, Department of the Treasury, 
Canberra, ACT, 9th January 1962, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other 
Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 2.  
206  The Department of Trade comments on the first draft of what was to be Cabinet 
Submission 305 are contained in A T Carmody, Deputy Secretary, Department of 
Trade to M W O’Donnell, First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, 
Canberra, ACT, 5th February 1962, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other 
Countries, Policy’, NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 2. 
207  See the discussion at 4.19. 
208  See the discussion at 4.9. 
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into some perspective when its permanent head questioned whether the 
anticipated revenue loss of £82,000 worth of future dividend concessions was 
significant in any assessment of the costs and benefits of capital inflow.209  
4.140 Clearly, all departments and the Cabinet saw Australia’s major trade and 
investment relationship as still being with the UK, and this led to the decision 
not to enter into tax treaties with European countries until the result of the 
UK’s first attempt to join the EEC was determined. This meant that Japan, 
South Africa and British Commonwealth countries in Asia were identified as 
countries whose offer to enter into tax treaty negotiations Australia should 
accept. Treasury recognised that, except in the case of Japan, Australia’s 
status as a net capital exporter to each of the other countries would mean that 
Australia could enter into tax treaties with these countries which prevented 
double taxation without granting concessions on shipping or source taxation 
of dividends.210  
Significance Of Belcher’s Review Of The 1963 Draft OECD Model For The First 
Two Questions Identified At 1.4 
4.141 Belcher’s assessment of the 1963 OECD draft highlighted the differences 
between the draft and Australia’s existing tax treaties, and it illustrates the 
factors that influenced one of Australia’s key negotiators in the period from 
1946 to 1963 in assessing tax treaties. Belcher’s overall conclusion on the 
draft OECD Model – that it was more favourable to capital exporting and 
maritime countries than to capital importing countries like Australia211 – 
accurately reflected his whole approach to the assessment of the draft OECD 
Model. With the exception of the taxes covered article212 and the immovable 
property article,213 Belcher consistently preferred the drafting of corresponding 
articles in previous Australian treaties.214  
                                                          
209  The comments of the Prime Minister’s Department on the first draft of what was to 
become Cabinet Submission 305 are contained in E J Bunting, Secretary, Prime 
Minister’s Department to The Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Canberra, ACT, 
25th January 1962, in ‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, Policy’, 
NAA, Series Number A571, Control Symbol 63/3972 Pt 2. 
210  See the discussion at 4.49. 
211  See the discussion at 4.84.  
212  See the discussion at 4.59 and 4.60.  
213  See the discussion at 4.69  
214  See the discussion at 4.64, 4.65, 4.67 to 4.68, 4.72, 4.73, 4.74, 4.76, 4.77, 4.78 and 
4.79. 
 
 
 
188 
188 
4.142 A clear theme that emerges from Belcher’s analysis of most articles in the 
draft OECD Model which had an equivalent in existing Australian tax treaties 
is that they would be less favourable to Australia because they allowed less 
scope for source basis taxation with consequential revenue losses. This can 
be seen in Belcher’s analysis of: the definition of ‘permanent 
establishment’;215 the shipping and aircraft profits article; the dividend 
article;216 and the royalties article.217 Belcher also made a negative 
assessment of the interest and other income articles in the draft OECD 
Model, neither of which had had equivalents in previous Australian tax 
treaties. The limit on source taxation of interest in the OECD draft was 
characterised as being unacceptable if revenue were the only yardstick.218 
Similarly, with the other income article Belcher commented that the Australian 
position of retaining full source country taxing rights favoured Australia in 
situations where Australia was a net capital importer.219 Belcher’s assessment 
of the non-discrimination article focused on the possibility that Australia’s 
denial of the inter-corporate dividend rebate to non-residents might infringe 
the article and that this would have a ‘tremendous impact’ on revenue.220 
4.143 Belcher was also concerned with preserving the operation of particular 
provisions in Australian domestic law and with possible conflicts between 
provisions in the OECD draft and Australian domestic law. These concerns 
can be seen in Belcher’s analysis of: the definition of ‘resident’;221 and the 
business profits article.222 
                                                          
215  As discussed at 4.62, Belcher was concerned that the examples in Article 5(2) would 
be required to be fixed places of business. 
216  Belcher, as discussed at 4.74, noted the significant loss of Australian revenue that 
would be associated with adopting the draft OECD article. 
217  As discussed at 4.77, Belcher believed that only the 1946 UK Treaty taxed both 
industrial and cultural royalties on a residence basis and that Australia’s existing tax 
treaties all preserved Australia’s right to tax film royalties under ITAA 1936 s136. 
218  See the discussion at 4.76. 
219  See the discussion at 4.78. 
220  See the discussion at 4.66. 
221  As discussed at 4.65, Belcher considered the OECD approach could give rise to 
practical operational difficulties and would be major departures from Australian 
domestic law and existing tax treaties. 
222  As discussed at 4.71, Belcher pointed to the preservation of Australian taxing rights 
under ITAA 1936 divs 14 and 15 and ITAA 1936 s136 in previous Australian tax 
treaties. 
 
 
 
189 
189 
4.144 On credits, Belcher recommended continuing to use an overall credit basis in 
tax treaties, notwithstanding the use of wide exemptions under Australian 
domestic law.223  
4.145 Belcher did not favour adopting the OECD draft in future Australian tax 
treaties with either OECD or non-OECD countries. Belcher expressed 
concern about whether the OECD Model would preclude Australia from 
having a uniform rate of withholding tax on all dividends and from collecting 
some tax at source from shipping profits;224 he considered that adopting the 
draft OECD Model would make it difficult to persuade Japan to allow some 
source taxation of shipping profits and source based taxation of other types of 
income.225 Despite the absence of tax sparing provisions in the draft OECD 
Model, Belcher doubted that adopting the OECD Model would provide any 
positive assistance in future tax treaties with Singapore and Malaya.226 
The Significance Of The 1965 Australian Model Tax Treaty For The First Two 
Questions Identified At 1.4 
4.146 Although the Australian model tax treaty of 1965 was not directly used in the 
actual negotiations of any Australian tax treaties between 1965 and 1969, it 
(particularly given the comments by Hill in the comparative schedule227) does 
provide evidence relevant to the first two questions identified at 1.4 in the 
period immediately before Australia entered into its next four pre-OECD 
membership tax treaties. The model was used by Australian officials in 
analysing the 1966 UK draft and in negotiating the 1967 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty.  
4.147 The 1965 model followed the OECD draft in presentational matters, but 
generally228 followed a draft developed by M J Belcher in terms of language 
and technical content.229 The reason why the OECD draft was followed in 
presentational matters was that the 1965 Australian model was developed 
with the intention of sending it to European countries. The expectation was 
                                                          
223  See the discussion at 4.79. 
224  See the discussion at 4.81. 
225  See the discussion at 4.82. 
226  See the discussion at 4.83.  
227  The comments in the comparative schedule are discussed at 4.110 to 4.128. 
228  The only exceptions being following OECD Draft Article 5(5) by including ‘or any other 
agent of an independent status’ immediately after the word ‘broker’ (as discussed at 
4.116) and the inclusion of an equivalent to OECD Draft Article 25(1) (as discussed at 
4.154). 
229  See the discussion at 4.108. 
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that the more familiar OECD layout would facilitate agreement with European 
countries.230 Treasury officials favoured Belcher’s draft on technical issues as 
providing for greater scope for source basis taxation and as being verbally 
simpler and more specific.231 
4.148 Belcher’s draft largely represented a consolidation and refinement of previous 
Australian tax treaty practice. It retained the same structural features as 
Australia’s four previous tax treaties by: defining industrial or commercial 
profits in terms which excluded particular categories of income; not including 
an interest article; not including a capital gains article; and not including an 
‘other income’ article.232  
4.149 The major differences between Belcher’s draft and previous Australian tax 
treaties were a product of Cabinet decision 386.233 The result was that 
Belcher’s draft expressly excluded ‘dividends’ and ‘income from operating 
ships or aircraft’ from the definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ and did 
not contain a dividend article or a royalty article. It is clear that Belcher 
considered that these features would mean that Australia would retain full 
source country taxing rights in relation to these categories of income.234  
4.150 The comments on the 1965 model stated that the capital gains article was not 
relevant for Australia’s present taxation purposes.235 The comments, while 
noting the absence of an article on taxation of capital, did consider that the 
inclusion of such an article would be desirable in tax treaties with countries 
which taxed capital.236  
4.151 Belcher was sceptical as to whether European countries would agree to enter 
into tax treaties having the features referred to in 4.149 and that compromises 
on shipping profits and royalties might be the best that Australia could expect 
to achieve.237 No similar reservations were expressed in the comments, which 
                                                          
230  See the discussion at 4.129. 
231  These were the reasons Ross gave for following the Belcher draft when forwarding 
the revised draft and the comparative schedule to another Treasury official, E M W 
Visbord. See the discussion at 4.109. 
232  See the discussion at 4.100. 
233  4.58 discusses how Belcher’s draft was constrained by Cabinet decision 386. Cabinet 
decision 386 and Cabinet Submission 305 are discussed at 4.33 to 4.52. 
234  See the discussion at 4.97. 
235  See the discussion at 4.119. 
236  See the discussion at 4.119. 
237  Belcher’s scepticism on these issues is discussed at 4.98. 
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merely proposed that Australia’s attitude to these articles be conveyed in a 
covering letter.238 
4.152 Interestingly, Belcher’s comments on his draft did not highlight several 
respects in which it followed prior Australian treaties in a manner that differed 
from the OECD Model. The inclusion of those features in Belcher’s draft (and 
subsequently in the revised draft) is evidence that in subsequent Australian 
tax treaties where they appear, they are likely to have been requested by 
Australia.  
4.153 Those features were: the preservation of the operation of ITAA 1936 divs 14 
and 15;239 the preservation of the operation of ITAA 1936 s136;240 expressly 
preserving the principle underlying ITAA 1936 s38;241 following the list of 
exclusions in the 1960 Australia – NZ Tax Treaty definition of ‘industrial or 
commercial profits’;242 following the residence provisions in the 1957 Australia 
– Canada Tax Treaty and in the 1960 Australia – NZ Tax Treaty;243 including 
a ‘substantial equipment’ provision in the definition of permanent 
establishment;244 following the phraseology and narrower list of activities in 
Article 5(3) in the 1957 Australia – Canada Tax Treaty and the 1960 Australia 
– NZ Tax Treaty;245 including a provision deeming there to be a permanent 
establishment in the situation which arose in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 
656;246 containing deemed source rules in the credit article in relation to 
personal (including professional) services and amounts taxable under either 
ITAA 1936 divs 14 or 15;247 and exchange of information and communication 
between tax authorities provisions identical to those in the 1957 Australia – 
Canada Tax Treaty and the 1960 Australia – NZ Tax Treaty.248  
4.154 Although commenting that the exchange of information provisions in Belcher’s 
draft were adequate and covered the whole of OECD Draft Article 25, the 
                                                          
238  See the discussion at 4.109. 
239  See the discussion at 4.95. 
240  See the discussion at 4.95. 
241  See the discussion at 4.96. 
242  See the discussion at 4.100. 
243  See the discussion at 4.101. 
244  See the discussion at 4.102. 
245  See the discussion at 4.104. 
246  See the discussion at 4.105. The comments in the schedule to the revised draft, as 
discussed at 4.117, are consistent with the inclusion being in response to the decision 
in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656. 
247  See the discussion at 4.106. 
248  See the discussion at 4.107. 
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revised draft did include an equivalent to OECD Draft Article 25(1).249 The 
comments also compared Belcher’s draft exchange of information article 
favourably with its direct OECD draft equivalent, noting that Belcher’s draft 
was more concise, made specific allowance for disclosure to judicial 
authorities, and that the OECD draft appeared to limit exchange of 
information to what was available in the state with the poorer information 
facilities.250 
4.155 The respects in which Belcher’s draft (other than in its treatment of dividends, 
shipping profits and royalties) differed from earlier Australian tax treaties may 
be evidence that those features were included in those earlier treaties at the 
request of the treaty partner. Belcher’s draft used an ‘attributable to’ basis 
rather than a ‘force of attraction’ basis in allocating industrial or commercial 
profits to a permanent establishment. A force of attraction basis had been 
adopted in the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty and in the 1960 Australia – NZ 
Tax Treaty, but Belcher indicated that no strong preference between the two 
approaches was felt. The first draft that Australia sent to Canada had adopted 
a force of attraction basis, but this was readily deleted by Australia in 
subsequent drafts.251 It appears likely that the adoption of a force of attraction 
basis in the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty was at the request of the US and 
was something that Australia would agree to but would not insist on.  
4.156 Other features of the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty which were not included 
in Belcher’s draft were the assistance in collection and mutual agreement 
procedure articles. The absence of these articles in the 1957 Australia – 
Canada Tax Treaty, in the 1960 Australia – NZ Tax Treaty and in Belcher’s 
draft provides some evidence that they were inserted in the 1953 Australia – 
US Tax Treaty at the request of the US.252  
4.157 The other significant respect in which Belcher’s draft differed from a previous 
Australian tax treaty was the absence of a provision for proportional credits 
                                                          
249  See the discussion at 4.125. 
250  See the discussion at 4.126. 
251  See the discussion at 3.154 and in C John Taylor, ‘The Negotiation and Drafting of 
the First Australia–Canada Taxation Treaty (1957)’ (2013) 61 Canadian Tax Journal 
915, 935–7, 969 and 981. 
252  In relation to the mutual agreement procedure article, this conclusion is consistent 
with McGovern’s statement (discussed at 3.73) that the article had been included at 
the request of the US. McGovern’s comment (discussed at 3.70) does not explicitly 
state that the assistance in collection article was inserted at the request of the US. 
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for tax on third country income contained in the 1946 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty.253  
4.158 The definition of permanent establishment in Belcher’s draft differed from all 
previous Australian tax treaties, by including supervisory activities in relation 
to building or construction projects (hence broadening the definition) and by 
requiring the project to exist for more than twelve months (hence narrowing 
the definition).254 The comments in the comparative schedule pointed out that 
the definition in Belcher’s draft was more extensive to cater for Australian 
conditions and also praised its verbal economy.255 
4.159 An immovable property article was not contained in either Belcher’s draft or 
the revised draft. The comments considered that the principle in the OECD 
draft article was implicit in Belcher’s draft, and expressed concern about how 
the scope of the immovable property article would be determined given the 
existence of different concepts in Australian domestic law.256 
4.160 Neither Belcher’s draft nor the revised draft contained a non-discrimination 
article, with the comments expressing concern about possible conflict with 
taxing provisions in Australian domestic law.257 
4.161 The credit provisions in the revised draft were identical to the equivalent 
provisions in Belcher’s draft. The comments pointed to the fact that 
symmetrical approaches to relieving double taxation were inconsistent with 
previous Australian practice. The comments also noted differences between 
the Belcher and revised drafts as compared with the OECD draft in relation to 
creditable taxes and credit limits.258 
4.162 The 1965 Australian model implemented the policies of maximising source 
taxing rights and Australian revenue that were evident in Cabinet decision 
386 and in Belcher’s review of the OECD Model in the detail of its drafting. 
The 1965 model also preserved certain features of Australian domestic law, 
although Belcher did not note this in his comments on his draft. The 1965 
                                                          
253  See the discussion at 4.101. As noted at 2.149 and accompanying notes, it is unclear 
from the files relating to the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty whether Australia or the 
UK initiated the process which led to the inclusion of this provision in that treaty. 
254  See the discussion at 4.102. 
255  See the discussion of the comments on the comparative schedule at 4.113 and 
4.114. 
256  See the discussion at 4.120. 
257  As noted at 4.122, the concern extended to possible conflict with State taxes. 
258  See the discussion at 4.123 and 4.124. 
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model and the comments on it also reflect a preference for concise and what 
was perceived to be precise language and a strong tendency to follow 
existing Australian precedents. The consolidation and refinement in the 1965 
model of provisions in previous Australian tax treaties which maximised 
source basis taxation, coupled with the omission of articles dealing with 
dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains and shipping profits, represented 
an extreme emphasis on source basis taxation which Australia was never 
able to achieve in any actual tax treaty.  
 
The   Challenge  To Australian  Attitudes Presented By The   Negotiation   And  
Drafting Of The  1967  UK Treaty 
 
4.163  Australia’s extreme  emphasis on source basis taxation  and  its  dislike of  
many of the provisions of the 1963 Draft OECD Model  were to be challenged  during 
the negotiation and drafting of the 1967 UK Treaty which was to prove  to have a 
most significant influence on future Australian treaties.    The background to, the  
negotiation and drafting of,  and the significance of that  treaty are discussed in  
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER FIVE: AUSTRALIA’S SECOND TREATY WITH THE UK IN 1967 
5.1 Although, as was noted in Chapter 4 and will be seen in Chapter 6, Australia had 
previously held preliminary discussions on possible taxation treaties with Japan and 
Singapore, the next taxation treaty that Australia commenced negotiations on and 
entered into was its second taxation treaty with the UK, in 1967. 
5.2 The 1967 UK Treaty is important for several reasons. It was the first treaty that 
Australia entered into after publication of the draft OECD Model and was based on a 
UK draft that had been influenced by the OECD Model. Hence the treaty and the 
negotiations leading up to it are evidence of how Australia would respond, in actual 
treaty negotiations, to the draft OECD Model relatively shortly after its publication. 
Australia had previously had preliminary discussions with Japan in relation to a 
Japanese draft, which had been influenced by the 1963 draft OECD Model,1 and the 
review of Australia’s tax treaty policy between 1959 and 19642 had considered the 
1963 draft OECD Model in developing the 1965 Australian model.  
5.3 Secondly, the treaty was an indication to Australia’s potential treaty partners as to 
how it would seek to vary several articles in the OECD Model. In particular, the treaty 
signalled the rates of withholding tax on dividends, interest and royalties that 
Australia was prepared to agree to and that Australia would not agree to a non-
discrimination article. In contrast to the OECD Model and UK practice, the treaty 
contained structural features, particularly the replacement of the ‘other income’ article 
with an article confined to tax on third country income, that developed out of the 
distinctive features of earlier Australian treaties discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
5.4 This chapter begins with a discussion of developments in the Australian economy 
and income tax system between 1960 and 1967 before examining the negotiation 
and drafting of the 1967 UK Treaty. 
The Australian Economy 1960–1967 
5.5 In 1960, while the UK was still Australia’s major trading and investment partner, its 
significance in both those capacities had been declining since 1950.3  
                                                          
1  The preliminary meeting with Japan is discussed at 6.4 to 6.12.  
2  See the discussion at 4.57 to 4.130. 
3  In 1949–50, 53.1% of Australian imports came from the UK. By 1960–61, this had declined to 
31.3%. In 1949–50, 39.4% of Australian exports were to the UK; but by 1960–61, this had 
declined to 23.9%. In 1949–50, 48.2% of the total inflow of foreign investment in Australian 
enterprises came from the UK. Although this figure was little changed by 1960–61, at 47.3%, 
it had fluctuated significantly in the interim, reaching a high point of 91.3% in 1952–53. R A 
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 The military and economic ascendancy of the US during the 1950s, together with the 
recovery of Europe (especially Germany) and Japan, meant that Commonwealth 
preferences and the Sterling Area came to be seen as less and less economically 
attractive.4 By the time Australia renegotiated the 1932 Ottawa Agreement as the 
1957 UK – Australia Trade Agreement, the level of Commonwealth preferences in 
the former agreement was seen, among other disadvantages for Australia, as 
inhibiting Australia’s ability to negotiate trade agreements with other countries, such 
as Japan, with fast-growing economies.5 Kunkel argues that the UK’s failed first bid 
to join the EEC left Australian officials ‘with a more jaundiced view of the supposedly 
special relationship with the UK having witnessed the crumbling of assurances about 
the protection of Commonwealth interests’.6 An important consequences was a 
concerted export diversification drive by Australia and a renewed effort to deepen 
trade relations with Asia and North America.7 
5.6  Throughout the 1960s, while the UK’s importance to Australia as a trading and 
investment partner continued to decline, it still remained a major trading partner and 
a major source of investment in Australian enterprises.8 Strategically, Australia was 
concerned at the prospect of the UK withdrawing militarily East of Suez. The military 
strategic imperative affected Australia’s trade relations with the UK. Australia made a 
muted response to the UK’s second unsuccessful bid to join the EEC in the fear that 
a more robust response would antagonise the UK and dilute Australia’s message on 
the need for a UK military presence in the Far East.9 The recognition in Australia that 
the UK’s economic destiny lay increasingly with Europe gave further impetus to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Foster, Australian Economic Statistics 1949–50 to 1994–95 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1996) 
9, Table 1.4, 13, Table 1.6 and 42, Table 1.17. 
4  This represented a shift from earlier policies. See the discussion of the economic policies of 
the Chifley and Menzies governments at 3.6 to 3.10. 
5  See the discussion in John Singleton and Paul L Robertson, Economic Relations Between 
Britain and Australasia 1945–1970 (Palgrave, 2002) chs 5 and 6 and in John Kunkel, 
‘Perfidious Albion Revisited: Anglo-Australian Trade Relations and European Economic 
Integration’, National Europe Centre Paper No. 88 (Australian National University, 2003) 13.  
6  Kunkel, above n 5, 20. There is a comprehensive discussion of the Australian and NZ 
responses to Britain’s first attempt to join the European Economic Community in Singleton 
and Robertson, above n 5, chs 7 and 8.  
7  See the discussion in Singleton and Robertson, above n 5, ch 9. These points are also made 
by Kunkel, above n 5, 20. 
8  By 1969–70, the UK accounted for only 11.8% of Australian exports and was the source of 
21.8% of Australian imports. The UK was the source of 33.1% of foreign investment in 
Australian enterprises by 1969–70. Foster, above n 3, 9, Table 1.4, 13, Table 1.6 and 42, 
Table 1.17. 
9  Points made by Andrea Benvenuti, ‘“Layin’ Low and Sayin’ Nuffin”: Australia’s Policy Towards 
Britain’s Second Bid to Join the European Economic Community’ (2006) 46 Australian 
Economic History Review 155. See also the discussion in Singleton and Robertson, above n 
5, chs 9 and 10. 
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Australia’s efforts at import diversification and import replacement through local 
manufacturing.  
The Australian Income Tax System: 1960–1966 
5.7 Between 1953 and 1966, incremental changes were made to the Australian taxation 
system from the system described at 3.11 to 3.12 and at 3.57. Machinery provisions 
relevant for credits under Australia’s tax treaties and for the credit for individuals for 
foreign tax on dividends under ITAA 1936 s45 were relocated from the International 
Agreements Act 1953 and became former Division 19 of ITAA 1936 (Cth).10 The 
method of calculating undistributed profits had been altered in 1952.11 A withholding 
tax regime for dividends had been introduced in 1959, although the regime still gave 
shareholders an option to file a return and to be taxed on an assessment basis.12  
5.8 The corporate tax rate was changed in 1957 to 32.5% for the first £5000 of taxable 
income of resident public companies, with a rate of 37.5% applying to taxable income 
above £5000. For non-resident public companies, the rate was 27.33% for the first 
£5000 of dividend income and 32.5% for the first £5000 of income other than 
dividends. A rate of 37.5% applied to taxable income of non-resident public 
companies above £5000. For resident and non-resident private companies, the rate 
was 22.5% for the first £5000 of taxable income and 32.5% thereafter. Undistributed 
profits tax on private companies which did not make a sufficient distribution was 50%. 
Corporate rates were increased in 1960, with a rate of 35% applying to the first 
£5000 of taxable income for resident public companies and a rate of 40% applying 
thereafter. For non-resident public companies, a rate of 30% applied to the first 
£5000 of dividend income, a rate of 35% applied to the first £5000 of non-dividend 
income and a rate of 40% applied to all taxable income over £5000. For resident and 
non-resident private companies, a rate of 25% applied to the first £5000 of taxable 
                                                          
10  These changes were made by Act No. 17 of 1961 and by Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Act (No 2) 1960. The background to the changes is discussed in Explanatory 
Memorandum to Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Bill 1960, Income 
Tax and Social Services Contribution Bill 1960 and Income Tax (International Agreements) 
Bill 1960. The change coincided with the introduction of income tax in the Australian Territory 
of Papua New Guinea, as a consequence of which former ITAA 1936 div 18, which provided 
Australian residents with a credit for Papua New Guinea tax, was also introduced in 1959. 
11  As noted at Chapter 3, n 91 to paragraph 3.57. 
12  ITAA 1936 s128B(1) introduced by Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment 
Act (No 3) 1959. 
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income, with a rate of 35% applying thereafter. The rate of undistributed profits tax 
was unchanged.13 
The Negotiation And Drafting Of The 1967 Australia – UK Treaty 
The 1966 Changes To UK Corporate-Shareholder Taxation And The Decision To 
Renegotiate The 1946 Australia – UK Treaty 
5.9 Due to proposed changes in its system of corporate-shareholder taxation, in late 
1965 the UK sought modifications to its existing bilateral taxation treaties, including 
the 1946 UK Treaty. Under the 1946 UK Treaty, the UK provided a foreign tax credit 
for underlying Australian corporate tax irrespective of the level of shareholding.14 In 
1946, the UK operated what was, in effect, a form of dividend imputation system. The 
UK introduced unilateral relief provisions in 1950, which allowed credits for 
underlying tax irrespective of the level of voting power held by the recipient where the 
paying company was a resident of a Commonwealth country.15 In 1965, the UK 
introduced a corporation tax that was regarded as a separate tax from the tax on 
shareholders. As a consequence, the UK sought to limit foreign tax credits for 
underlying corporate tax in its double taxation treaties by renegotiating the credit 
provisions in treaties through protocols. The general UK policy was to require a 
minimum 10% voting power before an underlying credit was available in a treaty with 
a Commonwealth country.16 The policy was consistent with amendments to the UK’s 
unilateral relief provisions, effective from 5th April 1966, under which the recipient was 
required to be a UK company with a minimum voting power of 10% where the paying 
company was a Commonwealth resident.17 
                                                          
13  Corporate tax rates for the period 1st July 1957 to 30th June 1962 are summarised in J A L 
Gunn, O E Berger and M Maas, Gunn’s Commonwealth Income Tax: Law and Practice, 
Butterworths, Sydney, 1963, at [1210] to [1212]. 
14  See the discussion at 2.129. 
15  See the discussion in John E Talbot and G S A Wheatcroft, Corporation Tax, and Income Tax 
Upon Company Distributions (Sweet & Maxwell, 1968) 279–80, para 18-01. See also the 
discussion in C N Beattie and J C Wisely, Corporation Tax (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1966) 170–
1.  
16  See the discussion of UK treaties in this period in Talbot and Wheatcroft, above n 15, 282–4, 
paras 18-07 and 18-08. In some instances, the UK required a 25% minimum voting power in 
treaties with non-Commonwealth countries. 
17  See the discussion in Talbot and Wheatcroft, above n 15, 284–86, paras 18-09 to 18-11 and 
in Beattie and Wisely, above n 15, 170–1. A minimum of 25% voting power held by a UK 
resident company was required where the paying company was a resident of a non-
Commonwealth country. 
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5.10 In 1965, the UK requested that a protocol be negotiated to take into account the 
effect of these changes to the UK system of corporate-shareholder taxation.18 
Australia preferred that a new treaty be entered into,19 because it was dissatisfied 
with some features of the 1946 UK Treaty and was contemplating changes to its 
domestic law affecting cross-border dividends, interest and royalties.20 The UK 
continued to request a protocol,21 but after making arrangements to renegotiate its 
treaty with NZ in the northern hemisphere autumn of 1966 or in the spring of 1967 
asked if Australia could indicate when it would like to undertake a complete review of 
the treaty.22  
The Initial UK Draft 
5.11 The UK, after seeking representations from other UK government bodies, business 
groups and selected businesses,23 submitted a draft treaty, influenced by the 1963 
draft OECD Model, to Australia for consideration on 20th September 1966.24 Australia 
                                                          
18  The earliest correspondence raising the issue that the author has been able to locate is a 
telegram dated 16th September 1965 from the UK Commonwealth Relations Office to the UK 
High Commission in Canberra asking for the question of negotiation of a protocol to the 1946 
treaty, consequent on the introduction of UK corporations tax, be raised with Australian 
authorities. The Secretary of the Australian Prime Minister’s Department (E J Bunting), in an 
undated reply to the UK High Commissioner in Canberra, stated that the government had 
considered the issue but would prefer that the 1946 treaty be renegotiated at a convenient 
time. It is clear that Bunting’s reply was received by the UK authorities by 2nd December 1965, 
as it is referred to in H H Woodruff to T W Keeble Esq, Commonwealth Relations Office, 
dated 2nd December 1965. All of these documents are contained in UK National Archives, 
Kew, ‘Revision of Double Taxation Agreement – Australia’, UK National Archives, IR 
40/16741. Hereafter referred to as ‘Inland Revenue file’. 
19  The Secretary of the Australian Prime Minister’s Department to the UK High Commissioner in 
Canberra, nd, above n 18. 
20  At a meeting in Canberra between UK and Australian officials on the issue in February 1966, 
the Australian officials indicated that Australia had long thought that several features of the 
1946 Australia – UK Treaty required revision. In particular, the exemption for dividends paid to 
a 100% UK parent was inconsistent with the 15% flat rate on dividends agreed to under 
Australia’s subsequent treaties with the US, Canada and New Zealand. Australia was 
concerned that the withdrawal of relief for underlying tax would remove the inducement for 
portfolio investment in Australia and might result in a reduction in the actual flow of portfolio 
investment. Inland Revenue file, ‘Notes of Meetings in Canberra 25th February 1966’, 
hereafter ‘Notes of Meetings’. 
21 Inland Revenue file, Johnson to Cain 1st March 1966, Cain to Johnson 1st April 1966, Johnson 
to Cain 5th May 1966, Cain to Johnson 17th May 1966. 
22 Inland Revenue file, Johnson to Cain 24th May 1966. 
23  Letters were sent on 12th September 1966 to the Board of Trade, the Treasury, the 
Confederation of British Industries, the British and Commonwealth Banks Association, the 
Taxation Committee of the British Insurance Association, the ANZ Banking Group and other 
businesses; these are contained in the Inland Revenue file. Most replies were not received, 
and the representations appear to have had little effect on the UK’s negotiating position. An 
undated summary of the representations is contained in the Inland Revenue file. 
24  Inland Revenue file, Johnson to Cain 20th September 1966, Harrison to Wearing 20th 
September 1966. 
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by this time had developed its own draft,25 but there is no evidence that this was ever 
sent to the UK. However, there is some evidence that it influenced Australia’s 
analysis of the UK draft and Australia’s negotiating position. 
Australian Reactions To The Initial UK Draft  
Australian Internal Reactions At The Official Level  
5.12 Official Australian internal reactions to the UK draft can be seen in a letter by W J 
O’Reilly to Sir Richard Randall and an accompanying Memorandum.26 In analysing 
the UK draft, O’Reilly and the Memorandum compared it with: the 1946 UK Treaty; 
the draft OECD Model Convention; previous UK treaty practice, particularly its 
recently concluded treaty with New Zealand; and the 1965 Australian model tax 
treaty. 
Corporate Dual Residence Tie-breaker 
5.13 One concern was with the proposed tie-breaker on corporate dual residence (place 
of effective management) in Article 3(3) of the draft. A company incorporated in 
Australia but centrally managed and controlled in the UK would be an Australian 
resident for purposes of Australian domestic law. Because of the ITAA 1936 s46 
inter-corporate dividend rebate, such a company would be effectively exempt from 
Australian tax on dividends it received, while Article 9 of the draft would mean that 
dividends that it paid to its UK parent would not be subject to Australian tax. O’Reilly 
considered that the problems of dual residence had been satisfactorily dealt with 
previously without resorting to dual residence tie-breakers. O’Reilly noted that the tie-
breaker provisions had been considerably modified in the 1966 UK – NZ Taxation 
Treaty.27 The Memorandum considered this approach would be more favourable to 
Australia but would not eliminate the possibilities for exploitation of tie-breaker 
provisions. 
                                                          
25  The development of this draft was discussed at 4.90 to 4.132. 
26  W J O’Reilly (Acting Second Commissioner of Taxation) to The Secretary to the Treasury (Sir 
Richard Randall) and accompanying memorandum, 16th November 1966, Australian Treasury 
file. All subsequent references to ‘O’Reilly’s letter’ or to ‘the Memorandum’ in paragraphs 5.13 
to 5.39 are to these documents and hence separate footnotes will not be provided for those 
references. O’Reilly was subsequently appointed as Commissioner of Taxation in 1976 and 
held that position until his retirement in 1984. Leigh Edmonds, Working for All Australians: A 
Brief History of the Australian Taxation Office (Australian Taxation Office, Canberra, 2010), 
154 and 175. 
27  Under the UK–NZ treaty, a NZ company was defined as one that met the NZ definition of 
corporate residence (place of incorporation and centre of administrative or practical 
management in NZ or central management and control in New Zealand). Under that treaty, a 
UK company was a company that was centrally managed and controlled in the UK but was 
not a NZ company.  
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Permanent Establishment 
5.14 O’Reilly observed that the definition was much narrower than Australia would desire 
and narrower than the definition in the 1966 UK – NZ Taxation Treaty. The 
Memorandum observed that, apart from paragraph 4, the definition of ‘permanent 
establishment’ in the UK draft was a copy of the definition in the OECD Model, and 
noted that the definition differed from its equivalent in the Australian model28 by not 
including the following specific instances of a permanent establishment: 
 An agency; 
 An oil-well; 
 An agricultural, pastoral or forestry property; 
 An installation project that existed for more than 12 months; 
 Supervisory activities on a building site or a construction, installation or 
assembly project for more than 12 months; and 
 The use or installation of substantial equipment or machinery by, or under 
contract with, an enterprise of one of the countries. 
5.15 An ‘agricultural or pastoral property’ had specifically been included in the definition of 
permanent establishment in the 1946 UK Treaty.29 The use or installation of 
substantial equipment had been expressly mentioned in the ‘includes’ portion of the 
definition in the 1953 US Treaty, in the 1957 Canada Treaty and the 1960 NZ 
Treaty.30 Installation projects and supervisory activities had not been expressly 
mentioned in any taxation treaty that Australia had entered into prior to 1966.  
5.16 The structure of earlier Australian treaties may have influenced Australian 
interpretation of later treaties, even though they had a different structure. In earlier 
Australian treaties, such as the 1946 UK Treaty and the 1953 US Treaty, the 
definition of ‘permanent establishment’ was a ‘means and includes’ definition; a form 
well known to common lawyers. Under a ‘means and includes’ definition, the items 
referred to after the word ‘includes’ may deem items to be covered by the defined 
term that would not fall within the ‘means’ portion of the definition. The definition of 
permanent establishment in the 1966 UK draft was structured differently and followed 
the OECD Model in this respect. Article 4.1 of the draft was a ‘means’ definition of 
permanent establishment and Article 4.2 stated that ‘permanent establishment’ 
‘includes especially’ a list of specified items. Article 4.5 expressly deemed what 
                                                          
28  The definition of ‘permanent establishment’ in the 1965 Australian model was discussed at 
4.102 to 4.105. 
29  See the discussion at 2.101 and 2.102. 
30  See the discussion at at 3.41 to 3.43, 3.84 to 3.85, 3.109, 3.136 and 3.148.  
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would now be referred to as dependent agents to be permanent establishments. 
O’Reilly’s letter appears to reflect a concern that all of the items specified in his letter 
would have to be included in either Article 4.2 or in a specific deeming provision for 
them to be regarded as permanent establishments.31 This reflects thinking that sees 
Article 4.2 as functioning to deem items to be permanent establishments whether or 
not they were within the Article 4.1 definition. This interpretation is understandable 
given the ‘means and includes’ drafting of the definition of permanent establishment 
in Australia’s previous treaties. It is questionable whether this construction of the 
definition in the UK draft was appropriate given the presence of Article 4.5, which 
specifically deemed certain agencies to be permanent establishments. The drafting 
arguably reflected the view that is currently taken in the OECD Model Commentary 
that the equivalent of Article 4.2 merely lists examples of items that are within the 
equivalent of Article 4.1, that each of these will only be a permanent establishment if 
it is a fixed place of business, and that the only items that are permanent 
establishments that are not within the Article 4.1 definition are those that are 
expressly deemed to be permanent establishments under articles such as Article 
4.5.32  
5.17 The Memorandum noted that, under the UK draft, unlike the 1946 UK Treaty, 
agricultural, pastoral and forestry properties were dealt with under Article 5 (income 
from immovable property) and that this, if anything, would be more favourable to a 
source country than would taxation as a permanent establishment under the 
industrial or commercial profits article. 
5.18 Again unlike the 1946 UK Treaty, the UK draft did not treat an agent who filled orders 
on a non-resident’s behalf from a stock of goods maintained in Australia as a 
permanent establishment. The Memorandum noted that the absence of such a 
provision and the deeming of warehousing activities to not be a permanent 
establishment meant that Australia would be unable, in the absence of anything 
more, to tax such activities by a UK firm. The Memorandum also observed that the 
converse was also true and that the levying of UK tax on the warehousing of 
Australian exports in the UK had been considered by the Department of Trade to be 
‘something of an obstacle’ to export market development expenditure. 
5.19 The UK draft did not include an equivalent provision to Article II(2) in the 1957 
Canada Treaty and the 1960 NZ Treaty. Under the 1946 UK Treaty, Australia was 
                                                          
31  As noted at 4.62, M J Belcher, the then Australian Assistant Commissioner of Taxation, raised 
similar concerns in his 1963 review of the draft OECD Model. 
32  See OECD Commentary on Article 5(2) paragraph 12. 
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unable to tax the UK company in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656 because it did 
not have a permanent establishment in Australia.33 The Memorandum commented 
that the provision in the 1966 UK – NZ Treaty dealing with this situation34 was an 
improvement on the equivalent provision in the 1960 NZ Treaty.  
Income From Immovable Property 
5.20 Article 5 of the UK draft was new to Australia. O’Reilly considered that it was not 
essential in the Australia – UK context, that its inclusion might be avoided if possible, 
and, if it were included, that some clarification of its scope would be required. The 
Memorandum noted that under Article 5 Australia could continue to tax rents from UK 
owned property situated in Australia and royalties from the exploitation of Australian 
natural resources. The article would also mean that Australia could tax profits from 
agricultural and forestry enterprises in Australia without having to determine if the 
profits were industrial and commercial profits attributable to a permanent 
establishment in Australia. The Memorandum commented on problems that could 
arise due to perceived differences between English and Australian law in relation to 
the classification of property as movable or immovable in the case of debts secured 
by immovable property. The Memorandum referred to the statements in the OECD 
commentary that no special provision in the income from immovable property article 
dealt with debts secured by immovable property as the question was settled by the 
provision (under the interest article) for a 10% tax in the source country.35 
Industrial or Commercial Profits And Associated Enterprises  
5.21 O’Reilly regarded the draft industrial or commercial profits article as ‘basically 
satisfactory in concept’ but commented that it would be desirable for it to recognise, 
as all of Australia’s prior treaties had done, Australia’s right to apply ITAA 1936 
s136,36 where information was insufficient for the arm’s length basis provided for in 
the Article to be applied.37 The Memorandum noted that NZ secured the ability to 
                                                          
33  In Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656, the Board of Review held that the UK company, which 
participated in the capital of an Australian company that manufactured light bulbs to the order 
of the UK company, was not taxable under the industrial and commercial profits article 
because it did not have a permanent establishment in Australia. The issue had been raised 
but not resolved at meetings between UK and Australian tax officials in London in 1959. See 
‘Australian Double Taxation Talks; Meeting 22nd April 1959 and ‘Australian Double Taxation 
Talks; Meeting 11th May 1959, Inland Revenue file. 
34 Article II(viii) of the UK – NZ Treaty of 1966. 
35  OECD Commentary on Article 6 paragraph 2.2. 
36  ITAA 1936 s136 was discussed at n 133 to paragraph 2.115. 
37  See the discussion at 2.115 to 2.126. 
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apply its equivalent provision in its recent treaty with the UK. The same point was 
raised in relation to Article 8, the associated enterprises article.  
5.22 Remuneration of an enterprise for personal services, dividends, interest, royalties 
and rents were excluded from the definition of ‘industrial and commercial profits’ 
except when effectively connected with a trade or business carried on through a 
permanent establishment. The Memorandum pointed out that in the latter case these 
items would be regarded as industrial or commercial profits and thus subject to full 
rates of source country tax. The comment should be read in the context of the 
limitations on the taxing rights of the source country of these types of income that are 
contained in other articles in the treaty. The Memorandum commented that, under 
the draft treaty, regarding personal services income, dividends, interest, royalties and 
rents effectively connected with a permanent establishment as industrial or 
commercial profits would favour Australia. Neither O’Reilly’s letter nor the 
Memorandum made any comment on whether capital gains would be within the 
definition of industrial or commercial profits.  
5.23 The Memorandum also questioned the appropriateness of the reference to ‘under the 
same or similar conditions’ in paragraph 3 of the article, pointing out that ‘It is 
generally because of the conditions that exist between an enterprise and its 
establishment that the derivation of profits can be transferred at will between one 
country and the other. By having to calculate the attributable profits on the basis of 
the conditions that do in fact exist, the country in which the permanent establishment 
is situated may have to work on the basis of special conditions that it ought to be able 
to ignore for this purpose.’ Australia had raised the same problem when it negotiated 
the 1946 UK Treaty and had had the phrase removed following negotiations.38  
5.24 The draft allowed for the deduction of all reasonable expenses, calculated on an 
arm’s length basis, in determining profits attributable to a permanent establishment. 
The Memorandum noted that the 1953 US Treaty allowed Australia to apply the 
principles in ITAA 1936 s38 in calculating profit39 and suggested that it would be 
useful to have the s38 principle recognised in the new treaty with the United 
Kingdom. 
5.25 The definition of industrial or commercial profits in the draft included income from the 
furnishing of services of employees or other personnel. The Memorandum 
considered that this was necessary to enable the country of source to tax profits of 
                                                          
38  See the discussion at 2.120 and 2.124. 
39  See the discussion at 3.47, 3.111 and 3.137. 
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public entertainer companies and argued that a source rule, in the form adopted in 
the 1946 UK Treaty and the 1953 US Treaty,40 should be inserted in the industrial 
and commercial profits article. Otherwise it would be fruitless to regard ‘public 
entertainer’ companies as having a permanent establishment in Australia if the 
ordinary source rules meant that the income of the company arose outside Australia. 
The comment reflects concern about the operation of Australian domestic law in the 
absence of the article. Following the decision of the High Court in FCT v Mitchum 
(1965) 113 CLR 401, it was uncertain when the income a company which provided 
the services of a public entertainer would have an Australian source.41 
Shipping And Air Transport  
5.26 O’Reilly’s letter and the Memorandum noted that the draft article taxed shipping and 
air transport on a residence basis, but contrasted it with both the 1946 UK Treaty and 
the 1966 UK – NZ Treaty. Under the 1946 UK Treaty,42 the exemption only applied to 
ships registered in the UK and operated by a UK resident. Under the draft, and in the 
1966 New Zealand – UK Treaty, the exemption would apply wherever the ship was 
registered provided it was operated by a UK resident. In addition, in combination with 
the definition of ‘international traffic’ in Article 2, the exemption in the draft applied, 
consistently with the 1946 UK Treaty, to ships and aircraft operated by a UK resident 
solely between places in Australia. Under the UK – NZ Treaty, by contrast, the 
exemption only applied to traffic between places in NZ where that traffic was in the 
course of a voyage which extended over more than one country. The Memorandum 
noted that these features meant that under the draft the exemption would apply to 
profits of a UK operator of an Australian registered tanker wholly between Australian 
ports. The Memorandum commented that if Australia sought to continue to confine 
the operation of the exemption to ships registered in the country of residence, then 
the UK might argue that the Australian arbitrary method of calculating shipping profits 
in ITAA 1936 div 1243 did not give a true measure of Australian source income; this 
would make obtaining a UK credit for the Australian tax paid by UK operators of ships 
registered outside the UK problematic. The Memorandum observed, however, that 
this was ‘the opposite side of the coin’ to the use of arbitrary methods by the UK in 
                                                          
40  Article III(3) 1946 UK Treaty contained an actual deemed source rule, but Article III(4) of the 
1953 US Treaty deemed profits attributable to a permanent establishment to be income of the 
permanent establishment and to be taxed accordingly. 
41  The decision of the Australian High Court in FCT v Mitchum (1965) 113 CLR 401 is discussed 
in R L Hamilton, R L Deutsch and J C Raneri, Guidebook to Australian International Taxation 
(Prospect Media, 7th ed, 2001) paras 2.520 and 2.530. 
42  See the discussion at n 120 to paragraph 2.102. 
43  See the discussion at paragraph 2.14 and accompanying notes. 
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calculating the profits of life assurance companies44 and that ‘the U.K. may not press 
the point’. 
Dividends 
5.27 While not specifying rates of source country tax on dividends, the UK draft envisaged 
that a different, and O’Reilly presumed lower, rate would apply where the dividend 
was paid to a shareholder controlling 25% or more voting power. The Memorandum 
noted that the 1966 NZ – UK Treaty provided for a uniform 15% rate on dividends, 
but considered that the UK might be contemplating the rates specified in the OECD 
Model, namely 5% for non-portfolio dividends and 15% for other dividends. If so, 
Australia would be gaining revenue in the wholly owned subsidiary situation but 
would be losing revenue where between 25% and 100% of the shareholding in 
companies was controlled by a UK resident. The credit for underlying tax for UK 
companies having at least 10% of the voting power in the paying company would 
mean that the UK revenue would generally not benefit in these cases from any 
reduction in the Australian tax on dividends below 15%.45 These statements highlight 
the emphasis that Australian officials of the time placed on revenue considerations, 
and also appear to indicate an assumption that the UK would also be significantly 
influenced by revenue considerations. The estimate was that there would be no 
benefit to the Australian revenue from the UK proposals in relation to UK dividends 
received by an Australian company, but that there would be some benefit in the case 
of dividends received by Australian individuals.46 
                                                          
44  At the time, both UK and Australian tax law contained special provisions that taxed certain 
profits of life assurance companies using arbitrary methods. 
45 Limits on source country taxation of dividends under the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty were 
discussed at 2.90.  
46  The combined operation of ITAA 1936 ss45 and 46 (as discussed at 2.9 and 3.11) meant that 
usually no Australian tax would be collected on a foreign source dividend. Article XII (2) of the 
1946 UK Treaty, however, meant that Australian taxpayers other than companies could be 
entitled to net UK tax deducted at the standard rate. In essence, this involved allowing an 
Australian resident shareholder other than a company a credit for UK corporate tax 
irrespective of the Australian resident’s level of shareholding in the UK company. Following 
the introduction of corporation tax in 1965, the UK had, pending the conclusion of a new 
treaty, unilaterally decided to limit its tax on dividends paid by UK companies to Australian 
residents to 15%, being the rate of tax levied by Australia on dividends paid by Australian 
companies to UK shareholders. Australian authorities had been notified of this intention at a 
meeting of UK and Australian Inland Revenue, Tax, Treasury and High Commission officials 
at Canberra on 25th February 1966. See Inland Revenue file, ‘Note of Meeting in Canberra 
25th February 1966. Article 21(1)(b) restricted the availability of credits in the UK for Australian 
underlying corporate tax to UK companies which had a 10% or more voting power in the 
Australian company paying the dividend. It is reasonably clear that O’Reilly was envisaging 
that Australian resident portfolio shareholders would not be entitled to underlying foreign tax 
credits on UK sourced dividends. If so, then limiting the UK tax on portfolio dividends to 15%, 
in contrast to deduction of tax at the standard rate of 38.75%, would, when combined with the 
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5.28 The Memorandum discussed the definition in the draft of dividends subject to treaty 
limits. The definition adopted an ‘in substance’ approach under which interest and 
royalties could be classified as dividends. Items were included that would not be 
dividends, or even taxable in some cases, for Australian domestic law purposes. 
When combined with Articles 10(4) and 11(4) of the draft, the effect of the definition 
of ‘dividend’ appeared to be that the UK could levy tax at dividend rates on certain 
interest and royalties that were treated as dividends under UK law. In the case of 
interest, this would apply where the interest was paid to an Australian company with 
greater than 50% control. In the case of royalties, taxation at dividend rates would 
apply where the royalty was paid between companies under common management 
where the Australian company had a greater than 50% control.  
5.29 Under the draft, the concessional rates of tax on dividends were only available to 
beneficial owners of the dividends. The Memorandum recognised that this was an 
anti-avoidance provision, but observed that both Australia and the UK taxed trustees 
on dividends and that the solution to this problem that had been developed in the UK 
– NZ Treaty would mean that an Australian charitable trust would be subject to full 
rates of UK tax on UK sourced dividends it received.  
5.30 Article 9(7) of the draft, unlike the 1946 UK Treaty, precluded Australia from taxing 
dividends paid by UK residents to shareholders who were not Australian residents, 
as distinct from the narrower subset of shareholders who were UK residents. The 
Memorandum commented that this was consistent with the 1957 Australia – Canada 
Treaty and the 1960 Australia – NZ Treaty, and with the Australian model treaty.47 
Here the progressive development of Australian treaty practice is referred to as being 
consistent with UK treaty practice, as evidenced by the draft.  
5.31 The Memorandum noted that Article 9(7) would free a UK private company operating 
in Australia from undistributed profits tax, but commented that undistributed profits 
tax was rarely levied on non-resident companies. Interestingly, neither O’Reilly nor 
the Memorandum refer to the treatment of undistributed profits tax in the negotiation 
of the 1946 UK Treaty,48 which had been the product of considerable negotiation. By 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
s45 foreign tax credit, have meant that more Australian tax would be collected on dividends 
paid by UK companies to Australian portfolio shareholders. 
47  As discussed in C John Taylor, ‘The Negotiation and Drafting of the First Australia–Canada 
Taxation Treaty (1957)’ (2013) 61 Canadian Tax Journal 915 at 969, this variation from the 
1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty in the 1957 Australia – Canada Tax Treaty was at the request 
of Canada. This aspect of the 1965 Australian model is noted at 4.118 n 173.  
48  See the discussion in 2.90 to 2.91 and 2.109 to 2.114.  
 
 
 
208 
208 
1966, Australian undistributed profits tax did not apply to public companies49 thus 
limiting the prospects of it applying to an Australian branch of a UK multinational. 
Interest 
5.32 O’Reilly stressed that under the 1946 Treaty interest had not been dealt with under 
the distributive rules, with the intention that the source country retain full taxing rights 
in relation to interest.50 Draft Article 10 taxed interest on a residence basis except 
when effectively connected with a permanent establishment. Where the borrower and 
lender were not at arm’s length, the exemption from source basis taxation was not to 
apply to interest above a normal commercial rate. Both the Memorandum and 
O’Reilly observed that the 1966 New Zealand – UK Treaty did not contain an 
equivalent article and concluded that this meant that NZ retained full source country 
taxing rights in relation to interest.51  
Royalties  
5.33 Unlike the 1946 UK Treaty, the draft royalties article meant that film royalties, in 
addition to other royalties, would be taxed on a residence basis. As with the 1946 UK 
Treaty, the definition of ‘royalties’ did not extend to mineral royalties.52 Both O’Reilly 
and the Memorandum contrasted the draft article with the equivalent provision in the 
1966 New Zealand – UK Treaty, which imposed an upper tax rate of 10% on the 
source taxation of royalties except in the case of royalties effectively connected with 
a permanent establishment. O’Reilly commented that under the 1966 New Zealand – 
UK Treaty, film royalties were excluded, with the effect that they remained taxable 
under the domestic law of each country. The Memorandum noted that NZ currently 
levied taxes equivalent to 11% of the gross rentals of British films. 
Capital Gains 
5.34 Although the draft contained a capital gains article, O’Reilly commented that it had no 
real relevance while Australia did not have a capital gains tax. O’Reilly and the 
Memorandum observed that, from the UK perspective, the article added little if 
anything to existing UK law. The Memorandum categorised the article as applying a 
                                                          
49  See the discussion at 3.11. 
50  See the discussion at 2.90, 2.92, 2.102 and 2.104. 
51  The Memorandum also noted that Article 10(5) had no equivalent in other Australian 
agreements. The article allowed a source country to tax interest derived by a tax exempt 
institution from interest bearing securities traded on a stock exchange where the institution 
was trafficking in securities. The Memorandum commented that Article 10(5) did not appear to 
have any effect for Australian tax purposes. 
52  The treatment of royalties in 1946 UK Treaty is discussed at 2.90, 2.91, 2.94, 2.155 and 
2.165. 
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similar principle to that applied in the industrial or commercial profits article, namely 
that source taxation of capital gains was only permitted in relation to property which 
was an asset of a permanent establishment in the source country. The comment 
reflects differences between the draft article and the capital gains article of the draft 
1963 OECD Model. Article 13(1) in the OECD Model gave the state of situs the right 
to tax gains from the alienation of immovable property. No equivalent provision was 
contained in the 1966 UK draft under which, except in the case of gains from the 
alienation of ships and aircraft, source taxation of capital gains was confined to 
situations where the gain was from the alienation of property forming part of the 
business property of a permanent establishment or of property pertaining to a fixed 
base available to a resident for the purpose of performing professional services. 
Such source taxation was also permitted under the OECD Model. In addition, both 
the draft and the OECD Model explicitly gave the source country the right to tax gains 
from the alienation of the permanent establishment itself or of the fixed base.53 The 
Memorandum commented that the practical effect of the insertion of the article would 
be to limit Australian source taxation of capital gains if Australia ever introduced a 
capital gains tax. O’Reilly commented that one advantage of the article was that it 
would limit the scope of future UK capital gains tax on Australian property to what 
was contained in the present UK law.  
5.35 As the draft contemplated that capital gains on property forming part of the property 
of a permanent establishment were to be taxed under the capital gains article, it is 
clear that the draft did not intend for such capital gains to also be the subject of 
source taxation of a permanent establishment under the industrial and commercial 
profits article. In other words, the draft did not consider that capital gains were within 
industrial or commercial profits as defined even though (unlike dividends, interest and 
royalties) they were not expressly excluded from the definition. The explanation for 
this may be that under UK54 and Australian law, capital gains had not been included 
in the ordinary concept of income as a business gain and in the UK had only been 
taxed through the introduction of statutory provisions that explicitly taxed capital 
gains. An interpretation of treaties which saw industrial or commercial profits as not 
                                                          
53 Unlike the OECD Model, the draft did not contain provisions excluding gains on moveable 
property dealt with under Article 22 of the OECD draft (dealing with Taxation of Capital) from 
taxation under the capital gains article. The draft did not contain any equivalent to Article 22 of 
the OECD Model.  
54 The United Kingdom treatment of capital gains prior to the introduction of capital gains tax is 
discussed in P G Whiteman and D C Milne, Wheatcroft and Whiteman on Capital Gains Tax 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 1973) paras 1–13 to 1–26 and in P G Whiteman and G S A 
Wheatcroft, Whiteman and Wheatcroft on Income Tax and Surtax (Sweet & Maxwell, 1971) 
paras 1–17 to 1–20. 
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including capital gains and which saw capital gains taxed under a separate article 
would thus seem natural to UK tax officials because it would mirror the structure of 
UK domestic law taxing capital gains.55 
Other Income  
5.36 The Memorandum noted that the other income article was new to Australia and that it 
taxed income from sources not otherwise mentioned in the treaty on a residence 
basis. Under all of Australia’s existing treaties income not expressly mentioned could 
be taxed in the source country, with the residence country allowing a credit for the 
source country tax. O’Reilly pointed out that the draft article was precisely the 
converse of Australia’s existing agreements. The Memorandum identified the income 
that would be covered by the article as the draft stood at that point.56 O’Reilly 
considered that, with some technical amendments, the article might prove 
satisfactory, depending on the general context of the treaty as concluded in other 
respects.  
Credits  
5.37 O’Reilly noted that the main point about the credit article was that it would withdraw 
credit for Australian underlying corporate tax in respect of dividends paid by an 
Australian company to a UK resident except where the recipient was a company that 
controlled 10% or more of the voting power in the Australian company. This change 
was in line with the amendments to the unilateral credit provisions which the UK had 
enacted in its domestic law. This change in the credit article was the UK’s principal 
objective in renegotiating the Treaty.57 The Memorandum observed that the draft 
contained a note to the effect that crediting of underlying tax by the UK was ‘subject 
to reciprocity’, but pointed out that the ITAA 1936 s46 rebate meant that dividends 
                                                          
55  The question of whether Australia’s pre capital gains tax treaties provided protection from 
Australian taxation of capital gains made by enterprises that did not have a permanent 
establishment was answered in the affirmative in Virgin Holdings SA v Commissioner of 
Taxation [2008] FCA 1503 and in Undershaft v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 41. 
See the discussion of these cases in R J Vann, ‘Comment on Virgin Holdings SA v 
Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1503 and Undershaft v Commissioner of Taxation 
[2009] FCA 41’ (2009) 11 International Tax Law Reports 653–72. 
56 This was: income from a trust or estate; some alimony payments; and income derived from a 
third country. In the case of trust income, the Memorandum considered that the draft might 
exempt all income derived by a UK resident from Australia via a trust; if so, this would clearly 
be inappropriate. Here it is worth noting that the draft included ‘interest’ and ‘capital gains’ 
articles. If these articles had been excluded, as had been previous Australian treaty practice, 
then interest and capital gains would have been dealt with under the ‘other income’ article. 
57  See the discussion at 5.9.  
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received by Australian public companies from UK companies did not bear Australian 
tax and that usually this would be the position in the case of Australian private 
companies. The Memorandum considered that, in these circumstances, the UK might 
not insist on reciprocity. 
Non-Discrimination  
5.38 The UK draft contained a non-discrimination article. Both the Memorandum and 
O’Reilly noted that: there was no equivalent provision in existing Australian treaties; 
subject to certain reservations by NZ, it was contained in the UK – NZ Treaty; and it 
was an OECD provision. O’Reilly went on to list examples of ways in which Australia 
discriminated between residents and non-residents. These were: (i) the rebate on 
dividends received by resident companies; (ii) limiting to residents only deductions for 
capital subscribed to prospecting companies; and (iii) the exemption for residents of 
income derived from the mining of uranium.58  
5.39 O’Reilly referred to a memorandum sent to the Treasurer as part of the Japanese 
negotiations.59 For the reasons set out there, O’Reilly considered the article 
undesirable and commented: ‘Even if it were re-drafted to permit us to continue all 
our present “discriminations” it would still be clearly restrictive on future policy.’ The 
Memorandum stated that acceptance of the article would preclude Australia in the 
future from discriminating against foreign owned companies. After noting that State 
taxes and other Commonwealth taxes would be within the prohibition, the 
Memorandum pointed out that the equivalent article in the 1966 NZ – UK Treaty only 
applied to the taxes covered by the that treaty.60 
Initial Australian Reactions At The Ministerial Level 
5.40 The UK sought renegotiation of the 1946 UK Treaty because changes in the UK 
system of corporate shareholder taxation meant that it wanted more restricted foreign 
                                                          
58  In addition, the Memorandum contained several examples of the implications of Article 22. 
These included that: (a) Australia might have to free from tax dividends flowing to UK 
companies attributable to their Australian permanent establishments; (b) capital subscribed by 
a non-resident to petroleum exploration companies would have to be deductible and this, 
presumably because of the operation of the UK’s foreign tax credit system, could produce 
benefits for the UK Treasury rather than for the UK investor; and (c) the variation according to 
the status of the payer in the consequences for failure to comply with proposed withholding 
tax provisions on interest and royalties might be prohibited. 
59  This aspect of the memorandum is discussed at 6.23. 
60  As discussed at 4.66, a negative view of the non-discrimination article had previously been 
taken in the analysis by M J Belcher of the non-discrimination article in the 1963 draft OECD 
Model. 
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tax credit provisions.61 The Australian Treasurer, in a submission to Cabinet, 
considered that this change was one that Australia would have to agree to.62 
5.41 The submission considered that the UK draft (and the OECD Model on which it was 
based) was technically unsatisfactory at several points because its provisions had 
been designed to suit the situation of bi-directional income flows that existed between 
the main OECD countries and not the largely uni-directional flows as between the UK 
and Australia.63  
5.42 The submission argued that any treaty Australia negotiated with the UK at this time 
would ‘stand as something of a precedent’ for negotiating treaties with other 
countries, especially given the UK’s renewed interest in EEC membership.64  
5.43 The submission regarded the following as the key UK proposals: 
1. A more restrictive definition of ‘permanent establishment’ than in the 
1946 UK Treaty; 
2. Shipping and aircraft profits continuing to be taxed on a residence 
basis but irrespective of the place of registration; 
3. A reduced rate of taxation on dividends paid to residents of the other 
country, with a further reduction for dividends paid to companies with 
a 25% or more shareholding; 
4. Interest and royalties (including film royalties) being taxed on a 
residence basis; 
5. The credit for Australian underlying corporate tax being restricted to 
UK companies with a 10% or more shareholding in the Australian 
company; 
6. A non-discrimination article; 
7. Taxation of other income on a residence basis.65 
5.44 The submission and the Cabinet decision on what should be Australia’s negotiating 
position on key articles in the UK draft are discussed in the following paragraphs. The 
primary focus of the submission and of the Cabinet decision is on setting a clear 
                                                          
61  See the discussion at 5.9.  
62  William McMahon, Treasurer, ‘Confidential for Cabinet Committee on Taxation Policy’ 
Submission 123 (hereafter ‘Submission 123’), Cabinet Office file, p5, para 9. McMahon 
became Federal Treasurer in January 1966. See P Sekuless, ‘Sir William McMahon’ in M 
Grattan (ed), Australian Prime Ministers (New Holland Publishers, 2000) 313–23 at 319. 
63  Submission 123, pp13–14, para 24.  
64 Submission 123, p13, para 25. For a discussion of Australia’s responses to the UK’s second 
attempt to join the EEC see Benvenuti (2006) above n 9 and Singleton and Robertson, above 
n 5, chs 9 and 10. 
65 Submission 123, pp14–15, para 24. 
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initial Australian negotiating position on withholding tax rates, exemptions and the 
scope of definitions, with little or no consideration being given to the technical issues 
raised in O’Reilly’s letter and the Memorandum. 
Permanent Establishment  
5.45 Regarding the definition of permanent establishment in the draft as unduly restrictive, 
the submission recommended pressing for a more comprehensive definition of 
permanent establishment.66 The technicalities in relation to the definition of 
permanent establishment were to be left to the negotiators, subject to consultation 
where necessary on a ‘best interests’ basis.67 
Dividends  
5.46 The submission considered that the UK Exchequer was the principal beneficiary of 
the exemption from Australian tax of dividends paid by a wholly owned subsidiary to 
a UK parent because otherwise it was likely that UK parent companies would have 
most, if not all, of their UK tax on dividends received from their Australian subsidiary 
eliminated by the UK foreign tax credit system.68  
5.47 The submission recommended, and Cabinet decided, that Australia argue for a 
uniform maximum rate of 15% withholding tax on all dividends (except for certain 
special transactions through permanent establishments). This proposal was 
consistent with Australia’s other taxation agreements of the 1950s, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, and with the UK’s newly revised agreements with the US, NZ and 
Canada, but it represented a change from the Australian Cabinet decisions 386 of 
August 1962 and 1009 of September 1963.69 Eliminating the exemption for dividends 
paid by 100% subsidiaries to their UK parent would increase the overall tax burden 
on these dividends but would put them in the same position as UK companies with a 
10% or more shareholding in an Australian company who would obtain a UK foreign 
tax credit for the underlying Australian corporate tax. This was seen as removing the 
strong incentive that the exemption provided for UK companies to acquire and retain 
100% ownership of Australian companies. Using the same logic, Australia did not 
                                                          
66  Submission 123, pp23–24, paras 46–7.  
67  Submission 123, p24, para 48. 
68  Submission 123, p18, para 23. The submission was inconsistent on this point as paragraph 
10 had noted that because of the availability of the credit for underlying tax, the level of 
Australian corporate tax meant that no UK corporate tax would be payable on dividends in 
this situation. 
69  Cabinet decision 386 and Cabinet Submission 305 are discussed at 4.33 to 4.52. Cabinet 
decision 1009 and Cabinet Submission 871 are discussed at 4.85 to 4.89. 
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favour the UK proposal for a further reduction in withholding tax for dividends paid to 
UK companies with 25% or more ownership.70  
Interest 
5.48 The submission proposed to continue to assert full source country taxing rights to 
interest, but noted the proposal to introduce a withholding tax system for interest paid 
to non-residents. 
Royalties 
5.49 The submission was that Australia’s initial negotiating position should be that 
Australia should have the right to tax royalties at source through the use of a 
proposed withholding tax system.71  
Shipping Profits  
5.50 The submission proposed, as a bargaining point in negotiations, that Australia have 
the right to tax 2.5% of the outward freight and passenger fares from shipping.72 
Australia expected strong resistance on this point and was prepared to concede a 
residence basis of taxation of shipping generally to gain the right to tax coastal 
shipping, which the UK had recently conceded in treaties with NZ and Canada.73 
Foreign Tax Credits  
5.51 The submission recognised that Australia would have to concede a minimum 
shareholding qualification for the UK credit for foreign underlying tax. Australia, as a 
bargaining ploy, proposed that the qualification be a 5% UK corporate shareholding, 
not the 10% minimum shareholding requirement of UK domestic law. The submission 
recognised that if Australia were to adopt a general foreign tax credit system, the UK 
would expect Australia to give credit for UK underlying corporate tax in equivalent 
circumstances to those where the UK gave such credit. 74  
                                                          
70  Submission 123, pp16–17, paras 27–29. As noted at 3.52, Australia had used a similar 
argument in negotiating a flat 15% source country tax rate for all dividends in the negotiations 
for the 1953 US Treaty. McGovern, as noted at 4.17, had continued to express this view in his 
8th April 1960 letter to the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury. As discussed at 6.19, 
the Australian delegation put the same argument against the use of a 5% dividend 
withholding tax for non-portfolio dividends in the preliminary talks with Japan in April 1964. 
71 Submission 123, pp19–20, paras 35–8.  
72 As noted at 5.26 and 2.14 and accompanying notes, Australia applied a presumptive tax 
regime to shipping profits under which 5% of the freight and fares were taxed.  
73  Submission 123, pp17–18, paras 30–2. 
74  Submission 123, pp20–2, paras 39–41. 
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5.52 In 1967, Australia’s dividend withholding tax system still permitted a non-resident to 
elect to be taxed on an assessment basis, with credit being given for the withholding 
tax deducted. For foreign tax credit purposes, the UK had refused to credit Australian 
dividend withholding tax and only credited Australian tax where the UK shareholder 
elected to be taxed in Australia on an assessment basis. The submission proposed 
to remove the right for non-resident shareholders to elect to be taxed on an 
assessment basis, expecting that the UK would thereafter credit Australian dividend 
withholding tax.75 
Non-discrimination  
5.53 The submission noted that the proposed article would conflict with certain provisions 
of Australian law, commenting that, ‘While it might be possible to negotiate provisions 
with sufficient qualification to make them compatible with our law, I think it would be 
best to avoid any provisions on “non-discrimination”.’76  
Correspondence Between Australian And UK Officials On The Draft Prior To 
Negotiations 
5.54 The Australian Commissioner of Taxation (E T Cain)77 wrote to W H B Johnson, 
Under Secretary of the UK Board of Inland Revenue, on 13th December 1966 raising 
technical and drafting points and seeking clarification on some aspects of UK law. 
Cain stated that his letter did not represent the beginning of formal negotiations, that 
he had not had direction from ministers on the form or substance of the agreement 
and stressed that his letter did not refer to any major matters of policy from an 
Australian government viewpoint.78 Johnson made a detailed reply to Cain’s letter on 
3rd February 1967.79 In the following paragraphs, each of Cain’s points and Johnson’s 
response to it will be discussed together. The discussion is confined to selected 
articles. 
                                                          
75  Submission 123, pp17–18, paras 30–2.  
75  Submission 123, pp20–2, paras 39–41. 
75 Submission 123, p23, para 45. 
75 Submission 123, p22, para 43. The election had primarily been introduced to accommodate 
NZ shareholders in Australian companies. The need for the election on this basis had 
disappeared when NZ replaced its exemption for income sourced in a Commonwealth country 
with a foreign tax credit system. The removal of the election had been recommended in 
Australia, Report of the Commonwealth Committee on Taxation (the Ligertwood Committee), 
Canberra, 1961, p110, para 543. 
76  Submission 123, p20, para 38. 
77  Cain was Commissioner of Taxation from 1964 to his retirement in 1976. Leigh Edmonds, 
Working for All Australians: A Brief History of the Australian Taxation Office (Australian 
Taxation Office, 2010) 134 and 154. 
78 Cain to Johnson, 13th December 1966. Inland Revenue file. 
79  Johnson to Cain, 3rd February 1966. Inland Revenue file. 
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Residence 
5.55 Cain doubted whether the definition of ‘resident’ in the draft would include entities, 
such as a company incorporated in Australia or a contributor to the Commonwealth 
Superannuation fund, who were Australian residents by virtue of the statutory 
definition in ITAA 1936 (Cth). Australia had been satisfied with the residence 
definitions in the 1946 UK Treaty and had never found dual residence to be a serious 
problem under it. Cain raised the problems with the corporate dual residence tie-
breaker that O’Reilly had identified80, but he did not refer to the then recent UK treaty 
with New Zealand. Johnson noted the suggestion that the definition in the 1946 treaty 
might be preferable, but said that his view was that it was necessary first to discuss 
whether it was desirable to eliminate dual residence. If Australia could accept the 
basic UK proposal, a solution could then be sought to the difficulties Cain had 
mentioned. Johnson stressed that the definitions in all new UK treaties were similar 
to those in the draft that followed the OECD recommendation. In addition, there 
would be awkward problems under UK law (as amended by changes in the corporate 
tax system) concerning any company with dual residence status.  
Permanent Establishment 
5.56 Cain regarded the definition of permanent establishment in the draft as falling short of 
what Australia viewed as adequate and enclosed the definition in the Australian 
model.81 Cain referred to paragraph (viii) of the definition in the 1966 UK – NZ 
Treaty82 and to equivalent articles in Australia’s treaties with Canada and NZ. The 
point had been raised in O’Reilly’s letter.83 Apparently, this request was a response 
to the situation that arose in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656.84  
5.57 Johnson responded that, while it was helpful to have Australia’s views, he was not 
sure that the Australian draft (particularly paragraph (2)(ii) dealing with substantial 
equipment) was entirely satisfactory from the UK viewpoint. Johnson considered that 
it ought to be possible to reach a solution acceptable to both sides in the 
negotiations. Johnson’s letter contained no specific comment on paragraph (viii) of 
the UK – NZ Treaty. The omission is interesting as the problem dealt with under the 
article is referred to in the UK Inland Revenue’s minutes of a meeting of Australian 
                                                          
80  See the discussion at 5.13.  
81  The definition of permanent establishment in the 1965 Australian model is discussed at 4.102 
to 4.105 and at 4.113 to 4.117. 
82  See the discussion at 5.19. 
83  See the discussion at 5.19. 
84  Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656 was discussed at 5.19 n 33. 
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and UK officials in 1959.85 The omission may reflect a desire to reserve the UK’s 
position pending face to face negotiations rather than ignorance of the problem on 
Johnson’s part.  
5.58 Article 4(4) (covering companies providing the services of public entertainers or 
athletes) dealt with a situation of concern to Australia, and Cain feared that the real 
profit might not be derived by the company that ‘carries on the activity of providing 
the services’ of the entertainer.86 Cain makes no mention of the need for a source 
rule. Johnson noted that Australia was giving further consideration to the adequacy of 
paragraph (4) and indicated that the UK had no objection to ‘tightening it up’.  
Industrial Or Commercial Profits And Associated Enterprises  
5.59 On Article 6, dealing with industrial or commercial profits, Cain raised three issues 
which had been discussed in O’Reilly’s letter and in the Memorandum. In all three 
issues, both O’Reilly and the Memorandum had contrasted the 1966 UK draft with 
either the 1946 UK Treaty or with the 1953 US Treaty. On all three issues, Cain 
merely stated the point of concern to Australia without comparing the UK draft with 
previous Australian treaties. 
5.60 First, on the ‘same or similar conditions’ point,87 Cain more succinctly made the same 
point as had been made by the Memorandum, namely that there could be 
circumstances in which a true arm’s length profit could only be ascertained by 
postulating different conditions from those which in fact applied. Johnson noted that 
Australia would pursue this point in negotiations. 
5.61 Second, on the issue of providing for cases where information was insufficient to 
determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment,88 Johnson’s 
response was to indicate that the UK was prepared to add a sentence in similar form 
to Article III(3) of the 1946 UK Treaty and Article III(3) of the then current UK treaty 
with New Zealand. Cain also raised the same issue in relation to Article 8 
(Associated Enterprises) and received a similar response from Johnson. 
5.62 Third, on Australia’s ability to apply ITAA 1936 (Cth) s38 on the basis that it was a 
simplification of but not a departure from the principles in Article 6(4) of the draft,89 
Johnson’s reply was that the UK did not consider s38 in any way in conflict with 
                                                          
85 Australian Double Taxation Talks, Meeting 11th May 1959, para 3, and 22nd April 1959 3(a) 
Inland Revenue file.  
86  As discussed at 5.25, the Memorandum had also raised this issue. 
87  See the discussion at 5.23.  
88  See the discussion at 5.21.  
89  See the discussion at 5.24.  
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Article 6(4), and that it would not prevent Australia from applying the principles of 
Article 6(4).  
5.63 Cain raised several issues in relation to Article 6 which had not been raised in the 
same form by O’Reilly or in the Memorandum. The first concerned the geographic 
source of profits attributable to a permanent establishment. The Memorandum90 had 
raised this issue in the specific context of the profits of public entertainer companies, 
but Cain raised it in the context of industrial or commercial profits generally. Cain’s 
letter at this point reflected concern about the adequacy of Australian source rules. 
Johnson responded that, following the OECD Model Article, it had not been the UK’s 
practice to include a source rule. He questioned whether a source rule was any 
longer necessary, but said that if it were necessary on the Australian side to include a 
special source rule, then the UK would be happy to do so.  
5.64 Cain pointed out that the 1946 UK Treaty had preserved the Australian bases of 
taxing film businesses controlled abroad and insurance with non-residents. Johnson 
replied that the UK noted Australia’s interest in continuing the special bases for 
taxing these types of income and that these questions would need further discussion 
during the negotiations.  
5.65 Another issue concerned the application of Article 6(7) in determining the profits of 
insurance companies, particularly in relation to relief for management expenses, the 
basis on which taxation would be levied and the effect of the non-discrimination 
article on them. Cain asked a question about the potential effect the article might 
have on ‘the companies’, clearly meaning insurance companies. Johnson replied that 
since the decision in Ostime v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1960] AC 459, 
the UK had changed its domestic law so that the position that existed prior to that 
decision would apply. Johnson explained that the main purpose of Article 6(7) of the 
UK draft was to clarify the basis of liability of Australian life insurance companies 
operating in the UK. In the absence of Article 6(7), the UK would be able to choose 
between assessing the company to corporation tax as trading profits or assessing it 
on investment income on property or rights held by or used by the branch plus 
annuity profits. If the company were assessed on an investment income basis, then 
chargeable gains would also be liable to corporation tax. As there were not statutory 
provisions relating to the method for determining investment income, Johnson 
indicated that the UK would probably use a formula like the one (relating to 
corporation tax on life insurance companies) in s430 of Income Tax Act 1952. In this 
                                                          
90  See the discussion at 5.25.  
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situation, Australian life insurance companies would obtain relief for their 
management expenses but would only be able to set these against dividends 
received from UK companies if the treaty included a non-discrimination article.91  
Dividends92 
5.66 Cain indicated that Australia anticipated difficulties in relation to the ‘beneficial 
ownership’ test proposed for dividends, given that in Australia a trustee could be 
taxed on income accumulating in the trust and, as the ultimate title to the income 
often depended on contingencies, the beneficial ownership of dividends paid to 
trustees would not be clear. This could mean that an Australian trustee receiving 
dividends from a UK company might not be entitled to the reduced treaty rate of 
withholding tax.93 Johnson agreed that the concept of beneficial ownership was not 
always easy to apply in the trust context,94 but he indicated that a similar formula 
could be adopted in Australia’s case to the one that the UK had used in the 1966 NZ 
– UK Treaty.95 Johnson believed, however, that this was not necessary, because in 
the case Cain had mentioned, the UK considered that relief from UK tax would be 
                                                          
91  In Ostime v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1960] AC 459, a majority of the House of 
Lords held that an Australian insurance company’s taxable surpluses were ‘industrial and 
commercial profits’ and hence were only taxable under Article III(2) of the 1946 UK – Australia 
Treaty and not on a proportion of its worldwide income attributable to the UK under UK 
domestic law. As a consequence, the UK amended its domestic law to enable it to continue to 
apply a global apportionment approach to determining the income of a company engaged in 
the business of life assurance that was subject to UK tax. Article 6(7) in the draft treaty was a 
savings clause in relation to these provisions in UK domestic law. 
92  In addition to the questions discussed under this heading, Cain raised three questions for 
Johnson concerning: (a) the exclusion of certain redeemable share capital and securities in 
respect of shares from the definition of ‘dividend’ in the 1966 NZ – UK Tax Treaty; (b) what 
were the practical means that the UK used in applying the reduced rate for dividends in tax 
treaties; and (c) the rationale behind Article 9(4) of the UK draft, which was an anti-dividend 
stripping provision. Cain’s questions and Johnson’s responses are discussed in more detail in 
C John Taylor, ‘The Negotiation and Drafting of the 1967 UK – Australia Taxation Treaty’ in 
John Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law (Hart Publishing, 2012) vol 5, 427 at 453–5. 
93  As discussed at 5.29, the point had been raised less explicitly in the Memorandum. 
94  A note, dated 6th January (apparently 1966 from the order in which it appears in the file), 
commented on the meaning of ‘beneficial owner’. The note points out that the expression 
‘beneficial owner’ was not defined in UK statute law but had been considered by UK courts. 
The note indicates that, generally speaking, a beneficial owner of property may be said to be 
one who has the right to the use and enjoyment of property, including, on a sale, the right to 
the proceeds. The note goes on to point out that the beneficial owner is not necessarily the 
same as the legal owner. Examples from the law of trusts are given to illustrate the point. 
‘Beneficial Ownership’ 6th January, Inland Revenue file.  
95  Article VI(3) of the 1966 NZ – UK Tax Treaty stated: ‘For the purposes of paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of this article, dividends in respect of which a trustee is subject to tax in NZ shall be 
treated as being beneficially owned by that trustee.’ Article VI(4) included the following 
sentence: ‘For the purposes of this paragraph, dividends in respect of which the trustee is 
subject to tax in the UK shall be treated as being beneficially owned by that trustee.’  
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available under the current draft. As an alternative, Johnson suggested that the 
‘subject to tax’ test from the 1946 UK Treaty could be used.96    
5.67 Under paragraphs 9(5) and (6) of the draft dividend article, the reduction in the rate of 
tax on dividends in Article 9(1) did not apply where the dividend was effectively 
connected with a trade or business carried on by the non-resident through a 
permanent establishment in the other treaty partner country where the trade or 
business was such that a sale of the shareholding would be regarded as a trading 
receipt. Cain asked whether administrative guidelines had been set for determining 
when a dividend was effectively connected with a trade or business carried on 
through a permanent establishment. Cain assumed that Article 9(5) was not to be 
construed so that a company whose profit on a sale of shares would be a capital gain 
would not be entitled to the reduced rate on dividends.  
5.68 Johnson’s reply was that the UK had no formal rules for determining when a dividend 
was ‘effectively connected’ with a permanent establishment, and that the words had 
been taken from the OECD Model. Johnson referred Cain to the Commentary on the 
OECD Model in noting that the object of the language was to do away with the ‘force 
of attraction’ principle. In a narrow interpretation of ‘effectively connected’,97 Johnson 
stated that generally there should be no difficulty in identifying when interest, 
dividends and royalties were effectively connected with a permanent establishment. 
The only interest and dividends effectively connected with a permanent 
establishment would be when ‘financial concerns’ drew interest and dividends in the 
course of carrying on their normal business. Johnson confirmed that Article 9(5) was 
not intended to deprive a company whose profit on a sale of shares was treated as a 
capital gain from the reduced rate on dividends. The UK was prepared to apply the 
reduced rate on all dividends, even those effectively connected with a permanent 
establishment, except where the owner of the effectively connected holding was an 
                                                          
96  The relevant provision in the 1946 UK Treaty was Article VI(2)(b), which stated: ‘Any dividend 
paid by a company which is a resident of Australia (whether or not also resident in the UK or 
elsewhere) to a company which – (a) is a UK resident; (b) is subject to UK tax in respect 
thereof, and (c) beneficially owns all the shares (less directors’ qualifying shares) of the 
former company, shall be exempt from Australian tax: [a proviso followed setting out 
circumstances in which the exemption was not available].’  
97  The interpretation of the expression ‘effectively connected’ given in Johnson’s letter is narrow 
by comparison with paragraph 31 of the Commentary on Article 9(4) in the OECD Model, the 
relevant portion of which makes the point that Article 9(4) does not adopt the ‘force of 
attraction’ principle but goes on to merely comment that dividends are taxable as part of the 
profits of a permanent establishment if they are paid in respect of holdings forming part of the 
assets of the permanent establishment or are otherwise effectively connected with the 
permanent establishment. The Commentary does not limit the application of Article 9(4) of the 
Model to ‘financial concerns’ or other entities where profits from sales of particular shares 
were included in their taxable profits. 
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individual or a financial concern. Financial concerns included the proceeds of share 
sales in their taxable profits, and the proceeds were therefore properly described as 
‘trading receipts’.98  
Interest And Royalties 
5.69 Contrary to prior Australian practice, Articles 10 and 11 of the UK draft gave the 
residence country the exclusive right to tax interest and royalties. Cain asked for an 
explanation of the purposes for UK law of Articles 10(4) and 10(5) and 11(4). 
Johnson explained that Articles 10(4) and 11(4) (in determining character in the 
hands of a non-resident recipient) overrode provisions in UK law which re-
characterised certain interest and royalty payments as dividends (and hence denied 
a deduction to the payer). The override did not apply where the recipient company 
was under UK control. Johnson explained that Article 10(5) was an anti-avoidance 
provision aimed at preventing bond washing by tax exempt bodies and paralleled 
similar provisions in UK domestic law.  
Capital Gains 
5.70 Cain explained that Australia did not at present have a capital gains tax and that this 
kind of tax was not covered by any of Australia’s existing agreements. Cain asked 
whether the article varied the practical effects of UK law regarding capital gains 
derived by non-residents. Johnson replied that the article reproduced the substance 
of UK law but that since drafting it, a loophole had been discovered which would 
enable a UK resident to go to a foreign country, such as Australia, for one year, and 
while there realise a capital gain on UK property tax free. Johnson indicated that to 
prevent this the UK would like to add a ‘subject to tax’ test in Article 12(3). 
Other Income 
5.71 Both O’Reilly’s letter and the Memorandum had pointed out that none of Australia’s 
earlier treaties had contained an ‘other income’ article.99 Cain commented that the 
other income article in the draft would operate for UK residents in relation to income 
from a trust, some alimony payments, and to income derived from a third country. 
Australia was concerned that, under the draft, dividends derived from Australia 
                                                          
98 In the subsequent Australian Federal Court decision in Undershaft v Commissioner of 
Taxation [2009] FCA 41, Lindgren J held, inter alia, that capital gains made on disposals of 
shares in a related entity in a corporate reconstruction were ‘industrial or commercial profits’ 
for the purposes of the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty. The decision is inconsistent with 
Johnson’s interpretation of paragraphs 9(5) and 9(6) of the dividend article. 
99  See the discussion at 5.36.  
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through a trust would have to be exempted in Australia. Cain asked what income of 
Australian residents the article would extend to. Johnson replied that the article was 
‘a sort of long stop’ intended to regulate the treatment of types of income which had 
not been specifically dealt with elsewhere in the treaty. Hence it was not possible to 
give an exhaustive list of the types of income which it might cover. The obvious 
cases were trust income, alimony payments and third country income, and Johnson 
noted that Australia had reservations about the application of the article relating to 
trust income. 
Credits 
5.72 Cain enquired whether if Australia taxed a profit as ordinary income in circumstances 
where the UK taxed it as a capital gain, the UK would give credit for the Australian 
income tax against the UK tax on the capital gain. Johnson confirmed that credit 
would be granted.  
5.73 Under the draft, the UK would only grant a credit for underlying corporate tax if 
Australia reciprocated. Cain pointed out that usually ITAA 1936 s46 freed Australian 
companies from tax on dividends.100 Johnson replied that the credit provisions in the 
draft simply reflected current UK law but would continue to bind the UK in the event 
of changes to UK domestic law. Hence the UK considered that it was entitled to ask 
Australia to undertake a corresponding obligation. Johnson suggested that either the 
credit be contingent on the continuance of Australia’s effective exemption, or that the 
two countries should consult to establish new rules.101 Johnson explained that this 
was what was meant by reciprocity and failing it, an alternative would be to drop the 
credit clause altogether and allow each country’s domestic law to operate.  
5.74 Cain commented that for Australia to give credit for UK tax, it appeared to be 
necessary to have an election to gross up UK dividends. The issue had arisen in the 
negotiation of the 1946 UK Treaty.102 Johnson did not reply to Cain’s comment. 
The Negotiations In Canberra: March–April 1967 
5.75 Negotiations were held in Canberra over a ten-day period commencing on 31st 
March 1967. Australia was represented by Sir Richard Randall (Secretary to the 
Treasury), Messrs Pryor, Daniel and Ross of the Treasury, Cain (Commissioner of 
Taxation), Wicks, W J O’Reilly (Second Commissioner of Taxation), Boucher, and 
                                                          
100  As noted at 5.37, this point had been raised by O’Reilly and in the Memorandum. 
101  Johnson noted that this had been done in the UK’s treaties with Canada and New Zealand. 
102  See the discussion at 2.132 to 2.133. 
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Hill of the ATO and Hutchinson (First Assistant Crown Solicitor) of the Attorney 
General’s Department. The UK was represented by Messrs Johnson (Under 
Secretary, Department of Inland Revenue), F P Harrison (Assistant Secretary, 
Department of Inland Revenue), Robertson (Principal, Department of Inland 
Revenue) and by Miss Harrison from the British High Commission.103 
5.76 Cain’s opening address emphasised that Australia, as a net importer of capital and 
not a maritime nation, approached many issues from a different point of view. Cain 
commented: ‘Much of the lore on double taxation has been built up on the experience 
of countries quite differently situated, and there is a limit to the extent that we can 
accept it.’104 The UK ‘Notes of Meetings’ record that in their opening remarks the 
Australian representatives ‘pointed out that they did not regard the OECD Model as 
entirely suitable to the circumstances of their country’. Cain possibly departed from 
his draft text and explicitly mentioned the OECD Model, but it is also possible that the 
UK delegation interpreted the remarks from Cain’s opening address quoted above as 
referring to the OECD Model. All records of the negotiations and the draft of the 
address itself confirm that Australia was particularly concerned about provisions in 
the UK draft relating to dividends, interest, royalties and shipping profits.  
5.77 By agreement, the UK draft of September 1966 formed the basis for the discussions. 
The remainder of the first day of negotiations was devoted to an examination of the 
broad outline of each article of the September 1966 draft.105 Australian records of the 
negotiations report that Johnson indicated that his government had taken a very firm 
line on shipping profits.106 The following account of the negotiations will be confined 
to those issues on which there was significant discussion between the delegations. 
The account is organised topically rather than chronologically. 
 
 
                                                          
103 Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p1. Note dated 31st March 
1967 ‘Opening Meeting with UK Delegation’, Australian Treasury file. 
104  ‘Draft Notes of a Statement by the Commissioner’, Australian Treasury file. ‘Opening Meeting 
with UK Delegation’, Australian Treasury file, confirms that Cain was scheduled to give the 
opening address at the conference. ‘Notes on discussions 13/3/67–14/4/67’ (hereafter ‘Notes 
on discussions’) Australian Treasury file, handwritten notes (apparently made by an 
Australian Treasury official) confirm that Cain made an opening address but do not indicate 
what the content of the address was.  
105 Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p1. Report of discussions 
(hereafter ‘Report of discussions’) on 31st March 1967, Australian Treasury file. Notes on 
discussions 13/3/67–14/4/67. 
106  Report of discussions on 31st March 1967. Notes on discussions 13/3/67–14/4/67.  
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Definitions  
Resident  
5.78 Australia raised an issue concerning the corporate residence tie-breaker in the draft 
(place of effective management) and referred to the problem identified in O’Reilly’s 
letter to Randall107 and in Cain’s letter to Johnson108. The UK delegation appreciated 
the problem but pointed out that the tie-breakers were intended to avoid the taxation 
of dual resident companies by both countries. The Notes of Meetings record that ‘It 
might be possible to meet the Australians’ problem by provisions along the lines of 
those in the recent NZ agreement.’109  
5.79 The Australians subsequently raised the same issue and the same scenario, 
explicitly referring to proposed Article 9(7) as preventing Australia from taxing a 
dividend paid by the interposed company to UK residents and to the shareholder not 
being liable to UK tax because of the credit provisions. The Australians suggested 
that the definition of resident company be amended (consistently with previous 
Australian practice) so that a company would be a resident of Australia if it were an 
Australian resident under Australian domestic law and would be a resident of the UK 
if it were a resident of the UK under UK domestic law provided it was not a resident 
of Australia. The UK delegation objected that this proposed definition was too wide, 
given the Australian tests of company residence.110 The Notes of Meetings record 
that a possible compromise was: (a) that for all purposes, other than dividends paid 
by dual resident companies, the definition include a corporate residence test along 
the lines of either the September 1966 draft or the 1966 UK – NZ Treaty;111 and (b) 
                                                          
107  See the discussion at 5.13.  
108  See the discussion at 5.55.  
109  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p2. The Notes of Meetings 
do not explicitly refer to the inability of Australia to tax subsequent dividends paid by the 
interposed company to UK resident shareholders, but this would have been the combined 
effect of the tie-breaker and draft article in the circumstances contemplated. The Notes of 
Meetings merely record that the use of the interposed company would secure the dividend 
rebate and escape Australian tax on the dividends. ‘Notes on discussions’, in commenting on 
the discussion of Article III(3) of the draft on the first day, note that a company incorporated in 
Australia would be a resident for purposes of the s46 exemption but that the ‘effective 
management’ tie-breaker ‘cld give complete exemption’.  
110  Under the definition of ‘resident’ as it applied to companies in ITAA 1936 as it then stood, a 
company was a resident of Australia if it: (a) was incorporated in Australia; or (b) not being 
incorporated in Australia, carried on business in Australia and either: (i) was centrally 
managed and controlled in Australia; or (ii) had its voting power controlled by Australian 
residents. 
111 Under the 1966 UK – NZ Treaty, the definitions of corporate residence in Article II were: 
‘(j) The term “NZ company” means any company which is – 
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that the dividend article should provide that, in the case of dual resident companies, 
Australia was entitled to tax dividends paid to UK shareholders and that the UK was 
entitled to tax dividends paid to Australian shareholders.112 The initialled draft 
implemented this agreement, but it was subject to further amendment through 
correspondence following the completion of negotiations.113 
Permanent Establishment  
5.80 The Australians indicated an intention to raise the question of including oil and gas 
wells and agricultural and pastoral properties in the definition of permanent 
establishment (PE) and also wanted a provision similar to Article II(1)(p)(viii) of the 
UK–NZ Agreement (which expressly included a subsidiary company engaged in 
trade or business in the other state whether or not through a permanent 
establishment) and wanted an agent who filled orders from stock to be included. 
5.81 The Australians’ reasons for including agricultural and pastoral properties in the 
definition of PE were explained and the Australian request was agreed to. Johnson 
had explained that their omission from the definition of PE was due to them being 
dealt with in the OECD Convention under Article 5 relating to immovable property.114 
It was noted that agricultural and pastoral properties were included in the definition of 
PE in the 1946 UK Treaty because it did not contain an immovable property article. 
Including them under the immovable property article as in the September 1966 draft 
meant that they were not given the protection of the rules in the industrial or 
commercial profits article about the allowance of reasonable expenses. It was agreed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(i) Incorporated in NZ and which has its centre of administrative or practical 
management in NZ whether or not any person outside NZ exercises is 
capable of exercising any overriding control or direction of the company or of 
its policy or affairs in any way whatsoever; or 
(ii) Managed and controlled in New Zealand; 
 
(k) The term “UK company” means any company which is managed and controlled in the 
UK and is not a NZ company. 
(l) (i) The term “resident of the UK” means any UK company and any other person who 
is resident in the UK for the purposes of UK tax and the term “resident of New 
Zealand” means any NZ company and any other person who is resident in NZ for the 
purposes NZ tax.’ 
112  Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Afternoon Session, pp3–4. Report of 
discussions on 31st March 1967, the official Australian record of the discussions, is much 
briefer at this point and merely comments on Article 3: ‘The article was found to be technically 
unsatisfactory in some respects and some clauses were redrafted along lines acceptable to 
Australia. One clause remained unacceptable to Australia but the UK undertook to provide a 
form of words which it was thought would meet Australia’s requirements.’ Notes on 
discussions, 3rd April 1967, record that there was a drafting change to Article 3(2)(a) but that 
O’Reilly said that Article 3(2)(d) was ‘politically undesirable’ and suggest that Johnson agreed 
to take Article 3(d) out. 
113  See the discussion at 5.147 to 5.151. 
114  Notes on discussions, 4th April 1967. 
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at this point that ‘it would be preferable to deal with such property in the present 
article, and to add a reference to forestry’.115  
5.82 The word ‘installation’ was added to sub-paragraph 2(g) to cover a person who 
contracts to manufacture, supply and install equipment.116 It was agreed on the third 
day that provision dealing with supervisory activities as in the UK – NZ Treaty would 
be added. It is clear that these additions were requested by Australia.117  
5.83 At Australia’s request, the minimum period for building or construction sites and 
assembly projects in sub-paragraph 2(g) was agreed to be reduced to six months.118 
The equivalent provision in the UK draft had contained a twelve-month minimum 
period for building sites or construction or assembly projects. The 1967 UK Treaty is 
the first Australian treaty with six months being the minimum required period for a 
building site, construction or assembly project to be classified as a permanent 
establishment.119  
5.84 Australia raised the case of a US company which had appointed a UK company as 
its sole distributor of its products in Australia on a commission basis. The US 
company licensed the UK company to manufacture its products and use its 
trademarks, reimbursed the costs of manufacture and loaned all the machinery 
necessary to manufacture its products. The US company was treated as having an 
Australian PE under the 1953 US Treaty where permanent establishment was 
defined as including ‘the use or installation of substantial equipment or machinery by, 
for, or under a contract with, an enterprise of one of the countries’. While the UK 
delegation agreed that there was some justification for treating the company as 
having an Australian PE in the example given, they considered that the Australian 
formula was too wide because it might, for example, cover plant supplied under a 
hire purchase agreement or ordinary plant hire and hence might ‘cut across’ the 
royalty article.120 No further mention is made of this request in either the UK or 
Australian records of the negotiations nor in the subsequent correspondence. A 
                                                          
115  Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. Notes on discussions, 4th 
April 1967. The handwritten notes by the Australian Treasury official convey the impression 
that the suggested solution was proposed by Mr Johnson of the UK delegation. 
116 Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. Notes on discussions, 4th 
April 1967. 
117  Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. Notes on discussions, 4th 
April 1967. An equivalent article had been in the 1965 Australian model. See the discussion at 
4.62 and 4.70. 
118  Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. 
119  This was a variation on prior Australian practice. See the discussion of the comments in the 
Memorandum at 5.14. 
120  Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Afternoon Session, pp.2–3.  
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substantial equipment provision was not included in the final version of the treaty, 
although variants on it appear in most subsequent Australian treaties.121 
5.85 The Australians pointed out that Article 4(3)(e) (which deemed certain activities not to 
amount to a PE) could mean that a person who sold information through a place of 
business would be deemed not to have a PE. It was agreed that the draft of Article 
4(3)(e) would be revised.122 The final version of the treaty, in a variation from the 
1963 Draft OECD Model and subsequent versions of the OECD Model, did not 
contain the words ‘for the collection of information’ in Article 4(3)(e).  
5.86 An Australian Treasury official’s notes indicate that Australia sought the addition of 
clause 8(p)(viii) of the UK – NZ Treaty and comment that this was ‘OK’.123 As is clear 
from the UK Notes of Meetings, the reference should have been to Article II(1)(p)(viii) 
of the UK – NZ Treaty.124 The final version of the Australia – UK Treaty included 
Article 4(8), which was identical in form to Article II(1)(p)(viii) of the UK – NZ Treaty. 
Article 4(8) dealt with the problem raised in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656.125  
5.87 Agreement was also reached on changes relevant to agency PEs requested by 
Australia. One amendment agreed to at this point was that: (a) ‘on behalf of’ be 
substituted for ‘in the name of’ in paragraph 5 to cover the agent who acts for an 
undisclosed principal.126 Paragraph 5 of the UK draft was identical to Article 5(4) in 
the draft 1963 OECD Model Convention. The change of language agreed upon here 
clearly reflects an attempt to accommodate the language of the article to the common 
law concept of ‘agent’.127 The Notes of Meetings also record that at this point, as 
                                                          
121 As shown in Appendix 3, substantial equipment provisions appear in all but five subsequent 
Australian tax treaties. 
122  Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Afternoon Session, p3. 
123 Notes on discussions, 5th April 1967, ‘Article 4 (Cont)’. 
124  Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. There was no clause 
8(p)(viii) in the 1966 UK – NZ Treaty. The author considers that the reference to this clause 
was a clerical error by the Australian Treasury official and that the reference should have 
been to clause II(p)(viii), which deemed there to be a permanent establishment in certain 
cases where there was a special relationship between principal and agent. Article 4(8) of the 
1967 UK – Australia Treaty is identical in form to Article 2(p)(viii) of the 1966 UK – NZ Treaty. 
125  See the discussion at 5.19.  
126  Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. Notes of discussions, 5th 
April 1967, ‘Article 4 (Cont)’. 
127  The different concepts of ‘agent’ in common law and civil law and their implications in this 
context are discussed by John F Avery Jones and Jurgen Ludicke, ‘The Origins of Article 5(5) 
and Article 5(6) of the OECD Model’ (2014) 6 World Tax Journal 203. As Avery Jones and 
Ludicke at 206 point out, the expression ‘in the name of’ has no meaning in common law 
because a contract by an agent for an undisclosed principal will normally bind the principal. 
Avery Jones and Ludicke also note, at 221, that earlier OEEC and OECD drafts of Article 5(4) 
had used the expression ‘on behalf of’ in the second reference in Article 5(4)(a) and comment 
that ‘How and why the change was made is something of a mystery for which no explanation 
is contained in the minutes.’ 
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requested by Australia, it was agreed to add words at the end of paragraph 6 to 
cover an agent who, because of a special relationship with the principal, does not 
charge commission at the going rate.128  
5.88 Curiously, in the final treaty the addition suggested was not made to paragraph 6. 
Handwritten notes by an Australian Treasury official record O’Reilly as observing that 
the UK draft had dropped the idea of a special relationship between an agent and his 
principal.129 It is likely that O’Reilly’s comment was making a comparison between the 
UK draft and the 1946 UK Treaty, which limited the equivalent exclusion to situations 
where the broker or general commission agent received remuneration at the rate 
customary in the relevant class of business.130 The Australian Treasury official’s 
notes record Johnson as replying that he regarded some cases as being covered by 
Article 8 (the ‘associated enterprises’ article), but that he did not see how or why a 
PE could be regarded as existing in these cases. The notes by the official then state, 
‘Addition Agreed’.131 The absence of the agreed addition in the final version of the 
treaty is therefore puzzling. The UK Notes of Meetings also note that ‘It was agreed 
to add a sub-paragraph dealing with an agent who fills orders from stock to be a 
permanent establishment.’132 The Australian Treasury official’s notes make it clear 
that the addition was at Australia’s request.133  
5.89 Australia expressed concerns about Article 4(4) in the context of companies 
providing the services of public entertainers,134 fearing that Article 4(4) would not 
catch a company providing (possibly through an intermediary) the services of an 
entertainer under a slavery contract. Australia then submitted an alternative draft, 
which read as follows: 
‘An enterprise of one of the territories shall be deemed to carry on business in 
the other territory though a permanent establishment situated therein in 
relation to income (other than dividends) which it derives from or in relation to 
contracts or obligations for the rendering within the other territory of the 
services of public entertainers or athletes such as are referred to in Article 
15.’  
                                                          
128 Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. 
129  Notes of discussions, 5th April 1967, ‘Article 4 (Cont)’. 
130  Article II (1)(j) of the 1946 UK – Australia Treaty. 
131 Notes of discussions, 5th April 1967, ‘Article 4 (Cont)’. 
132  Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. The relevant provision in 
the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty was Article 4(5)(b). 
133  Notes of discussions, 5th April 1967, ‘Article 4 (Cont)’. 
134  As discussed at 5.58, this concern had been raised in Cain’s letter to Johnson. 
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The UK objected that this would deem there to be an Australian source and enable 
Australia to obtain tax in circumstances where this might not be possible under 
Australian domestic law. This was justifiable to ensure that a treaty did not open up 
avenues for avoidance, but it was ‘quite another matter’ to use a treaty to make good 
gaps in domestic anti-avoidance legislation. The Notes of Meetings then record that a 
solution might be to exclude supplying the services of public entertainers from the 
definition of industrial or commercial profits;135 a decision which was subsequently 
made.136 The notes of an Australian Treasury official record that this was at 
Australia’s request and was based on the form of the 1960 NZ Treaty, which 
excluded such profits from the definition of industrial and commercial profits.137  
5.90 Australia had already indicated on the first day that it wanted Article 15 (dealing with 
artistes and athletes) strengthened to cover companies which supplied the services 
of entertainers.138 It was subsequently agreed that, as it was conceivable that 
Australian courts might in some circumstances deem income from ‘employment, etc.’ 
exercised in Australia to have a non-Australian source, a source rule was necessary 
in Articles 13, 14 and 15 (professional services, dependent personal services and 
entertainers, respectively).139 This is an example of a continuing Australian treaty 
practice of deeming there to be an Australian source where there might not be an 
Australian source outside the treaty.  
5.91 Interestingly, the UK does not appear to have objected to the existence of a deemed 
source rule in this context, although, as noted above, it objected to such an extension 
in the context of industrial and commercial profits. To be consistent with the UK’s 
objection to the extension in that context, having a deemed source rule in the context 
of Articles 13, 14 and 15 would have to be seen as preventing the treaty from 
otherwise opening up avenues for tax avoidance. 
Industrial Or Commercial Profits  
5.92 Australia wanted two further types of income to be excluded from the definition of 
‘industrial or commercial profits’.140 These were the taxation of film businesses,141 
                                                          
135  Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Morning Session, p3. 
136  Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. The relevant provision in 
the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty was Article 5(7)(c). It is clear from the Notes of Meetings 
that this was a solution suggested by the UK to a problem raised by Australia. 
137  Notes of discussions, 5th April 1967, ‘Article 4 (Cont)’. 
138  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Afternoon Session, p4. 
139  Notes of Meetings, Fifth Day, 6th April 1967, Morning Session, p1. In the final version of the 
Treaty these articles became Articles 11, 12 and 13 respectively.  
140  The definition in the draft of September 1966 was discussed at 5.21 to 5.25. 
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over which Australia wished to retain its current tax treatment, and coastal 
shipping,142 with the latter exclusion being considered necessary if Australia’s source 
country taxing rights over coastal shipping were to be preserved.143  
5.93 The Australians requested a source rule in the industrial and commercial profits 
article. The Notes of Meetings indicate that the UK was prepared to acquiesce so 
long as this did not mean that there was an Australian source where there was not 
one under Australian domestic law.144  
5.94 The Notes of Meetings on the discussion of paragraph (3) of the article (providing for 
the use of arm’s length in determining the profits of a PE) comment that in making 
this determination it ought to be possible to ignore the special relationship between a 
head office and a branch. The Australians doubted whether the phrase ‘under the 
same or similar conditions’ would allow this to be done. It was agreed to use 
paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article III of the 1946 UK Treaty instead. This would entail 
adding the source rule and the information provision that was contained in the 1946 
UK Treaty.145  
5.95 The Australians commented that they did not regard paragraph (4) of the industrial 
and commercial profits article as being inconsistent with ITAA 1936 s38,146 but 
preferred to apply s38 as a short cut that saved arguments. The UK delegation 
undertook to consider the issue further.147 The Australians subsequently explained 
that s38 simplified calculations by obviating the need to analyse all elements going 
into a wholesale price. The UK delegation agreed to the inclusion of a s38 source 
rule at this point, ‘especially if it can be done on a reciprocal basis’.148 The 
Australians indicated that they would produce a form of words that would allow the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
141  The negotiations in relation to the taxation of film businesses are not discussed in detail in this 
chapter. 
142 Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p3. 
143  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p3.  
144  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p2. The relevant provision 
became Article 5(9) in the 1967 UK Treaty, clearly inserted at Australia’s request. The Notes 
of Meetings also record that the Australian domestic law source rule was ‘not very precise’.  
145  Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Morning Session and Afternoon Session, p2. 
The information provision and aspects of the source rule in the 1946 UK Treaty were 
discussed at 2.115 to 2.126. 
146  ITAA 1936 s38 was discussed at 3.47. 
147  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p3. Notes of discussions, 
31st March 1967 contain the following comment:  
‘VI source rule J (Johnson) some hesitation 
(4) cf s38 
film business & reinsurance (illegible)’ 
148  Notes of discussions, 5th April 1967. 
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principles of s38 to be applied.149 There is no further mention of discussion of the 
industrial and commercial profits article in the Notes of Meetings.  
Associated Enterprises  
5.96 The desirability of including a provision to cover estimated profits where actual 
figures were not available, as had been done in the 1946 UK Treaty, was 
discussed.150 The UK pointed out that the article was in the standard form adopted in 
almost all UK treaties. The Australians argued that the proposed wording of Article 8 
was less precise than that in Article IV of the 1946 UK Treaty, which had been tested 
in the courts and had been found to work as intended. The meeting then decided to 
substitute Article IV of the 1946 UK Treaty, including the source rule and the 
information provision for draft Article 8.151 
Dividends 
5.97 The draft dividend article assumed that different rates would apply to portfolio and 
non-portfolio dividends. The discussion of rates of withholding tax on dividends was 
obviously robust. On the first day the Australians proposed a rate of 15% for both 
portfolio and non-portfolio dividends, but the question was reserved for later 
discussion.152  
5.98 The UK suggested that the OECD rates of 15% for portfolio dividends and 5% for 
non-portfolio dividends apply, and that the OECD definition of the type of company 
qualifying for the lower rate be adopted; but it did not consider this test sacrosanct.153 
The UK argued that the provisions in the 1946 UK Treaty, which exempted dividends 
paid to a 100% UK parent, were inconsistent with modern conditions and with 
Australia’s policy of encouraging local participation. Although the UK had agreed to a 
uniform 15% rate on dividends in several of its recent agreements, the situation with 
Australia was distinguishable because, given that dividends by wholly owned 
subsidiaries had been completely exempt for a long time, a large number of 
companies would be affected by any change and a 15% withholding tax would only 
                                                          
149  Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. Notes of discussions, 5th 
April 1967. The relevant article was Article 5(4) in the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty. It 
would appear from the Notes of Meetings that Article 5(4) was drafted by Australia and was 
certainly inserted at Australia’s request. 
150  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p3. The background to 
Article IV of the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty is discussed at 2.115 to 2.126. 
151 Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Afternoon Session, p3. There is no reference 
to subsequent discussion of the associated enterprises article in the Notes of Meetings. 
152  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p.3.  
153  Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p.1. 
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add to their tax burden. The UK balance of payments would suffer both from the 
reduction in the rate on outbound portfolio dividends and from an increase in 
Australian tax on inbound dividends from 100% subsidiaries. The Voluntary 
Program154 was already restricting the increase in UK investment in Australia, but a 
15% withholding tax on dividends paid to direct investors would be a positive 
discouragement of it.155 The UK argued that there should be broad equality of 
treatment between a branch and a subsidiary. Hence Australian tax on subsidiary 
dividends should be kept to a minimum as a high rate would encourage UK 
businesses to convert their subsidiaries to branches.156  
5.99 The Australians’ response was that Australia had long been unhappy with the 
exemption for dividends paid by 100% subsidiaries. All of Australia’s other 
agreements had a uniform 15% rate on dividends. To concede a lower rate on 
dividends paid to UK parents would cause Australia difficulties in negotiations with 
other countries, and political opinion in Australia was strongly against it. Given the 
imbalance of income flows between the two countries, a low rate of tax on 
subsidiaries’ dividends would cause a substantial loss to the Australian revenue. By 
contrast, a 15% rate would not cause a loss to the UK revenue because the extra tax 
would be borne by the companies concerned.157 A 15% rate on dividends taken with 
the Australian rate of corporate tax produced a total rate of around 51% on non-
portfolio dividends, which Australia did not regard as exorbitant. Australia was not 
concerned about possible avoidance,158 because Australia would not be any worse 
off than it was now given that it was not collecting any tax on dividends paid by 
wholly owned subsidiaries.159 
5.100 The Australians agreed to make a submission to their ministers for a reciprocal 10% 
rate on interest and royalties and a uniform 15% rate on dividends.160 The Notes of 
Meetings do not record any discussion of the reasons behind the shift in the UK’s 
attitudes to the taxation of dividends. Given that the submission for a uniform rate of 
15% on all dividends was to be made along with submissions for rates of 10% on 
                                                          
154  The Voluntary Program was a UK program introduced in 1965 to control direct UK investment 
in developed Sterling Area countries. UK National Archives, T295/524, OIG (66)2, 
‘“Guidelines” for overseas investment’, 9 February 1966. 
155  Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p1. 
156  Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p1. 
157  Presumably because of limitations on the UK’s foreign tax credit, although this is not stated in 
the Notes of Meetings. 
158  Although not expressly stated in the Notes of Meetings, a reasonable inference is that the tax 
avoidance would be through converting subsidiaries to branches. 
159 Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p1. 
160  Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Morning Session, p1. 
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interest and royalties, it may be that Australia’s agreement to the latter rates was 
regarded as a matching concession for the UK conceding its position on non-portfolio 
dividends. While the rates of tax on interest and royalties were high by OECD 
standards, they did represent a reduction in Australian source taxation of these items 
of income which had previously been taxed at full marginal rates.161  
5.101 The initial discussion of effectively connected dividends confirmed that sales of 
shares in a 100% subsidiary would not normally constitute trading receipts.162 The 
discussion then turned to the treatment of banks. The UK pointed out that under 
Australian law Australian banks received an inter-corporate dividend rebate under 
ITAA 1936 s46, but UK banks operating through branches in Australia did not. The 
UK submitted that this meant that UK banks were at a competitive disadvantage 
when compared with Australian banks and that this should be removed in the treaty. 
Taxing UK banks under the industrial or commercial profits article effectively involved 
giving the branch analogous treatment to an Australian resident company so far as 
the inclusion of dividends in assessable income was concerned, but analogous 
treatment was not given in the case of the inter-corporate dividend rebate under s46. 
The Australian reply was that Australia could levy dividend withholding tax on 
dividends paid by a resident company to a non-resident shareholder, but could not do 
this in the case of branches and hence took the tax where it could.163 
5.102 The Australians indicated that they were not happy with Article 9(7) applying to 
Australian undistributed profits tax. The UK view was that the ban on undistributed 
profits tax was complementary to the ban on taxation of dividends paid by a non-
resident company to a non-resident shareholder and that the Australian definition of 
private company meant that a wide range of companies, some of them quite 
substantial, were exposed to undistributed profits tax.164 Subsequently, it was noted 
that UK private companies were seldom, if ever, caught by undistributed profits tax. 
Australia was concerned that if it were to renounce undistributed profits tax on UK 
private companies in the treaty, then UK private companies would be able to ‘plough 
back tax free’ a greater amount of retained profits than would similarly placed 
Australian companies.165 The UK response was that this was essentially an anti-
                                                          
161  This aspect of prior Australian tax treaty practice is discussed at 2.90, 2.102, 2.104, 3.127, 
4.93 to 4.100, 4.109 and 4.148. 
162  This was consistent with Johnson’s earlier advice to Cain discussed at 5.68.  
163 Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p2. It is likely that this 
represents the UK reporter’s interpretation of what the Australian delegation said. It seems 
unlikely that the Australian delegation would use the words ‘took the tax where it could’.  
164  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p3. 
165 Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p2. 
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avoidance issue that was properly a matter for the residence country. If the UK close 
company legislation were taken into account, then UK companies were no better 
off.166 A compromise was suggested to include a proviso in paragraph (7) that each 
country would undertake to levy only the same tax on non-residents as on 
residents.167 It is unclear which delegation proposed this compromise. It was later 
decided to substitute a provision similar to Article VI(8) of the NZ Treaty for 
paragraph (7). Article VI(8) of the NZ Treaty restricted a source country from 
imposing tax on dividends paid by a non-resident company to a non-resident 
shareholder, but did not in terms prevent the source country from imposing 
undistributed profits tax on the non-resident company.168  
5.103 The treatment of dividends paid in the ‘New Broken Hill’ situation (where a UK 
resident company paid dividends funded solely from Australian source profits to 
Australian resident shareholders) was a major point of disagreement in the 
negotiations and was not finally resolved until several months after the negotiations 
were otherwise concluded. The Australians asked for a provision similar to Article 
9(8) of the UK – Canada Treaty, arguing that there should be no UK tax on the 
dividends in the New Broken Hill situation simply because Australian source profits 
had passed through a conduit UK company en route to Australian shareholders.169  
5.104 The UK response was that to give shareholders relief because dividends were 
funded from a particular geographic source of profit would be inconsistent with the 
separate entity theory that now underpinned both Australian and UK corporate-
shareholder taxation. Furthermore, the New Broken Hill situation was merely a 
variant on a company which had profits from several jurisdictions, and in the latter 
case it was impossible to apportion dividends according to the source of profits. The 
UK delegation indicated that their ministers would have to be consulted before a 
decision could be made.170  
5.105 The Australians raised the New Broken Hill issue again towards the end of the 
negotiations, stating that if the UK was willing to drop the non-discrimination article 
and tax on dividends in the New Broken Hill situation, Australian ministers were 
                                                          
166  Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p3. 
167  Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p3. 
168  Article VI(8) of the UK – NZ Double Taxation Treaty of 11th August 1966 read as follows: 
‘VI(8) The Government of one of the territories shall not impose any form of taxation, in 
addition to tax on the company’s profits, on dividends paid by a company which is 
resident of the other territory to persons not resident in the first mentioned 
territory.’ 
169  Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p3. 
170 Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p3. 
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prepared to accept, though with considerable reluctance, a shipping exemption. The 
Australians further indicated that they would like a decision on the New Broken Hill 
situation before the end of discussions, but that if no decision was reached by then 
they were authorised to initial the draft, with the shipping exemption, on the basis that 
the matter could be raised again at government level. The UK’s response was that 
their ministers might take the view that, except for Broken Hill relief, the agreement 
was merely a standard agreement without a non-discrimination article and might 
want some matching concession from Australia.171 
5.106 The Australians pointed out technical problems that would be involved in giving effect 
to a New Broken Hill concession if the UK were to agree to one. The Notes of 
Meetings comment that the problem would have to be resolved by providing that 
where the 90% rule applied Australia would not treat the company as a resident for 
the purposes of the ‘criss-cross’ rule.172 
5.107 When the position in relation to trusts was discussed, the Australians explained that 
Australia taxed the trustee of a discretionary trust and the trustee of estates in the 
course of administration where no beneficiary was presently entitled to the trust 
income. The Australians envisaged that the UK draft might open up opportunities for 
tax avoidance, giving the example of a UK trust set up with a fund of Australian 
shares and Australian beneficiaries. The Australian view was that under the draft 
Australia would only get 15% withholding tax on the dividends, the UK might have to 
give up its tax on the winding up of the trust, and Australia would get nothing more as 
it did not tax distributions out of trust accumulations.173 It was agreed to not put any 
special provision for trusts in the dividend article and to consider excluding trust 
income from the ‘sweep up’ (that is, other income) article as had been done in the NZ 
Agreement.174 
 
 
                                                          
171 Notes of Meetings, Sixth Day, 7th April 1967, Morning Session, p1. 
172  Notes of Meetings, Sixth Day, 7th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. The author has previously 
discussed the detail of the technical problems (which were specific to the particular situation 
of the company) in C John Taylor, above n 92, 474–5. Subsequent references to New Broken 
Hill in the Notes of Meetings are in the context of the non-discrimination article and the 
general conclusion to the negotiations.  
173  Where no beneficiary was presently entitled to the income of the trust estate or to any part of 
the income of the trust estate, under ITAA 1936 s99, as it then stood, a trustee was assessed 
and liable to pay tax on the net income or the relevant part of the net income. At that time, no 
provision in ITAA 1936 taxed beneficiaries on subsequent distributions of accumulated 
income. 
174  Notes of Meetings, Second Day, 3rd April 1967, Morning Session, p2. 
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Interest  
5.108 Subject to some exceptions, principally where payment was made to a permanent 
establishment, the UK draft exempted interest from source taxation.175 This 
represented a very significant change from the 1946 UK Treaty where full source 
country taxing rights in relation to interest were retained. 
5.109 The Notes of Meetings record that the current Australian system of taxing interest 
paid to non-residents at marginal rates was easily avoided because tax was not 
payable where interest was paid on a contract, enabling the lender to enforce 
payment without deduction of tax.176 Australia was proposing to introduce a 
withholding tax likely to be at a 10% rate. Australia argued for a reciprocal limitation 
of the rate to the proposed rate of Australian withholding tax. The UK objected that 
this would allow Australia but not the UK to tax at its full statutory rate and thus it 
might be preferable to drop the interest article altogether.177  
5.110 When the interest article was discussed again the Notes of Meetings record that, 
although Australia was not prepared to surrender its right to tax interest to the 
residence country entirely, it would accept a reciprocal rate of 10%. This was agreed 
and the Australians undertook to produce a revised draft of Article 10. It was also 
noted that, as Australian borrowers received a deduction for interest paid, Article 
10(4) needed to be reciprocal.178 The Notes of Meetings contain no explanation of 
the change in the UK’s attitude. 
Royalties 
5.111 Australia and the UK had diametrically opposed views on the taxation of royalties. 
The Notes of Meetings record that large amounts of royalties and know-how 
payments were leaving Australia but that Australia was unable to tax them either 
because the contracts were arranged so that it was difficult to allege an Australian 
source or because they were ‘dressed up’ as industrial and commercial profits. The 
Australians indicated that the government intended to legislate to define royalties in 
similar terms to those used in Article 5 of the UK draft, and to deem them to have an 
Australian source and tax them on an assessment basis when exploited in Australia. 
                                                          
175  Article 10 of UK Draft, September 1966. 
176  At the time of the negotiations in Canberra in 1967, Australian treatment of interest paid to 
non-residents was unchanged from the treatment that applied in 1945. See the discussion of 
that treatment at 2.15. 
177  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, pp3–4. 
178  Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Morning Session, p1. The interest article is not 
mentioned subsequently in the Notes of Meetings. Note that, as discussed at 2.19, the UK did 
not allow a deduction for interest paid. 
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Australia’s view was that the country of source ought to have the right to tax, but it 
was prepared to concede a reduced rate of tax in the treaty.179  
5.112 By contrast, the UK’s view was that royalties should be taxed on a residence basis, 
as the gross royalty did not represent true profit because it took no account of 
expenses. Only the country of residence was in a position to tax royalties fairly, 
because only the country of residence was able to say what expenses ought to be 
allowed.180 
5.113 The Australians claimed the right to tax royalties at source: (a) on the basis that the 
royalties were (i) paid out of Australian source profits and (ii) deductible from the 
payer’s Australian source profits; and (b) because Australia provided the conditions 
under which the licensor could exploit knowledge. The outflow of royalties to the UK 
was considerable, with the Australian estimate being $A10 million to $15 million while 
the UK estimate was $A7 million gross. The UK reiterated their previous arguments 
for taxation on a residence basis, adding that exemption in the source country 
encouraged the free interchange of technical knowledge. Nonetheless, the UK 
agreed to source taxation providing that the Australians would make a submission to 
Australian ministers that the rate on royalties (including copyright royalties) not 
exceed 10% and that there be a uniform 15% rate on dividends.181 The source 
country rates on these three types of income were probably arrived at through a 
process of matching concessions.182 It seems likely that the key concession made by 
Australia was to tax royalties at a flat 10% rate, because the proposed treaty rate for 
interest was the same as the foreshadowed Australian domestic law rate and 
because the UK originally sought a 5% rate on non-portfolio dividends.183 
5.114 It was also agreed that ‘information’ be added after ‘rights or property’ in Article 11(3) 
to cover title to receive payments from know-how. The Notes of Meetings record that 
a definition along the lines of the definition in the 1966 UK – NZ Treaty would 
                                                          
179  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p3. 
180  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p4. 
181 Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Morning Session, p1. 
182  See the discussion of balancing concessions at 5.133 to 5.140. 
183  As Australia in 1967 was still taxing royalties paid to non-residents on a net basis, it is 
possible that deductions may have meant that taxation on a net basis under domestic law 
might have been less than the 10% gross basis permitted under the treaty. Hence, agreeing 
to a 10% gross basis might in fact not have been such a significant concession by Australia. 
Vann and Oliver make a similar point about taxation of leasing of substantial equipment under 
the treaty (taxed under the royalty article in this treaty) in R J Vann and J D B Oliver, ‘The 
New Australia–UK Tax Treaty’ [2004] British Tax Review 194 at 221–4. Admittedly, the point 
is stronger in the case of equipment leasing where significant deductions (interest and 
depreciation) for equipment are available. 
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conform more closely to the new definition proposed for Australian domestic law. 
Hence it was agreed to redraft Article 11(3) accordingly.184 
Shipping And Air Transport 
5.115 Australian ministers had given instructions that Australia should have the right to tax 
UK shipping profits in accordance with Australian domestic law. The UK would not 
agree to this and produced a written statement of the UK view.185 The UK was 
prepared to agree to allow Australia to tax the profits of ships engaged in coastal 
trade, but wanted to give further consideration to whether this should include 
voyages between Australia and Papua New Guinea.186 The Australians wanted to 
examine the definition of ‘international traffic’ to ensure that it would allow Australia to 
tax the profits of voyages solely between Australian ports.187  
5.116 The Australian record of the discussions notes that when shipping profits were 
discussed again there was ‘a total opposition of views, which was not resolved’.188 
This record notes that the Australians stressed that ministers had given firm 
directions on the taxation of international shipping and that any question of 
derogation from this position would have to be referred back to ministers.189 The UK 
‘Notes of Meetings’ record that the Australian delegation commented that ‘their 
Ministers might be more inclined to accept the UK views on the taxation of shipping if 
they could report a favourable solution to the dividend question’, something on which 
the UK had not yet reached a final decision.190 The treatment of shipping profits was 
only finally resolved through correspondence, discussed below, following the 
conclusion of the negotiations. 
 
                                                          
184  Notes of Meetings, Third Day 4th 1967, Morning Session, p2. The royalties article is not 
mentioned subsequently in the Notes of Meetings. 
185  Both the Notes of Meetings and the official Australian Report of discussions refer to the UK 
circulating a paper on the first day setting out its views on the international taxation of 
shipping and air transport. The author has been unable to locate the paper in either the UK 
National Archives or the National Archives of Australia. 
186 Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p4. 
187  Notes of Meeting, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p1. 
188  Report of discussions on 4th April 1967. 
189  Report of discussions on 4th April 1967. 
190  Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Morning Session, p1. The only subsequent 
mention of the shipping and air transport article in the Notes of Meetings is in the morning 
session of the 9th day under the heading ‘General’. The reference to the ‘dividend question’ 
clearly is to the rate of withholding tax on dividends as distinct from the ‘dividend question’ 
associated with the New Broken Hill situation. Shipping profits were the first item discussed in 
the morning session of the third day but, as discussed at 5.95, the UK later in that session 
apparently agreed to a uniform 15% dividend withholding tax.  
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Immovable Property  
5.117 Income from immovable property was originally dealt with in Article 5 of the UK draft 
of September 1966.191 The Notes of Meetings record that the article ‘dealt with 
agricultural enterprises but there might be some advantage in transferring to Article 
4’.192 Clearly, this suggestion came from the Australians. As noted above, the Notes 
of Meetings also record that the Australians indicated that they intended to raise the 
issue of including agricultural and pastoral properties in the definition of PE. When 
the article was discussed again, the Australian view was that the disadvantage of 
dealing with agricultural enterprise under the immovable property article as in the 
draft was that this did not give the protection of the rules in the business profits article 
about the allowance of reasonable expenses. It appears that the UK then agreed with 
the Australian suggestion on this point.193 
5.118 When the article was discussed again, it had been renumbered as Article 8. The 
Notes of Meetings record that it had been agreed that the article should be amended 
to allow ‘agricultural enterprises etc to have their expenses in accordance with the 
principles in article 6’. Difficulties in the interpretation of the article and possible 
conflicts with article 6(7) (which taxed effectively connected rents as business profits) 
were noted. As the article did not ‘secure any result other than that achieved under 
domestic law’, a decision was made to delete it.194  
Capital Gains  
5.119 The UK draft had included a capital gains tax article. The Australians explained that 
although Australia had no capital gains tax at present, the existence of the article 
would ‘tie their hands’ in relation to the UK if they ever introduced one in the future. 
The UK pointed out that the draft article was reciprocal but that an article based on 
the OECD Model was an alternative if Australia did not like the draft article. The 
Australians questioned the need for the article and preferred that the article be 
dropped altogether, which the UK delegation indicated they would consider.195 
                                                          
191  Article 5 of UK Draft, September 1966. 
192  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p2. Article 4 contained the 
definition of permanent establishment. Including agricultural enterprises within the definition of 
PE would mean that they were taxed under the industrial and commercial profits article, which 
was Article 6 in the draft of September 1966. 
193  Notes of Meetings, Third Day, 4th April 1967, Morning Session, p2. As noted at 2.102, 
agricultural and pastoral properties had been included in the definition of permanent 
establishment in the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty. 
194  Notes of Meetings, Fifth Day, 6th April 1967, Morning Session, p1. 
195  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p4. See also Notes of 
discussions, 31st March 1967. 
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Handwritten notes by an Australian Treasury official observe that the political climate 
was against CGT and that the inclusion of the article might prevent passage of the 
treaty through the Senate.196 The article is not mentioned again in either official 
record of the discussions until the fifth day, when both official records confirm that the 
article was to be omitted.197  
5.120 It is clear from the notes of the meeting that the Australian delegation considered that 
by not including a capital gains tax article in the treaty, Australia would retain full 
rights to levy capital gains tax on UK residents if it subsequently introduced a capital 
gains tax. In this context, it should also be noted that the view of the delegations was 
that capital gains on realisation of shares in a 100% subsidiary would not normally be 
considered ‘trading receipts’ and hence would not amount to industrial or commercial 
profits.198 
Other Income  
5.121 The UK draft contained an ‘other income’ article giving the country of residence 
exclusive right to tax income not expressly mentioned in other articles.199 The 
Australians stated that they considered that this article only needed to cover tax on 
third country income and that they were concerned about its application in the case 
of trusts.200  
5.122 The Notes of Meetings subsequently record that the article ‘contradicts Australia’s 
general philosophy concerning the taxation of income flowing abroad and they 
cannot accept it as it stands’. The Australians were prepared to accept the results of 
the article as regards tax on third country income. While this would mean that there 
would be nothing in the treaty dealing with alimony, this was seen as being of 
comparatively minor importance. Restricting the article to tax on third country income 
would not create problems in relation to trusts because both the UK and Australia 
treated income flowing through a trust in which beneficiaries had an absolute interest 
as retaining its original identity. The Notes of Meetings comment that the absence of 
another income article would only be felt in the case of discretionary trusts, which 
would be treated on an ‘empirical basis’, and record that ‘It was in consequence 
                                                          
196  See also Notes of discussions, 31st March 1967. 
197  Notes of Meetings, Fifth Day, 6th April 1967, Morning Session, p1. Report of discussions on 
6th April 1967. The Australian record makes it clear that the article was omitted at Australia’s 
request. 
198  As noted at 5.68 n 98, in Undershaft v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 41 Lindgren J 
subsequently came to the opposite conclusion. 
199  Article 20 of UK Draft, September 1966, Inland Revenue file. 
200  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Afternoon Session, p5. 
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agreed that the Article should be amended to restrict its scope to tax on third country 
income.’201 
5.123 By restricting the other income article to tax on third country income, both parties 
considered that they would retain full taxing rights in relation to income not otherwise 
dealt with in the treaty. This is particularly evident from the Australian comment that 
the original article, which gave exclusive taxing rights to the residence country, 
contradicted Australia’s general philosophy concerning the taxation of outbound 
income. 
Credits 
5.124 The major reason why the UK wanted the treaty reviewed was to restrict the 
circumstances in which it would, following the introduction of UK corporation tax, 
grant a foreign tax credit for underlying foreign corporate tax.202 The draft credit 
article limited the availability of credits for underlying corporate tax to situations 
where the recipient of the dividend was a company holding a 10% or greater interest 
in the paying company. Draft Article 22(1)(b) indicated that the UK would grant credit 
for Australian corporate tax in this situation. A marginal note in the draft indicated that 
the inclusion of (b) was subject to reciprocity and indicated that the reciprocal 
provision was to be drafted by Australia. 
5.125 The Australians proposed that the minimum percentage shareholding for an 
underlying foreign tax credit should be reduced to 5%.203 The UK saw no logic in this, 
as the reason for the minimum shareholding requirement was to limit credit for 
underlying tax to dividends from ‘trade investment’. It was unlikely that a trade 
investor would have a less than 10% shareholding, but it was possible that a portfolio 
investor might hold 5%.204 
5.126 On the question of reciprocity, the Notes of Meeting record that the UK’s preferences 
were in the following order: 
(1) to write in each country’s domestic laws; 
(2) to link the UK commitment to the continuance of the present 
Australian exemption; and  
                                                          
201  Notes of Meetings, Fifth Day, 6th April 1967, Afternoon Session, p2. The other income article 
is not mentioned subsequently in the Notes of Meetings. 
202  See the discussion at 5.9.  
203  As discussed at 5.51, this was a bargaining ploy recommended to Cabinet in the Treasurer’s 
submission. 
204  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p5. 
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(3) to have a consultation provision on the NZ model.205  
The Notes of Meeting indicate that Australia’s preference at this stage was for (3).206 
5.127 When the credit article was discussed again, Australia was no longer pressing for a 
reduction in the minimum shareholding percentage for an underlying foreign tax 
credit. The Australians explained their reasons for rejecting approaches (1) and (2) at 
5.127 to reciprocity. The first alternative, of writing in each country’s domestic laws, 
would remove their freedom of action for a considerable time in the future. They were 
concerned that the second alternative, of linking the UK’s commitment to the 
continuance of the present Australian exemption, might mean that the UK could be 
released from its obligation to provide an underlying foreign tax credit if Australia did 
nothing more than change its law by adopting a foreign tax credit system which 
provided for underlying foreign tax credits. The UK accepted the Australian proposal 
that there should be consultation to establish the new rules if and when Australia’s 
existing rules were changed.207 
5.128 The Notes of Meetings record that rules would be needed to resolve conflicts 
between the UK and Australian law on the source of interest and royalties to enable 
credit to be given for tax deducted from ‘criss-cross’ dividends paid by dual resident 
companies.208 The credit article was also briefly discussed in the afternoon session of 
the sixth day. Here it was agreed to amend Article 21(4) so that it could apply where 
Australia gave relief in the form of: (a) credit (as in the case of dividends); or (b) 
exemption. Source rules for dividends, interest and royalties were also inserted.209 
Non-Discrimination  
5.129 The UK draft contained a non-discrimination article. None of Australia’s previous tax 
treaties had contained a non-discrimination article, and a non-discrimination article 
                                                          
205  The relevant provision in the 1966 UK – NZ Treaty was Article XVIII(2)(b), which read as 
follows: ‘In the event that the Government of NZ should impose a tax on dividends received 
by companies which are resident in NZ the Contracting Governments will enter into 
negotiations in order to establish new provisions concerning the taxation of such dividends 
derived from sources in the UK.’ 
206 Notes of Meeting, First Day, 31st March 1967, Morning Session, p5. 
207  Notes of Meetings, Fifth Day, 6th April 1967, Afternoon Session, p2. 
208  Notes of Meetings, Fifth Day, 6th April 1967, Afternoon Session, p2. The Notes of Meetings 
also record that the insertion of source rules in Articles 13, 14 and 15 meant that the source 
rule in paragraph (3) of the credit article was no longer necessary so far as it related to 
personal and professional services, but that it needed to be kept for services on board ships 
and aircraft. 
209  Notes of Meetings, Sixth Day, 7th April 1967, Afternoon Session, p3. At this session it was 
also agreed to amend the source rule in Article 21(4) dealing with services aboard ships and 
aircraft to make it consistent with Article 14(3).  
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had not been requested by Australia’s treaty partner in any of those treaties. All prior 
Australian analysis of and experience with non-discrimination articles had been 
negative.210 In the negotiations in Canberra the non-discrimination article emerges as 
one which divided the delegations, more at the level of principle and policy than 
practicality, and as one which proved to be the fulcrum on which the overall balance 
of concessions in the treaty pivoted.  
5.130 The Notes of Meetings record that the article was not acceptable to Australian 
ministers. Although Australia did not discriminate on the basis of nationality, the 
notes list a number of examples of ways in which Australia did discriminate against 
non-residents.211 Including a non-discrimination article in the treaty was seen as likely 
to be highly embarrassing by adding fresh fuel to political controversy over whether 
Australia should have a branch profits tax.212  
5.131 The UK responded that one function of a double taxation agreement was to do away 
with discrimination against non-residents and that a non-discrimination article was 
therefore ‘a natural constituent of an agreement’. Similar articles were contained in 
their agreements with the US, Canada and New Zealand. Nothing in the draft article 
would prevent Australia from ‘refusing the dividend rebate’, and the article could be 
amended so as to enable the exemption for uranium mining to be continued in its 
present form. The UK pointed out that the absence of a non-discrimination article 
would mean that Australian insurance companies would not be able to get full relief 
for their management expenses.213 On the argument that the inclusion of the article 
would restrict Australia’s freedom in the future, the UK delegation responded that this 
was true of any article in the agreement.214  
5.132 When the non-discrimination article was discussed again, the UK reiterated its earlier 
arguments but added that the article would override the Finance Act provision which 
denied a resident company a deduction for interest paid to a non-resident. The UK 
then linked the non-discrimination article with the negotiations over the treatment of 
                                                          
210  As discussed at 4.66, Belcher, in reviewing the 1963 OECD draft, had been concerned at the 
revenue impact of a non-discrimination article if it required extension of the inter-corporate 
dividend rebate. As discussed at 4.122, the 1965 Australian model did not contain a non-
discrimination article. As will be discussed at 6.11, Australian officials in preliminary 
discussions with Japan in 1963 had rejected a non-discrimination article. 
211  The discriminatory treatments listed were: (a) the inter-corporate dividend rebate; (b) the 
exemption for profits for uranium mining; and (c) the tax reliefs to residents who subscribe 
capital for mineral exploration.  
212 Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Afternoon Session, p5.  
213  See the discussion of Ostime v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1960] AC 459 and the 
UK’s legislative responses in relation to this issue at 5.65.  
214  Notes of Meetings, First Day, 31st March 1967, Afternoon Session, p6. 
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dual resident companies and the rates of withholding tax on dividends. The UK would 
be prepared to consider relief in the dual resident company case if there was a 
matching concession by Australia on either the non-discrimination article or in 
agreeing to the OECD rate on dividends.215 
5.133 In response to the request for a balancing concession, the Australians raised the 
issues of the treatment of shipping profits and the UK’s wish to withdraw underlying 
tax relief for portfolio dividends.216 As the withdrawal of credits for underlying tax for 
portfolio dividends was the issue that had generated the negotiations in the first 
place, the Australians were on strong ground with this argument. The Australians 
argued that the concessions the UK offered were not adequate compensation for the 
UK tax system being less favourable to overseas investment as a result of the 
introduction of corporation tax.217 
5.134 The UK’s reply was that credits for underlying tax would still be available for direct 
investment (presumed to be the form of investment of greatest concern to Australia) 
and, subject to certain conditions, for insurance company portfolio dividends, which 
could be written into the agreement if necessary. The UK also pointed out that any 
source tax on subsidiary dividends would be a disincentive to investment as it would 
fall on the parent company.218 The UK undertook to put to ministers Australia’s 
compromise proposal that New Broken Hill dividends should be exempt but that the 
exemption should be withdrawn if Australia subsequently introduced a branch profits 
tax.219 
5.135 The Australian delegation subsequently indicated that if the UK would drop the non-
discrimination article and exempt New Broken Hill type dividends, and provided there 
were no other matters in the agreement adverse to Australia, then Australian 
ministers would, with great reluctance, accept a shipping exemption. The Australians 
indicated a preference for a decision on the New Broken Hill issue before the end of 
the discussions, but that if none was forthcoming they were authorised to initial the 
agreement with a shipping exemption on the understanding that the New Broken Hill 
issue would be taken up at a government level.220 The UK replied that they would 
telegraph home for instructions, but commented that their minister might regard the 
agreement, without the New Broken Hill clause, as being merely a standard 
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216 Notes of Meetings, Fourth Day, 5th April 1967, Morning Session, p1. 
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agreement without a non-discrimination article and might want some matching 
concession.221 
5.136 Johnson sent a telegram to Brookes of Internal Revenue on 7th April 1967, stating 
that the Australians were ‘anxious that dividends paid to their residents by U.K. 
companies operating almost wholly in Australia should be exempt from U.K. 
withholding tax’ and giving New Broken Hill as an example of such a company. The 
exemption sought in the New Broken Hill situation would be withdrawn if Australia 
ever imposed a branch profits tax. Johnson indicated that the Australians were very 
reluctant to exempt international shipping profits.  
5.137 Johnson summarised what he saw as the likely content of any agreement with 
Australia. There would be: uniform reciprocal rates of 15% on dividends; 10% on 
interest and 10% on royalties; credit relief for underlying tax for portfolio shareholders 
would be withdrawn; and no non-discrimination article (‘because the Australians 
refuse to commit themselves in this way’). Australia would retain the right to tax 
premiums for the reinsurance in London of Australian risks. Johnson commented that 
he had made what case he could for a 5% rate on subsidiary dividends, but had to 
concede that ‘a 15 per cent rate was in line with a common pattern’. Johnson 
reported that the Australians had indicated that if Johnson could be given the 
authority to concede New Broken Hill relief, they would initial a text containing a 
shipping exemption while reserving the right to reopen the matter at a government 
level. The Australians had requested that Johnson seek the necessary authority and 
wanted the matter settled, if possible, during the discussions in Canberra. Johnson 
considered that, as a last resort, the UK should accept the bargain proposed by the 
Australians but noted that it was possible, if unlikely, that if the Australians were left 
to raise the matter at a government level the UK could secure a reduction of tax on 
non-portfolio dividends as well as the shipping exemption.222 
5.138 In response to Johnson’s telegram, some ‘back of the envelope’ calculations were 
undertaken by Inland Revenue officers to determine the likely net revenue effect of 
the Australian proposal.223 Brookes replied to Johnson by telegram on 11th April 
1967, indicating that New Broken Hill relief could not be conceded without ministerial 
authority and that it was impossible to obtain the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s 
decision at that time due to Budget preparations. In addition, ‘we should have to 
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square treasury first on balance of payments aspects’. Brookes’ advice was that it 
would be wiser not to initial anything, because initialling would involve accepting 
Australia’s view on non-discrimination, non-portfolio dividends, and insurance. The 
Australian reservation on shipping meant that their initialling of that article was 
worthless. There was no objection to settling the drafting of these and other articles 
without prejudice to the policy.224 
5.139 The next time that the non-discrimination article is mentioned, the Notes of Meetings 
record that the UK communicated the gist of the reply from London, summarised 
above.225 The Australians replied that they had authority to initial an agreement with a 
shipping exemption, provided there was no non-discrimination article and provided 
that the agreement was satisfactory in other respects. If there was no concession on 
the New Broken Hill issue, they reserved the right to raise the matter at a government 
level independent of the agreement.226 The UK’s response was that under this 
approach their minister might want a quid pro quo elsewhere in the agreement and 
that they would not want to do anything at this point that would inhibit him from 
seeking this.227 Hence it was agreed that the treaty be initialled on the terms 
provisionally accepted but accompanied by a covering memorandum stating that if 
the New Broken Hill issue was raised, ministers were free to reopen other matters.228 
5.140 Johnson sent a telegram to Brookes on 12th April 1967 reporting Australia’s offer to 
initial a text which did not contain New Broken Hill relief but which did include a 
shipping exemption, and which dealt with other matters in the manner set out in 
Johnson’s telegram of 7th April 1967 on the basis that the Australian government 
might raise the issue of New Broken Hill relief with the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
separately on the condition that they would not seek to change other items if New 
Broken Hill relief was refused. Johnson considered the proposed treaty acceptable 
and reported that the delegates had agreed, subject to Brookes’ approval, to initial 
the draft text on the basis offered by Australia. The non-discrimination article was 
probably of little practical significance, the UK had a uniform 15% rate on dividends in 
other agreements, had conceded insurance to Australia and to other countries in 
previous agreements and the UK now had its own desire to reverse the decision in 
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Ostime v Australian Mutual Provident Society.229 Brookes’ brief telegram in reply 
dated 12th April 1967 simply stated ‘Content you should initial’ on the terms set out in 
Johnson’s telegram.230 A draft was evidently initialled at this point and members of 
the UK delegation left Australia on 16th April 1967.231 
The Subsequent Correspondence And Drafting  
5.141 Following the conclusion of the negotiations, Australia prepared a draft which was 
initialled by the delegations and forwarded to the UK. Major issues and detailed 
drafting amendments were then eventually resolved through correspondence without 
further meetings between officials. 
5.142 The initial recommendation from Inland Revenue to the UK Treasury noted that 
although there were benefits for the UK in the treaty (removal of the requirement to 
give credit for underlying corporate tax and the exemption of shipping and aircraft 
profits from source taxation), it did not contain a non-discrimination clause and made 
a number of other concessions to Australia, particularly in relation to the level of 
source taxation permitted on dividends, royalties and interest. The uniform rate of 
15% source taxation on dividends contrasted with the exemption of subsidiary to 
parent dividends in the 1946 UK Treaty. The revenue cost was estimated at £1.5 
million, but the greater part of this was expected to fall on UK parent companies 
rather than on the Exchequer. At a cost of £0.25 million, royalties were to be taxed at 
10% at source in contrast to the complete exemption under the 1946 UK Treaty. 
Interest was to be subject to 10% taxation at source which, while an improvement on 
the 1946 UK Treaty, represented a ‘derogation from our ideal, which is again 
complete exemption’. The recommendation noted, however, that the overwhelming 
proportion of interest received by UK residents from Australia was on Australian 
government securities exempt from source taxation. The recommendation was for 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer to refuse any special relief in the New Broken Hill 
situation for the present time and to wait for a further approach from Australian 
ministers in the expectation that it was ‘just conceivable’ that Australia might then 
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offer something in exchange, such as a reduction in the withholding tax rate on 
dividends paid by Australian subsidiaries to their UK parent.232  
New Broken Hill  
5.143 Correspondence continued between UK officials and between UK and Australian 
officials on the New Broken Hill issue.233 Eventually, Cain accepted a proposal by 
Johnson of 4th September 1967 and the draft of 11th October 1967 prepared by 
Australia excluded dual resident companies from the 90% New Broken Hill relief.234 
Finally, on 28th October 1967 Cain advised Johnson by telegram that, ‘subject to 
Government approval of agreement as a whole your proposal on N.B.H.C. is 
accepted’ and indicated that action was being taken to put the complete text before 
the Australian Cabinet.235  
Other Matters 
5.144 Cain’s letter to Johnson of 16th June 1967 enclosed a revised draft treaty 
incorporating a total of 48 amendments proposed by Australia accompanied by notes 
explaining the rationale behind the amendments.236 Johnson advised Cain of the UK 
response to the amendments by letter on 4th September 1967.237 Most of the 
Australian amendments dealt with stylistic or grammatical matters and were readily 
agreed to by the UK. Other amendments either dealt with issues which the countries 
continued to discuss through correspondence before reaching final agreement or 
dealt with drafting features which, although readily agreed to by the UK, were 
significant from an Australian perspective and had longer term effects on Australian 
tax treaty practice.  
Credits For Withholding Tax On Dividends Paid By Dual Resident Companies 
5.145 It had been agreed during the negotiations in Canberra238 that where a dual resident 
company paid a dividend to a shareholder resident in Australia then the UK would 
levy withholding tax on the dividend and that Australia would levy withholding tax 
                                                          
232  Memorandum, ‘PS 1152/67Mr Baldwin’, Inland Revenue file, Part II. From the content of the 
memorandum it is clear that this is from Inland Revenue to Treasury. From the content, the 
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where a dividend was paid by a dual resident company to a UK resident.  It had also 
been agreed that the country of the shareholder’s residence would give credit for the 
withholding tax.  These were described as the ‘criss-cross dividend’ provisions. The 
UK Chief Inspector (Company Taxation) had raised technical difficulties that would 
be associated with the implementation of the draft article using existing UK law.239 
Implementation problems were confirmed through subsequent legal advice.240 The 
UK Inland Revenue view was that amending relevant UK legislation was ‘presumably 
out of the question’ and that the Australians would have to be told that it would not be 
possible to gross up a dividend from a dual resident company subject to Australian 
withholding tax in calculating the recipient’s Schedule F tax and to then give credit for 
the Australian tax against the Schedule F tax. The Inland Revenue considered that, if 
UK Treasury agreed, giving New Broken Hill relief could be offered to the Australians 
on the condition that there would be no credit for Australian withholding tax on dual 
resident companies.241 Following further correspondence in which Johnson advised 
Cain of the impossibility under UK domestic law of giving effect to the criss-cross 
dividend provisions,242 Cain acknowledged the UK’s difficulties and agreed to a rule 
governing single residents whether or not New Broken Hill relief was agreed to. Cain 
proposed a further amendment aimed at: accommodating the situation where 
dividends were beneficially owned but not received by a shareholder: and 
overcoming difficulties associated with the undefined expression ‘residents of the 
first-mentioned territory’ in the case of a dual resident. This amendment was the final 
version of Article 8(7) and 8(8) used in the treaty. Cain commented that the UK’s 
amendment to the credit article had ‘proved troublesome to us’, but the conclusion 
had been reached that the amendments could be accepted.243 Johnson agreed to the 
proposal in a telegram to Cain dated 29th September 1967.244 
Trusts 
5.146 Difficulties associated with accumulation trusts had been considered but not resolved 
during the Canberra negotiations.245 Cain’s letter outlined again the planning strategy 
that Australia had identified during the Canberra negotiations and asked Johnson 
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how UK law would operate in the situation contemplated.246 Further internal UK 
discussions and correspondence between Johnson and Cain followed, which 
exposed differences between the Australian and UK interpretations of ‘beneficially 
owned’. Eventually, Cain conceded, stating: ‘In all circumstances willing to revert to 
original text and apply your interpretation. In event either country finds actual 
evidence of exploitation matter could presumably be looked at again.’247 Hence the 
final version of the treaty contained the original text of Article 8(1).248 
Residence  
5.147 The compromise in relation to corporate residence discussed during the negotiations 
had been implemented in the initialled version of the treaty. In the initialled draft, the 
expressions ‘resident of the UK’ and ‘resident of Australia’ were defined as having 
the meaning that those terms had under, in the former case, UK tax laws and in the 
latter under Australian tax laws. The notes explained that if these expressions were 
not defined in this manner, there would be difficulties when one country had to 
interpret the other’s ‘residence’ term. The expression ‘resident of the UK’ had no 
special meaning for Australia. The amendment, based on the approach taken in the 
1960 Australia – NZ Treaty, overcame this difficulty by defining the expressions by 
reference to the domestic law of the country in which it appeared.249  
5.148 A related amendment added the phrase ‘being a resident of Australia’ to the 
definition of ‘Australian company’ in Article 3(1)(a)(i). The reason for the amendment 
was that, otherwise the definition of ‘Australian company’ could include a company 
which was not an Australian resident. The amendment meant that to be an Australian 
company for treaty purposes, a company had to be a resident of Australia for 
purposes of Australian domestic law. Cain’s explanation cited an example of a 
company incorporated in NZ and carrying on business there but which was centrally 
managed and controlled in Australia. Cain considered that, prior to the amendment 
the company would be an Australian company for purposes of the treaty, because it 
was centrally managed and controlled in Australia, but would not be an Australian 
resident for domestic law purposes (presumably because the Australian notes did not 
regard it as carrying on business in Australia). Cain considered that this would enable 
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the company to receive a reduced rate of UK tax on, say, interest while Australia 
would not be taxing the interest because the recipient company would not be an 
Australian resident for domestic law purposes.250 Although the amendment was 
agreed to by the UK without question, Cain’s reason for seeking it is interesting in 
that it was not until 2004 that the ATO released a ruling251 clearly stating that a 
company in a situation analogous to the example given by Cain would not be an 
Australian resident. 
5.149 As the definitions of ‘Australian company’ and ‘UK company’ were mutually exclusive, 
it was not possible for companies to be dual residents.252 These provisions meant 
that a company incorporated in Australia with its centre of administrative and 
practical management in Australia would be an Australian company and not a UK 
company, even if it were managed and controlled in the UK. Where a company was 
not incorporated in Australia, it could only be an Australian resident for treaty 
purposes where it was managed and controlled in Australia. Where it was managed 
and controlled in the UK, then it would be a UK resident for treaty purposes. Where 
management and control was both in Australia and the UK, the effect of the 
definitions was that the company was an Australian resident. Where it was managed 
and controlled in neither Australia nor the UK, it would be neither an Australian 
company nor a UK company as defined. It could still, however, be an Australian 
resident as ‘a person (other than a UK company) who is a resident of Australia’. 
Hence, in the situation where a company was not incorporated in Australia, was not 
managed and controlled in either Australia or the UK, but carried on business in 
Australia and had its voting power controlled by Australian shareholders, the 
company would be a resident of Australia for both Australian domestic law purposes 
and treaty purposes.  
5.150 Ironically, the convoluted drafting would not in all cases have dealt with the problems 
previously raised by Australia.253 Where the interposed company was centrally 
managed and controlled in the UK, and where (as might have been the case with a 
mere holding company) its centre of administrative or practical management was not 
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in Australia, it would be a UK company and hence a UK resident for treaty purposes. 
Nonetheless, as a company incorporated in Australia it would still be an Australian 
company for Australian domestic law purposes and hence be entitled to the s46 inter-
corporate dividend rebate.254 Nor was the UK’s concern about the breadth of the 
definition of Australian resident company under Australian domestic law entirely met. 
Where a company was ‘a person, other than a UK company, who is a resident of 
Australia’, it would have been an Australian resident for both Australian domestic law 
and treaty purposes. It may be that the UK did not regard this situation as raising 
significant issues from a UK perspective given that it contemplated a company that 
was not managed and controlled in the UK. The definition represented a compromise 
from the initial positions of both countries where a company was incorporated and 
had its centre of administrative or practical management in Australia notwithstanding 
it being centrally managed and controlled in the UK. The definition represented a 
compromise by the UK where the central management and control of a company was 
divided between the UK and Australia.  
5.151 Unlike the relevant provisions in the 1966 UK – NZ Treaty, the 1967 UK Treaty 
included an additional tie-breaker, which stated: 
(3) Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article a 
person other than an individual is both a UK resident and an 
Australian resident – 
(a) it shall be treated solely as a UK resident if it is managed and 
controlled in the UK;  
(b) it shall be treated as an Australian resident if it is managed and 
controlled in Australia. 
It was not possible for a company to be a dual resident, because the terms 
‘Australian company’ and ‘UK company’ were mutually exclusive. The tie-breaker 
was directed at entities such as trusts.  
Tax On Third Country Income 
5.152 Pursuant to the agreement in Canberra,255 Article 18 ( the ‘other income’ article) had 
been redrafted and was confined to tax on third country income. Australia now 
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sought an amendment so that the article only applied to dual residents of Australia 
and the UK. If the provision applied to single residents, a resident of the UK (for 
example) could arrange to ensure that income flowing to Australia was sourced in a 
third country and hence subject to UK but not Australian tax.256 In reply, Johnson did 
not consider that the initialled draft was ‘likely to lead to untoward results’, but he had 
no objection to making it more precise. Johnson identified an additional problem that 
could arise with dual residents in connection with dividends, interest and royalties. If 
an individual who was a UK resident under the ordinary law but who was an 
Australian resident under the treaty received dividends from a company in a third 
country, the UK could not tax the dividend; however, if he received dividends from an 
Australian company (that was not a UK resident) then there was nothing in the 
initialled or revised Article 18 which would prevent the UK from taxing the dividend up 
to a rate of 15%. Johnson suggested a further amendment to Article 18 aimed at 
resolving this problem by extending the exemption to include income derived from 
sources in the other Contracting State in addition to income derived from a third 
country.257 Cain’s telegram in reply accepted the UK amendment but commented that 
where income had a dual source, Australia assumed that the source rule of the 
country to which residence was allotted would apply. In Cain’s view there were other 
situations where the provision could apply, such as rent from Australia derived by a 
dual resident whose residence the treaty allotted to Australia.258 
Miscellaneous 
5.153 Other amendments in the Australian draft of 16th June 1967, which were either 
readily accepted by the UK or the UK accepted subject to modifications, affected 
subsequent Australian treaty practice for some years. A deemed source rule for 
interest and royalties was included in the credit article consequent on Australia taxing 
interest and royalties at source without technically requiring the relevant income to 
have an Australian source.259 Australia sought specifically to exclude from the 
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operation of the industrial or commercial profits article any income taxed under 
Australian domestic law provisions dealing with insurance with non-residents and film 
business controlled abroad.260 The UK accepted this with a relatively minor drafting 
change.261 Other changes were proposed by Australia, but the final form was a 
product of further amendment by the UK. In Article 4(8) (definition of PE), Australia 
had proposed the deletion of the phrase ‘in the other territory’ to deal with situations 
like those in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656.262 The UK response proposed that 
‘in the other territory’ be replaced by ‘a person in the other territory’.263 Likewise, 
Australia had proposed substituting ‘might be expected to accrue’ for ‘would have 
accrued’ in Article 7(1) to provide a more practical measure of the profits which could 
be taxed to an enterprise.264 A similar change was made in paragraph 4 of Article 19 
dealing with credits, despite the UK’s preference for the language in the initialled 
text.265 The UK would have preferred that this change not be made and suggested 
the final wording ‘might have been expected to have accrued’, that was used in the 
treaty.266 The Australian redraft amended the definition of ‘royalties’ to allow for the 
apportionment of lump sum payments and to include any payment in respect of films 
or videotapes for use in connection with television, or tapes for use in connection with 
radio.267 The UK indicated the amendment was acceptable in principle, but 
considered the term ‘any payment’ too wide because it could potentially cover a 
payment to an airline for transporting a film. The UK’s preferred language was, ‘and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
proposed interest withholding tax legislation in Australia so that interest subject to Australian 
withholding tax was regarded as having an Australian source for treaty purposes 
notwithstanding that domestic law would not in terms deem it to have an Australian source. 
The Notes on Australian Drafting Amendments point out that the position would be different in 
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Article 5(8) be changed from ‘Nothing in this Article shall apply to either territory to prevent the 
operation in the territory of a law’ to ‘Nothing in this Article shall apply to either territory to 
prevent the operation in the territory of any provisions of the law relating to …’ 
262  Notes on Australian Drafting Amendments, Note on Amendment 12. Case 110 (1955) 5 
CTBR (NS) 656 was discussed at 5.19 n 33. 
263  Johnson to Cain, 4th September 1967, Inland Revenue file, Part II. Johnson indicated that the 
UK considered that the Australian amendment went too far because it would operate even 
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264  Notes on Australian Drafting Amendments, Note on Amendment 17. 
265 Notes on Australian Drafting Amendments, Note on Amendment 42. Johnson to Cain, 4th 
September 1967, Inland Revenue file, Part II. 
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includes any payments of any kind to the extent to which they are paid as 
consideration for the use of, or the right to use, motion picture films,’268 which 
became the phraseology used in the final version of the treaty. 
Significance Of The Treaty 
5.154 The 1967 UK Treaty was the first Australian treaty entered into after the publication 
of the 1963 draft OECD Model and was the first Australian treaty to come into force 
after the introduction of Australian interest and royalty withholding tax. Two major 
policy messages were apparent from the treaty. First, the treaty gave a clear signal 
on what Australia’s position was on rates of withholding tax. Despite the fact that 
these rates were higher than those suggested in the draft OECD Model, Australia 
managed to maintain them in almost all the treaties that it entered into until the 2001 
Protocol to the treaty with the US. Second, the 1967 UK Treaty also signalled that 
Australia would not agree to the non-discrimination article, a position that Australian 
adhered to (with the exception of the 1982 US Treaty269) until the 2003 UK Treaty.270 
Policy on withholding tax rates was determined at a ministerial level and was 
influenced by prior Australian Treaty practice and by economic and revenue 
considerations relevant to current and expected trade and investment flows between 
the two countries. Policy on the non-discrimination article also was determined at a 
ministerial level and was primarily influenced by Australian domestic law 
considerations. 
5.155 The treaty continued structural features that had characterised earlier Australian 
treaties. It did not have an ‘other income’ article, did not have a capital gains article 
and defined industrial and commercial profits as excluding specified items. Instead of 
an ‘other income’ article, it contained an article dealing with tax on third country 
income that found its way into several Australian treaties271 up to the 1980 treaty with 
Canada, which was the first Australian treaty to contain a general ‘other income’ 
article.272 The policy decision to continue these structural features appears to have 
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have the force of law in Australia. 
270 Article 25 of the 2003 UK Treaty. 
271 For example: Singapore Treaty 1969, Article 16; NZ Treaty 1974, Article 17; Germany Treaty 
1972, Article 20; Netherlands Treaty 1976, Article 22; France Treaty 1976, Article 21. 
272 Australia – Canada Treaty 1980, Article 21. This article applied to items of income of a 
resident of one of the countries which was not expressly mentioned in the earlier articles. 
Unlike the OECD ‘other income’ article, however, this article gave the source state a right to 
tax other income arising in it. 
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been made at the official level and reflects a belief that the absence of a general 
‘other income’ article and the exclusion of specified types of income from the 
definition of ‘industrial and commercial profits’ meant that full source country taxing 
rights were maintained in relation to items of income not expressly mentioned in the 
Treaty. This, too, was the thinking behind the exclusion of a ‘capital gains’ article. It is 
clear from the negotiations that the Australians considered that omitting a capital 
gains article would leave Australia’s ability to tax capital gains in the future 
unrestricted. It is also reasonably clear from the negotiations that neither delegation 
considered items that ordinary concepts would characterise as capital gains to fall 
within the definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’.  
5.156 Past Australian treaty practice was a major factor in continuing this structure, but 
economic and Australian domestic law considerations also appear to have had an 
effect. While Australia was responsible for the exclusion of the ‘other income’ and 
‘capital gains’ articles and the introduction of the ‘ tax on third country income’ article, 
the UK draft defined industrial or commercial profits as excluding specified items. 
5.157 Several features of the detailed drafting of the treaty were to find their way into 
subsequent Australian treaties, particularly in the period before Australia joined the 
OECD. Some, such as Article 4(8) dealing with the situation in Case 110 (1955) 
CTBR (NS) 656, were refinements or continuations of the drafting of prior Australian 
treaties273 while others, such as the way ‘resident of Australia’ was defined and the 
adjustments in the interest and royalty articles to accommodate the language of the 
new Australian withholding tax provisions, were developed as part of these 
negotiations. Another significant development was the broadening, consistently with 
Australia’s emphasis on source basis taxation, of the definition of permanent 
establishment. Five of the variations, initiated by Australia, from the OECD Model 
currently operative Australian tax treaties concerned the definition of permanent 
establishment.274 The treaty also saw a further development of the Australian treaty 
practice of including deemed source rules which, in this instance, were extended to 
items that did not necessarily have an Australian source under domestic law.  
5.158 Prior Australian treaty practice, Australian domestic law considerations, prior UK 
treaty practice and the prior treaty practice of other countries (particularly New 
Zealand) appear to have been the dominant influences on the detailed drafting. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
274  AV8, AV9, AV12, AV13 and AV14. Details are set out in Appendices 3 and 5. 
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5.159 Ironically, the New Broken Hill provisions, which, apart from the non-discrimination 
article, were the subject of the most extensive negotiations and correspondence, 
were not replicated in any subsequent Australian treaty. New Broken Hill represented 
a then unusual situation of a UK resident company with most of its income derived 
from Australian sources and with a high percentage of Australian shareholders. An 
exact repetition of those precise circumstances was unlikely to recur. Economic 
considerations appear to have been dominant for both Australia and the UK in 
relation to the New Broken Hill issue. Some other drafting features of the treaty were 
never repeated in subsequent Australian treaties, with some of these being the 
product of unusual features of the UK draft or of particular features of UK domestic 
law.275 
5.160 As will be seen in Chapter 6, the treaty formed the basis for the draft that Australia 
sent to Japan in 1968. Australia was evidently pleased with the treaty as a whole. In 
its first negotiation dealing with a draft influenced by the OECD Model, it managed to 
continue a policy of high levels of source basis taxation through the agreed rates on 
dividends, interest and royalties through the broad definition of permanent 
establishment. Saving provisions preserving the operation of particular features of 
Australian law were introduced or refined. Australia achieved relief from UK tax on 
dividends in the New Broken Hill situation, and managed to not agree to a non-
discrimination article but had to concede residence taxation of shipping. The latter 
concession would prove to be damaging to Australia in its next tax treaty negotiations 
with Japan. Chapter 6 discusses the background to, the negotiation and drafting 
of, and the significance of the 1969 Japan Treaty.  This was Australia’s first tax treaty 
with an Asian country and, as is argued in Chapter 6, in some respects represents 
the ‘high water mark’ of Australian exceptionalism.  
                                                          
275 See the discussion in Taylor, above n 92, 502. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE 1969 TREATY WITH JAPAN 
6.1 Australia’s first taxation treaties with Asian countries were with Japan and Singapore, 
and both were concluded in 1969. The influence of the 1967 UK Treaty (discussed in 
Chapter 5) can be seen in both treaties, despite there being preliminary discussions 
in relation to them before the 1967 UK Treaty was entered into. This chapter is 
confined to the negotiation and drafting of the 1969 Japan Treaty. At the time, 
Australia was a net capital exporter to Singapore, which was a new and developing 
country recovering from the effects of World War II. As a result, the 1969 Singapore 
Treaty contained several features (most notably a tax sparing provision) which were 
atypical of Australia taxation treaties in the period discussed in this thesis. 
The Increasing Importance Of Japan As An Australian Trading Partner 
6.2 Australia and Japan entered into an Agreement on Commerce in 1957,1 which 
granted Australia access to the Japanese market for raw materials but reserved the 
right to impose restrictions on Japanese imports that might damage Australian 
industries. A 1963 Protocol to that agreement removed this restriction, and 
contemporary comment regarded it as effectively placing Japan in an equivalent 
trade position in relation to Australia as the United Kingdom, Canada and New 
Zealand.2  
6.3 By the end of the 1960s, Japan was Australia’s major export destination. In 1949–50, 
4% of Australia’s total exports were to Japan, with 18.9% and 8.2% of total exports 
being to the UK and US respectively. By 1962–62, exports to Japan, at 16.1% of the 
total, had nearly drawn level with exports to the UK, at 18.7%, and had surpassed 
exports to the US, at 12.3% of total exports. By 1969–70, Japan was the major 
destination of Australian exports, at 25% of exports, dwarfing exports to the UK, at 
10.9% of exports, and exports to the US, at 13.4% of exports.3 Japan increased in 
importance as a supplier of imports to Australia in the same period without becoming 
the major source. In 1949–50, 1.3% of Australia’s imports came from Japan 
compared with 53.1% from the UK and 9.9% from the US. By 1969–70, 12.4% of 
                                                          
1  Agreement on Commerce between the Commonwealth of Australia and Japan, 6th July 1957, 
Australian Treaty Series, 1957, No. 15 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1997). 
2  Protocol between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan amending the 
Agreement on Commerce of 6 July 1957, 5th August 1963, Australian Treaty Series, 1964, 
No. 11, (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1996). A contemporary discussion of the 
Protocol and of the prospects for trade between Australia and Japan is Z M Kubinski, 
‘Australia–Japan Trade Treaty, 1963’ (1963) 35 Australian Quarterly 51–62. 
3  R A Foster, Australian Economic Statistics: 1949–50 to 1994–95, Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Occasional Paper No. 8, Sydney, 1996, 9, Table 1.4. 
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Australia’s imports came from Japan while 21.8% came from the UK, with 24.9% 
coming from the US.4  
1964 Preliminary Negotiations For A Treaty With Japan 
6.4 As discussed at 4.1, Australia received a proposal for a tax treaty from Japan in 
1959. Following Australian Cabinet decision 386 on 10th August 1962,5 Australia took 
advantage of a visit by a Japanese delegation to NZ to have an exchange of 
information about the two countries’ tax systems in Canberra in August 1962. 
Following these discussions, the Australian Cabinet on 28th November 1962 agreed 
that: 
‘preliminary discussions and correspondence between officials with the 
Japanese should continue, without commitment on either side, with a view to 
defining the issues involved and the points of difference which might be likely 
to arise in any formal negotiation. At a later stage the Treasurer will give the 
Cabinet an opportunity to consider the issues involved and decide whether or 
not it would be desirable to enter into formal negotiations with Japan for such 
an agreement.’6 
Correspondence between Australian and Japanese officials continued, with the 
Japanese providing a draft taxation treaty to the Australians in March 1964.7 An 
Australian delegation of officials led by D L Canavan, Commissioner of Taxation,8 
met with Japanese officials (including the Director of the Tax Bureau and the Chief of 
the International Tax Affairs section of the Tax Bureau) in Tokyo from 20th to 30th 
April 1964.9 The following discussion of the negotiations is based on: Canavan’s 
                                                          
4  Foster, above n 3, 13, Table 1.6. 
5  Cabinet decision 383 was discussed at 4.52. 
6  The Cabinet minute is quoted in D L Canavan (Australian Commissioner of Taxation) to The 
Commonwealth Treasurer (H E Holt) 27th July 1964, paragraph 1 in NAA, ATO file, Pt 1, 83. 
Canavan was appointed as Commissioner of Taxation in January 1963 and held that position 
until his retirement in November 1964. Leigh Edmonds, Working for All Australians: A Brief 
History of the Australian Taxation Office (Australian Taxation Office, Canberra, 2010) 134. 
7  Canavan, above n 6, 83, para 2. The draft, dated 28th February 1964, is Annexure B to 
Canavan, above n 6, and is hereafter referred to as ‘the 1964 Japanese Draft’.  
8  D L Canavan (Commissioner of Taxation, hereafter referred to as ‘Canavan’), Belcher (First 
Assistant Commissioner of Taxation), D S Craik (Assistant Secretary, Treasury), W J R Hill 
(Assistant Executive Officer, Taxation) accompanied by G H Clark of the Australian Embassy 
as an interpreter. The names of the Taxation and Treasury officials present at the discussions 
in Tokyo are set out in Canavan, above n 6, 60, addendum. That Clark accompanied the 
delegation as an interpreter is stated in ‘Double Taxation, Australia – Japan, Record of Tokyo 
Talks’ [hereafter ‘Record of 1964 Tokyo Talks’] in NAA, ATO file, Pt 1, 41, para 1. 
9 Canavan, above n 6, 83, para 3. The full Japanese delegation is listed in Record of 1964 
Tokyo Talks, 41, para 2. 
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report to the Treasurer; the 1964 Japanese Draft; and the Record of 1964 Tokyo 
Talks. 
6.5 Canavan’s report noted that because of Australia’s provisions for unilateral relief from 
international double taxation,10 Australian residents did not generally require relief 
from international double taxation.11 However, as the Japanese foreign tax credit 
system did not extend to the 10–11% local ‘enterprise tax’,12 a Japanese company 
might, in some circumstances, need greater credit than Japanese law allowed to 
ensure adequate relief from double taxation, and Japanese shipowners trading with 
Australia could also find the present position unsatisfactory.13  
6.6 The Japanese draft was used as the basis for the discussions.14 The draft had clearly 
been influenced by the 1963 draft OECD Model. The Japanese draft contained three 
structural features which differed from the 1963 draft OECD Model but which were 
consistent with previous Australian treaties. These were: (a) the presence of a 
definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’; (b) the absence of an ‘other income’ 
article; and (c) the absence of a capital gains or alienation of property article. 
Nonetheless, the draft contained some articles (dealing with interest and non-
discrimination), derived from the 1963 draft OECD Model, which had not been in 
previous Australian treaties. Canavan drew the Treasurer’s attention to the features 
of the draft that were most likely to raise important policy issues, particularly given 
the Australian Cabinet decision 386 and the then Treasurer’s and Treasury view15 
that, as a starting point, Australia should avoid making concessions on shipping 
profits and dividends absent compelling reasons for doing so. The features 
specifically identified were:16 (a) a residence basis of taxation for income from the 
operation of ships and aircraft;17 (b) limiting source country taxation to 10% on 
                                                          
10  At the time, foreign source income (other than dividends) was exempt from Australian income 
tax under ITAA 1936 (Cth) s23q where it had been subject to tax in a foreign country. 
Australia gave a foreign tax credit under ITAA 1936 s45 for dividends received by residents 
sourced in non-Australian profits. No credit was given where a dividend sourced in Australian 
profits was paid by a foreign company to an Australian resident. The Commissioner noted 
that, to this extent, double taxation was imposed on Australian residents investing in Japan, 
but pointed out (Canavan, above n 6, 82, para 10) that this situation had not arisen in 
practice.  
11  Canavan, above n 6, 82, para 11. 
12  Canavan, above n 6, 82, para 8. 
13  Canavan, above n 6, 82, para 11. Record of 1964 Tokyo Talks, 3–7 contains further details of 
Japanese taxes and of the Japanese system of corporate-shareholder taxation at the time. 
14  Canavan, above n 6, 81, para 16 and Record of 1964 Tokyo Talks, 41, para 4. 
15  See the discussion at 4.49 and 4.52. 
16  Canavan, above n 6, at pp80–1, para 17. 
17  Article V of the 1964 Japanese Draft. 
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dividends paid by a 25% or more subsidiary to a parent;18 (c) limiting source country 
tax on other dividends to 15%;19 (d) limiting source country tax on interest to 10%;20 
(e) limiting source country tax on royalties to 10%;21 and (f) a non-discrimination 
article.22 While Canavan’s letter discussed each article in the draft in more detail, the 
discussion here is confined to Canavan’s conclusions on the preliminary 
negotiations. 
Commissioner’s Conclusions On The Preliminary Negotiations 
6.7 Canavan believed there was a genuine desire on the part of Japan to conclude a 
taxation treaty with Australia. Shipping and air transport, dividends, and industrial or 
commercial profits were the major areas where significant issues still needed to be 
resolved. 
6.8 The biggest issue concerned the treatment of shipping and air transport. The draft 
gave exclusive right to tax shipping and aircraft profits to the residence country of the 
operator (whether owner or charterer) irrespective of the place of registration of the 
ship or aircraft. Australian acceptance of a residence basis in all of its previous 
treaties had only been in respect of ships and aircraft registered in the residence 
country of the operator. There would be a gain to Japanese shipping companies of 
£225,000 annually from tax concessions proposed in the draft. While there would be 
gains to Qantas and Dominion Navigation Co. Ltd, these would not offset the 
revenue loss to Australia of a treaty consistent with the draft. Canavan speculated 
that the Japanese, as they had done with NZ, might agree to a 50% exemption for 
shipping and air transport. In the NZ context, this meant a NZ source country tax rate 
of 5% on shipping and air transport. This was the current source country rate on 
shipping and air transport under Australian domestic law, but the Tokyo discussions 
did not suggest that the Japanese would be satisfied with the status quo on shipping 
and air transport.23  
6.9 Canavan considered that, while Japan would continue to press for a lower source 
country rate on non-portfolio dividends, it might agree to a uniform rate of 15% on all 
dividends paid by Australian companies to Japanese residents. The revenue cost to 
                                                          
18  Article VI(1) of the 1964 Japanese Draft. 
19  Article VI(1) of the 1964 Japanese Draft. 
20  Article VII of the 1964 Japanese Draft. 
21  Article VIII of the 1964 Japanese Draft. 
22  Article XVIII of the 1964 Japanese Draft. 
23  Canavan, above n 6, paras 162 and 163. 
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Australia would at that time be small but might ‘ultimately assume large 
proportions’.24 
6.10 Whether industrial or commercial profits should be taxed on an ‘attributable to’ basis, 
as required by the draft, or on a ‘force of attraction’ basis as adopted in the Australian 
draft, did not at that time involve any significant revenue problem. Canavan 
expressed the theoretical justification for a force of attraction basis in these terms: ‘It 
might be said that once an enterprise sets up a permanent establishment in a 
country, it should be taxed on its full income in the same manner as applies to a 
resident, except where a specific exemption is granted.’ While considering that the 
force of attraction basis was more appropriate, Canavan nonetheless suggested that 
Australia could concede the ‘attributable to’ basis if a matching concession were to 
be made by Japan.25 
6.11 Canavan made only brief concluding comments on other articles in the draft. The 
discussions had not significantly clarified the Japanese attitude to interest and 
royalties. The draft proposed a 10% limit on source taxation of interest and literary 
royalties, whereas Australia’s previous treaties had not restricted source taxation of 
interest but had taxed some royalties on a residence basis.26 As some changes were 
being considered in Australian law, the Australian delegation could not press these 
issues. Canavan recommended that ‘the view in relation to these classes of income 
may need further revision if discussions are to be resumed’.27 There were matters 
still to be resolved in relation to other classes of income, but these would not stand 
permanently in the way of a treaty.28 The use of the credit method to relieve double 
taxation was seen as being sound in principle, but some matters of detail would need 
to be resolved.29 Canavan opposed inclusion of a non-discrimination article, 
describing the need for it as not being apparent and commenting that, in practice, it 
would conflict with existing provisions in both Australian and Japanese law.30 
                                                          
24  Canavan, above n 6, para 164. 
25  Canavan, above n 6, para 166. It is unclear what ‘Australian draft’ Canavan was referring to 
here. The 1965 Australian model discussed in Chapter 4 adopted an ‘attributable to’ rather 
than a ‘force of attraction’ basis. Previously, Australia had assessed likely revenue impacts of 
treaties with potential partners on the basis that a treaty concluded with them would follow the 
1957 Canada Treaty. That treaty also used an ‘attributable to’ basis. Australia’s most recently 
concluded treaty at the time of Canavan’s letter was the 1960 NZ Treaty, which adopted a 
‘force of attraction basis’. A ‘force of attraction’ basis had been adopted in the draft Australia 
sent to Canada as part of the negotiations leading to the 1957 Canada Treaty. 
26  See the discussion at 2.90 and at 3.59 to 3.63 and 3.127.  
27  Canavan, above n 6, para 165. 
28  Canavan, above n 6, para 166. 
29  Canavan, above n 6, para 168. 
30  Canavan, above n 6, para 169. 
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6.12 The Japanese proposed to report to their government, and Canavan presumed that 
the Japanese government would suggest further negotiations in Canberra and 
considered that further detailed and extensive negotiations would be required before 
a treaty could be approved by the Commonwealth government.31 The revenue cost to 
Australia of a treaty consistent with the Japanese draft would be £232,500 annually 
but would trend upwards. Of this, £225,000 would come from the exemption for 
shipping and aircraft profits and £7000 would come from reductions in source country 
tax on dividends (the remaining £500 would come from other concessions). With a 
50% reduction in source country taxation of shipping and air transport instead of a 
total exemption, the revenue cost would be £120,000 annually and would again trend 
upwards.32 Canavan considered that any treaty with Japan would ‘almost certainly be 
put forward as a pattern for agreements with other countries. In particular, countries 
with mercantile marine could be expected to seek in relation to shipping a concession 
at least as favourable as any that may be granted to Japan.’33 
The Decision To Commence Formal Negotiations 
6.13 Following the Tokyo talks in 1964, between August 196434 and November 1965 the 
Australian Treasury, with limited liaison with the ATO, drafted a Cabinet submission 
                                                          
31  Canavan, above n 6, para 170. 
32  Canavan, above n 6, paras 18–19 and para 171. 
33  Canavan, above n 6, para 172. 
34  The earliest draft was prepared by D Steele Craik, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in 
August 1964 when it was circulated to several Treasury officials. Craik wanted to avoid 
including the views of other departments in the submission and suggested that this could be 
achieved by making it a submission by the Treasurer. Minute Paper, D Steele Craik to Mr 
Visbord, Mr Moore, Mr Ross, Mr Hunter, 19th August 1964, NAA, Treasury file, Pt 1. A later 
version of the draft submission was sent to the Commissioner of Taxation for comment on 4th 
February 1965. F C Pryor, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to 
The Commissioner of Taxation, Canberra, ACT, 4th February 1965, NAA, Treasury file, Pt 1. 
M J Belcher, Second Commissioner of Taxation, replied on 21st May 1965. The substance of 
Belcher’s reply was: that he could see no commensurate advantages to be gained by 
Australia from a tax treaty with Japan that would offset revenue losses from a shipping 
exemption; that prior to negotiations, Australia should either modify its approach to shipping 
concessions so that there was scope for negotiation or indicate to Japan that it was not 
prepared to agree to a shipping exemption or to reduced rates of source taxation on dividends 
unless there were commensurate advantages for Australia; that Japan might not agree to 
continue negotiations on that basis; and that it was an oversimplification to say that tax 
treaties were primarily concerned with preventing double taxation as they were also 
concerned with reducing the weight of taxation on direct cross border investment and that for 
double taxation to be relieved one or both countries must forego revenue. M J Belcher, 
Second Commissioner of Taxation to M W O’Donnell Esq, First Assistant Secretary, 
Department of the Treasury, Canberra, ACT, 21st May 1965, NAA, Treasury file, Pt 1. The 
Treasury file contains a handwritten note by M W O’Donnell, evidently in reply to Belcher’s 
letter, which strongly asserts that the primary purpose of a double tax treaty was to relieve 
double taxation. The document appears to be an original, and it is unlikely that it was ever 
sent to Belcher. ‘The Role of Double Tax Agreements’, M W O’Donnell, First Assistant 
Secretary, undated, NAA, Treasury file, Pt 1. The formal reply to Belcher was made by F C 
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recommending that Australia enter into formal negotiations for a taxation treaty with 
Japan. The submission and a memorandum by the Acting Secretary of the 
Treasury35 to the then Treasurer36 recognised that in the negotiations, difficulties 
were likely to arise in relation to the taxation of shipping profits, dividends, interest 
and royalties. Consistent with Cabinet submission 305, tax treaties were clearly seen 
by Australian Treasury officials as being primarily concerned with preventing double 
taxation.37 As Australia unilaterally prevented residence source double taxation, 
international double taxation was not seen as a significant problem for Australia. 
Japan was regarded as seeking concessions that would affect Australian revenues 
adversely and would raise serious questions of principle.38 A summary of the main 
issues accompanying the submission recognised that unilateral credit provisions did 
not remove all international double taxation conflicts (conflicts of source rules and 
issues concerning the allocation of head office and branch expenses are explicitly 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Pryor as Acting First Assistant Secretary on 22nd September 1965. Pryor’s reply: states that to 
offer any concessions on shipping in negotiations with Japan would be inconsistent with 
Cabinet decision 386 and would expose Australia to further requests for concessions by other 
maritime nations; agrees that Japan should be advised in advance of Australia’s negotiating 
position, as had been the case in the 1964 talks in Tokyo (a suggested amendment of the 
relevant paragraph in the submission was forwarded with the letter); and argues, in more 
measured tones than in O’Donnell’s handwritten note, that the principal purpose of double tax 
treaties was to relieve double taxation and, while conceding that treaties also served other 
purposes, argues that reallocations of revenue had been made as a means of securing 
agreements. Pryor’s letter closed by indicating that if Belcher were otherwise satisfied with the 
modified draft, officers of both departments could settle minor points of drafting. F C Pryor, 
Acting First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to The Commissioner of 
Taxation, Canberra, ACT, 22nd September 1965, NAA, Treasury file, Pt 1. Belcher replied to 
O’Donnell on 22nd October 1965. In that letter Belcher: recommended that the amended 
paragraph be altered to read ‘no change’ instead of ‘no significant change’; clarified the 
paragraphs in his earlier letter dealing with a different basis for negotiation; argued that the 
role of double taxation treaties should be brought to the attention of ministers to make them 
aware of the attitudes of other countries; agreed that detailed matters could now be 
considered by officers of both departments; and questioned whether, if Japan agreed to 
taxing shipping profits on a source basis, it would be wise to press for taxation of air transport 
on a residence basis but conceded that Japan might not be concerned about this if Japan 
contemplated having air services to Australia. A memorandum dated 24th March 1965 from M 
W O’Donnell, First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury to The Treasurer (Harold 
Holt), refers to a draft submission having been prepared, and comments that Treasury was 
waiting on comments by the Commissioner of Taxation. This memorandum is contained in 
‘Double Taxation Agreements With Other Countries, Policy, Part 5’, NAA, Series Number 
A7571, Control Symbol 63/3972. 
35  R J Randall was Acting Secretary of the Treasury at the time. 
36  The Treasurer at the time was Harold Holt. 
37  Cabinet Submission 305 was discussed at 4.33 to 4.51. 
38  Draft ‘Confidential for Cabinet, Submission, Double Taxation Agreement – Japan/Australia’, 
Harold Holt, Treasurer, undated and Minute Paper by R J Randall, Acting Secretary, 10th 
November 1965, ‘The Treasurer, Proposed Double Taxation Agreement – Japan/Australia’. 
Both documents are contained in NAA, Treasury file, Pt 2. A copy of the draft submission is 
also contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 1. Randall’s Minute Paper records that the draft 
submission and a draft attachment setting out the main issues had been prepared in co-
operation with the taxation branch. 
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mentioned) and that taxation treaties had an ‘assurance’ function of maintaining, for 
the duration of the treaty, a consistent treatment in the taxation of cross border 
activities by the treaty partner. Nonetheless, the document ‘Japan/Australia – The 
Main Issues’ observed that: 
‘Some countries, including Japan, view double taxation agreements also as a 
means of achieving a re-distribution of the taxation revenue arising from 
income flowing between countries which are parties to an agreement. To this 
end, a mutually [emphasis in the original] satisfactory allocation is sought by 
means of a re-arrangement of classes of income which each country is free to 
tax and by the restriction of the rate of tax which may be charged in the 
country of source of income. Such countries want Australia to reduce (or in 
some cases eliminate completely) its taxation on certain classes of income – 
and in particular on shipping profits and dividends. We are a capital importing 
country and dependent on foreign shipping so that the flow of dividends, 
interest and shipping profits from Australia to other countries greatly exceeds 
any inflow of these kinds of income. Consequently were we to grant these 
requests without obtaining something in return we would reduce our revenues 
by a substantial and, over the years, growing amount.’39 
6.14 Japan/Australia – The Main Issues recommended, and Cabinet approved, application 
of the 1962 policy that, generally, Australia should not make concessions on shipping 
profits and dividends unless ‘some clearly commensurate advantage could be 
negotiated for Australia’, but that the Australian concessions should not go as far as 
they had in Australia’s previous treaties.40 Commensurate advantages ‘in the taxation 
field’ were to be preferred, and in any case, when negotiating with a capital exporting 
maritime nation the onus should be on the other country to suggest an appropriate 
commensurate advantage41 Foreign relations considerations were dismissed as 
                                                          
39  ‘Double Taxation Agreement – Japan/Australia – The Main Issues’, Annexure A to Draft 
Cabinet Submission unnumbered of 1965 (hereafter ‘Main Issues’), in NAA, Treasury file, Pt 
2.  
40  See the discussion at 4.49 and 4.52 of the content of the 1962 Cabinet decision. 
41  Main Issues, pp3–5. Treasury and ATO officials consistently expressed the view in internal 
correspondence that they could see no commensurate advantages for Australia in a tax treaty 
with Japan having regard to the revenue losses associated with a shipping exemption and a 
reduced rate of source taxation on dividends. The ATO view was that Japan would not agree 
to a treaty which did nothing more than formalise the credit arrangements, and that unless the 
Australian view that no concessions would be granted was made clear to the Japanese prior 
to negotiations, then undesirable acrimony might result during the actual negotiations. For an 
example of the ATO view see M J Belcher, Second Commissioner of Taxation to M W 
O’Donnell Esq, First Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Canberra, ACT, 21st 
May 1965, NAA Treasury file, Pt 1. Examples of the Australian Treasury view can be seen in: 
Minute Paper to Mr Craik from E M W Visbond, 28th September 1964, NAA, Treasury file, Pt 
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reasons for entering into taxation treaties42 Providing an incentive for foreign non-
portfolio investment was no longer seen as a benefit of a taxation treaty. Rather, 
taxation treaties were seen as setting dangerous precedents, with the existing 
treaties being ‘somewhat of an embarrassment’.43 The concessions sought by Japan 
and provided in Australia’s existing taxation treaties would be attractive to countries 
either with maritime fleets calling at Australia or with equity investments in Australia. 
A treaty granting such concessions to Japan, unless commensurate benefits were 
secured for Australia, was regarded as making it ‘more difficult than ever to refuse 
similar treatment to other countries’.44 
6.15 Neither the draft submission nor Randall’s memorandum nor Japan/Australia – The 
Main Issues envisaged any commensurate advantage to Australia of a treaty with 
Japan. Nonetheless, the draft submission recommended that, as the Japanese still 
sought formal negotiations notwithstanding their awareness of Australia’s attitude, 
Australia should agree to the Japanese request. The draft submission recommended 
that the Australian negotiators should make it clear that Australia’s attitude to the 
concessions Japan sought had not changed since the Tokyo talks. The Japanese 
would have an opportunity to either offer commensurate advantages to Australia or 
enter into a treaty which did little more than formalise the existing unilateral 
provisions relieving international double taxation between Australia and Japan.45 
Based on the Tokyo talks, it was considered that agreement would be reached on 
items other than the main issues in dispute, namely: shipping and aircraft profits; 
dividends; interest; royalties; taxes covered; and non-discrimination. The revenue 
cost of Australia adopting the concessions sought by the Japanese was estimated at 
£257,500.46 
6.16 The draft submission and Japan/Australia – The Main Issues recommended a hard 
line on all the contentious issues. Revenue cost is given overwhelming importance in 
these documents. Revenue cost is seen as trumping all other considerations unless 
they produce a commensurate (and implicitly, tangible) benefit to Australia.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1; Minute Paper to Mr Craik from A D Ross, 18th September 1964, NAA, Treasury file, Pt 1; 
and Minute Paper to Mr Craik from A D Ross, 24th August 1964. 
42  Japan/Australia – The Main Issues contained the observation: ‘I do not think our relations 
with, say, the U.K. or the U.S.A. are demonstrably better today because over ten years ago 
we agreed to concessions in double tax agreements which cost our revenue more and more 
each year.’ Main Issues, p6. 
43  Main Issues, pp6–7. 
44  Main Issues, p7. 
45  This is particularly clearly stated in the draft submission, pp3–4. Similar points are also made 
in Randall’s memorandum and in Main Issues. 
46  Main Issues, pp8–9; draft submission, pp2–3. 
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6.17 On shipping and aircraft profits, Japan/Australia – The Main Issues, after 
summarising the Japanese arguments for residence taxation, commented: ‘None of 
these arguments alters the plain fact that if Australia were to grant the Japanese 
request it would mean an immediate loss of Australian revenue of about £250,000 
per annum, a loss which would increase as shipping grows between the two 
countries.’ Japan/Australia – The Main Issues then observed that while the Japanese 
shipping companies were in a loss position, residence taxation would benefit them; 
however, once they became profitable, it would benefit the Japanese Treasury, and 
commented that it was ‘difficult to see why Australian taxpayers should be called 
upon to subsidise the Japanese Treasury’. Although Australia had conceded a 
residence basis of taxation in its first four agreements (on more restrictive terms than 
Japan proposed), those could be distinguished because the latter three all followed a 
precedent set by the 1946 UK Treaty, which was entered into ‘when our special ties 
with the UK were extremely strong’ and replaced the arrangements under the 
Dominion Income Tax Relief System,47 which was characterised as being ‘more 
onerous’. Although Japan was a ‘very good customer of ours’, and although the 
balance of payments was in Australia’s favour, granting concessions to Japan in a 
taxation treaty would not, Japan/Australia – The Main Issues suggested, have a 
significant effect on Japan’s trading with Australia. As long as Australia’s prices were 
competitive and its supplies adequate, Japan would continue to buy from Australia 
irrespective of the existence or otherwise of a taxation treaty. Having bought from 
Australia, Japan would ensure that ships were available to transport the goods to 
Japan. The Japan – NZ Taxation Treaty, and the statements by Japanese officials on 
shipping profits at the Tokyo talks, raised the possibility that Japan might agree to a 
50% reduction of source taxation of shipping profits, but that this should only be 
agreed to if Japan were to offer an acceptable direct commensurate concession.48 
Japan/Australia – The Main Issues recommended that, irrespective of the outcome of 
the Japanese negotiations, Australia should renegotiate the complete exemption of 
shipping profits in its existing treaties, because they provided an ‘awkward precedent’ 
in discussions with other countries and cost Australia substantial revenue, particularly 
in relation to the UK.49 
                                                          
47  The Dominion Income Tax Relief System was discussed at 2.22 to 2.30. 
48 Main Issues, pp11–14 and draft submission, p4.  
49  Main Issues, p14. 
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6.18 The attitude on aircraft profits was the opposite. There, since Australia would gain a 
revenue benefit from adopting a residence basis, the recommendation was to accept 
this aspect of the Japanese proposal.1 
6.19 The response to Japan’s request for a reduced rate of source country tax on non-
portfolio dividends was clearly affected by political issues of economic nationalism. 
Rather than neutrality between different forms of business organisation being the 
objective, the emphasis was on encouraging local (as distinct from foreign) 
investment. The comment on the Japanese proposal in Japan/Australia – The Main 
Issues was: ‘I think we might first look at this last proposition (the 10% source country 
rate request on non-portfolio dividends), which touches on fundamental questions of 
our attitude to overseas investment and local participation. I do not wish to open up 
this controversial question in this context. But I do not think that we could seriously 
contemplate giving a concession in respect of dividends paid by an Australian 
resident company because not less than 25 per cent of the shares are owned by a 
company resident in Japan. Still less could we justify such a concession on dividends 
paid by a wholly-owned Japanese subsidiary. I recommend strongly that in 
negotiations we do not accept this clause.’2  
6.20 In the case of dividends generally, despite Japanese arguments that a reduction of 
source country taxation on dividends to 15% would encourage investment and was 
consistent with both Australia’s previous taxation treaties and the 1963 draft OECD 
Model, the view in Australia/Japan – The Main Issues was that the Japanese foreign 
tax credit meant that few, if any, Japanese investors were subject to double taxation. 
The recommendation was that Australia should not concede 15% on dividends 
unless the Japanese could offer something commensurate in return that would also 
grow in value at a similar rate to the cost of a 15% dividend rate to Australia.3 The UK 
and Canada had requested that Australia not levy undistributed profits tax on their 
companies with Australian branch profits. In those negotiations, the request had been 
rejected ‘with vigour’ and the recommendation was again to refuse to limit Australia’s 
taxing jurisdiction by agreeing to the similar Japanese request.4  
6.21 Hard lines were recommended in the case of interest and royalties where the 
Japanese had requested that source taxation be limited to 10%. Despite the 
Japanese argument that gross basis taxation of interest above 10% would render on-
                                                          
1  Main Issues, p14. 
2  Main Issues, p15 and draft submission, p4. 
3  Main Issues, p16 
4  Main Issues, p17. 
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lending uneconomic, adopting the Japanese proposal was seen as creating ‘a most 
undesirable precedent’ because Australia had not made any concessions on interest 
in its previous treaties. The recommendation was that Australia reject the Japanese 
draft interest article.5 On royalties, despite the similarity of the Japanese request to 
the royalty provisions in the 1946 UK Treaty and the OECD Model, and the Japanese 
argument that it was difficult to relate expenses to royalties and the unfairness of 
taxation of gross royalties at normal rates, Japan/Australia – The Main Issues 
recommended: ‘I do not think we should be prepared to … concede to them very 
nearly as much as we have to the UK. We should … continue to impose tax at 
normal rates on net royalties derived in Australia.’6 
6.22 Taxes covered was one of the contentious issues in the Japanese draft. Consistent 
with its previous treaties, Australia wanted local and state taxes to be excluded from 
the scope of the treaty on the basis that it was not ‘desirable from the legal or 
practical viewpoint’ to cover the possibility of income taxes being reintroduced by the 
Australian States.7 
6.23 The final contentious issue was the inclusion of a non-discrimination article in the 
Japanese draft. Both Japan/Australia – The Main Issues and the draft submission 
recommended outright rejection of the non-discrimination article. Reservations were 
expressed about Australia binding itself in any way by a non-discrimination article, 
and its conflict with (unspecified) provisions in Australian law was pointed out.8  
6.24 As early as March 1965, Australia was aware that the UK might introduce changes to 
the manner in which it taxed companies, and this might mean that the UK would 
request renegotiation of the 1946 UK Treaty, which Australia was no longer satisfied 
with.9 Following correspondence and negotiations between Australian and UK 
officials, it was eventually agreed that the 1946 Treaty would be renegotiated in 
Canberra in March or April 1967.10 As Australian resources for negotiating taxation 
treaties were limited, and as Australia considered that any request for formal 
negotiations should come from Japan as the initiator of the previous discussions, the 
decision was made to negotiate a new taxation treaty with the UK first. This decision 
had significant consequences for the taxation treaty that Australia and Japan 
eventually entered into in 1969. In the 1967 UK Treaty, Australia agreed to a uniform 
                                                          
5  Main Issues, pp17–18 and draft submission, p4. 
6  Main Issues, p18 and draft submission, p4. 
7  Main Issues, p19 and draft submission, p4. 
8  Main Issues, p19 and draft submission, p4. 
9  O’Donnell to Holt, 24th March 1965, above n 34. 
10  See the discussion at 5.9 to 5.10. 
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withholding tax rate of 15% on dividends, and to withholding tax rates of 10% on 
interest and royalties. Australia had also agreed to residence taxation of shipping and 
aircraft profits.11 When negotiations with Japan were resumed in 1968, the 
concessions Australia made in the 1967 UK Treaty meant that it was difficult for 
Australia to maintain the hard line adopted in the draft submission of November 
1965. At the same time, by removing the exemption for dividends paid by wholly 
owned Australian subsidiaries of UK companies, and by not including capital gains, 
other income or non-discrimination articles, the 1967 UK Treaty provided the basis 
for an Australian argument that Japan could not expect any greater concessions than 
Australia had granted to the UK.  
6.25  A further Japanese request for a taxation treaty was made during a visit by the 
Japanese Prime Minister in early 1968. As a consequence, the then Treasurer12 
made a Cabinet submission that Australia should enter into tax treaty negotiations 
with Japan.13 Treasury advice indicated that, of all the countries that were seeking to 
enter into taxation treaties at the time, Japan was chosen because of its importance 
in Australia’s trade. The Japanese had felt discriminated against by Australia not 
having a taxation treaty with them, and the Treasury view was that not to conclude a 
taxation treaty with Japan would be regarded by Japan as a discriminatory and 
unfriendly act.14  
6.26 McMahon’s submission to Cabinet in January 1968 indicated that Australian 
negotiations with Japan would be based on the ‘source’ principle. Australia expected 
that the Japanese would look to the 1967 UK Treaty as a guide to the sort of 
agreement that they could negotiate with Australia. The 1967 UK Treaty was now 
seen as a sound basis for the negotiation of agreements with other countries.  
6.27 The key features of the 1967 UK Treaty relevant to the negotiations with the 
Japanese were seen as: (a) taxation at source with a credit being given by the 
residence country; (b) credit for underlying tax where a corporate shareholder held a 
more than 10% interest in the paying company resident in the other country; (c) 
                                                          
11  See the discussion at 5.140. 
12  William McMahon was Treasurer at the time. McMahon became Treasurer in January 1966, a 
position he held until November 1969. Peter Sekuless, ‘Sir William McMahon’ in Michelle 
Grattan (ed), Australian Prime Ministers (New Holland Publishers, 2000) 313–23. 
13  William McMahon (Treasurer), Cabinet Taxation Committee, Submission No. 9 ‘Double 
Taxation Agreement With Japan’, 25th January 1968 (hereafter ‘McMahon, 1968’), p1. A copy 
of the submission is contained in NAA, Prime Minister’s file. 
14  The Treasury advice is set out in Memorandum by the Economic Policy Branch, Prime 
Minister’s Department, to The Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, ‘Double Taxation 
Agreement with Japan Benefits for Australia’, 1 July 1968. NAA, Prime Minister’s file, 
Document 52.  
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dividend taxation at source normally being limited to 15% except for some 
transactions through Permanent Establshments; (d) shipping profits from 
international operations to be exempted by the source country; (e) international 
airline profits to be exempted by the source country; (f) interest taxation at source to 
be limited to 10%; (g) source taxation of royalties (except mineral royalties) to be 
limited to 10% of the gross royalties;15 and (h) a suitable definition of PE to ensure 
that the source country had ample right to tax profits originating in it.16  
6.28 Given the preliminary discussions, Australia expected Japan to request, as had 
Britain, the inclusion of a non-discrimination article in the treaty. McMahon’s 
submission recommended rejecting the non-discrimination article as limiting 
Australia’s freedom of action regarding the relative taxation treatment of residents 
and non-residents.17  
6.29 Difficulties were anticipated in relation to the treatment of dividends and shipping 
profits where it was anticipated that the Japanese would adhere to the views they 
had expressed in the preliminary negotiations.18 Australia could not but agree to a 
reduction in dividend withholding tax to 15% under the proposed treaty, as this was 
the rate in its existing treaties. Lowering the level of ownership at which a credit for 
underlying tax was available would reduce the benefit to the Japanese Treasury from 
reductions in withholding tax. Given the imbalance of investment flows between 
Australia and Japan, the reduction in withholding taxes would result in a loss of 
revenue to Australia, although the submission anticipated that this might be offset by 
increased revenues resulting from increased Japanese investment in Australia. 
Australia anticipated that the Japanese would seek a higher level of participation as 
the trigger for the underlying foreign tax credit, because 25% ownership was the 
trigger under Japanese domestic law. 
6.30 On shipping profits, the submission recognised that the Japanese would be reluctant 
to agree to a provision that was out of line with international practice and 
discriminated against them as compared with the UK and the USA. Australia would 
seek to retain its full taxing rights over coastal shipping.19 
                                                          
15  Significant changes in the Australian taxation of royalties were contemplated, and the 
submission recognised that the Japanese would need to be advised of these. 
16  McMahon, 1968, pp2–3.  
17  McMahon, 1968, pp4–5. 
18  See the discussion at 6.8 and 6.9. 
19  McMahon, 1968, pp5–9. 
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6.31 When Cabinet was considering the Treasurer’s submission, the Australian Minister 
for Trade and Industry, John McEwen,20 made a written submission arguing that the 
treaty would be balanced in favour of Japan. McEwen considered that the treaty 
would be likely to promote Japanese investment in Australia at a time when 
investment in, and exports to, Japan were highly regulated. He was particularly 
concerned about the effects a treaty that favoured Japanese shipping lines would 
have on Australian aspirations in overseas shipping. Australian companies had seen 
a market opportunity for the bulk shipping of minerals from Australia to Japan, and if 
Japanese shipping were to be exempted from Australian tax, this would be seen as 
discrimination in favour of Japan and against Australian shipping with possibly 
adverse Australian political ramifications. On access to Japanese markets, McEwen 
sought a ‘private understanding’ that government to government negotiations would 
take place as issues arose and that Australian applications would be sympathetically 
treated. McEwen favoured a time limit being placed on any exemption of Japanese 
shipping from Australian taxation under the treaty.21  
6.32 Cabinet resolved that ‘it would not be prudent to introduce into the negotiations … the 
matters proposed by the Minister for Trade and Industry in his submission … the 
Minister’s proposals on these issues should be considered by Cabinet in the light of 
general trade and other interests … when any agreement negotiated by officials is 
before the Government for approval.’ Cabinet authorised the Treasurer to make 
arrangements for the negotiation of a treaty with Japan, with the Japanese 
negotiators being advised that any treaty negotiated at the official level was subject 
to Australian government approval and subsequent ratification by the Parliament, and 
that the government may wish to consider the agreement in the light of financial, 
shipping and trade relations between the two countries. The Cabinet Taxation 
Committee resolved that these conclusions and this proposed approach be subject to 
confirmation by Prime Minister John Gorton before negotiations commenced.22  
6.33 Gorton did not approve of the issues raised by McEwen being excluded from the 
negotiations. Rather, in Gorton’s view, the Japanese should be told during the treaty 
negotiations that the expectation was that Australian business would receive 
                                                          
20  John McEwen was Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Prime Minister at the time. 
Peter Golding, ‘Sir John McEwen’ in Michelle Grattan (ed), Australian Prime Ministers (New 
Holland Publishers, 2000) 287–96. 
21  J McEwen (Minister for Trade and Industry), Cabinet Taxation Committee, Submission No. 13 
‘Double Taxation Negotiations with Japan in Relation to Policies on Overseas Trade and 
Shipping’, January 1968. A copy of the submission is contained in NAA, Prime Minister’s file. 
22  Cabinet Minute, Taxation Committee, Sydney, 31st January 1968, Decision No. 10 (Tax). A 
copy of the minute is contained in NAA, Prime Minister’s file. 
 
 
 
272 
272 
equivalent opportunities for investment in Japan as Australia accorded to Japanese 
business, and that an exchange of letters to this effect would be sought. Gorton’s 
view was that the Japanese be asked to exclude shipping from the treaty, and that if 
they refused, a clear indication be given that Australia would regard this as an issue 
of significance when considering the ratification of the treaty. While being genuinely 
negotiated for, these points were not to be pressed to the point of preventing 
agreement in principle at the official level.23 The application of this approach was to 
nearly derail the negotiations several times. 
The 1968 Japanese And Australian Drafts  
6.34 Japan sent a draft treaty to Australia in January 1968, and Australia developed a 
draft treaty dated February 1968. Relevant features of the two drafts will be 
discussed as they are considered in the negotiations and correspondence between 
Australian and Japanese officials. Where relevant, the Australian draft as used in 
these negotiations will be contrasted with the 1965 Australian model discussed in 
Chapter 4.24 
The Negotiations In Canberra, 5th to 16th February 1968 
6.35 Negotiations were held in Canberra from 5th to 16th February 1968. The Australian 
Commissioner of Taxation, E T Cain, led the Australian delegation, and the Secretary 
of the Australian Treasury, Sir Richard Randall, attended the initial sessions.25 The 
Japanese delegation was headed by Tateo Suzuki, Counsellor, Embassy of Japan. 
The Japanese Ambassador to Australia, Kai, attended the initial session.26 During the 
negotiations, drafts prepared by each of the negotiating countries were studied and 
information was exchanged about each country’s taxation system. A tentative draft 
treaty was prepared by Australia following the negotiations. The tentative draft 
                                                          
23  Gorton to McMahon, 4th February 1968, NAA, Prime Minister’s file, Document 8. 
24  The Japanese draft did contain an alienation of property Article whereas the Australian draft, 
the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty and the 1965 Australian model did not. Strangely, the 
record of negotiations makes no mention of the alienation of property article. Perhaps this 
was because, as will be seen below, the Australian draft was used as the de facto guide to 
the sequence of discussion. The final version of the treaty did not contain an alienation of 
property article.  
25  Other members of the Australian delegation were: W J O’Reilly (Second Commissioner of 
Taxation), T P Boucher and W J Hill (from the ATO), P Daniel and A D Ross (from the 
Australian Treasury), A H Borthwick and P Knight (from the Department of External Affairs) 
and R B Hutchinson (from the Attorney-General’s Department). Australian record of 
negotiations (hereafter ‘Record of Negotiations’) for 5th February 1968, p1 and attached list of 
participants. NAA, ATO file, Pt 1. 
26  The other members of the Japanese delegation were: Takekoshi, Honda, Comi, Kito, Ikeda 
and Hakayama. Record of Negotiations for 5th February 1968, p1 and attached list of 
participants. 
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reflected the current views of both delegations on the broad form that a treaty 
between the countries might take. It was agreed that Australia would prepare a ‘more 
precise’ draft for study by the Japanese delegation. The negotiations did not reach 
the stage at which a draft treaty could be initialled by the heads of the respective 
negotiations. It was agreed that further negotiations should take place, probably in 
Tokyo.   
6.36 Eventually the delegations agreed to give parallel consideration27 to the drafts of both 
countries, with the Australian draft being the de facto guide to the sequence of 
discussion,28 and to work through them on a clause by clause basis rather than 
concentrating on major issues.29 The following discussion concentrates on issues of 
major dispute in the negotiations and on issues of particular relevance to the 
questions examined in this thesis. 
The First Discussion Of Drafts On A Clause By Clause Basis 
Definitions Of Australia and Japan 
6.37 The definitions of ‘Australia’ in the Australian draft included the following sub-
paragraph: 
‘(v) any area outside the territorial limits of the Commonwealth and the 
said Territories in respect of which there is for the time being in force a 
law of the Commonwealth or of a State or part of the Commonwealth 
or of a Territory aforesaid dealing with the exploitation of any of the 
natural resources of the sea-bed and sub-soil of the continental 
shelf’30 
The Japanese were concerned that this definition of Australia might weaken Japan’s 
case in a fisheries dispute with Australia, which might go to the International Court of 
Justice. Australia was particularly concerned to preserve its taxing rights over profits 
                                                          
27  Cain had proposed that the Australian draft be adopted as a working document, but Japan 
argued that, as its draft was based on the draft OECD Model, and as Japan had adequate 
translations of the OECD phraseology, at least parallel consideration should be given to the 
Japanese draft. Cain agreed to refer to the Japanese draft on phraseology as far as possible, 
but the question of which draft should be used as a working document was not resolved. 
Record of Negotiations 7th February 1968 p1. 
28  Record of Negotiations 4th day reports that the Japanese appeared to be regarding the 
Australian draft de facto as a guide to the sequence of discussion. 
29  Japan proposed working through the drafts on a clause by clause basis while Cain had 
proposed concentrating on major issues. Record of Negotiations indicates that a clause by 
clause approach was tentatively agreed on. 
30  An identical provision was contained in Article 2(v) of the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty. No 
equivalent extension to the continental shelf was contained in the 1965 Australian model.  
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from the exploitation of offshore petroleum and natural gas resources. It was agreed, 
via an exchange of letters, that the application of the definition would be limited to the 
taxation of petroleum exploitation products.31 Subsequently, Ikeda tabled a draft 
protocol relating to the continental shelf. The Australian record of negotiations 
indicates that there was some informal criticism of the draft; and the Memorandum of 
Understanding dated 16th February identified the issue of the continental shelf as a 
subject of further discussion following completion of the negotiations.32  
Taxes Covered 
6.38 The Australian draft described the Australian taxes covered as: ‘the Commonwealth 
income tax, including the additional tax upon the undistributed amount of distributable 
income of a private company’.33 Takekoshi asked if there were no local taxes in 
Australia. O’Reilly replied that, for negotiation purposes it could be taken that there 
was only the Commonwealth income tax. He pointed out that the States had the right 
to impose income tax, but to do so would break down the then existing financial 
arrangements between the Commonwealth and the States. The Commonwealth 
could not contemplate the possibility of the States imposing an income tax or of 
seeking to bind the States by bringing their income tax under a treaty. O’Reilly 
stressed the importance to Australia of preserving the right to impose undistributed 
profits tax, commenting that while it was very unlikely that a Japanese-owned 
company would ever have to pay the tax, Australia would not yield its right to impose 
it.34 
6.39 The Japanese draft had referred to the Japanese taxes covered as being: ‘the 
income tax and the corporation tax’. There was an exchange of technical information 
on: (a) the likelihood of ex Australian dividends being caught for Japanese enterprise 
tax; (b) the degree to which credit for foreign tax could be carried forward in time or 
from central Japanese taxes to local taxes; and (c) the treatment of capital gains 
under Japanese and Australian law. The Australian record of negotiations indicates 
that Japan was considering replacing the enterprise tax with a value added tax.35 
Australia at the time did not regard capital gains as being income under ordinary 
concepts and usages, but did include gains from undertaking a profit-making scheme 
                                                          
31  Record of Negotiations, 8th February 1968, p1. 
32  The Memorandum of Understanding is discussed at 6.68 to 6.69. 
33  This was identical to Article 1(b) of the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty and was substantially 
the same as Article 1(b) of the 1965 Australian model, with the only difference being that the 
1965 Australian model referred to the ‘Commonwealth income tax and social services 
contribution’. 
34  Record of Negotiations, 8th February 1968, p2. 
35  Record of Negotiations, 8th February 1968, p2. 
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in assessable income. The Australian record of the negotiations for the 4th day then 
states: ‘The tax coverage of the Australian draft was agreed; that of the Japanese 
draft (after amendment) was agreed provisionally.’36  
Residence 
6.40  The definition of ‘resident’ in the Japanese draft was identical to Article 4(1) of the 
draft OECD Model with the addition of ‘place of head or main office’ after ‘residence’ 
and before ‘place of management’.  
The Japanese draft provided that dual residence of individuals be resolved by mutual 
agreement between the competent authorities. For corporate dual residence, it 
proposed, as a tie-breaker, being the place where the company had its head or main 
office. In the Australian draft, several definitions interacted to determine the 
residence of individuals and companies. These were: 
‘ “Australian corporation” means a company which is a resident of Australia 
and which does not have its head or main office in Japan.’ 
‘ “Australian resident” means a person, other than a company, who is resident 
of Australia and is not resident in Japan and is an Australian corporation.’ 
‘ “Japanese corporation” means a juridical person having its head or main 
office in Japan, or any organisation without juridical personality treated for the 
purposes of Japanese tax as such a juridical person, which is not a resident 
of Australia.’ 
‘ “Japanese resident” means any individual who is a resident in Japan and is 
not a resident of Australia and a Japanese corporation.’ 
‘ “resident in Japan” has the meaning which it has under the laws of Japan 
relating to Japanese tax.’ 
‘ “resident of Australia” has the meaning which it has under the laws of 
Australia relating to Australian tax.’37 
The issues raised in discussion were the possibility of dual residence under 
Japanese and Australian law, the merits and demerits of eliminating dual residence 
and the possible machinery for resolving it, and the importance to Australia of 
                                                          
36  Record of Negotiations, 8th February 1968, p2. 
37  The Australian drafting echoed, but did not replicate, Article 3 of the 1967 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty. By contrast, Article III of the 1965 Australian model used an approach more like that 
taken in the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty. 
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preserving taxpayers’ rights of access to the courts. Takekoshi suggested that 
Australia might agree to the residence provisions of the UK – Japan Treaty or those 
in the 1967 UK Treaty. In defining a ‘Japanese corporation’ and in excluding a 
company with its ‘head office in Japan’ from the definition of Australian company, the 
Australian draft adopted the language used in the corporate dual residence tie-
breaker in the Japanese draft and would have meant that a company which was 
otherwise an Australian resident under the definition in ITAA 1936 (Cth) s6(1) would 
be a Japanese resident for treaty purposes. The Australian record of negotiations 
indicates that the matter was left unresolved for further negotiation at this stage.38 
Industrial Or Commercial Profits 
6.41 When the definitions of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ were discussed, Comi 
questioned the Australian definition, which, consistent with earlier Australian treaties 
and the 1965 Australian model,39 specifically excluded items from the scope of 
‘industrial or commercial profits’. Comi indicated that Japan would prefer the simpler 
OECD formula. O’Reilly responded by saying that simpler meant looser. Takekoshi 
commented that there may be some merit in the Australian technique of defining by 
inclusion and then exclusion, but that the current Australian wording did not properly 
accommodate the Japanese approach to capital gains. The Australian record of 
negotiations notes that it was agreed to look at the matter again after drafting 
changes.40 
Permanent Establishment  
6.42 Progress was made towards agreeing provisionally on individual paragraphs of 
Article 3 dealing with PEs, with minor drafting changes being agreed. The Japanese 
requested that some provisions, probably those where the Australian definition was 
broader than the OECD Model,41 be removed to an exchange of letters, something 
                                                          
38  Record of Negotiations, 8th February 1968, p3. 
39  See the discussions in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
40  Record of Negotiations, 8th February 1968, p3. The definition was contained in Article 2(1)(k) 
of the Australian draft but differed from the definitions in Article II(1)(m) of the 1965 Australian 
model and Article because it did not expressly exclude contracts or obligations to provide the 
services of public entertainers (or athletes, in the case of the 1967 UK Treaty). 
41  The definition of ‘permanent establishment’ in Article 3 of the Australian draft largely followed 
the definition in Article 4 of the 1967 UK Treaty. The definition differed from the definition in 
the Japanese draft of January 1968 in several respects. Under the Japanese definition, the 
minimum time period for a building site, construction, installation or assembly project to be an 
example of a permanent establishment was 12 months, whereas it was six months in both the 
Australian draft and the 1967 UK Treaty. The period had been 12 months in the 1965 
Australian model. The agency permanent establishment provision in the Japanese draft used 
the phrase ‘in the name of’, whereas the Australian model and the 1967 Australia – UK Tax 
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which the Australians pointed out would not have the force of law in Australia and 
hence would be ineffective for tax purposes. Immediately after noting this Japanese 
request, the record of negotiations states: ‘Mr Cain firmly told the Japanese that they 
could not ask of Australia more or better conditions than it had recently given to the 
UK. For Australia to do otherwise would cause embarrassment towards the UK and 
also create difficulties at the political level.’42 This is a clear instance of using 
previous Australian treaty practice and the treaty practice of third countries and the 
potential sensitivities of third countries as a negotiating tactic.  
Industrial or Commercial Profits And Associated Enterprises  
6.43 Four issues dominated the discussion of the industrial or commercial profits article of 
the Australian draft. These were: (i) Australian taxation of film businesses controlled 
abroad; (ii) Australian taxation of insurance with non-residents; (iii) the application of 
ITAA 1936 (Cth) s38; and (iv) paragraph 5, which gave the taxation authorities 
discretion to determine a price where there was insufficient information to ascertain 
an arm’s length price. Items (i), (ii) and (iv) had their origins in provisions contained in 
the 1946 UK Treaty, while item (iii) had its origin in the 1953 US Treaty. Equivalent 
provisions had been included in all Australian taxation treaties after the 1953 US 
Treaty. The Australian record of the negotiations stated: ‘Explanations were given by 
the Australian delegation and the possibilities of accommodation through redrafting 
were examined. Further consideration will be given to these matters.’43 Similar 
Japanese objections were raised in relation to paragraph 5 of Article 5 (Associated 
Enterprises) to those raised in relation to Article 4(3), and similar solutions were 
explored.44  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Treaty used the phrase ‘on behalf of’. The Australian draft, and the 1965 Australian model 
and the 1967 UK Treaty all contained substantial equipment provisions, while the Japanese 
draft and the 1967 UK Treaty did not. The Australian draft and the 1967 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty contained a ‘supervisory activities’ provision, but the Japanese draft did not. The 
Australian draft, the 1965 Australian model and the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty all 
contained provisions dealing with the situation in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR (NS) 656, while 
the Japanese draft did not. 
42  Record of Negotiations, 9th February 1968, p5. 
43  Record of Negotiations, 10th February 1968, p1. Both the 1965 Australian model and the 1967 
UK Treaty contained all these features. 
44  Record of Negotiations, 10th February 1968, p1. 
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Dividends45 
6.44 During discussion of the dividends article, Takekoshi argued that in order to give 
equivalent treatment to foreign investment through branches and subsidiaries, the 
rate of withholding tax on dividends paid by a subsidiary should be reduced. Comi 
argued that, as Australian tax considerably exceeded Japanese tax, Australia should 
reduce its rate of withholding tax on dividends as much as possible to avoid an 
overspill of Japanese foreign tax credits. The Australian response was that, 
alternatively, Japan could allow Australian corporate tax as a credit against Japanese 
enterprise tax. No conclusion on these issues was reached on the sixth day of 
negotiations.46 
6.45 When discussion of the dividend and associated articles continued, the Japanese 
sought to have Japanese close companies exempted from Australian undistributed 
profits tax. The Australians’ response was extremely negative, indicating that they 
would not so much as initial a draft providing for such an exemption. The Australian 
record of the negotiations observes that there was considerable discussion of the 
significance of, and the necessity for, the concept of ‘beneficial ownership’ in the 
Australian draft. While the Japanese agreed with the concept in principle, both 
parties undertook to re-examine the drafting of the expression.47 
Interest 
6.46 The Japanese draft contained a definition of ‘interest’ similar to that in the 1963 draft 
OECD Model, but after the phrase ‘debt claims of every kind’ and before the phrase 
‘as well as all other income’ inserted the following words: ‘and any excess of the 
amount repaid in respect of such debt-claims over the amount lent’. The Australian 
draft, by contrast, did not define ‘interest’. In discussion of the interest article, the 
Australians commented that the Japanese definition was ‘lengthy and prolix’ and that 
it was better to leave the meaning of interest to the practice in the legal system of 
each treaty partner country. Then the Australians pointed out that the ‘definitional 
clutter’ in the Japanese draft could be dispensed with if the ‘other income’ article in 
the Japanese draft were omitted. The Australian thinking here would appear to be 
that less detailed definitions were required in the absence of an ‘other income’ article 
                                                          
45  As noted in Chapter 4, the 1965 Australian model did not include provisions reducing source 
taxation of dividends. Article 7 of the Australian draft contemplated, but did not specify the 
extent of, uniform reductions in source taxation of dividends An overall upper limit of source 
taxation of 15% had been specified in the 1967 UK Treaty. 
46  Record of Negotiations, 10th February 1968, p2. 
47  Record of Negotiations, 12th February 1968, p1. 
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because, in those circumstances, each country would retain full source country 
taxing rights in relation to categories of income not fitting within defined terms. If this 
were the argument, it does appear to have great logical force; however, it has to be 
seen in the context of a discussion in which the Australians had just referred to 
provisions in the Japanese draft as ‘definitional clutter’. Consistent with prior 
Australian practice, the Australians then indicated that Australia was opposed to the 
‘other income’ article because it was inconsistent with the Australian view that the 
source country, as a matter of principle, had the initial right to tax.48  
6.47 The Australian draft did not contain a source rule in relation to interest.49 The source 
rule in the Japanese draft corresponded with paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the 1963 
draft OECD Model. The Japanese questioned the absence of a source rule from the 
Australian draft. The Australian record of negotiations notes that the Australians 
argued that it was best to leave the determination of source to domestic law, pointing 
to the possible static effect of including a rule in the treaty and arguing that each side 
should be free to vary its source rules in accordance with general policy 
considerations. The Japanese then pointed out the desirability of freezing source 
rules in order to limit the liability of the residence country to give credit. The 
Australians then indicated that Australia might be willing to agree to limit credit 
obligations to the source rules at the time, provided the government was made aware 
that if domestic source rules changed, it would be complicating the situation and 
risking the imposition of double taxation.50  
Royalties 
6.48 When Article 9 dealing with royalties was discussed, the delegations agreed that 
there was no substantial difference between the definitions of royalty proposed by 
each side. Australia at the time still taxed royalties paid to non-residents on an 
assessment basis.51 O’Reilly explained contemplated changes to Australian taxation 
of royalties paid to non-residents, which would nonetheless continue to be taxed on a 
net basis. Comi suggested that a 10% rate was the ideal. The Australian draft set the 
                                                          
48  Record of Negotiations, 12th February 1968, p1. The 1967 UK Treaty had been the first to 
contain an interest article. Article 8 in the Australian draft (dealing with interest) was identical 
to paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (6) of Article 9 of the 1967 UK Treaty. 
49  The 1965 Australian model did not contain a source rule for interest. As discussed at 5.128, 
source rules for interest were inserted in the 1967 UK Treaty to resolve conflicts between the 
UK and Australian law on the source of interest and royalties to enable credit to be given for 
tax deducted from ‘criss-cross’ dividends paid by dual resident companies. It appears that 
Australia considered that providing a source rule for interest was only necessary where 
specific conflicts and problems were identified. 
50  Record of Negotiations, 12th February 1968, pp2–3. 
51  See the discussion at 2.17. 
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maximum rate of source country tax on royalties at 20%.52 Notwithstanding that 
McMahon’s Cabinet submission of January 1968 had indicated that the government 
would agree to a 10% rate on interest,53 O’Reilly replied by noting that 20% was the 
rate in Japanese domestic law and indicating that this would seem to be an 
appropriate level; he pointed out that Japan would not be giving anything away and 
that Australia would be reducing from as high a level as 42.5%. The difficulty for 
Australia at this point was that in the 1967 UK Treaty, it had agreed to a 10% rate on 
royalties.54 O’Reilly explained that this had represented an increase in source basis 
taxation, because under the 1946 UK Treaty, royalties had been taxed on a 
residence basis. This was somewhat misleading, because under the 1946 UK Treaty, 
Australia taxed mineral royalties on a source basis.55 Takekoshi, referring to the 
question of precedents, then commented that if the rate of tax on royalties were not 
reduced, his government might be unwilling to continue with the agreement. At this 
point, the Australian record of negotiations notes that the qestion of rates was left for 
further discussion.56 
Other Income  
6.49  The Australians reiterated their objections to the ‘other income’ article in the 
Japanese draft, and suggested that it would be inappropriate to discuss the article 
further until the other articles had been settled.57 
Credits 
6.50 When the credit article was discussed, the Japanese questioned why the article did 
not refer to Australia providing exemption. The Australians explained that it was not 
necessary to refer to the exemption in the credit article where income was exempt 
under Australian domestic law.58 The Japanese commented on the absence of a 
credit for Japanese underlying tax. The record of negotiations notes that ‘the lack of 
                                                          
52  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9 of the Australian draft. The 1965 Australian model did not 
contain provisions setting a maximum rate for source taxation of royalties, and the 1967 
Australia – UK Tax Treaty had set a maximum source country rate on royalties of 10%. 
53  See the discussion at 6.27. 
54  See the discussion at 5.100 and 5.113. 
55  See the discussion at 2.90.  
56  Record of Negotiations, 12th February 1968, pp4–5. 
57  Record of Negotiations, 13th February 1968, p3. Neither the Australian draft nor the 1965 
Australian model contained an ‘other income’ article. As discussed at 5.121 to 5.123, 
Australia had successfully argued for it to be modified so that it only applied to tax on third 
country income and became Article 18 of that treaty. No equivalent to Article 18 of the 1967 
Australia – UK Tax Treaty was contained in the Australian draft. 
58  The Australian domestic law treatment of foreign source income was as described at 5.7. 
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need for this was also explained’.59 Presumably, the Australian reasoning here 
corresponded to the explanation that Australia had provided in negotiating the 1967 
UK Treaty.60 
6.51 Comi then disputed the 10% holding test for Japan allowing credit for Australian 
underlying tax, and pointed out that Japan had never agreed to this in any of its 
previous agreements. Cain responded by saying that he had ‘very firm’ instructions 
for a 10% test and that for Australia this had equivalent significance as the shipping 
issue had for Japan. The 10% holding test would encourage Japanese investment in 
Australia, but on a scale that would not require effective control of the Australian 
enterprise in question and would ensure that the benefit of reducing Australia’s 
withholding tax on dividends was received by Japanese investors rather than the 
Japanese Treasury. Takekoshi indicated that Australia’s views had been noted and 
that he would come back to the issue after consulting his colleagues.61 
Identification Of Areas Of Dispute 
6.52 Following the initial discussion, and a comparison of differences between the 
Australian and Japanese positions, the delegations considered that there was 
agreement, in principle, on all but the following: 
dual residence; 
industrial or commercial profits; 
shipping profits; 
the rate of withholding tax on dividends paid by a subsidiary; 
the rate of withholding tax on royalties; 
credit for underlying tax; and  
non-discrimination. 
Further discussion of the disputed points then took place.62 
 
                                                          
59  Record of Negotiations, 13th February 1968, pp3. 
60  See the discussion at 5.37, 5.73 and 5.124 to 5.128. 
61  Record of Negotiations, 13th February 1968, pp3–4. The 1965 Australian model did not 
provide for credits for underlying corporate tax. As discussed at 5.125 to 5.129, in negotiating 
the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty Australia had initially argued for a minimum shareholding 
percentage of 5% for credits for underlying corporate tax, but had agreed to a 10% minimum 
shareholding in accordance with the UK draft of September 1966. 
62  Record of Negotiations, 14th February 1968, pp1–2. 
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Further Discussion Of Disputed Issues 
Non-Discrimination 
6.53 On 14th February 1968, O’Reilly explained why Australia did not want a non-
discrimination clause. (O’Reilly’s reasons are not stated, but presumably they 
corresponded with those raised in Canavan’s report,63 in Japan/Australia – The Main 
Issues and the draft submission,64 and in McMahon’s Cabinet submission.)65 O’Reilly 
pointed out the inconsistencies of the clause as drafted, but the record of 
negotiations does not specify what the inconsistencies were thought to be. Cain 
referred to the failure of the UK to have a non-discrimination clause included in its 
1967 UK Treaty.66 O’Reilly said that from Australia’s viewpoint, the clause was not 
negotiable and could not even be weighed in the overall balance of concession and 
counter concession. Takekoshi then said that he would return to the point 
subsequently.67 
Shipping  
6.54 The shipping article was a major point of disagreement between the two delegations. 
Australian domestic law taxed shipping on an arbitrary basis68 while Japan, 
consistently with international practice, wanted shipping taxed on an entirely 
residence basis. The Australians at this point in the negotiations saw conceding a 
residence basis on shipping as a means of obtaining concessions on other articles. 
The issue was complicated by the intervention of the Department of Trade and its 
Minister, John McEwen, and the Prime Minister, John Gorton, seeking separate 
discussions on allowing greater Australian investment in Japan and shipping to 
Japan.69  
6.55 The record of negotiations for 14th February 1968 shows Cain trying to distinguish the 
concession of shipping on a residence basis in the 1967 UK Treaty, but does not 
state the basis on which the distinction was made. Cain stated that for Australia to 
make a concession on shipping, the price in the tax treaty talks (as distinct from the 
separate ‘political talks’) must be very high because Australia regarded a concession 
                                                          
63  See the discussion at 6.13. 
64  See the discussion at 6.23. 
65  See the discussion at 6.28. 
66  As discussed at 5.129 to 5.140, after prolonged negotiations and in response to offsetting 
concessions the UK had agreed to exclude a non-discrimination article from the 1967 
Australia – UK Tax Treaty. 
67  Record of Negotiations, 14th February 1968, p2.  
68  See the discussion at 5.26 and at 2.14.  
69  See the discussion at 6.31 to 6.33. 
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on shipping as ‘tipping the scale of comparative advantages against it in a way which 
could not be redressed’. When asked what Australia wanted in exchange for a 
shipping concession, Cain replied that Australia would be prepared to talk on 
royalties and dual residence but would want a 10% test for underlying tax credit and 
a uniform flat rate for withholding tax on dividends. The absence of a non-
discrimination article would not be acceptable as a balancing item.70  
6.56 Takekoshi replied that Japan regarded the separate ‘political talks’ on Australia’s 
shipping and investment interests as being the price for a shipping exemption in the 
taxation treaty. He described the political issues as ‘hanging like a spectre’ over the 
tax treaty talks. As long as this was the case, Japan would insist on full exemption on 
shipping. But for the political issues, Japan considered that there could be scope for 
discussion on the shipping exemption. Takekoshi indicated that he would like to have 
the shipping article set aside from the rest of the agreement and not taken into 
account in balancing other provisions in the agreement. If Japan did not meet 
Australia’s wishes on the political issues, then the situation would change and the 
shipping article could be reintroduced into the tax treaty negotiations.71 
6.57 Cain’s reaction was that following Takekoshi’s proposition would effectively mean the 
end of the talks. Both sides wanted to have an in principle document produced by 
16th February for consideration by ministers, who might then wish to take other 
factors into account. In Cain’s view, extraneous (clearly a reference to the ‘political 
issues’) matters should be looked at after completion of the agreement, not during its 
negotiation. Cain indicated that Australia wanted an agreement to emerge from the 
discussions which approximated, as far as possible, its agreement with the UK.72 
6.58 Cain suggested a compromise under which a shipping exemption would be put in the 
draft as part of what Japan required and that consideration could then be given to 
clauses that might be put in as part of what Australia required. Takekoshi agreed, but 
opened up wider issues for discussion by pointing out that the Japanese had already 
made concessions on the basis that the shipping question would be decided in 
Japan’s favour.73 Cain questioned whether any of Japan’s concessions were of any 
substance. When Comi pointed to changes in the definition of PE, Cain replied that 
Australia already had the definition in its amended form in the 1967 UK Treaty and, 
as the initiator of the talks, Japan could not seek to obtain more from its treaty with 
                                                          
70  Record of Negotiations, 14th February 1968. 
71  Record of Negotiations, 14th February 1968. 
72  Record of Negotiations, 14th February 1968. 
73  Although not explicitly stated, it appears from the context that Mr Takekoshi was referring to 
the shipping profits article in the treaty being decided in Japan’s favour. 
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Australia than the UK had. O’Reilly added that the present state of Australian law had 
not prevented Japanese investment into Australia, and that there were radically 
divided views in Australian politics as to the extent to which foreign investment 
should be encouraged.74 
Final Offsetting Concessions In The Negotiations  
6.59 Cain summarised the result of this tortuous discussion of 14th February 1968, stating 
that: (a) a shipping clause based on the Japanese model would be inserted in the 
draft; (b) Australia would ask Japan to change its attitude on levels of ownership for 
foreign underlying tax credits and on the rate of withholding tax on dividends paid to 
a subsidiary; (c) Australia would agree to talk on dual residence and royalties; and (d) 
if agreement was possible on these, a draft might be produced. Otherwise Australia 
would not agree to the Japanese clause on shipping, and that and associated issues 
of disagreement would have to be the subject of a joint memorandum of 
understanding setting out the points of difference. Takekoshi concurred with this 
summary and plan for further discussions.75 
6.60 Both sides used the dispute over shipping as a bargaining point in relation to other 
aspects of the treaty. The session on the ninth day of negotiations closed with 
Takekoshi indicating that he was inclined to adopt the Australian position on dual 
residence but required clarification of technicalities. O’Reilly indicated that, in view of 
the inclusion of the Japanese version of the shipping article, Australia would 
tentatively propose a uniform rate of 15% on dividend withholding tax and would 
continue to propose a 20% rate on royalties.76 
6.61 Australia tabled a redraft on 15th February which took into account all points agreed 
on the previous day.77 Discussions continued on 15th and 16th February, with 
agreement eventually being reached on 16th February through a series of matching 
concessions. On 15th February, Takekoshi indicated acceptance of Australia’s 
                                                          
74  Record of Negotiations, 14th February 1968. 
75  Record of Negotiations, 14th February 1968, p5. The shipping article in the Japanese model 
differed from both the 1963 draft OECD Model and from the shipping article in the 1967 UK 
Treaty. The Australian draft contained an article dealing with aircraft profits but not with 
shipping profits. The 1965 Australian model did not contain an article dealing with taxation of 
shipping and aircraft profits. Article 7 of the Japanese draft read: ‘(1) Profits from the 
operation of ships and aircraft in international traffic carried on by an enterprise of a 
Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State; (2) the provisions of paragraph (1) shall 
likewise apply in respect of participations in pools, in a joint business in an international 
operations agency of any kind by enterprises engaged in the operations of ships or aircraft in 
international traffic.’  
76  Record of Negotiations, 14th February 1968, p5. 
77  Record of Negotiations, 15th February 1968, p4. 
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position on dual residence and the residence of a payer of a dividend. Cain then 
observed that this meant that the areas of disagreement were shipping, dividends, 
credits for underlying tax, and royalties, with shipping outweighing all the other points 
at issue. For Australia to agree to a shipping exemption, it would be necessary for 
Japan to agree with Australia’s position on the other points.78  
6.62 Cain, clearly keen to obtain agreement on a draft treaty, pointed out that if Japan as 
a result of the ‘political talks’ found itself with an over-burdensome commitment, it 
would be free to withdraw its conditional concurrence from the various provisions of 
the draft treaty.79 
6.63 Discussion then shifted to the threshold for credits for underlying tax. Comi reiterated 
that Japan had never used a threshold as low as the 10% threshold that Australia 
sought. He then offered a ‘tax sparing’ or ‘matching credit’ system for withholding tax 
on dividends. Under this approach, if Australian tax on dividends were reduced to 
15%, Japan would continue to give a foreign tax credit (applying to all shareholders, 
not just corporate shareholders) for Australian tax of 30%. In addition, full credit for 
Australian underlying corporate tax would be given to corporate shareholders 
meeting the 25% ownership test in Japanese domestic law. The Australians rejected 
this offer, concluding that some of the benefit from Australia reducing its rate of 
withholding tax would flow to the Japanese Treasury and that there would still be 
some incentive for Japanese firms to acquire controlling interests in Australian 
enterprises. It is not entirely clear that these points were made to the Japanese at 
this time.80  
6.64 When source taxation of royalties was discussed, Comi indicated that Japan would 
extend the ‘tax sparing’ or ‘matching credit’ offer to royalties if Australia reduced its 
rate of source country tax on royalties to 10%. The Australians indicated that this was 
unacceptable. They indicated that if Japan would agree to Australia’s proposals for 
underlying tax credits, Australia would reduce its source country tax on royalties to 
10%,81 but that if Japan did not agree to those proposals, Australia would revert to 
20% on royalties.82  
6.65 The Australian position on royalties appears to have been a critical negotiating tactic, 
as Takekoshi then indicated his delegation’s in principle agreement to the Australian 
                                                          
78  Record of Negotiations, 15th February 1968, p1. 
79  Record of Negotiations, 15th February 1968, p2. 
80  Record of Negotiations, 15th February 1968, pp2–3. 
81  The initial offer was 15%, but Record of Negotiations indicates that ‘this was later dropped to 
10%’. 
82  Record of Negotiations, 15th February 1968, p3. 
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proposal on credits for foreign underlying tax. As this would be the first time Japan 
had agreed to a 10% threshold, he wished to obtain confirmation from Tokyo; he 
noted that if approval were not forthcoming, the whole position would be thrown open 
again. O’Reilly then invited Takekoshi to point out to his government that in the draft, 
Australia would be making ‘notable concessions’ on shipping and on the rate of 
withholding on royalties and dividends.83 
6.66 The shipping and aircraft profits article was considered on 15th February, and 
substantial redrafting was done.84 O’Reilly was concerned that the absence of a 
definition of coastal shipping in the 1967 UK Treaty made that agreement deficient in 
a way that he did not want to see repeated in the treaty with Japan.85 The definition 
of coastal shipping was discussed subsequently, but the issue was not resolved by 
the end of the negotiations and was left pending86 on the basis that: the principles of 
the draft Australian agreement Article 6(1) and (4) were accepted by Japan; that 
Japan would consider the exemption of Australian shipping from Japanese enterprise 
tax;87 and that Australia would give further consideration to the treatment of bare boat 
charter monies.88 
6.67 On 16th February, Takekoshi indicated that he had received advice from Tokyo that 
the Japanese government had agreed to a 10% level for the ownership test for 
indirect credits for Australian corporate tax, provided Australia gave a full exemption 
                                                          
83  Record of Negotiations, 15th February 1968, p3. As noted at 6.27, agreeing to source taxation 
of royalties at a rate of 10% had previously been contemplated in McMahon’s Cabinet 
submission. Hence, agreeing to a 10% rate was hardly a significant concession, but originally 
asking for a 20% rate clearly appears to have been a negotiating tactic. 
84  Record of Negotiations, 15th February 1968, p3. 
85  The relevant definition in the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty was in Article 6(1), which read: 
(1) A resident of one of the territories shall be exempt from tax in the other territory on profits 
from the operation of ships or aircraft, other than profits from voyages or operations of ships 
or aircraft confined solely to places in the other territory, voyages of ships or aircraft between 
a place in Australia and a place in the Territory of Papua or the Territory of New Guinea being 
treated as voyages between places within Australia.’ A draft version of the Australia – Japan 
Tax Treaty dated 16th February includes a handwritten note indicating that the definition of 
‘coastal shipping is to be removed to the Protocol’.  
86  Record of Negotiations, 16th February 1968, p2. 
87  O’Reilly had raised the question of whether Japanese enterprise tax would be levied on 
Australian shipping engaged in international traffic through Japan. The Japanese reply was 
that this would only occur if the Australian shipper had a permanent establishment in Japan. 
O’Reilly pressed for exemption in these circumstances on the basis of adverse political 
reaction if Japanese enterprise tax were to apply to Australian ships. Record of Negotiations, 
16th February 1968, pp1–2. 
88  The Japanese had indicated that they would agree to Article 6(4) if Australia would agree to 
treat a charter fee paid by an Australian skipper to a Japanese company under a bare boat 
charter either as income from international operations or as a royalty. Record of Negotiations, 
16th February, 1968, p1. 
 
 
 
287 
287 
of Japanese shipping from Australian tax. The delegations then drafted a press 
statement and a memorandum of understanding, which was initialled.89 
The 16th February 1968 Memorandum Of Understanding 
6.68 A memorandum of understanding90 indicated that the tentative draft prepared on 16th 
February 1968 was intended to reflect the present views of the delegations as to the 
broad form that a treaty between Australia and Japan might take. Both sides agreed 
that further discussions should take place at a time to be arranged and probably in 
Tokyo. The stage at which a draft treaty could be initialled by the heads of the 
delegations had not been reached. Both sides appreciated that the preliminary draft 
was subject, in all respects, to the consideration of their respective governments, and 
that either government might wish to alter, add to or delete any item in the draft after 
taking into account any matter which it considered relevant or appropriate. It was 
agreed that Australia would prepare a more precise draft, still on a tentative basis, as 
soon as possible and would forward it to Japan for study by the Japanese. 
6.69 The memorandum commented that: 
 The provisions of Article 6 of the draft were agreed in principle on the 
understanding that: (a) Japan would give favourable consideration to 
exempting Australian ships from Japanese enterprise tax; and (b) Australia 
would give consideration to either exempting from Australian tax 
consideration received by a Japanese shipowner for a bare boat charter of a 
Japanese ship to an Australian interest for use in operations on the Australian 
coast, or treating that consideration as a royalty payment.  
 The question was discussed of whether the definition of ‘Australia’ for the 
purposes of the treaty could be extended so that it included the areas of 
continental shelf specified in Australian legislation relating to exploitation of 
petroleum. Australia sought a provision similar to the one contained in its 
1967 UK Treaty as applied to activities (including shipping) concerned with 
petroleum search and extraction.91 The Japanese considered that a provision 
                                                          
89  Record of Negotiations, 16th February 1968, pp2–3. The Record of Negotiations actually 
refers to ‘withholding tax’; however, as it appears that the final rate of dividend withholding tax 
of 15% had been previously agreed, and as the minimum shareholding for an indirect credit at 
10% was an offsetting concession against Australia agreeing to a residence basis for 
shipping, it is likely that the Record of Negotiations here meant to refer to the minimum 
shareholding requirement for the credit for underlying tax. 
90  The memorandum is contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 2. 
91  Article 2(1)(c) of the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty defined ‘Australia’ as including: ‘any area 
outside the territorial limits of the Commonwealth and the said Territories in respect of which 
there is for the time being in force a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or part of the 
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of this kind was not appropriate given present Japanese policy on the 
continental shelf. The Japanese indicated, however, that, once the Australian 
taxation policy on the continental shelf was clarified, an appropriate protocol 
could be entered into on the exploitation of petroleum from the continental 
shelf.  
The Commissioner Of Taxation’s Report To The Treasurer On The Negotiations In 
Canberra  
6.70 Cain wrote to McMahon on 23rd February 1968, reporting on the stage reached in the 
negotiations with Japan and seeking approval to resume discussions aimed at 
producing a final draft treaty for government.92 Randall had kept McMahon informed 
on the parallel discussions with the Japanese on ‘non-taxation’ matters raised by 
McEwen. Cain commented that ‘something like three full days’ of negotiations had 
been lost while the Japanese considered their position on the ‘non-taxation’ matters 
and the parallel discussions were arranged. Despite these setbacks, Cain reported 
that substantial agreement in principle had been reached by the final day of 
negotiations and that the Australian side had produced a preliminary draft reflecting 
the extent of the agreement.93 
6.71 Cain considered that the preliminary draft accorded in all respects with the objectives 
set by Cabinet, and was quite satisfactory from the Australian viewpoint.94 The 
articles in the draft dealing with permanent establishment, dividends, interest and 
royalties corresponded with those in the 1967 UK Treaty. In the negotiations, the 
Japanese had abandoned their request that a lower rate of withholding tax be applied 
to dividends paid to a company owning 25% or more of the paying company. The 
Japanese had agreed to recognise the new Australian source rules for interest and 
royalties and ‘to resolve to our advantage other difficulties of a substantial kind we 
would have otherwise encountered as to source of income’. The credit article had 
involved the important matter of ensuring that reductions in tax under the treaty went 
to Japanese companies rather than to the Japanese Treasury, and that no particular 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commonwealth or of a Territory aforesaid dealing with the exploitation of any of the natural 
resources of the sea-bed and sub-soil of the continental shelf’. While this definition was 
drafted by Australia, the definition of ‘the UK’ in the UK draft of September 1966 did include 
the UK continental shelf, and the extension of the definition of ‘Australia’ to include the 
continental shelf was not an issue of controversy in the negotiation of the 1967 Australia – UK 
Tax Treaty. 
92  E T Cain, Commissioner of Taxation to The Commonwealth Treasurer, 23rd February 1968 
(hereafter ‘Cain to McMahon, 23/2/68’), NAA, ATO file, Pt 2. 
93  Cain to McMahon, 23/2/68, p1, para 3. 
94  Cain to McMahon, 23/2/68, p3, para 5. 
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incentive was given to Japanese companies to obtain 25% or more of the shares in 
an Australian company. This would be achieved with Japan allowing a credit for 
Australian underlying tax where the Japanese investor held 10% or more of any 
Australian company. Japan had not agreed to this in any of its other 16 treaties, 
where it had always used 25% ownership as the threshold for indirect credits. 
Australia had also succeeded in persuading Japan to delete the non-discrimination 
article.95  
6.72 The area where Australia had not achieved its initial negotiating objective, but one in 
which Cabinet gave the officials the option to make concessions, was the treatment 
of shipping profits. Cain reported that the Australian case for retaining its present 
taxing rights on Japanese shipping was ‘put most forcefully’. In Cain’s view, the 
principal difficulty Australia faced in retaining its rights in a diminished scale (namely, 
a reduction of Australian tax by one half) was that there would be ‘obvious and 
substantial discrimination by Australia against their (Japanese) shipowners as 
compared with competing shipowners in the UK or the US’.96 
6.73 Cain explicitly states that it was decided on Australia’s part to ‘bargain the exemption 
of Japanese international shipping against other matters important to Australia’, and 
specifically mentions the concession by the Japanese of allowing a credit for 
underlying tax on more generous terms. Cain points out that Japan ‘made it quite 
clear that its eventual concession on credit for “underlying tax” followed from the 
Australian acceptance of exclusive residence based taxation of shipping profits’. Cain 
considered that other Japanese concessions were no doubt influenced by this 
concession.97  
6.74 On taxation of shipping between Australian ports, Australia had held out strongly for 
the right to tax such shipping even in the course of an international voyage, which 
would mean that Australia had wider rights than under the 1967 UK Treaty.98 While 
the Japanese had accepted the Australian proposal in principle, they had also put 
forward for Australia’s consideration a proposal on bare boat charters. Cain indicated 
that he had commissioned research to see if Australia could meet this request 
without foregoing revenue it might otherwise receive.99 
                                                          
95  Cain to McMahon, 23/2/68, pp1–2, para 4. 
96  Cain to McMahon, 23/2/68, p3, para 6. 
97  Cain to McMahon, 23/2/68, p3, para 7. 
98  This variation is not made clear in the Notes of Meetings discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
changes are reflected in the draft of the treaty dated 10th May 1968 discussed at 6.87. 
99  Cain to McMahon, 23/2/68, p3, para 8. 
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6.75 Cain concluded by advising that the preliminary draft would need revision on both 
sides as to technical adequacy, and that shipping and some other issues were not 
fully resolved. There would be a need for further discussions, and Cain suggested 
that they take place in late April in Tokyo. While Cain was confident that further 
discussions would ‘quickly result in a final document being ready for governmental 
consideration’,100 he considered that until the issues raised by McEwen were 
resolved, he could not produce anything other than a document which represented 
agreement at an official level on the form that a taxation treaty between the countries 
might take. Japan, in Cain’s view, would want to weigh any concessions they made 
in the taxation treaty against those they made outside it. Despite this, Cain advised 
that, in view of Gorton’s direction101 that agreement in principle on a taxation treaty 
should be reached, a document of the type he had just described should be 
produced as soon as possible. Cain sought approval to resume discussions at the 
earliest time convenient to both sides.102 
6.76 After receiving Cain’s letter. McMahon evidently asked what the issues were that 
were not fully resolved, and also raised questions in relation to the continental shelf. 
O’Reilly replied on 17th February 1968 explaining that, apart from the shipping 
questions and the continental shelf, the other matters were mainly drafting problems. 
O’Reilly further explained that as Australian policy on the continental shelf had not 
been finalised, Japan was reluctant to go so far as recognising the continental shelf 
as part of Australia for purposes of the treaty. It had been agreed that once 
Australian policy on the issue was settled, it would be dealt with in an appropriate 
protocol to the treaty that would recognise Australia’s taxing rights to income through 
exploitation of the continental shelf. As no reciprocity from Australia was involved, 
O’Reilly considered that a protocol was the appropriate technical means of dealing 
with the issue.103  
6.77 McMahon then wrote to Gorton (with copies to McEwen and to the Minister for 
External Affairs104) on 11th March advising of the progress of discussions. McMahon’s 
letter largely repeats the points made in Cain’s letter to McMahon.105 McMahon 
recommended that there be further discussions in Tokyo but that before these took 
place, that the matter go to Cabinet to consider the preliminary draft and the 
                                                          
100  Cain to McMahon, 23/2/68, p4, para 10. 
101  See the discussion at 6.33. 
102  Cain to McMahon, 23/2/68, p4, para 11. 
103  O’Reilly to McMahon, 27th February 1968. A copy of the letter is contained in NAA, Treasury 
file, Pt 9. 
104  The Minister for External Affairs at the time was Paul Hasluck. 
105  Discussed at 6.70 to 6.75. 
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discussions on the ‘non-taxation’ matters so that Australian officials could proceed to 
complete the draft for submission to, and ratification by, governments.106 
The Australian Draft Of 10th May 1968 And The Australian Commentary On The Draft 
6.78 Australia produced a revised draft and protocol dated 10th May 1968, and forwarded 
it and a commentary on it to the Japanese.107 The following paragraphs will discuss 
the more significant changes made in the Australian draft and protocol, and the 
Australian commentary on them. The Australian commentary refers to changes 
suggested by Japanese authorities. The author has not been able definitively to 
identify a document in the National Archives of Australia that sets out the changes 
suggested by the Japanese delegation. 
Industrial Or Commercial Profits 
6.79 Several changes were made to Article 4 dealing with industrial or commercial profits. 
Two changes were made to Article 4(3) to make it clear that only expenses of the 
particular enterprise qualified for deduction in calculating the industrial or commercial 
profits of the enterprise.108 
6.80 A further change was the deletion of Article 4(5) of the 14th February 1965 draft. That 
paragraph was aimed at allowing Australia to continue to apply ITAA 1936 (Cth) 
ss38–43 in calculating the profits of a permanent establishment where goods were 
manufactured out of Australia and subsequently imported into Australia and sold by 
the manufacturer in Australia either before or after importation. The Australian 
commentary stated that Australia agreed to the deletion of the paragraph and an 
appropriate provision would be inserted in the protocol.109 
6.81 A significant change was that the word ‘profits’ was substituted for the phrase 
‘income (other than capital gains)’ in Article 4(7). The Australian commentary 
indicates that the clear basis for this substitution was to avoid the implication that 
capital gains would otherwise be considered income. This is clear from the following 
statement in the Australian commentary: 
                                                          
106  An undated copy of the letter McMahon to Gorton is in NAA, Treasury file, Pt 9. This same file 
also contains Ainsley Gotto, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister to Private Secretary to 
the Treasurer, 13th March 1968, which confirms that the date of McMahon’s letter was 11th 
March 1968. Documents in the Treasury file indicate that McMahon’s letter was drafted by 
Treasury on 8th March 1968.  
107  Both the draft of 10th May 1968 and the Australian commentary (hereafter referred to as 
‘Commentary’) on the draft are contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 2.  
108  Commentary on Article 4(3).  
109  Commentary on Article 4(5) previously paragraph (4), p2. 
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‘Australia is not happy with the expression “income (other than capital gains)”. 
It carries the implication – embarrassing in the Australian political arena – that 
income either includes, or could come in the future to include, capital gains. 
We would be content merely to substitute the word “income”. However, we 
understand that that word alone would, from your standpoint, include capital 
gains and you do not wish capital gains to fall under the business profits 
provisions. We have accordingly substituted the word “profits” in the hope it 
will prove acceptable to you. It presents no problems for us.’110 
6.82 Alterations were made to Article 4 in relation to royalties in a way that was intended 
to be consistent with the then Australian view of source country taxing rights in 
relation to items not specifically dealt with in a taxation treaty. The draft of 14th 
February 1965 had simply excluded ‘royalties’. The alteration excluded ‘royalties 
(including those payments which come within the meaning of ‘royalties’ for the 
purposes of Article 9)’. The definition of ‘royalties’ in Article 9 of the draft of 10th May 
1965 excluded ‘royalties and other payments in respect of the operation of mines or 
quarries or of the exploitation of any natural resource’. The Australian commentary 
made the following comments on this alteration to Article 4(7): 
‘Royalties are defined in Article 9 expressly to exclude “natural resource” 
royalties. The intention is that the country of source may levy its full tax on 
such royalties. However, the effect of the paragraph (7) of the 14.2.68 draft is 
that, if a natural resource royalty is a profit of a trade or business, the country 
of source is obliged to find a permanent establishment to which it is 
attributable to be able to tax it. This is because it is by definition a commercial 
or industrial profit and is not removed from the scope of that definition by the 
exclusion of royalties as defined in Article 9. It is not a royalty as defined in 
Article 9.’111 
The commentary went on to concede that, having regard to Article 3(2)(f) of the 
definition of ‘permanent establishment’, the source country would probably be able to 
find a PE when natural resource royalties were the product of a trade or business. 
The commentary, however, then goes on to make the following statement: 
‘Nevertheless, it is considered that it should be made clear that a natural 
resource royalty is not a commercial or industrial profit unless effectively 
connected with a trade or business carried on through a permanent 
                                                          
110  Commentary on Article 4(5) previously paragraph (7), p2. 
111  Commentary on Article 4(5) previously paragraph (7), p3. 
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establishment. The insertion of the words “(including those payments which 
come within the meaning of “royalties” for the purposes of Article 9)” is 
designed to achieve this.’112 
It is difficult to see how the proposed change achieved the effect stated in the 
Australian commentary. The exclusion of payments which came within the definition 
of ‘royalty’ for the purposes of Article 9 did not exclude royalty payments for natural 
resources, as these were not within the definition of ‘royalty’ in Article 9. The final 
version of Article 4(7) of the treaty included these amendments. A better solution to 
achieve the desired objective would have been to exclude natural resource royalties 
from the definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’. 
6.83 The draft also amended Article 4(7)113 to exclude ‘income from operating ships or 
aircraft’ from the definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ and deleted former 
Article 4(8), which had stated that Article 4 did not apply to profits from the operation 
of ships or aircraft which were either exempt from tax under Article 6(1) or to which 
Article 6(2) applied. Articles 6(2) and (3) of the draft of 14th February 1968 were also 
deleted from the amended draft. Article 6(2) had given the source state a right to tax 
5% of the revenues from coastal shipping, while Article 6(3) excluded ships operated 
by a Japanese enterprise with a principal place of business in Australia from the 
operation of Article 6(2). The effect of this exclusion in combination with Article 6(1) 
of the treaty was that the profits of such an enterprise would be taxed at normal rates 
for non-residents, but that profits from amounts taxed in the territory of Papua New 
Guinea were excluded from those on which such an enterprise was taxed in 
Australia. The Australian commentary pointed out that Australia agreed that, 
following the deletion of Articles 6(2) and 6(3), paragraph (8) of Article (4) could not 
remain unchanged. Apparently, the Japanese had suggested an amendment which 
would have meant that the profits of coastal shipping could be taxed in the source 
country only if the shipowner operated in the source country through a PE. This was 
not acceptable to Australia, because Australia intended to tax Japanese shipowners 
trading on the Australian coast on the basis that 5% of the freights and passage 
monies were taxable income. This, the commentary explained, was the reason why 
Article 4(5) had been amended to exclude ‘income from operating ships and aircraft’ 
                                                          
112  Commentary on Article 4(5) previously paragraph (7), p3. 
113  This became Article 4(5) in the amended draft. 
 
 
 
294 
294 
from the definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ and as a consequence Article 
4(8) had been deleted as unnecessary.114  
Associated Enterprises  
6.84 A small but significant change, highlighting Australian anxieties, was made to the 
associated enterprises article. The words ‘profits which might be expected to accrue 
to the enterprise of one of the Contracting States’ were changed to ‘profits which 
might be expected to accrue to one of the enterprises’. The Australian commentary 
indicated that the article in the draft of 14th February 1968 had been at best 
ambiguous and could have been read as meaning that a contracting state was 
entitled to reconstruct the accounts of a parent company only. The amendment was 
designed, according to the Australian commentary, to make it clear that a contracting 
state could reconstruct the accounts of any of the enterprises referred to in Article 
5(1)(a) so long as it was a resident of the contracting state.115 
Shipping And Aircraft Profits 
6.85 The amendments made in the draft to Article 6 (shipping and aircraft profits) involved 
the deletion of Article 6(2) dealing with shipping between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea. The Australian commentary explained that Australia had agreed to place the 
references to voyages between Australia and Papua New Guinea in the protocol.116 
The draft added a new Article 6(2), which made it clear that the exemption from 
source basis taxation for shipping and aircraft profits extended to profits through 
participation in a pool service, a joint transport operating organisation or an 
international operating agency except in so far as the share of profits was attributable 
to voyages or operations confined solely to places in the source state. The Australian 
commentary merely noted that the paragraph provided for a pooling clause ‘along the 
lines sought by the Japanese side’.117 Further amendments to Article 6 were intended 
to make it clear that paragraph 6(3) in the draft referred only to coastal voyages. 
 
                                                          
114  Commentary on Article 4(5) previously pargraph (7), p3. 
115  Commentary on Article 5. 
116  Paragraph 5 of the protocol in the draft of 10th May 1968 provided: ‘For the purposes of 
Articles 6 and 17 profits derived from the carriage by ships or aircraft of passengers, livestock, 
mails or goods shipped in a place in Australia for discharge in the Territory of Papua or in the 
Trust Territory of New Guinea shall be treated as profits from a voyage of a ship or aircraft 
confined solely to places within Australia.’ Note that this is a significantly more specific 
provision dealing with coastal shipping than the equivalent provision in the 1967 Australia – 
UK Tax Treaty quoted at note 134 above. 
117  Commentary on Article 6(1) and 6(2), pp2–3. 
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Dividends And Interest 
6.86 Article 7(1) was amended in the draft by substituting ‘derived by a Japanese resident 
who is beneficially entitled to the dividends’ for ‘to which a Japanese resident is 
beneficially entitled’. The Australian commentary indicated that the change was made 
to ‘give expression to our view that the concessional rate should only apply where the 
person who is beneficially entitled to the dividends derives the dividends’.118 This 
reflects a view that, under Article 7(1) in the draft of 14th February 1968, the 
concessional rate on dividends might have applied where an Australian company 
paid a dividend to a person other than the person who was beneficially entitled, 
because the language of the draft of 14th February required that a Japanese resident 
be beneficially entitled to the dividends but did not in terms require that the dividend 
be either paid to or derived by that Japanese resident. Equivalent changes were 
made to Article 7(2) and to Articles 9(1) and 9(2) dealing with royalties. 
6.87  Other changes to Article 7 dealt with the situation where dividends were paid to dual 
residents. Under Article 7(4) of the 14th February 1968 draft, dividends paid by a 
company of one of the contracting states to a person beneficially entitled to them who 
was not a resident of the other contracting state were exempt from tax in that other 
contracting state. In the Australian view, Article 7(4) of the 14th February 1968 draft 
would have meant that Japan would have been obliged to exempt from its tax a 
dividend paid by a single Australian resident company to a dual resident of Australia 
and Japan, and the converse would also have been true.119 This was a consequence 
of the Australian drafting that attempted to deal with the issue of dual residence. A 
‘resident of one of the Contracting States’ and a ‘resident of the other Contracting 
State’ meant either an ‘Australian resident’ or a ‘Japanese resident’ as the context 
required. An ‘Australian resident’ and a ‘Japanese resident’ were defined in a manner 
which meant that a dual resident could be neither an Australian resident nor a 
Japanese resident.120 The draft of 10th May 1968 substituted the following 
paragraphs for Article 7(4): 
‘(4) Dividends paid by a company which is a Japanese resident and to 
which a person who is not a resident of Australia is beneficially entitled 
shall be exempt from Australian tax. 
                                                          
118  Commentary on Article 7(1) and (2). 
119  Commentary on Article 7(4) of 14/2/68 draft. 
120  See the discussion at 6.40. 
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(5) Dividends paid by a company which is an Australian resident and to 
which a person who is not resident in Japan is beneficially entitled 
shall be exempt from Japanese tax.’ 
As ‘resident of Australia’ and ‘resident in Japan’ were defined as having the 
meanings that they had under the laws of the respective countries relating to tax and 
did not exclude dual residents, the effect of new Articles 7(4) and (5) was that 
dividends paid by a company resident in one contracting state to a dual resident was 
not exempt from tax in the other contracting state. Hence, the Australian commentary 
on the redrafted provisions observed: 
‘It seems to Australia that the logical procedure in such a case is for both 
countries to tax the dividend and for it to be treated as having a source in the 
country in which the paying country is resident so that the other country will 
give credit for the tax of the country of source. The new paragraphs are, in 
association with paragraph 3(a) of Article 17 (the credit Article), designed to 
give effect to this view.’121 
Royalties 
6.88 The definition of ‘royalties’ had been redrafted in response to an earlier Japanese 
draft, and, as requested by Japan, had been relocated to Article 9. The Australian 
commentary regarded the redraft, so far as it referred to natural resources royalties, 
as being more precise. In response to a request from Japan during the Canberra 
negotiations,122 the draft included consideration for the bare boat charter of a ship 
within the definition of royalties; however, the Australian commentary indicated that 
the insertion was ‘without commitment on Australia’s part’.123 
6.89 The definition of ‘royalties ‘ in the amended draft, which was unchanged in the final 
version of the treaty, apart from matters of layout, substantially followed the definition 
in the 1967 UK Treaty but specifically included ‘the bare boat charter of a ship’.  
The final portion of the definition in the draft of 16th February 1968 had read, ‘but 
does not include royalties or other payments in respect of the exploitation of mines, 
quarries or natural resources’. This was replaced in the amended draft with the 
following language (corresponding to that used in the 1967 UK Treaty): ‘but does not 
include royalties or other payments in respect of the operation of mines or quarries or 
                                                          
121  Commentary on Article 7(4) of 14/2/68 draft. 
122  See the discussion at 6.65. 
123  Commentary on Article 9(2). 
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of the exploitation of any natural resource’. The amendment was clearly based on the 
notion that mines and quarries are better described as being ‘operated’ than as being 
‘exploited’.  
Public Entertainers  
6.90  Article 12 in the draft was a hybrid of the public entertainers articles in the Japanese 
draft of January 1968 and the Australian draft of February 1968, but it is possible that 
a further draft was developed between the drafts of January 1968 and February 1968 
and the draft of 10th May 1968. Paragraph 1 differed from paragraph 1 of the 
Japanese draft and corresponded to the Australian draft of February 1968 in that it 
contained the words ‘shall be deemed to have a source in’. These words applied the 
deemed source rule that had been included in the public entertainers article in the 
1967 Australia – UK Treaty.124 
6.91 Paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the amended draft contained elements from both 
paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Japanese draft of January 1968 and the definition of 
‘permanent establishment’ in the Australian draft of February 1968. Paragraph 2 of 
Article 12 of the amended draft read as follows: 
‘An enterprise of one of the Contracting  
States shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment in the other 
Contracting State if in the course of carrying on business it provides it carries 
on a business of providing the services of public entertainers or athletes 
referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article in that other Contracting State and 
the public entertainer or athlete controls, directly or indirectly, such 
enterprise.’ 
The words underlined and struck through represent changes made in the amended 
draft from what appears to have been an earlier draft developed between the drafts 
of January and February 1968 and the amended draft. The portion (which was 
deleted from the definition of ‘permanent establishment’ in the amended draft) of 
paragraph 2 of Article 12 deeming there to be a PE appears to derive from the 
Australian draft of February 1968, while the reference to the enterprise providing the 
services of public entertainers or athletes and to the public entertainer or athlete 
controlling the enterprise appear to derive from the Japanese draft of January 1968. 
The Australian commentary on the changes in the amended draft stated that the 
change ‘is designed to eliminate any suggestion that the paragraph is applicable only 
                                                          
124  See the discussion at 5.90 to 5.91. 
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to a company the sole business of which is providing the services of entertainers, etc. 
in the other State.’125 The final version of Article 12 in the treaty was identical to the 
version in the amended draft. 
Credits  
6.92 The Australian commentary indicates that Japanese revision to paragraph 1 of the 
credit article, Article 17, was not acceptable to Australia. A draft of 16th February 
1968 had deleted paragraph 1 of the credit article of the draft of 14th February 1968 
and of the Australian draft of February 1968, and included a handwritten marginal 
note requiring a more detailed definition relating to foreign tax credits and tax 
exemption. The amended draft reinserted paragraph 1 of the draft of 14th February 
1968. The Australian commentary explained the methods for relieving international 
double taxation under domestic law and treaties, and pointed out that Australia had 
never undertaken to apply the exemption method in tax treaties although, as a 
feature of domestic law, Australia considered itself bound to use it when it applied. 
The reason given for not referring to the exemption system in tax treaties was that 
Australia might at some future time wish to change to a credit system. Australia did 
not wish to foreshadow such a change in its tax treaties and did not wish to bind 
itself, even temporarily, to exemption if a change to a credit system was made.126 
6.93 The amended draft made changes, from the draft of 16th February 1968, to the 
source rule for dividends in Article 17(3)(a). In the draft of 16th February 1968, Article 
16(3)(a) and (b) read as follows: 
‘(3) For the purposes of this Article – 
(a) dividends paid by a company that is a resident of Australia shall be 
treated in Japan as having a source in Australia; 
(b) dividends paid by a company which is a resident of Japan shall be 
treated in Australia as having a source in Japan.’ 
In the amended draft, the source rule for dividends was confined to Article 17(3)(a), 
which read as follows: 
                                                          
125  Australian Commentary, Commentary on Article 12. 
126  Commentary on Article 17(1) previously Article 16. The commentary also made a similar point 
in relation to paragraph 4 of Article 17, which required a giving of credit for additional tax 
imposed because of adjustments under the associated enterprises article. This paragraph 
needed to be retained to deal with the possibility that Australia might in future alter their 
existing policy of exempting profits accruing to the other country as a result of these 
adjustments. Commentary on Article 17(4) previously Article 16(4). 
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‘(3) For the purposes of this Article – 
(a) dividends paid by a company which is a resident of one of the 
Contracting States shall be treated as having a source in that 
Contracting State.’ 
The Australian commentary on the amended draft pointed out that paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of Article 16 of the draft of 16th February 1968 could have had ‘undesirable 
results’. The commentary gave an example of a dual resident shareholder receiving a 
dividend from a dual resident company. In this situation, both Australia and Japan 
would be obliged to give credit for each other’s tax on the dividend. The commentary 
observed that there was ‘thus a circular effect and the result could be that the 
shareholder would bear tax on the dividend only to the extent of the difference 
between the Australian and Japanese rates of tax’. The commentary considered that 
the redrafted sub-paragraph ‘might be thought to provide a solution’ to this problem, 
and noted that it only provided a source for dividends paid by single resident 
companies and that in unusual situations like the example given, ‘the two taxing 
authorities could come to some agreement as to which country would allow credit’.127 
In fact, the deemed source rule was narrower still because it only applied where a 
single resident company paid a dividend to a single resident shareholder. The 
commentary also noted that the source rules in Article 17(3)(b) of the amended draft 
similarly meant that the deemed source was confined to situations where the interest 
or royalty was received by a single resident.128  
6.94 The source rule for royalties in the credit article was changed in the amended draft by 
adding ‘(including those payments which come within the meaning of ‘royalties’ for 
the purposes of Article 9)’ after ‘royalties’. The Australian commentary pointed out 
that the change was designed to ensure ‘that there is a source rule for natural 
resource royalties not included in the definition of “royalties” in Article 9’.129 The 
comment is confusing given that the definition of ‘royalties’ in Article 9 excludes 
natural resource royalties.130 Hence, including payments within the definition of 
‘royalties’ for the purposes of Article 9 in the source rule in Article 16 would not 
appear to extend that rule to natural resource royalties. Other changes in the source 
rules for interest and royalties were designed to align them with Australian domestic 
source rules. The Australian commentary conceded that there would need to be 
                                                          
127  Commentary on Article 17(3) previously Article 16(3). 
128  Commentary on Article 17(3)(b) previously Article 16(3)(b), p7. 
129  Commentary on Article 17(3)(b) previously Article 16(3)(b), p8. 
130  See the discussion at 6.82. 
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further discussions on whether the redraft adequately covered Japanese source 
rules.131 
6.95 Australia commented that the source rule for profits from ships or aircraft132 remained 
necessary from Australia’s perspective notwithstanding the deletion of Article 6(2).133 
Australia wanted a specific source rule for amounts that were to be taxed in either 
country as a result of coastal shipping operations.134 A subsequent draft of 10th 
September 1968 135added the words ‘or aircraft’ following ‘ships’ and amended the 
sub-paragraph after the word ‘profits’ so that the source rule was confined to ‘profits 
from voyages or operations confined solely to places in the other Contracting State’.  
The Protocol136 
6.96 Paragraph 1 was a saving provision in relation to the provisions in Divisions 14 and 
15 of Part III of ITAA 1936 (Cth) dealing with film business controlled abroad and 
insurance. The Australian commentary pointed out that ‘Provisions on the lines of the 
second sentence of paragraph (1) of the Protocol are incorporated in each of 
Australia’s other agreements.’ The commentary also noted that Australia’s other 
agreements contained a deemed source rule in relation to income that Australia 
taxed under Divisions 14 and 15, and commented that ‘the second sentence of 
paragraph (1) of the Protocol will ensure that this is also the situation in the 
Convention between Australia and Japan’.137 
6.97 Paragraph 2 preserved Australia’s right to determine profits via s38 of ITAA 1936 
(Cth). The Australian commentary pointed out that while an effort had been made to 
redraft the provision138 in a ‘less precise way’, Australia had found it necessary to 
‘stick fairly closely to the expressions used in section 38’. The paragraph did refer to 
a method of apportionment of the total profit to its various parts, as requested by the 
Japanese, although the Australian commentary pointed out that this had no 
relevance for Australian income tax law.139 
6.98 Paragraph 3, from the Australian perspective, preserved the right to use ITAA 1936 
(Cth) s136 in instances where adequate information for determining the profits of a 
                                                          
131  Commentary on Article 17(3)(b) previously Article 16(3)(b), p8. 
132  Article 17(3)(d) of the amended draft.  
133  Article 6(2) dealt with source taxation of shipping based on a 5% of gross freights. 
134  Commentary on Article 17(3)(d) previously Article 16(3)(d). 
135  The draft of 10th September 1968 is contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 2. 
136  Pargraph 5 of the protocol, dealing with the definition of ‘coastal shipping’, was discussed at 
note 165 above. 
137  Commentary on paragraph 1 of the protocol. 
138  The provision had been paragraph 4 of Article 4 of the draft of 14th February 1968. 
139  Commentary on paragraph 2 of the protocol. 
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permanent establishment was not available to the relevant competent authority. 
Similar provisions had been in every Australian taxation treaty since the 1946 UK 
Treaty, and equivalent provisions had been included in the 1965 Australian model 
discussed in Chapter 4. No comment was made about paragraph 3 in the Australian 
commentary on the amended draft.  
The Draft Cabinet Submission, June 1968 
6.99 On 11th June 1968, Cain forwarded to Randall a draft Cabinet submission,140 
prepared by the ATO, on the negotiations with Japan. Cain stated that the 
submission had been prepared ‘as a basis for bringing the matter before Cabinet at 
the appropriate time’.  
6.100 The draft submission commented that the negotiations had been conducted 
consistently with the directions of Cabinet141 and the Prime Minister’s Decision No. 10 
(Tax) of 31 January 1968, and that the preliminary draft was in all material respects 
‘in line’ with the 1967 UK Treaty. The Japanese had been advised that any draft 
agreement between officials would be subject to consideration in full by the 
Australian government as to its acceptability and that, in particular, the government 
would wish to take into account the result of the separate talks on Australian 
investment in Japan and on the operation of Australian ships in the bulk cargo trade 
between Australia and Japan.  
6.101 The draft submission summarised the effect of the preliminary draft and of the 
drafting changes since the negotiations in Canberra, and noted several respects in 
which the Australian negotiators had been successful in achieving their objectives. 
This aspect of the submission largely reiterated the points made in Cain’s letter to 
McMahon.142 The draft submission noted that Japan had agreed to omit the non-
discrimination article. Handwritten corrections on the draft indicate that the omission 
could be important if Australia ever decided to impose additional tax on the Australian 
branch profits of non-resident companies.  
6.102 The draft submission noted that, consistent with Australia’s other treaties, the draft 
conceded a residence basis for the taxation of shipping and aircraft profits, and went 
on to reiterate the points made in Cain’s letter to McMahon.143  
                                                          
140  The draft submission is contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 2.  
141  Decision No. 10 (Tax) of 31 January 1968 discussed at 6.32 to 6.33. 
142  See the discussion at 6.70 to 6.75.  
143  See the discussion at 6.72 to 6.74. 
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6.103 Outside of technical drafting and language issues, the draft submission pointed out 
that there were some matters that required further negotiation. These were: (a) 
issues relating to the continental shelf (here the draft submission largely reiterated 
the points made in O’Reilly’s letter to McMahon);144 and (b) shipping profits (here the 
draft submission reiterated the points made in Cain’s letter to McMahon145 
concerning Japanese enterprise tax and bare boat charters). 
6.104 The draft submission then referred to the two non-taxation issues146 that McEwen 
had raised, noting that these were the subject of separate negotiations on which 
McEwen would be reporting to Cabinet. The submission indicated that McMahon 
understood that a satisfactory solution on the investment problem was in sight, but 
that reaching accord on the shipping issue would be more difficult. 
6.105 The draft submission concluded by arguing that the parallel non-taxation discussions 
should not delay settlement of a final draft of the taxation treaty by officials. McMahon 
recommended that the Australian negotiators be authorised to reach a final draft 
treaty with the Japanese, making it clear that it would still be subject to approval by 
the Australian government.  
The Australian Cabinet Decision(s) Of July 1968 
6.106  O’Reilly wrote to McMahon on 29th July 1968, enclosing a note on the stage reached 
in the taxation treaty negotiations with Japan.147 The note148 observed that McEwen, 
as Minister for Trade and Industry, had now obtained assurances from Japan relating 
to investment opportunities for Australian business in Japan and the carriage of a 
reasonable share of bulk cargo from Australia to Japan in Australian flag vessels.  
6.107 To date, the author has been unable to locate a record of a final submission, based 
on the draft submission, being made to the Australian Cabinet or of a Cabinet 
decision to resume negotiations with Japan being made. It is reasonably clear that at 
least a Cabinet decision to resume negotiations with Japan was made in late July 
1968. On 30th July 1968, the Australian Cabinet made a decision without submission 
which noted that understandings had been reached with Japan to cover an agreed 
position on Australian investment in Japan and on shipping freights. The Cabinet 
decision further noted that the understandings would be incorporated in an 
                                                          
144  See the discussion at 6.76. 
145  See the discussion at 6.70. to 6.75. 
146  See the discussion at 6.31 and 6.33. 
147  W J O’Reilly, Second Commissioner to The Commonwealth Treasurer, 29th July 1968, NAA, 
ATO file, Pt 1. 
148  ‘Double Taxation Agreement With Japan’, no date, NAA, ATO file, Pt 1. 
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appropriate instrument for initialling by leaders of the respective delegations on 
completion of the talks on the taxation treaty, and that the instrument would be 
subsidiary to the taxation treaty and would not be published.149 Subsequently, the 
Australian Department of Trade and Industry was informed that the leader of the 
Japanese delegation did not have authority to initial the instrument, and that instead 
an official of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs would initial the instrument 
following completion of the taxation treaty negotiations in Tokyo.150 
The 1968 Negotiations In Tokyo 
6.108 Further negotiations, commencing on 2nd September 1968 and lasting for one week, 
were held in Tokyo. The Australian delegation was led by W J O’Reilly, Second 
Commissioner of Taxation.151 It appears that originally the Japanese delegation was 
to be led by Yoshikuni, Director General of Taxation Bureau, and Kitahara, Director 
of European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau,152 but O’Reilly’s cable reporting the 
finalisation of the negotiations indicates that K. Ahara, Director-General of European 
and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, led the Japanese delegation.153 
6.109 The author has been unable to locate a record of the 1968 negotiations in Tokyo, but 
documents in the Australian Department of External Affairs files indicate that the 
negotiations concluded on 9th September 1968 and that a draft treaty was initialled 
on that date. O’Reilly reported to Cain that the most substantial difficulties arose in 
relation to the continental shelf protocol, that enterprise tax and coastal shipping 
were to be as proposed by Australia, and that bare boat charters were not to be 
mentioned. Two matters were left pending at the time of initialling. The first 
concerned interpretation of words in the singular and plural cases so as to ensure 
                                                          
149  A copy of Cabinet Minute dated 30th July 1968, Decision No. 404 is contained in NAA, ATO 
file, Pt 2. Copies of the memoranda of understanding relating to Australian investment in 
Japan and to shipping are contained in NAA, ATO file, Pt 2. G J Cordell, for The Secretary, 
Department of External Affairs to Australian Embassy, Tokyo, 20th August 1968, refers to 
‘recent decisions by Cabinet’ as having opened the way for resumption of negotiations. This 
letter is contained in NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 2. 
150  G F Johnson, Acting First Assistant Secretary, International Trade Relations Division, 
Department of Trade and Industry to E T Cain, CBE, Commissioner of Taxation, 28th August 
1968. NAA, ATO file, Pt 2. 
151  G J Cordell to Australian Embassy, Tokyo, above n 198. The other members of the Australian 
delegation were: T P W Boucher, Assistant Commissioner of Taxation; R N Hutchinson, First 
Assistant Crown Solicitor; and E X W Visbond, from the Department of the Treasury. An 
official of the Australian Embassy in Toyko also attended as translator.  
152  Cable, Australian Embassy to EA, Treasury, DCO, PM’s, dated 28th August 1968, NAA, 
External Affairs file, Pt 3. 
153  Cable, O’Reilly to Cain, Commissioner of Taxation, date unclear and Press Release, Tokyo, 
9th September 1968. Both documents are in NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 3. The Press 
Release indicates that O’Reilly and Yoshikuni initialled the treaty. 
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that the singular included the plural and vice versa.154 The second concerned the use 
of the words ‘directly or indirectly’ in paragraph 5 (dealing with the continental shelf) 
of the protocol. The Japanese regarded the expression as being too broad, while the 
Australian delegation considered them necessary to define the activities on the 
continental shelf which were the subject of the paragraph. O’Reilly reported that, in 
other respects, the initialled treaty corresponded with the draft developed at the 
Canberra negotiations.155  
6.110 Australian records of the resolution of the two issues left pending at the time of 
initialling are fragmentary. Evidently, a possible formula to deal with the singular and 
plural cases had been discussed during the Tokyo negotiations. It appears that 
Australia had developed this formula and continued to press for its inclusion. The 
author has been unable to locate a draft of the formula discussed during the Tokyo 
negotiations, but it appears likely that it was implemented in the final form of 
paragraph 6 of the protocol, which reads: 
‘The Government of Japan agrees to the Government of the Commonwealth 
providing in its legislation giving the force of law to the Agreement that the 
words in the Agreement in the singular include the plural and words therein in 
the plural include the singular, unless the context of the Agreement otherwise 
requires.’ 
6.111 The ATO file contains what appears to be an earlier draft of paragraph 5 of the 
protocol dealing with the continental shelf, but does not contain any indication of the 
relationship between this draft and the final version of paragraph 5 of the protocol. 
The principal differences between the draft in the ATO file and the final version of 
paragraph 5 in the protocol lay in the geographic scope of the area referred to in the 
paragraph and the purposes for which the reference was made. The draft deemed 
the term ‘Australia’ to include for ‘the purposes of the Convention156 in relation to all 
acts, matters, circumstances and things touching, concerning, arising out of or 
connected with the exploration of the sea bed or sub-soil of sub-marine areas 
adjacent to Australia for petroleum as defined in the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
Act of the Commonwealth and for the exploration of the said petroleum’. By contrast, 
                                                          
154  O’Reilly to The Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, ACT, 10th October 1968, 
NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 3 indicates that the problem arose because of the absence from 
the Japanese language of singular and plural forms of expression. 
155  O’Reilly to Cain, above n 215 and Memorandum signed by O’Reilly and Yoshikuni dated 9th 
September 1968 contained in NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 3. 
156  The reference to ‘the Convention’ appears from the context, and from the fact that the treaty 
in terms refers to itself as ‘the Agreement’, to be to the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
signed at Geneva on 29th April 1958. 
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the final version of paragraph 5 of the protocol merely gave the Commonwealth 
government the right to levy tax on income of a Japanese resident in connection with 
the exploration for petroleum or the exploitation of petroleum in accordance with the 
terms of the treaty as if the area referred to in the paragraph were part of Australia. 
Also, the area referred to in paragraph 5 of the final version of the protocol was 
limited to ‘an area adjacent to Australia as specified in the Second Schedule to the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967–1968 of the Commonwealth. Moreover, the 
final version of paragraph 5 of the protocol only applied when Australian law was in 
force in relation to the relevant area. 
6.112 O’Reilly advised the Secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs on 31 
January 1969 that the text of the treaty had now been settled at the official level and 
would now be translated into Japanese. McMahon had approved the treaty and did 
not propose to submit it to Cabinet or to the taxation committee of Cabinet. McMahon 
wished to sign the treaty himself in Australia, and O’Reilly requested that External 
Affairs enquire if this would be acceptable to the Japanese.157 The text was then 
translated into Japanese, approved and modified by the Japanese Cabinet, and then 
checked by the Australian Embassy in Tokyo.158 The treaty was also accompanied by 
an exchange of notes requiring consultation between the two governments in the 
event of a subsequent introduction of sub-national taxes on the profits of ships and 
aircraft in international traffic in Australia, and a change in the method of relief from 
double taxation being adopted by Japan where profits of related enterprises had 
been adjusted under Article 5.159 The treaty was signed in Canberra on 20th March 
1969 by McMahon as Australian Treasurer and by Kai Fumihiko as Japanese 
Ambassador to Australia. 
The Significance Of The Treaty 
6.113 The 1969 Japan Treaty was significantly influenced by the 1967 UK Treaty, and 
continuity with that treaty is apparent. Consistent with the 1967 UK Treaty, source 
taxation of dividends, interest and royalties was limited to 15%, 10% and 10% 
respectively, while a residence basis was largely conceded on shipping and aircraft 
profits. The precedent of the 1967 UK Treaty, coupled with a hard initial negotiating 
stance, meant that Australia was able to secure variations that it sought from the 
                                                          
157  W J O’Reilly, Second Commissioner of Taxation to The Secretary, Department of External 
Affairs, 31 January 1969, NAA, External Affairs file, Pt 3.  
158  Cable, Australian Embassy, Tokyo to EA, 10/3/69 and M J Percival (Counsellor) to The 
Secretary Department of External Affairs, 7th March 1969. NAA, External Affairs File, Part 3. 
159 A copy of the Exchange of Notes, dated 20th March 1969, is contained in NAA, External 
Affairs file, Pt 3. 
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OECD Model. In particular, Australia used a combination of the precedent of the 
1967 UK Treaty and a tough initial negotiating stance on shipping profits and 
royalties to secure agreement from Japan on a uniform rate of source taxation on 
dividends and on the threshold for credits for underlying Australian corporate tax. The 
baby boomer structure of previous Australian tax treaties was preserved, with 
industrial or commercial profits being defined in exclusionary terms and with there 
being no ‘other income’ article. Unlike the 1967 UK Treaty, there was no tax on third 
country income article. The definition of PE continued to be broader than the OECD 
definition, and there was no capital gains article. The beneficial ownership 
requirement for dividends, interest and royalties was continued and refined, as was 
the definition of ‘royalties’. Several other variations in previous Australian tax treaties 
– the savings provision for ITAA 1936 (Cth) divs 14 and 15, the provision allowing 
application of domestic law in determining arm’s length in the absence of sufficient 
information, and the provision that effectively allowed the application of ITAA 1936 
(Cth) s38 in determining industrial or commercial profits – were all relegated to the 
protocol. The negotiations were delayed and complicated by the presence of the 
parallel ‘political talks’ on shipping and investment opportunities for Australian 
business in Japan. 
6.114 In some respects, however, the 1969 Japan Treaty either reverted to previous 
Australian idiosyncrasies or extended source basis taxation beyond what had been 
agreed in the 1967 UK Treaty. Thus, at Australia’s request, the treaty did not contain 
dual residence tie-breakers while maintaining an approach to defining corporate 
residence that in other respects bore some similarity to the approach used in the 
1967 UK Treaty. The absence of a definition of ‘interest’ was consistent with 
Australian tax treaties prior to the 1967 UK Treaty, although in that treaty ‘interest’ 
was largely defined in negative terms. The provisions which included carriage 
between Australia and Papua New Guinea within the meaning of operations within 
Australia were refined but were relegated to the protocol. A more refined provision 
dealing with the continental shelf was also developed and placed in the protocol. 
Australia also succeeded in having an enterprise that provided the services of public 
entertainers deemed to be a PE, something it had unsuccessfully attempted in 
negotiating the 1967 UK Treaty.160 Source rules for dividends, interest and royalties 
were more closely aligned with the circumstances under which Australian domestic 
law taxed outbound payments in these categories. In these respects, the 1969 Japan 
Treaty can be seen as representing the high-water mark of Australian idiosyncrasies 
                                                          
160  See the discussion at 5.90 to 5.91. 
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and source basis taxing claims in an actual Australian tax treaty following the 
publication of the 1963 draft OECD Model and prior to Australia joining the OECD. 
 
6.115 This  chapter   is the final chapter of the  thesis  devoted to analysis, based on 
archival materials, of the  negotiation and drafting of Australian  tax treaties in the 
period  prior to Australia joining the OECD in 1971.   Chapter 7, on the basis of the  
analysis  in this and  preceding chapters,  will  draw conclusions  relating to the 
central questions investigated in the thesis.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 On the basis of previous chapters, this chapter will draw conclusions relating to the 
central questions investigated in this thesis.  
Question 1: What explanations can be derived from archival materials for variations in 
Australian treaties from the current OECD Model? 
7.2 Question 1 of the central questions at 1.4 asked what explanations for variations in 
currently operative Australian tax treaties from the OECD Model were provided by 
archival materials relating to the negotiation and drafting of Australian bilateral tax 
treaties up to and including the treaty with Japan in 1969. The first point that can be 
made is that the majority of those variations can be found in tax treaties entered into 
by Australia in this period. The existence of these variations in Australian tax treaties 
up to and including the 1969 Japan Treaty does not necessarily explain the 
occurrence of those variations in subsequent and currently operative Australian tax 
treaties. However, as will be noted at 7.6, there was a strong tendency in Australian 
treaty practice in this period to continue a provision in subsequent treaties where it 
accorded with Australian tax policy objectives. This tendency supports an inference 
that the existence of these variations in early Australian treaties may explain their 
continued occurrence in subsequent Australian tax treaties. Second, from this 
perspective, the two most important treaties in this period were the 1946 UK Treaty1 
and the 1967 UK Treaty,2 as the majority of variations can be traced to one or other 
of these treaties. The next most significant treaty in the period was the 1953 US 
Treaty,3 but very few variations can be traced to the 1969 Japan Treaty4 or the 1969 
Singapore Treaty5 and only one variation can be traced to the 1957 Canada Treaty. 
7.3 One further conclusion that can be drawn from Chapters 2, 3 and 5 is that many of 
the variations originating in these tax treaties were initiated by the other party in the 
                                                          
1  Depending on the degree of similarity and influence, that treaty can be regarded as the origin 
of up to 22 variations from the 2014 OECD Model in currently operative Australian tax 
treaties. Details of the variations are set out in Appendices 3 and 4. 
2  Twenty-two variations from the 2014 OECD Model in currently operative Australian tax 
treaties can be regarded as having their origins in the 1967 UK Treaty. A further three 
variations could possibly be regarded as originating in the 1967 UK Treaty. Details of these 
variations are set out in Appendix 5.  
3  The origins of 8 variations from the 2014 OECD Model can be traced to the 1953 US Treaty. 
Details of these variations are set out in Appendix 3. 
4  Three variations can be traced to the 1969 Japan Treaty; one of these was a refinement of a 
variation first appearing in the 1967 UK Treaty. Details of these variations are set out in 
Appendix 3. 
5  Four variations can be traced to the 1969 Singapore Treaty, but two of these can be seen as 
refinements of variations in earlier treaties. Details of these variations are set out in Appendix 
3. 
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negotiations. In the 1946 UK Treaty, approximately 70% of variations from the OECD 
Model were initiated by the United Kingdom, with around one-third of these being 
modified by Australia in the drafting process. Of the variations from the current OECD 
Model in the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty, it is likely that only the substantial 
equipment provision and the 15% rate on all dividends were initiated by Australia. 
Over 70% of the variations from the current OECD Model in that treaty were initiated 
by the US. In the 1967 UK Treaty, 54% of variations from the current OEDC Model 
were initiated by the UK. The analysis of these treaties demonstrates that it cannot 
be assumed that a variation from the OECD Model was originally initiated by 
Australia simply because it continues to be part of Australian tax treaty practice. 
7.4 A third observation relating to variations contained in Australia’s first two tax treaties 
is that many of them are attributable to following the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty. The 
influence of the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty on the United Kingdom’s 6th May 1946 
draft of the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty was discussed at 2.38 and 2.98 to 2.99. 
The 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty also influenced, to a lesser extent, the subsequent 
drafts of the 1946 UK Treaty. Over 45% of variations from the OECD Model were 
attributable to following the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty. Only 1 of 10 variations from 
the OECD Model attributable to following the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty was modified 
in the drafting process. However, over 70% of variations from the 1945 UK – US Tax 
Treaty were either initiated or modified by Australia. By contrast, the only explicit 
references to models developed by the League of Nations in the negotiation of the 
1946 UK Treaty were in relation to the shipping profits article and to the use of the 
arm’s length principle in computing profits of branches and related companies.6 In 
these instances, the reference was by UK officials and was to a principle adopted by 
the League of Nations rather than to any specific article in any of the League of 
Nations models as such.  
7.5 Similarly, in the case of the 1967 UK Treaty, 7 of the 21 variations from the current 
OECD Model that were initiated by the UK are attributable to following the 1963 draft 
OECD Model in respects in which it differed from the current OECD Model. Only one 
variation initiated by Australia, the omission of an assistance in collection article, can 
possibly be characterised as following the 1963 draft OECD Model, but the record of 
                                                          
6  See the discussion at 2.54 and 2.119. 
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negotiations shows that the deletion of the article from the UK draft was due to 
Australian domestic law considerations.7  
7.6 Having included a provision in a tax treaty, there was a strong tendency to reproduce 
or refine it in a subsequent treaty, particularly where the provision accorded with 
general Australian tax treaty policy objectives; this was especially true in relation to 
Australia’s emphasis on the primacy of source basis taxation. The most notable 
examples here were the continued use of the savings provision for domestic 
legislation in situations where information was inadequate to determine an arm’s 
length price8 and the use of a substantial equipment provisions in the definition of 
‘permanent establishment’.9 In accounting for a tendency to follow precedents, 
however, bureaucratic caution and inertia cannot be discounted, particularly once, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, Australia started to develop internal model treaties. Even 
where an existing provision was considered by Australia to be less desirable, there 
were instances where Australia agreed to a request by the treaty partner to include 
the provision as a result of an argument calling for equality of treatment to that given 
to other treaty partners. One notable example is agreeing to a shipping exemption in 
all these treaties despite the Australian policy of maximising source basis taxation 
and consequently of initially refusing in negotiations to agree to a shipping 
exemption.10 In some instances (most significantly in relation to source taxation of 
dividends, interest and royalties following the entry into the 1967 UK Treaty), 
Australia changed its official policy on the basis that a precedent had been set by its 
previous tax treaties.11 When Australia’s first internal model tax treaty was developed 
in 1965, there was a strong tendency to favour the language used in existing 
Australian tax treaties even where the OECD language arguably produced similar 
results. This can be seen repeatedly in the comments comparing the Australian 
model with the 1963 OECD draft where the Australian model is characterised as 
                                                          
7  The history of this aspect of the drafts is summarised in Appendix 5 comments on OECD 
Model Article 27 and AV 111. Space considerations have meant that this aspect of the history 
of the draft and the negotiations were not able to be discussed in Chapter 5. 
8  See the discussion at 2.115 to 2.126, 3.134, 4.153, 5.21, 5.61, 5.94 and 5.96. 
9  See the discussion at 3.41 to 3.43, 3.84 to 3.85, 3.109, 3.136, 3.140, 3.148, 4.102, 4.153, 
5.14, 5.15, 5.57, 5.84, 6.42 and 6.113. Although the final versions of the 1967 UK Treaty and 
the 1969 Japan Treaty did not include substantial equipment provisions, such provisions were 
included in the initial Australian drafts in those negotiations. 
10  This approach is most particularly evident in the negotiation of the 1967 UK Treaty and the 
1969 Japan Treaty, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
11  This can be seen, for example, in the change in Australian attitudes to reductions in source 
taxation of dividends from the review of treaty policy discussed at 4.49, the 1965 Australian 
draft model discussed at 5.149 and in the negotiation of the 1969 Japan Treaty discussed at 
6.13, 6.14, 6.19 to 6.20, 6.29, 6.44 to 6.45, 6.55, 6.59, 6.61, 6.63, 6.65, 6.71 and 6.113. In the 
negotiations associated with the 1969 Japan Treaty, the Australian attitude changes after the 
conclusion of the 1967 UK Treaty. 
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more concise and specific.12 This attitude to both the Australian model and the 1963 
OECD draft Model is also evident at various points in the negotiation of the 1969 
Japan Treaty.13 
7.7 Many of the variations from the OECD Model that Australia initiated in treaties in the 
period after the 1946 UK Treaty and then after the 1967 UK Treaty have to be seen 
against the background of this tendency to follow precedents. Consistency with an 
overall policy objective of the primacy of source basis taxation, bureaucratic inertia, 
and linguistic and stylistic chauvinism all contributed to Australia initiating variations, 
while arguments based on precedents with third countries were used as a means of 
achieving the variations in question. 
7.8 Another type of variation from the OECD Model was offsetting concessions obtained 
by Australia for agreeing to a provision sought by the other party to the negotiations. 
Variations that were the product of this approach by Australia to negotiations are 
evident in the negotiation of the 1967 UK Treaty where Australia agreed to a shipping 
exemption in exchange for (among others) deletion of the non-discrimination article14 
and in the 1969 Japan Treaty where Australia obtained tax and trade concessions 
using a similar approach.15 Given that Australian officials and relevant politicians 
were clearly aware that residence basis taxation of shipping profits was well 
established by the time these tax treaties were negotiated, it is remarkable that this 
negotiating tactic continued to be adopted and even more remarkable that it was 
successful. Again, in all instances the variation was seen as being consistent with 
Australia’s general tax treaty policy objectives, particularly its emphasis on the 
primacy of source basis taxation. 
Question 2: What factors influenced Australian taxation treaty policy and practice 
between 1946 and 1971 and how, if at all, did those factors change in that 
period?  
7.9 The first of the key questions investigated in this thesis naturally leads into and 
overlaps with the second, namely: What factors influenced Australian taxation treaty 
policy and practice between 1946 and 1971 and how, if at all, did those factors 
                                                          
12  See, for example, the discussion at 4.109, 4.111 and 4.114.  
13  See, for example, the discussion at 6.41. 
14  See the discussion at 5.130 to 5.133. 
15  See the discussion at 6.65 of the Australian position on royalties as a negotiating tactic used 
in conjunction with the position on shipping profits to obtain concessions such as change to 
the level of ownership at which Japan would allow a credit for foreign underlying tax. 
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change in that period? In attempting to answer this question, distinctions can be 
drawn between factors:  
(a)  that influenced officials in advising in relation to decisions to enter into tax 
treaties in general and into particular tax treaties;  
(b)  that influenced politicians in deciding to enter into tax treaties in general and 
into particular tax treaties;  
(c)  that influenced politicians and officials in negotiating the broad content and 
overall bargain of a particular tax treaty; and  
(d)  that influenced officials in negotiating and drafting the technical details of 
particular tax treaties.  
Although analysis is aided by drawing these distinctions, it is recognised that one or 
more factors may be relevant under more than one category. The factors and the 
categories are interrelated and are not mutually exclusive.16 
Factors Influencing The Decision To Enter Into Tax Treaties In General And Into 
Particular Tax Treaties 
Economic Considerations Relating To Current And Expected Trade And Investment Flows 
7.10 Economic considerations relating to current and expected trade and investment flows 
between Australia and the treaty partner country influenced both politicians and 
officials in deciding to enter into tax treaties with potential partners during this period. 
This was a particularly significant factor influencing the decision to enter into 
                                                          
16  The difficulty of distinguishing between factors that officials took into account in advising and 
factors that politicians took into account in deciding needs to be acknowledged. Cabinet 
submissions were drafted by officials and usually reached their final form before they were 
sent to the relevant minister for perusal prior to submission to Cabinet. Cabinet minutes in this 
period virtually never contain transcripts of Cabinet discussions; they usually just minute the 
final decision reached by Cabinet. Correspondence between departments is usually at the 
official level, and in instances where it is at the ministerial level the correspondence typically 
was drafted by officials and then settled by the minister. Only in rare instances is there 
evidence of either correspondence or Cabinet submissions being significantly altered when 
settled by ministers. Some indication of the views of ministers can sometimes be found in 
correspondence between officials and the relevant minister. A limitation of the research 
undertaken as part of this thesis is that it has been confined to departmental and Cabinet 
office files held in relevant national archives and has not considered personal papers of 
relevant ministers. Given this limitation, it is necessary to attribute the final form of Cabinet 
submissions and of Cabinet decisions and correspondence between ministers to relevant 
ministers. In the absence of archival evidence, such as ministerial notes or notations, to the 
contrary the assumption has been made that these Cabinet submissions and ministerial 
correspondence also represent the views of relevant officials. In the absence of archival 
evidence to the contrary, the assumption has also been made that preliminary drafts of 
Cabinet submissions and correspondence between departments represents the views of 
relevant officials rather than the views of the relevant minister. 
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Australia’s first comprehensive taxation treaty with the United Kingdom in 194617 
although, in that instance, this factor was partly a product of the incomplete relief 
from international juridical double taxation provided under the Dominion Income Tax 
Relief System. A desire to attract US direct investment into Australia was a factor 
influencing at least some ministers of the Menzies government and some officials – 
but notably not the Australian Treasury – in deciding to enter into a tax treaty with the 
United States.18 The possible encouragement of Canadian investment in Australia 
was a factor that led Australian officials and the Australian Cabinet to favour a tax 
treaty with Canada.19  
7.11 Throughout the first formal revision of Australian tax treaty policy, the Australian 
Treasury remained highly sceptical of whether economic benefits flowed from tax 
treaties.20 While officials from other departments, including the Australian Taxation 
Office, held more positive views about the economic effects of tax treaties, it is clear 
that by the early 1960s Treasury had become the dominant department in advising 
on the economic effects of tax treaties.21  
7.12 The importance of the United Kingdom as a trade and investment partner in the early 
1960s influenced both the decision to not negotiate with European countries while the 
UK’s first attempt to join the European Economic Community was ongoing22 and in 
the 1966 decision to enter into a new comprehensive tax treaty with the United 
                                                          
17  The economic importance of the United Kingdom to Australia at the time was discussed at 2.5 
and 2.6. The influence of this factor on the decision to enter into the 1946 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty can be seen in the discussion at 2.30, 2.66, 2.68, 2.73, 2.74 and 2.89. 
18  The Liberal/Country Party policy prior to the 1949 Federal election was discussed at 3.10, and 
the general attitude of the Menzies government to direct investment from the United States 
was discussed at 3.17. The possible influence of the dollar loan from the World Bank on the 
decision to enter into the treaty was discussed at 3.21. Lobbying from US businesses was 
discussed at 3.22. The Spooner and Hughes report, discussed at 3.23, concluded that a 
treaty would encourage US investment in Australia. The negative view held by the Australian 
Treasury of the likely economic effects of a treaty was discussed at 3.24. The negative 
attitudes to a tax treaty with the US held by Treasury and Taxation Office officials during the 
Chifley government were discussed at 3.14 to 3.16. 
19  This aspect was discussed at 3.145. Note in particular that lobbying by Canadian business 
(notably the Ford Motor Company of Canada) contributed to this belief. 
20  See in particular the discussion at 4.24, 4.35 and 4.37. 
21  The dominance of Treasury is evident in the drafting of Cabinet Submission 305 discussed at 
4.20 to 4.32. The observation is consistent with the analysis of Jones on the role of the 
Department of the Treasury in the demise of the Division of Industrial Development in the 
period from 1949 to 1960. See E Jones, ‘Post World War Two Industry Policy: Opportunities 
and Constraints’ (2002) 42 Australian Economic History Review 312, particularly at 331–2. 
22  The continued, if declining, economic importance of the UK to Australia up to the early 1960s 
was discussed at 5.5 to 5.6. Although the importance of the UK as a trading and investment 
partner is not explicitly mentioned, it provides the best explanation of the 1962 decision 
(discussed at 4.52) to defer negotiations with European countries pending the outcome of the 
United Kingdom’s first application to join the European Economic Community.  
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Kingdom.23 Similarly, the importance of Japan as a trading partner by the 1960s was 
the major factor leading to a decision to enter into tax treaty negotiations with 
Japan.24  
Cultural And Political Factors  
7.13 There is clear evidence that cultural and political factors were significant in the 
decision to enter into the tax treaties with the United States in 195325 and with 
Canada in 1957.26 There is no explicit mention of cultural and political factors in 
archival material examined relating to the 1946 UK Treaty, although these are 
mentioned in Cabinet Submission 305 in July 1962 as factors relevant to the entry 
into that and later tax treaties.27  
7.14 Researchers into the strategic and geopolitical environment of the early to mid 1960s 
have argued that fear of the United Kingdom withdrawing militarily east of Suez 
affected Australia’s trade relations with the UK,28 but the author has found no direct 
evidence of this factor influencing the Australian decision to enter into a second tax 
treaty with the UK. 
Treaty Practice And Domestic Law Considerations Of Treaty Partner And Third Countries  
7.15 The treaty practice and domestic law of the treaty partner was a factor influencing the 
decision to enter into tax treaties in this period. In the case of the 1946 UK Treaty, the 
                                                          
23  Again, paradoxically the significance of the UK as a trading and investment partner can be 
seen not by it being expressly mentioned but by the fact that, as discussed at 6.24, Australia 
decided to proceed with renegotiating the 1946 UK Treaty before entering into formal 
negotiations with Japan notwithstanding that a Cabinet decision had been made to do so and 
notwithstanding that there had been preliminary talks with Japan. 
24  As noted at 4.54, O’Donnell’s assessment in 1962 was that Japan was probably the most 
important trading partner with which Australia did not have a tax treaty. In 1963, Belcher, as 
discussed at 4.82, considered Japan the most important of the non-OECD countries with 
whom Australia might negotiate a tax treaty. The significance of Japan as a trading partner 
was discussed at 6.2 to 6.3. As noted at 6.25, Treasury advice in 1968 indicated that Japan 
was chosen as a treaty partner because of its importance to Australia’s trade. 
25  The general geopolitical context was discussed at 3.18 to 3.21. At 3.24 it was noted that 
Fadden’s Cabinet submission made express reference to the political considerations arising 
out of the relationships between the two countries in the then current circumstances. 
26  As noted at 3.145, Fadden’s 1953 submission to Cabinet had stated that it would be difficult 
and perhaps embarrassing in any treaty to deny broadly comparable terms to Canada to 
those proposed to be agreed with the United States. 
27  As discussed at 4.33 and 4.35, Cabinet Submission 305 noted that Australian tax treaties up 
to that point had been with countries with which Australian political and economic 
relationships were especially close. While the closeness of the relationship with the UK was 
regarded as affecting the concessions made in the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty, as 
discussed at 4.35, Submission 305 also took the view that the concessions were also 
influenced by the inadequate relief provided under the previous system of Dominion Income 
Tax Relief.  
28  The literature was discussed at 5.6. 
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inadequate relief provided under the Dominion Income Tax Relief System29 and the 
existence of a foreign tax credit in the 1945 UK – US Tax Treaty30 were significant 
factors, at both the official and political level, contributing to Australia agreeing to 
enter into a tax treaty with the UK. In the case of the 1953 US Treaty, the problem of 
credit overspill due to the combination of Australian rates on corporate income and 
dividends and limitations in the US foreign tax credit system was a major factor in the 
decision to enter into the treaty.31  
7.16 The incomplete relief from international juridical double taxation provided by some 
foreign jurisdictions was recognised as a reason for entering into tax treaties in 
McGovern’s 1959–60 assessment of Australian tax treaties,32 but a similar 
recognition does not appear to have been made by Treasury officials who were the 
primary drafters of Submission 305 in 1962.  
7.17 Changes to the UK system of corporate-shareholder taxation with consequences for 
the appropriate conditions on which credits for underlying corporate tax could be 
granted were the major reason why the UK wanted the 1946 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty revised and were seen in McMahon’s Cabinet submission prior to the 1946 
UK Treaty as something that Australia would have to agree to.33  
7.18 The failure to credit Australian corporate tax against Japanese local enterprise tax34 
and other causes of double taxation, such as conflicts of source rules, were noted, in 
the context of the proposed negotiations with Japan, as reasons for entering into tax 
treaties.35 
Revenue Considerations And The Primacy Of Source Basis Taxation 
7.19 Throughout the period under review, Australian policy emphasised source basis 
taxation and was concerned about possible losses of revenue that would result from 
entering into tax treaties. In the case of the 1946 UK Treaty, although an emphasis 
on the primacy of source basis taxation and revenue considerations influenced the 
overall bargain struck in the treaty and its detailed drafting, Australia wanted a 
comprehensive tax treaty because of the perceived inadequacy of the relief provided 
under the system of Dominion Income Tax Relief. Despite views on the primacy of 
                                                          
29  This point was made at 2.28 and 2.30 in relation to Dominion Income Tax Relief. See also the 
discussion at 2.60 and 2.66. 
30  See the discussion at 2.59 and 2.72. 
31  This issue was discussed at 3.25 to 3.29. 
32  See the discussion at 4.5 and 4.7. 
33  See the discussion at 5.40. 
34  See the discussion at 6.5 of Canavan’s report to Fadden following the Tokyo talks. 
35  See the discussion of this aspect of Holt’s Cabinet submission at 6.13. 
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source basis taxation and of the importance of revenue considerations expressed at 
various points prior to the ministerial agreement outlined at 2.90,36 one gets the 
impression that, in the circumstances, trade and investment flows trumped all other 
considerations and that some compromise on the primacy of source basis taxation 
and on revenue considerations to obtain a tax treaty was inevitable.  
7.20 In the case of the 1953 US Treaty, revenue considerations had been a dominant 
factor in the Chifley government’s reluctance to negotiate between 1946 and 194937 
and were seen as a negative aspect of a tax treaty in both the Spooner and Hughes 
report38 and in Fadden’s Cabinet submission39 due to the need to reduce Australian 
tax on dividends to avoid credit overspill.  
7.21 Loss of revenue was a dominant factor in the Chifley government’s unwillingness to 
enter into a treaty with Canada40 and was regarded as a negative aspect of the 
proposed treaty when Treasury drafted Fadden’s 1953 Cabinet submission.41  
7.22 Revenue considerations and the primacy of source basis taxation were paramount as 
considerations on whether or not to enter into tax treaties in the 1959–62 review of 
tax treaty policy,42 in Belcher’s assessment of the 1963 draft OECD Model43 and in 
the 1965 Australian model.44 By 1965, dissatisfaction with the amount of source basis 
taxation provided for in the 1946 UK Treaty had led Australian officials to request a 
new treaty instead of an amending Protocol.45  
                                                          
36  Although revenue considerations and jurisdictional claims are raised by Australia several 
times in the negotiations leading to the 1946 UK Treaty, the closest that any of these 
comments comes to suggesting that Australian jurisdictional claims and revenue 
considerations meant that a tax treaty should not be entered into was a comment in Jackson’s 
briefing of Evatt discussed at 2.66. The statement of ‘Australia’s Minimum Position’ in Evatt’s 
memorandum titled, ‘What Australia Asks For’ outlined at 2.74 does indicate that Australia 
would have to agree to a tax treaty which provided only for a foreign tax credit on business 
profits and non-portfolio dividends. If anything, this statement shows the importance to 
Australia of obtaining a tax treaty in relation to business profits and non-portfolio dividends 
and hence the importance of economic considerations in the decision to enter into a tax 
treaty. 
37  The Chifley government’s reluctance to negotiate was discussed at 3.14 to 3.16. 
38  The Spooner and Hughes report was discussed at 3.23. 
39  Fadden’s Cabinet submission was discussed at 3.24. 
40  The Chifley government’s unwillingness to enter into a tax treaty with Canada was discussed 
at 3.144. 
41  See the discussion at 3.146. 
42  See the discussion of the review at 4.20 to 4.51 and the nine-point summary at 4.49. 
43  Belcher’s assessment of the 1963 draft OECD Model was discussed at 4.57 to 4.84. Revenue 
considerations are given significant emphasis in Belcher’s summary conclusion at 4.84. 
44  The emphasis on source basis taxation in Belcher’s draft is evident in the discussion at 4.93, 
4.95, 4.97 to 4.100, 4.102 to 4.106. The emphasis on source basis taxation in the revised 
draft can be seen in 4.109, 4.112 to 4.113, 4.115 to 4.118 and at 4.121. 
45  See the discussion at 5.10. 
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7.23 An emphasis on revenue and on source basis taxation can be seen in McMahon’s 
Cabinet submission prior to the negotiations leading to the 1969 Japan Treaty; 
Australia would enter into treaties where source country taxing rights were preserved 
to the extent that they had been in the 1967 UK Treaty.46 Throughout the period, 
revenue estimates were commonly made by the ATO of the revenue cost of entering 
into any particular tax treaty based on information supplied by ATO Deputy 
Commissioners.47 
Australian Domestic Law Considerations  
7.24 As Australia provided unilateral relief from international double taxation,48 the 
consistent Australian attitude throughout the period was that any international 
juridical double taxation that did exist was either the result of the inadequacy of the 
unilateral relief provided by the potential treaty partner (most notably in the case of 
the UK in 1946) or due to differences in tax rates between Australia and the treaty 
partner country and limitations on the unilateral relief provided by the proposed treaty 
partner. This led to a reluctance to enter into tax treaties in the period from 1946 to 
the early 1960s, which was only overcome in the case of the US,49 Canada50 and 
New Zealand by economic, political, strategic and cultural factors. The reluctance is 
particularly evident in the first formal review of Australian tax treaty policy.51  
7.25 The view that Australian domestic law meant that a treaty was not necessary to 
prevent international juridical double taxation of Australian residents is still evident in 
the ‘no concession without commensurate advantages’ stance in Holt’s 1965 Cabinet 
submission relating to the preliminary negotiations with Japan.52 Following the 
signing of the 1967 UK Treaty, that treaty was regarded as setting the norm for 
distributive articles in Australian tax treaties,53 and the view that unilateral relief 
provisions made tax treaties unnecessary is not evident in McMahon’s 1968 
submission prior to negotiating the 1969 Australia – Japan Tax Treaty. 
 
                                                          
46  The overall approach recommended in McMahon’s submission was discussed at 6.26. 
47  As discussed in note 6 to 4.3, this was done systematically in 1959 at the beginning of the 
first official review of Australian tax treaty policy. 
48  Australia’s unilateral relief measures throughout this period were discussed at 2.7, 2.8, 2.13, 
3.11 and 5.7. 
49  In the case of the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty, see the discussion at 3.17 to 3.24. 
50  In the case of the 1957 Australia – Canada Tax Treaty, see the discussion at 3.145. 
51  See in particular points (1), (4) and (5) in the nine-point summary in Cabinet Submission 305 
outlined at 4.49. 
52  See the discussion of this aspect of Holt’s Cabinet submission at 6.13 to 6.21. 
53  This point was expressly made in McMahon’s 1968 Cabinet submission as discussed at 6.26. 
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Factors Affecting The Broad Content Of Tax Treaties 
Revenue Considerations And The Primacy Of Source Basis Taxation 
7.26 Throughout the period, revenue and an emphasis on source taxation were clearly the 
dominant factors affecting the overall bargain that Australia sought to achieve in tax 
treaties. Both were heavily emphasised by Australian politicians and officials in the 
negotiations leading to the ministerial agreement outlined at 2.90,54 and the 
concessions from the UK’s initial position that resulted from that agreement are all 
explicable as means of preserving source basis taxation and Australian revenue.  
7.27 In the case of the 1953 US Treaty, McGovern emphasised that Australia’s position 
was, in general, to oppose any violation of the priority of source taxing rights55 and 
that Australia’s major objective was to obtain a reduction in source taxation which 
would encourage US direct investment in Australia without producing the ‘Treasury 
effect’.56 In this respect, obtaining a uniform rate of 15% on all dividends was 
regarded as a major achievement.57  
7.28 An emphasis on revenue considerations and on the primacy of source basis taxation 
was clearly evident in the 1959–62 review of Australian tax treaty policy culminating 
in the ‘no concessions’ policy of the Cabinet decision of August 1962.58 Overall 
revenue considerations are also evident in Belcher’s assessment of the 1963 draft 
OECD Model59 and in the 1965 Australian model which gave effect to the ‘no 
concessions’ policy.60  
7.29 An objective of obtaining greater source country taxing rights than had been provided 
for in the 1966 UK draft is evident in McMahon’s 1967 Cabinet submission.61 
                                                          
54  The references in note 36 above can all be equally well classified as affecting the broad 
content of the treaty. In addition, the concessions that Coombs obviously argued for at his 
meeting with Gregg outlined at 2.89 can also be seen as a means of preserving source basis 
taxation and Australian revenue. 
55  See the discussion at 3.33. 
56  See the discussion at 3.32. 
57  McGovern’s views on the uniform 15% rate on dividends were discussed at 3.52 to 3.56. 
58  Cabinet Submission 305 was discussed at 4.33 to 4.51. The Cabinet decision was discussed 
at 4.52. 
59  See the discussion of Belcher’s assessment of the impact of the OECD Model on future 
Australian tax treaties at 4.81 to 4.83. 
60  See the discussion at 4.95, 4.97 to 4.100, 4.102 and 4.104 to 4.106 of the manner in which 
Belcher’s draft consolidated and extended the emphasis on the primacy of source basis 
taxation in previous Australian tax treaties. 
61  Although this submission does not expressly state an overall objective of maximising source 
basis taxation, the effect of all of the objectives mentioned in McMahon’s submission, 
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Similarly, McMahon’s Cabinet submission prior to the negotiations with Japan sought 
to rely on the 1967 UK Treaty as a precedent for granting greater source country 
taxing rights than had been provided for in the 1968 Japanese draft.62 
Australian Domestic Law Considerations 
7.30 One feature of Australian domestic law of recurring significance throughout this 
period for the overall bargain struck in particular tax treaties, particularly in 
negotiations between officials, is the Australian system of corporate-shareholder 
taxation as compared with the system adopted by the treaty partner. This was 
particularly evident in the 1946 UK Treaty negotiations where Australia was using a 
classical system while the UK was using a form of integrated system. The relevance 
to the broad bargain in Australian eyes was the effect that the differences in systems 
had on reduced rates of source taxation on dividends.63  
7.31 Another significant factor was the Australian desire to preserve the operation of 
Australian domestic law relating to film business and insurance with non-residents 
and shipping and air transport.64  
7.32 The trends identified at 7.30 and 7.31 continued with the 1953 US Treaty, although 
clearly the fact that these features had been present in the 1946 UK Treaty affected 
the overall bargain struck.65 In the case of shipping and air transport, while Australia 
always ultimately agreed to adopting a residence basis, it consistently tried to 
negotiate for the residence basis to be expressed in a restrictive form and always 
began with a position of source basis taxation of shipping profits. All of these features 
were incorporated into the 1965 Australian model66 and were also found in the 
February 1968 draft sent to Japan.67 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
discussed at 5.40 to 5.52, was to allow greater source country taxing rights than had been 
provided for in the 1966 UK draft. 
62  See the discussion of this aspect of McMahon’s Cabinet submission at 6.26 to 6.27 and 6.29. 
63  See the discussion at 2.35, 2.47 and 2.61. Note also McGovern’s comment, discussed at 
4.13, that the use of a dividend exemption system and a higher corporate tax rate by New 
Zealand had prevented Australia and NZ from entering into a tax treaty prior to NZ’s change 
to a classical system. 
64  In relation to the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty, see the discussion at 2.43, 2.48, 2.57, 2.60, 
2.76, 2.82 and 2.84. 
65  As discussed at 3.31, McGovern reported that the US attitude was that the 1946 Australia – 
UK Tax Treaty should be regarded as setting the pattern for Australian tax treaties with capital 
exporting nations. 
66  The provisions in relation to films and insurance were discussed at 4.95 and 4.106. The 
provisions in relation to shipping were discussed at 4.97. 
67  The provisions relating to film business and insurance with non-residents were noted at 6.43. 
The absence of an article on shipping profits was due to the Cabinet decision discussed at 
6.30 to 6.31 and to the Prime Minister’s decision discussed at 6.33. 
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Cultural And Political Considerations  
7.33 Cultural and political factors did play a role, albeit relatively minor, in influencing the 
general bargain struck in tax treaties in the period under review. In the 1946 UK 
Treaty, domestic political considerations were raised by officials to support 
arguments rejecting the UK’s proposals on dividends68 and shipping.69 In the case of 
the 1953 US Treaty, political considerations in the US are mentioned as reasons for 
agreeing to particular provisions.70 Holt’s 1965 Cabinet submission raised what 
amounted to issues of economic nationalism as reasons for not agreeing to Japan’s 
request for a reduced rate of source taxation on non-portfolio dividends.71 
Model Treaties And Policies Developed By International Organisations  
7.34 It is remarkable that, throughout the period, the explicit references to model treaties 
developed by international organisations (such as the League of Nations, the United 
Nations and the OECD) are virtually all negative. In the 1946 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty negotiations, League of Nations principles (in relation to the taxation of 
shipping profits) are mentioned by UK officials72 once prior to the ministerial 
agreement discussed at 2.90. There is no direct evidence that this influenced 
Australia’s decision to agree to taxing shipping profits on a residence basis. Recent 
treaties concluded by the UK and the overall bargain struck as part of the ministerial 
agreement are likely to have had more influence on that decision.  
7.35 The first formal review of the 1963 draft OECD Model by Belcher concluded that its 
provisions were more favourable to capital exporting and maritime nations73 and that 
Australia should be able to obtain more favourable treaties from OECD countries 
than would be obtained by following the OECD Model.74 A similar point was made in 
McMahon’s Cabinet submission prior to negotiating the 1967 Australia – UK Tax 
                                                          
68  See the discussion at 2.46. 
69  See the discussion at 2.64 and also Willis’ views on the Australian attitude to films and 
shipping at 2.48. 
70  As discussed at 3.31, McGovern mentioned this as a general factor and, as discussed at 
3.49, specifically mentioned it in relation to shipping profits. 
71  See the discussion of this aspect of Holt’s submission at 6.19. 
72  See the discussion at 2.54. 
73  Belcher’s overall conclusion on the 1963 draft OECD Model was discussed at 4.84. 
74  The respects in which Belcher considered more favourable tax treaties could be obtained 
from OECD countries were discussed at 4.81. 
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Treaty,75 and at the opening of those negotiations the Commissioner of Taxation 
indicated that the ‘lore’ on double tax treaties did not suit Australia as a capital 
importing country which was not a maritime nation. The UK delegation interpreted 
these remarks as an indication that Australia did not regard the OECD Model as 
entirely suitable to Australian circumstances.76  
7.36 In summary, the influence of model treaties developed by international organisations 
on the broad content of Australian tax treaties in this period can be seen as negative. 
By the mid 1960s, the fact that the 1963 draft OECD Model allocated taxing rights to 
particular classes of income differently to prior Australian treaties was, if anything, 
seen as a reason for continuing with prior Australian practice. 
The Australian Policy Development And Negotiating Process Itself  
7.37 Early on Australian politicians and officials learnt that hard bargaining, intransigence 
and reference to precedents could produce favourable results. A recognition of the 
value of offsetting compromises to achieve what were considered to be more 
important objectives is evident in the negotiation of the 1946 UK Treaty, although this 
only really begins when Evatt meets with Dalton.77  
7.38 It is unclear from the available records whether the compromises made by both 
sides78 in negotiating the 1953 US Tax Treaty were offset against each other. Those 
negotiations appear to have been relatively convivial, possibly because of the 
similarities that then existed between the tax systems of the two countries.79  
7.39 Offsetting compromises are more evident in the negotiation of the 1957 Canada 
Treaty where Australia eventually modified its initial position on undistributed profits 
tax and conceded a residence basis for taxation of shipping profits.80  
7.40 During this period, the Australian Treasury moved from a position of peripheral 
involvement in 1946 to virtual dominance of advice on tax treaty policy by 1965. 
Treasury was largely responsible for Cabinet Submission 305, which led to the hard 
                                                          
75  This aspect of McMahon’s Cabinet submission was discussed at 5.41. 
76  See the discussion of Cain’s opening address at 5.76. 
77  As discussed at 2.71 to 2.76, Evatt’s memorandum given to Dalton emphasised the points of 
most importance to Australia and for the first time offered compromises on issues perceived 
to be of lesser importance. Further compromises were foreshadowed at Coombs’ meeting 
with Gregg (discussed at 2.89) and further offsetting compromises were made at the 
ministerial meeting discussed at 2.90. 
78  For Australia, the major compromise was agreeing to residence basis taxation of shipping and 
air profits. For the US the major compromise was agreeing to a uniform 15% source country 
rate on dividends. 
79  See the more detailed argument to this effect at 3.138. 
80  See the argument to this effect at 3.152. 
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line ‘no concessions’ Cabinet decision of August 1962.81 The policy was internally 
inconsistent, being based on the one hand on the proposition that concessions were 
unnecessary in tax treaties82 and on the other using the initial ‘no concessions’ 
stance (particularly in relation to shipping and aircraft profits) as a means of obtaining 
concessions in priority areas.83 The inconsistency was compounded by the ATO’s 
evident lack of faith in the viability of a ‘no concessions’ policy.84  
7.41 In negotiating both the 1967 UK Treaty and the 1969 Japan Treaty, the still relatively 
tough opening stance enabled negotiators to achieve what were perceived as 
significant concessions from the other party which affected the overall bargain of the 
respective treaties in the technical phase of the negotiations.85  
Factors Affecting Technical Drafting Considerations 
Revenue Considerations and Primacy of Source Basis Taxation 
7.42 Revenue considerations and an emphasis on the primacy of source basis taxation 
were also very significant considerations at the technical drafting stage of Australian 
tax treaties throughout this period. In the 1946 UK Treaty, the overall structure of the 
treaty, although present in the initial UK draft, can be seen as giving technical 
expression to the preservation of source country taxing rights for particular categories 
of income as agreed in the ministerial meeting as outlined at 2.90.86  
7.43 Further technical extensions of source basis taxation occurred with the 1953 US 
Treaty. One of the most significant was the introduction of a ‘substantial equipment’ 
provision in the definition of ‘permanent establishment’. It appears to be likely that the 
provision was introduced at Australia’s request.87 Revenue considerations and the 
primacy of source basis taxation clearly were behind Australia’s arguments in favour 
                                                          
81  The development of Cabinet Submission 305 was discussed at 4.20 to 4.32. 
82  See in particular paragraphs (4) and (5) in the nine-point summary in Cabinet Submission 305 
outlined at 4.49. 
83  This view as expressed in Cabinet Submission 305 was discussed at 4.50. 
84  See the argument to this effect at 4.58 and note McGovern’s earlier comments discussed at 
4.10. 
85  In the case of the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty, as discussed at 5.133 to 5.135 and 5.139 
to 5.140, Australia’s condition for agreeing to a shipping exemption was that the UK not insist 
on the presence of a ‘non-discrimination’ article. In the case of the 1969 Australia – Japan 
Tax Treaty, as discussed at 6.54 to 6.66 and 6.73, Australia used concessions from a tough 
initial position on shipping profits and royalties as a means of obtaining an agreed threshold 
for credits for foreign underlying tax. 
86  See the argument to this effect at 2.165. 
87  See the discussion at 3.42 to 3.43. As noted at 3.84 to 3.86, the Australian second draft 
attempted to broaden the scope of the substantial equipment provision; however, as noted at 
3.109, the only change from the second draft that was incorporated in the final draft was the 
reference to substantial equipment being ‘installed’. 
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of source taxation of industrial royalties in this treaty.88 This treaty also included a 
‘force of attraction’ rule which increased source basis taxation. While seen as 
favouring Australia in the longer term, this provision was clearly introduced at the 
request of the United States but not opposed by Australia.89 A force of attraction 
provision was rarely included in subsequent Australian tax treaties and did not find its 
way into the 1965 Australian model tax treaty.90  
7.44 With the exception of the ‘force of attraction’ principle, the extensions of source basis 
taxation in the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty were continued in the 1957 Australia – 
Canada Tax Treaty and were extended further by a provision in the definition of 
‘permanent establishment’ in response to the decision in Case 110 (1955) 5 CTBR 
(NS) 656.91  
7.45 Revenue considerations and the primacy of source basis taxation were also clearly 
dominant factors in Belcher’s review of the 1963 draft OECD Model and in the 
development of Australia’s 1965 model, which consolidated and extended all the 
provisions in Australian tax treaties that had enlarged the scope for source basis 
taxation.  
7.46 The pattern continued in the negotiation of the 1967 UK Treaty where Australia 
consistently argued for, or attempted to extend, technical provisions maximising 
source basis taxation, particularly the definition of ‘permanent establishment’, that 
had been in the 1965 Australian model or earlier treaties.92 Again, in negotiating the 
1969 Japan Treaty, Australia consistently preferred and argued for provisions from 
the Australian draft which provided for greater source basis taxation.93 
Australian Domestic Law Considerations 
7.47 Technical issues arising due to the relationship between Australian domestic law and 
treaty provisions affected the detailed drafting of Australian tax treaties throughout 
the period. The negotiations relating to undistributed profits tax on wholly owned 
                                                          
88  The Australian argument in favour of source basis taxation of royalties was discussed at 3.59 
to 3.60. 
89  That the force of attraction provision was introduced at the request of the United States is 
clear from McGovern’s letter to Fadden discussed at 3.46. 
90  See the discussion of this aspect of the 1965 model at 4.94. At 3.153 it was noted that a 
‘force of attraction’ approach had been adopted in the initial Australian draft sent to Canada 
but that Australia appears to have readily agreed to a Canadian request to revert to an 
‘attributable to’ basis. 
91  See the discussion at 3.149. 
92  See the discussion of the negotiation of the drafting of the definition of ‘permanent 
establishment’ at 5.80 to 5.89.  
93  Instances where Australia preferred its own draft over the OECD draft were discussed at 
6.41, 6.42, 6.43, 6.45, 6.46 and 6.48. 
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subsidiaries of UK companies in the 1946 UK Treaty fit into this category.94 So too do 
the negotiations in relation to that treaty concerning Australia’s desire to preserve the 
operation of ITAA 1936 s136.95 The ‘deemed source rule’, which can be traced to the 
1946 UK Treaty but which developed in the 1967 UK Treaty and the 1969 Japan 
Treaty as a means of resolving doubts about Australian source under domestic law, 
also fits into this category. Commentary on the Australian redraft in the negotiations 
of the 1969 Japan Treaty raises a justification based on avoiding double crediting, but 
doubts about source under Australian law both preceded and were concurrent with 
this justification.96 The inclusion of a credit article, notwithstanding the broad 
exemption for taxed foreign source income throughout this period, was justified on 
the basis that it would apply if and when Australia introduced a general foreign tax 
credit system. In the interim, the drafting which allowed the credit against Australian 
tax payable was regarded as ensuring that the credit article only applied to dividends 
(where a foreign tax credit or an inter-corporate rebate applied) or to items which had 
not been subject to foreign tax and not to other items of foreign source income which 
were exempt from Australian tax.97 
7.48 The Australian desire to preserve its perceived right to tax undistributed Australian 
source profits of non-resident private companies was the principal cause of the delay 
in entering into a tax treaty with Canada between 1953 and 1957.98  
7.49 The features referred to in 7.47 were preserved in the 1965 Australian model99 and in 
the draft sent to Japan in February 1968.100 
 7.50 In negotiating the 1967 UK Treaty, Australia argued for the omission of the capital 
gains article in the UK draft on the basis that Australia did not tax capital gains and 
                                                          
94  These negotiations were discussed at 2.109 to 2.114. 
95  These negotiations were discussed at 2.115 to 2.126. 
96  The deemed source rule in Articles III(3) and IV(2) of the 1946 UK Treaty was inserted at 
Australia’s request as part of the discussions relating to ITAA 1936 s136 discussed at 2.115 
to 2.126. It is arguable that the deeming did not extend beyond what was possible under 
former ITAA 1936 s136. See the discussion to this effect in C John Taylor, ‘Some Distinctive 
Features of Australian Tax Treaty Practice: An Examination of their Origins and Interpretation’ 
(2011) 9 E Journal of Tax Research 294 at 309–11. The inclusion of the deemed source rules 
in the 1967 UK Treaty was discussed at 5.89 at 5.91. In the case of the 1969 Japan Treaty, 
the deemed source rules in relation to public entertainers, discussed at 6.90, and ITAA 1936 
Divisions 14 and 15, discussed at 6.96, appear to be motivated by resolving doubts about 
source under Australian domestic law. The use of a deemed source rule in relation to 
dividends, discussed at 6.93, appears to be intended to ensure that double crediting did not 
arise. 
97  See the discussion at 2.128 for the rationale given for adopting a credit article notwithstanding 
the Australian broad exemption for taxed foreign source other than dividends at the time. 
98  See the discussion at 3.147. 
99  See the discussion at 4.95, 4.106 and 4.118. 
100  See the discussion at 6.38, 6.43, 6.45, 6.90, 6.93 and 6.96. 
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did not want to limit its source taxing rights in relation to capital gains should it 
introduce a capital gains tax in the future.101 In negotiating the 1969 Japan Treaty, 
Australia argued for the substitution of the word ‘profits’ for the phrase ‘income (other 
than capital gains)’ in the industrial or commercial profits article to avoid the politically 
embarrassing implication that income included capital gains.102 
Domestic Law And Treaty Practice Of The Treaty Partner And Of Third Countries  
7.51 At several points there is evidence of technical features of a particular treaty being 
the result of following the treaty practice of Australia’s treaty partner or of being a 
response to the domestic law of the treaty partner. In the case of the 1946 UK Treaty, 
it is difficult to distinguish between those features of the initial UK draft that reflected 
UK tax treaty practice and those that amounted to giving expression to the ministerial 
agreement discussed at 2.90. Possibly the variations from the 1945 UK – US Tax 
Treaty that were present in both the initial UK draft and in the initial UK proposals for 
a tax treaty with Australia reflect UK Tax Treaty practice at the time.103 The scope of 
the UK taxes against which Australian corporate and shareholder taxes could be 
credited was an example of the treaty partner’s domestic law influencing Australian 
negotiation of this treaty.104  
7.52 The influence of the treaty partner’s domestic law and treaty practice is more evident 
in the 1953 US Treaty. The US practice of taxing on the basis of citizenship affected 
the way ‘resident’ was defined,105 while the imposition of US withholding tax on 
royalties on a gross basis affected the form of the royalty article.106 Several provisions 
were included at the request of the United States because they were US tax treaty 
practice,107 with only some of them being carried over into subsequent Australian tax 
treaties.108  
                                                          
101  In relation to the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty, see 5.34, 5.70, 5.119 to 5.120. 
102  See the discussion at 6.81. 
103  These would include the absence of a capital gains article and the absence of a non-
discrimination article. Defining ‘industrial or commercial profits’ in exclusionary terms might 
also reflect UK tax treaty practice of the time, but it can also be analysed as a means of giving 
effect to the ministerial agreement discussed at 2.90. The initial UK proposals were discussed 
at 2.37 to 2.39. The absence of a capital gains article and of a non-discrimination article from 
the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty were discussed at 2.102, 2.105, 2.106 and 2.107. 
104  See the discussion at 2.129 to 2.130. 
105  See the discussion at 3.31. 
106  See the discussion at 3.63. 
107  These included: the force of attraction provision (discussed at 3.46); the provisions relating to 
deductible expenses for calculating business profits (discussed at 3.47 and, as argued at 
3.137, it is likely that this was included at the request of the US); residence basis for taxing 
shipping and aircraft profits (discussed at 3.49 to 3.50 – not a variation from the 1946 
Australia – UK Tax Treaty but something that the US insisted was part of its tax treaty 
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Economic Considerations Relating To Current And Expected Trade And Investment Flows 
7.53  This factor was less apparent but not absent at the technical drafting stage. It does 
explain Australia’s concern about credit overspill in the 1946 UK Treaty109 and in 
relation to the characterisation of Australian undistributed profits tax for US foreign 
tax credit purposes in the 1953 US Treaty.110 Similar concerns are also evident in the 
negotiation of the 1969 Japan Treaty.111 
Model Treaties And Policies Developed By International Organisations  
7.54 Prior to the publication of the 1963 draft OECD Model, there is little evidence of 
models developed by international organisations, such as the League of Nations or 
the United Nations, influencing the technical drafting of Australian tax treaties. The 
only explicit reference in the technical drafting stage prior to 1963 is the mention by 
Willis of the League of Nations arm’s length principle for determining branch profits 
and the profits of associate enterprises. There is no direct evidence that the 
Australian negotiators were influenced by this argument, as it was raised in the 
context of their attempts to preserve the operation of ITAA 1936 s136.112 The first 
official Australian assessment of the 1963 draft OECD Model was generally 
negative,113 and the 1965 Australian model followed the 1963 OECD draft Model’s 
order of presentation but followed prior Australian tax treaties at a technical level.114 
O’Reilly’s review of the 1966 UK draft noted several respects in which it followed the 
1963 draft OECD Model but, in each case, regarded the 1965 Australian model as 
preferable.115 UK officials, but not Australian officials, did refer to the 1963 draft 
OECD Model as a reason for adopting particular provisions.116 In negotiating the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
practice); the reciprocal collection of taxes provision (discussed at 3.70); and the mutual 
agreement provision (discussed at 3.73). 
108  The ‘force of attraction’ principle was not applied in the 1957 Australia – Canada Tax Treaty, 
although it had been included in the Australian draft sent to Canada and was applied in the 
1960 Australia – NZ Tax Treaty. It was not applied in the 1965 Australian model nor in the 
1968 draft sent to Japan. The assistance in collection provision was not included in the draft 
sent to Canada in 1953 nor in the 1965 Australian model nor in the 1968 draft sent to Japan. 
109  As discussed at 2.129, Australia was concerned about credit overspill if Australian corporate 
and shareholder tax was not credited against UK excess profits tax in addition to income tax. 
110  Australia’s concern was evident in McGovern’s report to Fadden, as discussed at 3.68 to 
3.69; however, Australia was unsuccessful with this argument. As noted at 3.97, the drafter of 
the second draft had listed this as an issue for further discussion with US officials. As noted at 
3.116, no changes giving effect to this request were made in the final draft of the treaty. 
111  See the discussion at 6.44, 6.103 and 6.109. 
112  See the discussion at 2.115 to 2.126. Willis’ reference the League of Nations principle is at 
2.119. 
113  Belcher’s review of the 1963 draft OECD Model was discussed at 4.57 to 4.84. 
114  See in particular the discussion at 4.93 and 4.108. 
115  See O’Reilly’s comments at 5.14 to 5.16, 5.27 and 5.38. 
116  See the discussion at 5.55, 5.63, 5.68, 5.81, 5.98, 5.119 and 5.132. 
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1969 Japan Treaty, Australian officials, in instances where Japan argued for the draft 
OECD Model articles, preferred articles based on prior Australian tax treaty practice 
over OECD.117 Australia was not yet a member of the OECD, regarded the OECD 
Model as favouring capital exporting and maritime nations118 and preferred to follow 
drafting technicalities established in its earlier treaties even when these had been 
discarded by the other party to those treaties.119  
The Development Of An Australian Model Tax Treaty  
7.55 Prior to 1965, the 1953 US Treaty formed the basis of the Australian draft sent to 
Canada,120 and the 1957 Canada Treaty appears to have formed the basis for the 
1960 NZ Treaty. 
7.56 As discussed in Chapter 4, the first Australian ‘model’ tax treaty was finalised in 
1965. That model largely represented a consolidation of prior Australian tax treaty 
practice but had an even heavier emphasis on source taxation than any prior 
Australian tax treaty. The 1965 Australian model was referred to by Australian 
officials in assessing the 1966 UK draft,121 in correspondence with UK officials122 and 
in negotiating the 1967 UK Treaty.  
7.57 An Australian draft, developed in February 1968, was used in negotiating the 1969 
Japan Treaty. That model was influenced by both the 1965 Australian model and the 
1967 UK Treaty.123 Australian politicians and officials clearly regarded the 1967 UK 
Treaty as forming the basis for the 1968 Australian draft. They also regarded the 
1969 Japan Treaty as conforming to the 1968 Australian draft in important 
respects,124 although it also refined some provisions in that treaty and, in some 
                                                          
117  See the discussion at 6.41 and 6.42. 
118  See the discussion at 7.35 and accompanying notes. 
119  An example can be seen in the 1967 UK Treaty where the UK draft of September 1966 was 
closer to the 1963 draft OECD Model than the final treaty was, and where O’Reilly and the 
Memorandum in analysing the UK draft compared it with the 1946 UK Treaty, with other 
earlier Australian treaties and with the 1965 Australian model. 
120  Evidence that the first draft sent to Canada by Australia in 1953 was based on the 1953 
Australia – US Tax Treaty is discussed in C John Taylor, ‘The Negotiation and Drafting of the 
First Australia–Canada Taxation Treaty (1957)’ (2013) 61 Canadian Tax Journal 915 at 934. 
Differences between the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty and the 1957 Australia – Canada 
Tax Treaty were discussed at 3.153 to 3.154. 
121  See the discussion of this aspect of O’Reilly’s letter to Randall and of the Memorandum at 
5.14 and 5.30. 
122  As discussed at 5.56, Cain’s letter to Johnson enclosed the definition of ‘permanent 
establishment’ in the Australian model. 
123  Respects in which the 1968 Australian draft differed from or followed the 1965 Australian 
model and/or the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty were discussed in detail at 6.34 to 6.51. 
124  Cain’s report to McMahon in February 1968, discussed at 6.71, identified the important 
respects in which the initialled draft for the 1969 Australia – Japan Tax Treaty followed the 
1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty. These were the articles dealing with ‘permanent 
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respects, either reverted to earlier Australian treaty practices or extended source 
basis taxation beyond what had been agreed to in the 1967 UK Treaty.125  
International Tax Policy Considerations 
7.58 Throughout the period, the clearly dominant international tax policy consideration that 
affected detailed drafting was the primacy of source basis taxation.126 While other 
broad policy considerations can be identified in arguments put by Australian officials, 
recognisable international tax policy nomenclature is not used for them by Australian 
officials in this period. Australia’s argument for preserving source country taxing 
rights in relation to undistributed profits was put in terms of equivalent treatment for 
different forms of business organisation.127 Australia’s arguments in relation to foreign 
tax credits were, at times, that investing in Australian companies should not be 
disadvantaged when compared with investing in foreign companies. This was 
consistent with capital export neutrality but was not expressed in those terms.128  
The Australian Approach To Negotiation And Drafting Of Detailed Provisions 
7.59 During the detailed drafting of the 1946 UK Treaty, Australia began an approach to 
negotiation and drafting of detailed provisions which evolved into a practice of 
seeking comments from ATO Deputy Commissioners, Parliamentary Draftsmen and 
the Department of External Affairs.129 The involvement of Parliamentary Draftsmen 
appears to have produced an approach to drafting consistent with the legalistic, 
detailed and specific approach used for Australian domestic law at the time. ATO 
Deputy Commissioners typically noted respects in which the interaction of a tax treaty 
with domestic law was problematic and contributed to the inclusion in Australian 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
establishment’, ‘interest’, ‘dividends’ and ‘royalties’, the 10% ownership requirement for 
underlying foreign tax credits, the rates of source taxation on dividends and omitting the ‘non-
discrimination’ article. 
125  The respects in which the 1969 Australia – Japan Tax Treaty refined provisions in the 1967 
Australia – UK Tax Treaty were summarised at 6.113. The respects in which the 1969 
Australia – Japan Tax Treaty reverted to earlier Australian idiosyncrasies or further extended 
source country taxing rights were summarised at 6.114. 
126  See the discussion at 2.160 to 2.165, 3,130 to 3.137, 3.147 to 3.150, 5.157, 5.160 and 6.113 
to 6.114. 
127  See the discussion at 2.63. 
128  See the discussion at 2.133. 
129  The general approach used in negotiating and drafting the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty 
was described at 2.167. The Commonwealth Crown Solicitor and the Solicitor-General were 
involved in drafting that treaty, but there is no evidence of direct involvement by Parliamentary 
Draftsmen. The practice of seeking comments on drafts from Deputy Commissioners was 
continued in negotiating and drafting the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty as described at 3.75 
(the involvement of the former Crown Solicitor in the drafting of that treaty was identified at 
note 135 and the involvement of Parliamentary Draftsmen was discussed at note 136).  
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treaties of provisions aimed at counteracting these problems.130 Australian 
negotiating delegations of the period typically included high-ranking Australian 
Taxation Office officials and officials from the Crown Solicitor’s office. From the 1967 
UK Treaty onwards, Australian Treasury officials were involved in negotiations.131  
Drafting Style And Preference For Clarity, Brevity and Familiarity of Language 
7.60 While there is some evidence of the influence of these factors in earlier Australian tax 
treaties, they were a significant influence in the development of the 1965 Australian 
model. A consistent theme in Ross’ comments when comparing the revised 
Australian draft with the 1963 draft OECD Model is that the Australian draft was more 
specific and concise.132 Although familiarity of language probably influenced the 1967 
UK Treaty, these factors are not explicitly mentioned either in correspondence or in 
the record of negotiations. Explicit mention of precision of language does occur, 
however, in negotiating the 1969 Japan Treaty.133 
Question 3: What variations in Australian taxation treaties from the OECD Model 
should be discontinued in future Australian treaty practice, having regard to 
the original reason why those variations were introduced and subsequent 
changes in circumstances relevant to Australian taxation treaty practice and 
policy? 
                                                          
130  A good example of the type of comments by Parliamentary Draftsmen can be seen in the 
comments on the second draft of the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty discussed at 3.79 to 
3.103 and in the comments on the second draft of the 1969 Australia – Japan Tax Treaty 
discussed at 6.78 to 6.98. 
131  The delegations involved in negotiating and drafting the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty were 
described at 2.45, 2.81 and 2.96. The Australian delegation for the Canberra negotiations 
leading to the 1953 Australia – US Tax Treaty was described at 3.30, and the Australian 
delegation for the Washington negotiations was described at 3.104. The Australian delegation 
involved in negotiating the 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty was described at 5.75. It should be 
noted that negotiations in relation to that treaty were only held in Australia. The delegation 
sent to Tokyo for preliminary talks in 1962 was described at 6.4. The Australian delegation for 
the negotiations in Canberra in 1968 was described at 6.35. The Australian delegation for the 
negotiations in Tokyo in 1968 was described at 6.108. 
132  See 4.109 where Ross indicates that he prefers Belcher’s draft as being more specific than 
the OECD draft and describes the OECD draft as containing ‘a waste of roundabout verbiage’ 
in many areas. See also Ross’ comments on the residence tie-breakers in the draft OECD 
Model at 4.110 to 4.111. As discussed at 4.114, Ross also commented that the OECD Draft 
Article 5(3) took four paragraphs to cover what was dealt with (‘on a verbally more economic 
and more readily intelligible basis’) by the single Taxation clause. 
133  As discussed at 6.41, O’Reilly responded to a Japanese suggestion that the simpler OECD 
definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ be adopted by saying that ‘simpler meant looser’. 
The redraft, discussed at 6.84, of the associated enterprises article was intended to remove a 
possible ambiguity. A desire for precision in drafting of paragraph 2 of the Protocol was 
discussed at 6.97. 
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7.61 Paragraph 1.35 noted Vann’s argument that when Australia joined the OECD in 1971 
it carried its previous treaty practices with it, resulting in an Australian tax treaty 
practice characterised by an extreme source position for an OECD country and 
language oddities maintained even where the OECD terminology produced similar 
results. As summarised in this chapter, the examination of archival material relating 
to the negotiation and drafting of Australian tax treaties in the period 1946 to 1969 is 
consistent with Vann’s argument.  
7.62 Revenue considerations and an emphasis on source basis taxation were invariably 
found to be the principal factors motivating both the overall balance of the bargain in 
a tax treaty and the detail of provisions which varied from the OECD Model when 
those variations were sought by Australia. Even in instances where a variation was 
not initiated by Australia, revenue considerations and an emphasis on source basis 
taxation were significant factors influencing its continued adoption by Australia in 
subsequent tax treaties. While it is conceivable that the maintenance of these 
variations since 1971 has been due to factors other than these and to bureaucratic 
inertia, such other factors have not been publicly expressed. 
7.63 While less emphasis has been placed on source basis taxation in Australian tax 
treaties since the 2001 Protocol to the Australia – US Tax Treaty, there are several 
respects in which Australian tax treaties continue to provide greater scope for source 
basis taxation than does the OECD Model. This is particularly so in the broader 
definition of ‘permanent establishment’ typically found in Australian tax treaties. 
Whether or not variations giving greater scope for source basis taxation should be 
continued into the future is a policy question that hinges partly on an assessment of 
the present and likely future balance between inbound and outbound capital flows 
affecting Australia. Although Australia remains a net capital importer, as Vann has 
pointed out, when investment flows trend towards balance, a country does not give 
up revenue by treaty decreases in source taxation as these are counterbalanced by 
increased revenue from residence taxation.134 A separate but related question is 
whether any revenue loss from a reduction in source country taxing rights is 
counterbalanced by increased inbound investment and consequential increased 
economic growth. Policy evaluation would also need to take into account changes in 
the Australian and global economies affecting methods of conducting business and 
the relative significance of industries, particularly the shift from tangibles to 
intangibles and the provision of services.  
                                                          
134  This aspect of Vann’s argument was discussed at 1.33. 
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7.64 Both of the policy questions identified in 7.63 need to be assessed on the basis of 
economic data and analysis and, in that respect, are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The contribution of this thesis to these questions has been to highlight the origins of 
these variations from the OECD Model and the influence of an emphasis on the 
primacy of source basis taxation and revenue considerations in their development. 
Awareness of the probable origins of these provisions and of the influence of these 
policy objectives in their development should assist policymakers in deciding whether 
to continue these provisions if an assessment is made that inbound and outbound 
capital flows are likely to be more balanced in the future and/or if the assessment is 
made that increased inbound investment and economic activity will offset any 
revenue losses consequent on a reduction in source country taxing rights.  7.65
 While revenue considerations and an emphasis on source basis taxation have 
arguably been the dominant factors affecting the detail of provisions varying from the 
OECD Model, familiarity with earlier forms of drafting coupled with a view that those 
forms were both clearer and more specific has been found to be a factor influencing 
those variations. As Vann has pointed out, however, the difficulty with exceptionalism 
of this type is that the OECD Commentary becomes less useful as an aid to 
interpretation of these aspects of Australian tax treaties.135   It is submitted that, if an 
assessment is made to discontinue variations from the OECD Model on the basis of 
the assessments referred to in 7.64, then continuity with prior Australian drafting style 
does not, of itself, constitute a sound reason for maintaining that practice and drafting 
style.  On the contrary, harmonising the drafting of Australian treaties with OECD 
drafting as much as possible, should enable greater use to be made of the OECD 
Commentary in interpreting Australian tax treaties with the effect that Australian tax 
treaties are interpreted more consistently with international practice.  Interpreting 
Australian tax treaties consistently with international practice is would produce 
greater certainty for individuals and businesses engaged in cross border activities 
and, for that reason alone, should be seen as desirable. 
 
7.66 A third category of variations from the OECD Model is those variations that were 
originally intended to preserve the operation of provisions in domestic law which have 
since been either repealed or amended. The variation that most obviously fits into 
this category is the provisions in the business profits and associated enterprises 
articles which preserve the operation of domestic law where the information available 
                                                          
135  Vann’s arguments in relation to this point were discussed at 1.36 and 1.37. 
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is not adequate to determine an arm’s length price. This variation originated in the 
negotiation of the 1946 UK Treaty and was inserted to preserve the operation of 
former ITAA 1936 s136. As discussed at 2.115, former s136 was a provision which 
allowed the Commissioner to determine the taxable income of a company controlled 
by non-residents when the company either produced no taxable income or produced 
less taxable income than might be expected from the business.  
7.67 Former ITAA 1936 s136 was replaced by transfer pricing provisions in ITAA 1936 
Division 13 in 1982. In 2012, ITAA 1997 Sub-division 815-A was added, which 
operated concurrently with Division 13. In 2013, Division 13 was repealed and Sub-
division 815-A ceased to have effect.136 Currently, ITAA 1997 Sub-divisions 815-B 
(between separate entities) and 815-C (between a permanent establishment and the 
rest of a single entity) are the relevant transfer pricing provisions in Australian 
domestic law that apply in both treaty and non-treaty cases.  
7.68 Under the current transfer pricing rules for separate entities, arm’s length conditions 
are substituted for actual conditions where the actual conditions produce a transfer 
pricing benefit as defined137 and effectively similar results are achieved by for profits 
of a permanent establishment. ITAA 1997 s815-135 and s815-235 require that Sub-
divisions 815-B and 815-C respectively are to be applied so as to best achieve 
consistency with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Commentary on the 
OECD Model. Hence, the negation of a transfer pricing benefit under Australian 
domestic transfer pricing law where a bilateral tax treaty is applicable is contingent on 
an assessment that relies on concepts and methodologies set out in the relevant 
bilateral tax treaty, in the OECD Model and in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
Unlike the previous law, it does not depend on a determination being made by the 
Commissioner. In addition, where the operation of Sub-division 815-B or of Sub-
division 815-C is inconsistent with a relevant Australian bilateral tax treaty, the treaty 
rules will prevail.138 Hence, it is considered that the provisions in all current Australian 
tax treaties which preserve the operation of domestic law in the business profits and 
associated enterprises articles where information is inadequate to determine an 
arm’s length price, aimed as they originally were at protecting a discretionary power, 
                                                          
136  This follows from Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997 ss815-1(2), 815-15. 
137  The broad effect of the current Australian rules is discussed in Tax Laws Amendment 
(Countering Tax Avoidance and Multilateral Profit Shifting) Bill 2013, Explanatory 
Memorandum, paras 2.16 to 2.31. 
138  This is the effect of s4(2) of the International Tax Agreements Act 1953. Because the new 
transfer pricing rules are closely modelled on the language of tax treaty provisions, there is 
unlikely to be significant differences in operation and hence any need for a tax treaty to limit 
the domestic law provisions.  
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are otiose. It is noted that the 2015 German Treaty, which is not yet in force, does not 
contain provisions that preserve the operation of domestic law in the business profits 
and associated enterprises articles where information is inadequate to determine an 
arm’s length price. If the omission of provisions of this nature is to be Australian 
policy in the future, then it would be consistent with the analysis in this thesis of the 
origins of provisions of this nature and of current Australian transfer pricing 
provisions.  More generally, it is submitted that there is little point in continuing in 
Australian tax treaties with variations from the OECD Model which were intended to 
protect features of Australian domestic law which are no longer operative and where 
subsequent developments in Australian law have effectively rendered the tax treaty 
provision otiose. 
7.69 An ongoing oddity in Australian tax treaties is the presence of deemed source rules. 
While in some instances these apply only to specific categories of income, in no case 
is the deeming entirely confined to the credit article.139 In the 2015 German Treaty,140 
a deemed source rule applies for Australian law generally and a separate deeming of 
Australian source is made in the credit article. The better view is that the effect of the 
deemed source rule is that the treaty rule interacts with domestic law so that tax is 
levied under domestic law when it would not be in the absence of the treaty.141 Part 
of Australian thinking behind the deemed source rule appears to have been to 
resolve doubts about the source of particular types of income under domestic law.142 
There is also evidence in the negotiations reviewed in this thesis of deemed source 
rules being seen as needed to ensure the effective functioning of credit articles,143 to 
                                                          
139  The variations on deemed source rules in Australian tax treaties are summarised in Appendix 
7. Note that ‘double deeming’ (for the purposes of Australian or both contracting states’ law 
and deeming for credit purposes) is common. Arguably, where ‘double deeming’ occurs the 
intent of the drafting is that the first deeming is for purposes of the particular contracting 
state’s tax law generally (other than credit purposes) and not for credit purposes, which is 
specifically dealt with by the second deeming. 
140  A deemed source rule is contained in paragraph 1 of the Protocol to the 2015 German Treaty 
signed on 12th November 2015. The influence of pre 1971 Australian tax treaty practice is still 
evident in the 2015 German Treaty. As shown in Appendix 3, at least 13 variations in that 
treaty from the current OECD Model can be found in Australian tax treaties entered into prior 
to 1971. 
141  See the discussion in R J Vann, ‘Australian Branch Report, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: 
Application of Anti Avoidance Provisions’ (2010) 95a Cahiers do droit fiscal international 79 at 
92–3, and Taylor, above note 96 at 309–15. For a contrary view see R Deutsch, R M 
Arkwright and D Chiew, Principles and Practice of Double Taxation Agreements (BNA 
International Inc., 2008) 9–10. 
142  See, in particular the discussion at 5.25 and 5.90–5.91 dealing with the deemed source rule in 
the case of public entertainers. 
143  For example, as discussed at 3.67, this was the justification for deemed source rules given by 
McGovern in relation to deemed source rules for services, films and insurance in the 1953 US 
Treaty. 
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limit the scope of credit obligations,144 and to avoid dual crediting.145 Both the 
rationale of resolving doubts about source and the rationale of ensuring the 
appropriate operation of provisions aimed at preventing international double taxation 
can be seen in one of the rare statements by a relevant Australian minister about 
Australian tax treaty policy.146 The former rationale is devoid of any policy 
justification. If Australia wants to expand its concept of source to match deemed 
source rules in its tax treaties, then it can do so through domestic legislation. 
Irrespective of the merits of the latter rationale, it would be better implemented either 
by systematically confining the operation of the deemed source rule to the credit 
article or by providing in the treaty that Australia has the right to amend its domestic 
law to deem particular items dealt with in the treaty to have an Australian source.147  
7.70 Finally, following the release of the OECD/G20 Final Recommendations on BEPS 
(Base Erosion and Profit Shifting),148 this is a propitious time for a reassessment of 
variations in Australian tax treaty practice and policy from the OECD Model. At a 
minimum, the BEPS Final Recommendations will involve changes in the OECD 
Commentary,149 and their non-binding recommendations on treaty practice150 and 
                                                          
144  See the discussion at 6.47 of the Japanese argument for freezing source rules so as to limit 
the liability of the residence country to give credit. 
145  Most explicitly in the drafter’s comments on the 1969 Japan Treaty on the deemed source 
rule for dividends as discussed at 6.93. Earlier, as discussed at 2.146, unrelieved double 
taxation of dividends had been perceived to be a problem where the paying company was a 
dual resident. 
146  In announcing a 2008 review of tax treaty policy, the then Assistant Treasurer and Minister for 
Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs (Chris Bowen) stated: ‘Deemed source rules are 
included to ensure that a country can exercise the taxing rights allocated to it under the treaty 
and to ensure appropriate double tax relief by the other country’. The Hon. Chris Bowen MP, 
Assistant Treasurer, Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs, Media Release 
25/01/2008 No. 004, ‘Australia’s Tax Treaty Negotiation Policy’, 25th January 2008. 
147  As Vann notes, above note 141, this approach was taken under paragraph 3 of the Protocol 
to the 1972 German Treaty, and the power given by the treaty was exercised by s11(3) of the 
Income Tax International Agreements Act 1953 (Cth). 
148  OECD (2015), OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, Final Reports. 
 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm 
149  For example, changes to the Commentary are envisaged in the recommendations on hybrid 
entities (OECD BEPS Final Report, Action 2 – Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements, para 438) and in the recommendations on artificial avoidance of PE status 
(OECD BEPS Final Report, Action 7 – Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent 
Establishment Status, pp15–44).  
150  For example, the OECD BEPS Final Report, Action 7 includes recommendations for changes 
to the definition of ‘permanent establishment’ (restricting the ‘preparatory or auxiliary’ 
exception to the definition of PE and an anti-fragmentation rule) and OECD BEPS Final 
Report, Action 2 includes recommendations for resolving dual residence on a case-by-case 
basis rather than through dual residence tie-breakers. These will all need to be considered by 
tax treaty negotiators. As shown in Appendix 3, some provisions in the 2015 German Treaty 
appear to anticipate these recommendations. While the broader definition of ‘permanent 
establishment’ in Australian treaties is in some respects consistent with these 
recommendations, some particular Australian variations (for example, AV6 and AV10, both of 
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domestic law151 will need to be considered by Australian negotiators, policy advisors 
and legislators respectively. The danger is that any adjustments to Australian tax 
treaty policy and practice will be confined to those actions directly relevant to BEPS 
recommendations. If so, the result would be a curious hybrid treaty policy and 
practice that responds to current recommendations while reproducing, possibly 
merely through bureaucratic inertia, features that developed to deal with issues of 
former times. As Bruner has argued, the fundamental insight of the BEPS project has 
been that ‘international coordination of tax policies is a condition for the success of 
any substantial reform’, which is, Bruner notes, in stark contrast to the current 
competition-based international tax regime.152 In Australia’s case, the contrast is 
particularly stark between a xenophobic historical policy of maximising revenue 
through excessive source claims and one of international collaboration and co-
operation aimed, at least officially, at increasing global welfare. A comprehensive 
reassessment of variations in Australian tax treaty policy and practice from OECD 
norms would produce a treaty policy and practice that is consistent with what should 
be Australian responses to the BEPS recommendations. It is hoped that this thesis 
will be a resource that assists in such a review. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
7.71 Several limitations of the research conducted in this thesis should be noted.   
7.72 First, as pointed out at 7.2, the existence of variations from the OECD Model in 
Australian tax treaties up to and including the 1969 Japan Treaty does not 
necessarily explain the occurrence of those variations in subsequent and currently 
operative Australian tax treaties.  A more definitive explanation based on archival 
material would require examination of archival materials relating to each currently 
operative subsequent Australian tax treaty.  Considerations of length and of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which originated in treaties examined in this thesis) could be characterised as being more 
relevant for particular industries and particular trading and investment relationships. 
151  For example, the recommendations in OECD BEPS Final Report, Action 3 – Designing 
Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules (particularly the recommendation at para 51 – 
Australian rules do not contain a tax rate exemption as such – and the recommendations at 
para 111 – Australian rules apply different tests for control and for attribution) and in OECD 
(particularly the recommendations for a best practice approach at paras 22–31 – Australian 
rules are not based on limiting interest deductions to a fixed percentage of EBITDA) are 
inconsistent with current Australian domestic law. Arguably, these domestic law rules should 
be reconsidered in the light of these recommendations. It should be noted, however, that this 
view is not shared by the Australian Treasurer at the time of writing. The Hon. Scott Morrison 
MP, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, Media Release, 6th October 2015, OECD 
Report Supports Australian Government Action on Multinational Tax Avoidance. 
152  Yariv Bruner, ‘BEPS: An Interim Evaluation’ (2014) 6 World Tax Journal 10 at 12. 
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availability of relevant archival materials have meant that such examination was not 
possible in this thesis.   
7.73 Second the archival materials examined have all been contained in official files of 
one or more governments.  Reference has not been made to personal diaries or 
written recollections of officials and officials involved in the negotiation of treaties 
have not been interviewed.  It is possible that there may be ‘non-official’ explanations 
for actions taken in negotiating and drafting Australian tax treaties between 1946 and 
1971 which are not disclosed in official records.   
7.74 Third none of the archival records in relation to the treaties discussed in the thesis 
can be said to be entirely complete.  Significant records from relevant Australian and 
United Kingdom departments were examined in relation to the 1946 UK Treaty and 
the 1967 UK Treaty but even there some files were missing and some parts of files 
were missing.  In the case of the 1953 US Treaty and the 1957 Canada Treaty while 
significant Australian files were able to be examined only limited US and Canadian 
files were able to be located and examined.  In the case of the 1969 Japan Treaty 
only Australian files were examined.  In addition archival materials, even when 
available, did not always contain direct comment on the reason for a particular 
variation from the OECD Model and, in some instances, contained somewhat cryptic 
comments which had to be interpreted by reference to their context.   
7.75 Despite these limitations it is submitted that the analysis of the individual treaties and 
the conclusions made in this chapter in relation to the central questions investigated 
in this thesis are based reasonable inferences derived from the archival materials 
that have been available to me. 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
7.76 The methodology used in this thesis could, as archival materials become more 
available, be adopted for researching subsequent Australian treaty policy and 
practice and the treaty policy and practices of other countries. Natural successors to 
the research in this thesis using materials that should now be available would be how 
Australian tax treaty policy and practice was affected by subsequent events such as: 
Australia’s 1971 OECD membership; the increased importance of Asia to the 
Australian economy; and the effect of the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact.  The methodology could also be applied to other more confined or thematic 
approaches such as: how Australian and New Zealand tax treaty policy and practice 
influenced each other; distinctive characteristics of Australian tax treaties with what 
were then less developed countries starting with the 1969 Singapore Treaty; and an 
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examination of subsequent instances where Australian tax treaties contained 
deemed source rules.  One of the distinctive features of Australian treaties continues 
to be the use of a ‘substantial equipment’ provision.  A substantial equipment 
provision first appears to have been used in a bi-lateral tax treaty in the 1950 
Protocol to the 1942 United States – Canada Tax Treaty.  Further examination of 
archival records relating to the negotiation of that Protocol could be undertaken to try 
to resolve more firmly the question of who initiated the inclusion of the provision and 
why they did so.  Subsequent Australian tax treaties for which archival materials 
should be available and which would merit further research would be the 1980 
Canada Treaty (the first Australian treaty not to include some of the structural 
features of the ‘colonial’ or ‘baby boomer’ model); and the 1982 US Treaty being a 
treaty with a major trading and investment partner and the first Australian treaty 
containing a ‘non-discrimination’ article albeit one which at the time was not given the 
force of law in Australia. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF AUSTRALIAN COMPREHENSIVE TAX TREATIES, 
AMENDING PROTOCOLS, EXCHANGES OF NOTES, AND EXCHANGES OF LETTERS 
 
Signature Entry into 
force 
Status Country Australian Domestic Implementation 
29/10/1946 3/06/1947 Applied from 
1/07/1947 
Terminated 
8/05/1968 
United 
Kingdom 
Income Tax Assessment Bill 1947 
 
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1953 
Original Schedule 1 IT (IA) Act 1953 
14/05/1952 14/12/1953 Applied from 
1/07/1953 
 
Terminated 
31/10/1983 
United 
States  
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1953 
 
Former Schedule 2 IT (IA) Act 1953 
1/10/1957 21/5/1958 Applied from 
1/07/1958 
 
Terminated 
29/04/1981 
Canada  Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1958 
 
Original Schedule 3 to IT(IA) Act 
1953 
12/05/1960 23/06/1960 Applied from 
1/07/1959 
 
Terminated 
31/03/1973 
New 
Zealand  
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1960 
 
Original Schedule 4 to IT(IA) Act 
1953 
7/12/1967 8/05/1968 Applied from United Income Tax (International 
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355 
1/7/1967 
 
Terminated  
17/12/2003 
Kingdom  Agreements) Bill 1968 
 
Former Schedule 1 to IT(IA) Act 
1953 
11/02/1969 4/06/1969 Applied from 
1/07/1969 
 
In force 
Singapore Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1969 
 
s7 IT(IA) Act 1953 
20/03/1969 4/07/1969 Applied from 
1/07/1970 
 
Terminated 
1/7/2009 
Japan Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1969 
 
Schedule 6 to IT(IA) Act 1953 
24/11/1972 15/02/1975 Applied from 
1/07/1971 
 
In force 
Germany Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1974 
 
s11 IT(IA) Act 1953 
8/11/1972 31/03/1973 Applied from 
1/07/1972 
 
Terminated  
29/03/1995 
New 
Zealand 
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1973 
 
Former Schedule 4  to IT(IA) Act 
1953 
21/05/1975 21/05/1975 Exchange of 
letters 
 
In force 
Singapore N/A 
17/03/1976 
 
27/09/1976 Applied from 
1/07/1975 
The 
Netherlands 
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1976 
 
 
 
356 
356 
  
First 
Protocol 
also signed 
on same 
date and 
entered into 
force on 
same date 
 
 
 
s5 and s 11A to IT(IA) Act 1953 
13/04/1976 21/09/1977 Applied from 
1/01/1973 
 
Terminated 
1/6/2009 
France Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1976 
 
Former Schedule 11 to IT(IA) Act 
1953 
13/10/1977 1/11/1979 Applies from 
1/01/1980 
 
In force 
Belgium Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1977 
 
s11C  IT(IA) Act 1953 
11/05/1979 17/06/1980 Applies from 
1/01/1980 
 
In force 
The 
Philippines  
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1980 
 
Schedule 14 to IT(IA) Act 1953 
29/01/1980 21/05/1980 Applies from 
6/04/1977 
 
Amending 
Protocol. 
United 
Kingdom 
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill 1980  
 
Repealed Schedule 1A to IT(IA) Act 
1953 
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357 
 
Terminated 
17/12/2003 
28/02/1980 13/02/1981 Applies from 
1/01/1979 
 
Terminated 
14/10/2014 
Switzerland Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1980 
 
Former Schedule 15 to IT(IA) Act 
1953 
21/05/1980 29/04/1981 Entered into 
force 
29/4/1981 
 
Applied from 
1/07/1975 
Canada Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1980 
 
s6A  IT(IA) Act 1953 
20/08/1980 26/06/1981 1/07/1979 
 
In force 
Malaysia  Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1981 
 
s11F IT(IA) Act 1953 
14/01/1981 4/09/1981 Applies from  
1/01/1982 
 
In force 
Sweden Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1981 
 
s11G  IT(IA) Act 1953 
1/04/1981 27/10/1981 Applies from 
1/01/1982 
 
In force 
Denmark Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill (No2) 1981 
 
s11H IT(IA) Act 1953 
6/08/1982 31/10/1982 Applies from 
1/12/1983 
United 
States of 
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill  1983 
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358 
 
In force 
America  
ss 6 and 20 IT(IA) Act 1953 
31/05/1983 21/12/1983 1/07/1984 
 
In force 
Ireland Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1983 
 
s11K IT(IA) Act 1953 
20/03/1984 20/9/1986 N/A 
Amending 
Protocol 
Belgium Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill 1984 
 
s5  IT(IA) Act 1953 
14/12/1982 5/11/1985 Applies from 
1/7/1976 
 
In force 
Italy  Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1983 
 
s10A IT(IA) Act 1953 
12/07/1982 1/01/1984 Applies from  
1/01/1982 
 
In force 
Republic of 
Korea 
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Bill 1983 
 
s11L  IT(IA) Act 1953 
6/05/1982 19/10/1983 Applied from 
01/07/1982 
 
Terminated? 
Norway Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill 1982 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953Pa 
9/05/1984 20/05/1985 Applies from 
01/01/1986 
 
In force 
Malta Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill 1985 
 
s11N IT(IA) Act 1953 
12/09/1984 28/03/1986 Applied from Finland  Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 
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359 
1/01/1987 
 
Terminated? 
(No3) 1985 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
30/06/1986 1/05/1987 1/07/1986 
 
2nd 
Amending 
Protocol  
 
In force 
The 
Netherlands 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 
(No3) 1986 
 
s11A IT(IA) Act 1953 
8/07/1986 1/09/1988 Applied from 
1/01/1989 
 
In force 
Austria Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 
(No3) 1986 
 
s11R  IT(IA) Act 1953 
17/11/1988 28/12/1990 Applies from 
1/07/1991 
 
In force 
China Taxation Laws Amendment 
(International Agreements) Bill 1990 
 
s5 and s11S  IT(IA) Act 1953 
24/05/1989 29/12/1989 Applies from 
1/07/1990 
 
In force 
Papua New 
Guinea  
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill (No2) 
1989 
 
s5  IT(IA) Act 1953 
19/06/1989 19/07/1990 1/07/1989 
 
Terminated 
1/6/2009 
France Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill (No2) 
1989 
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360 
31/08/1989 27/12/1989 Applies from 
1/01/1990 
 
In force 
Thailand Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill (No2) 
1989 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
16/10/1989 16/10/1989 Exchange of 
notes  
 
In force 
Singapore N/A 
18/10/1989 5/01/1990 Amending 
protocol 
 
In force 
Singapore Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill (No2) 
1989 
 
s7 IT(IA) Act 1953 
 
 
18/12/1989 21/10/1991 Applies from 
1/07/1992 
 
In force 
Sri Lanka Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill 1990 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
 
15/10/1990 28/12/1990 Applies from 
1/01/1991 
 
In force 
Fiji Taxation Laws Amendment 
(International Agreements) Bill 1990 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
29/11/1990 10/04/1992 Applies from 
1/07/1993 
Hungary Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill (No2) 
1989 
 
 
 
361 
361 
 
In force 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
 
23/03/1991 28/06/1991 Applies from 
1/07/1991 
 
In force 
Kiribati Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill (No2) 
1989 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
25/07/1991 30/12/1991 Applies from 
1/07/1992 
 
In force 
India Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill (No.2) 
1991 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
7/05/1991 4/03/1992 Applies from 
1/01/1993 
 
In force 
Poland Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill (No2) 
1991 
 
s5  and s11ZA IT(IA) Act 19 
22/04/1992 14/12/1992 Applies from 
1/07/1993 
 
In force 
Indonesia Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill 1992 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
13/04/1992 10/12/1992 Applies from 
1/07/1993 
 
In force 
Vietnam Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill 1992 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
24/03/1992 10/12/1992 Applies from 
1/01/1993 
Spain Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill 1992 
 
 
 
362 
362 
 
In force 
 
s5 IT(IA) Act 1953 
27/01/1995 29/03/1995 Applied 
from 
1/04/1995 
 
Terminated 
19/3/2010 
 
New 
Zealand 
Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Amendment Bill 1995 
 
Former Schedule 4 to IT(IA) Act 
1953 
23/03/1995 27/11/1995 Applies from 
1/01/1996 
 
In force 
Czech 
Republic 
International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill 1995 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
 
29/05/1996 21/10/1996 Applies from 
1/12/1996 
 
In force 
Taipei Taxation Laws (International Tax 
Agreements) Bill 1996 
 
s5 and s11ZF ITA Act 1953 
22/11/1996 23/07/1997 Exchange of 
notes  
 
In force 
Vietnam s5 and s11ZCA ITA Act 1953 
5/11/1997 17/08/2000 Second 
amending 
Protocol 
Applies 
1/07/2001 
Finland 
 
 
 
International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2000 
 
 
 
363 
363 
 
Terminated 
7/08/1998 6/09/1998 Exchange of 
notes  
 
In force 
Norway N/A 
1/07/1999 21/12/1999 Applies from 
1/01/2000 
 
In force 
South 
Africa 
International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill 1999 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
24/08/1999 22/12/1999 Applies from 
1/01/2000 
 
In force 
Slovakia  International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill 1999 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
 
20/8/1999 27/06/2000 Amending 
protocol N/A 
 
In force 
Malaysia  International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill 1999 
 
ss11F and 11FA ITA Act 1953 
29/08/1999 30/12/1999 Applied from 
1/01/2000 
 
In force 
Argentina International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill 1999 
 
s5 and s11ZI ITA Act  
9/11/1999 27/06/2000 Exchange of 
letters 
 
In force 
Malaysia  International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill 1999 
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364 
2/02/2000 11/04/2001 Applies from 
1/01/2002 
Romania International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2000 
 
s5  ITA Act 1953 
 
7/09/2000 17/12/2003 Applies from 
1/07/2003 
 
In force 
Russia  International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No 1) 2002 
 
s5  ITA Act 1953 
 
27/09/2001 13/05/2003 Applies from 
1/07/2003 
United 
States 
International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2002 
 
ss6 and 20 ITA Act 1953 
23/01/2002 18/12/2002 Amending 
Protocol 
Applies from 
1/01/2003 
 
In force 
Canada International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No2) 2002 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
28/07/2002 23/07/2003 1/07/2004 
2nd 
Amending 
Protocol 
 
And 
exchange of 
letters 
Malaysia International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No2) 2002 
 
ss11F and 11FB ITA Act 1953 
 
 
 
 
365 
365 
 
In force 
 
5/08/2002 11/02/2002 Exchange of 
letters 
 
In force 
Vietnam N/A 
9/09/2002 31/12/2003 Applies from 
1/01/2004 
 
In force 
Mexico International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill 2003 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
 
21/08/2003 17/12/2003 Applies from 
1/07/2004 
 
In force 
United 
Kingdom 
International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill 2003 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
15/11/2005 22/01/2007 Amending 
protocol  
 
Terminated 
19/3/2010 
New 
Zealand 
International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2006 
 
Schedule 4A to ITA Act 1953 
20/06/2006 1/6/2009 1/1/2010 
 
In force 
France International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2007 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
8/8/2006 12/09/2007 Applies 
1/01/2008 
Norway International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2007 
 
 
 
366 
366 
 
In force 
 
Schedule 23 to ITA Act 1953 
20/11/2006 10/11/2007 Applies from 
1/01/ 2008 
Finland International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No2) 2007 
 
Schedule 25 to ITA Act 1953 
31/3/2008 12/11/2008 
Amending 
protocol 
1/1/2009 South 
Africa 
International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No2) 2008 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
31/01/2008 3/12/2008 Applies from 
1/1/2009 
 
In force 
Japan International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2008 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
24/06/2009 19/03/2010 Applies from  
1/5/2010 
 
 
In force 
New 
Zealand 
International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2010 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
 
24/06/2009 12/05/2014 NA 
Second 
Amending 
Protocol 
Belgium Schedule 13B to IT(IA) Act 1953 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
8/9/2009 22/12/2010 22/12/2010 
Second 
amending 
Protocol 
Singapore s7 ITA  Act 1953 
 
 
 
367 
367 
24/02/2010 8/8/2011 NA 
Amending 
protocol 
 
In force  
Malaysia  s11F ITA Act 1953 
10/03/2010 8/2/2013 Applies from 
1/4/2013 
 
In force 
Chile International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2011 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
28/4/2010 5/6/2013 Applies to 
withholding 
tax from 
1/1/2014 
 
Applies to 
other 
Australian 
tax from 1 
July 2014 
 
In force 
Turkey  International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill (No1) 2011 
 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
16/12/2011 2/4/2013 NA  
Amending 
Protocol 
 
In force 
India 
 
 
 
30/7/2013 14/10/2014 Applies from 
1/1/2015 
Switzerland International Tax Agreements 
Amendment Bill 2014 
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In force 
s5 ITA Act 1953 
12/11/15 Not yet in 
force 
Not yet in 
force 
Germany NA 
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APPENDIX 2 
CURRENT AUSTRALIAN RESERVATIONS IN RELATION TO THE OECD MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION  
Article 2 
Australia reserves its position on that part of paragraph 1 which states that the Convention 
shall apply to taxes on capital. 
Article 5 Paragraph 1 
Australia reserves the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment in a 
State if it carries on activities relating to natural resources or operates substantial equipment 
in that State with a certain degree of continuity, or a person – acting in that State on behalf of 
the enterprise – manufactures or processes in that State goods or merchandise belonging to 
the enterprise. 
Article 5 Paragraph 3 
Australia reserves its position on paragraph 3, and considers that any building site or 
construction or installation project which lasts more than six months should be regarded as a 
permanent establishment. 
Australian reserves the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment in a 
State if it carries on in that State supervisory or consultancy activities for more than 183 days 
in any twelve month period in connection with a building site or construction or installation 
project in that State. 
Article 6 
Australia reserves the right to include rights relating to all natural resources under this 
Article. 
Article 7 
Australia reserves the right to include a provision that will permit its domestic law to apply in 
relation to the taxation of profits from any form of insurance. 
Australia reserves the right to include a provision clarifying its right to tax a share of business 
profits to which a resident of the other Contracting State is beneficially entitled where those 
profits are derived by a trustee of a trust estate (other than certain unit trusts that are treated 
as companies for Australian tax purposes) from the carrying on of a business in Australia 
through a permanent establishment. 
Australia reserves the right to propose in bilateral negotiations a provision to the effect that, if 
the information available to a competent authority of a Contracting State is inadequate to 
determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment of an enterprise, the 
competent authority may apply to the enterprise for that purpose the provisions of the 
taxation law of that State, subject to the qualification that such law will be applied, so far as 
the information available to the competent authority permits, in accordance with the 
principles of this Article. 
Article 8 
Australia reserves the right to tax profits from the carriage of passengers or cargo taken on 
board at one place in Australia for discharge in Australia. 
 
 
 
370 
370 
 
 
Article 9 
Australia reserves the right to propose a provision to the effect that, if the information 
available to a competent authority of a Contracting State is inadequate to determine the 
profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment of an enterprise, the competent 
authority may apply to the enterprise for that purpose the provisions of the taxation law of 
that State, subject to the qualification that such law will be applied, so far as the information 
available to the competent authority permits, in accordance with the principles of this Article. 
Article 12 
Paragraph 1 
Australia reserves the right to tax royalties at source. 
Paragraph 2 
Australia reserves the right to amend the definition of royalties to include payments or credits 
which are treated as royalties under its domestic law. 
Australia reserves the right, in order to fill what it considers to be a gap in the Article, to 
propose a provision defining the source of royalties by analogy with the provisions of 
paragraph 5 of Article 11, which deals with the same problem in the case of interest. 
Article 21 
Australia reserves its position on this Article and would wish to maintain the right to tax 
income arising from sources in its own country. 
Article 24 
Australia reserves the right to propose amendments to ensure that Australia can continue to 
apply certain provisions of its domestic law relating to deductions for R&D and withholding 
tax collection.  
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APPENDIX 3: VARIATIONS IN CURRENTLY OPERATIVE AUSTRALIAN TAXATION TREATIES FROM THE OECD MODEL CONVENTION 
ON INCOME AND CAPITAL 
The focus of the thesis is on articles with direct relevance to cross border investment by multinational enterprises.  For this reason this Table 
not consider  articles in the current or former OECD Models dealing with: Independent Personal Services (former OECD Art 14); Income From 
Employment (OECD Art 15); Pensions (OECD Art 18); Government Service (OECD Art 19); Students (OECD Art 20); Members of Diplomatic 
Missions And Consular Posts (Art 27 then 28); Territorial Extension (OECD Art 28 then 29); Entry into Force (OECD Art 29 then 30); and 
Termination (OECD Art 30 then 31). 
 
OECD 
Model 
Article 
Variation 
Number 
Variation In Australian Treaties Current Treaties Where Variation 
Appears 
Earliest Instance 
Of Variation 
Most Recent 
Instance Of 
Variation 
UN  
Equivalent 
Art 2(1) 
 
AV1 
Not included in Australian Treaties 
(23exceptions) 
All Australian treaties with the 
exception of the 1982 Australia – 
Italy Tax Treaty, the  2013 Swiss 
Treaty and the 2015 German Treaty. 
Australia – UK 
Tax Treaty 1946.  
The Australia – 
UK 1967 Tax 
Treaty was the 
first Australian 
treaty to contain 
this variation 
after the 
Tax Treaty with 
Turkey signed 
April 2010  
 
 
Identical to OECD 
Model 
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publication of 
the 1963 draft 
OECD Model 
Art2(2) 
 
AV2 
Not included in any Australian 
Treaties except 2013 Swiss Treaty 
and 2015 German Treaty 
All Australian treaties except 2013 
Swiss Treaty and 2015 German 
Treaty. 
Australia – UK 
Tax Treaty 1946.  
The Australia – 
UK 1967 Tax 
Treaty was the 
first Australian 
treaty to contain 
this variation 
after the 
publication of 
the 1963 draft 
OECD Model 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
Substantially 
identical to OECD 
Model  
Art 3(1) 
 
AV3(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Singapore includes a 
definition of ‘profits of a Singapore 
enterprise’ and of ‘profits of an 
Australian enterprise’ in terms which 
exclude particular categories of 
income.  This is a legacy of the 
‘Colonial Model’ referred to in 
Chapter 4 as the ‘Baby Boomer 
Treaty with Singapore 1969 Australia – UK 
Tax Treaty 1946 
Treaty with 
Singapore 1969 
Approach not 
taken in UN Model 
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AV3(b)1 
 
Model’ where industrial or 
commercial profits were defined in 
exclusionary terms.  
 
 
Art 4(1) 
 
AV4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of Australia if the person 
is a resident of Australia for the 
purposes of Australian tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties except 2013 
Swiss and 2015 German treaties.   
US Treaty and 2010 Turkish Treaty 
state that an ‘Australian company’ is 
an Australian resident.  An 
‘Australian company’ is separately 
 
 
Australia –UK 
Tax Treaty 1946 
although dual 
residents were 
not treaty 
residents under 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty  
 
2015  German 
Treaty  differs 
from both OECD 
 
 
Identical to  
OECD Model 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  All Australian treaties contain some variations from the general definitions in OECD Article 3.  Some of these of these are additional definitions (for 
example some treaties contain a definition of ‘stock exchange’). Only the treaty with Romania contains a definition of ‘international traffic’ identical to 
the OECD definition.  Other Australian treaties either do not contain a definition of ‘international traffic’ (for example, the treaty with Austria), or vary 
the OECD definition by excluding the words ‘that has its place of effective management in the Contacting State’ (for example, the treaty with 
Argentina).  A deletion that is permitted in the OECD commentary where the words ‘resident of the Contracting State’ are substituted.  Australian 
treaties signed before 1995 follow the pre 1995 OECD version of Article 3(2).  In general Australian treaties post 1995 follow the 1995 OECD version 
of Article 3(2).  Definitions of ‘enterprise’, ‘business’ and ‘national’ are infrequent in Australian treaties, particularly treaties signed before these 
definitions were added to the OECD Model but can be excluded from more recent treaties (for example, the 2010 Chilean treaty excludes the 
definitions of ‘enterprise’ and of ‘business’).  The definition of ‘national’ is rarely included and is varied in some treaties (for example the 2015 German 
treaty).  As these variations differ significantly between Australian treaties and as each variation may relate to one particular defined term in the 
OECD model they have not been included in the total of Australian variations from the OECD Model.  It was considered that to do so would have 
exaggerated the extent of the Australian variations from the OECD Model. 
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374 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Only 11 of 19 post 1995 tax treaties 
include 1995 addition ‘any political 
subdivision or local authority thereof’ 
defined as which is a resident of 
Australia under Australian law and 
which is not a resident of the other 
contracting state under its law.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australian post 1995 tax treaties 
other than: New Zealand 2009; 
Finland 2006; Norway 2006; Mexico 
2003; United Kingdom 2003; France 
2006; Japan 2008; Chile 2010; 
Turkey 2010; Switzerland 2013; 
Germany 2015. 
this treaty.  
Drafting 
technique in 
respect of 
companies dates 
from 1953 US 
Treaty.  Effect is 
that dual 
resident 
companies are 
not treaty 
residents under 
these treaties. 
 
 
 
Post 1995 
variation first 
appears in 1995 
Czech Treaty 
Model and prior 
Australian tax 
treaties.  In the 
case or Australia 
in this treaty, 
resident of a 
Contracting State 
means any person 
who ‘is liable to 
tax as a resident 
of Australia’. 
 
2000 Russian 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identical to OECD 
Model 
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375 
Art 4(3)  
 
AV5.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV5.1(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV 5.1(b) 
 
 
1982 US and 2010 Chilean and 
Turkish Treaties do not have 
corporate residence tiebreakers.  
Chilean Treaty denies dual corporate 
residents treaty benefits other than 
under the credit article. 
 
2015 German Treaty varies 
tiebreaker for persons other than 
individuals to some extent reflecting 
OECD BEPS recommendations.  
Similar drafting can be found in 
earlier Australian treaties, for 
example, New Zealand 2009. 
 
2015 German Treaty includes a 
deemed residence rule for collective 
investment vehicles in Art 4(4) and 
Art 4(5) includes a definition of 
‘equivalent beneficiary’ for purposes 
of Art 4(4).  2009 New Zealand 
 
 
1982 US and 2010 Turkish and 
Chilean Treaties 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty and 2009 New 
Zealand Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty and 2009 New 
Zealand Treaty. 
 
 
1982 US Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 New 
Zealand Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty first to 
mention ‘collective 
investment 
vehicles’  2009 
New Zealand 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
Identical to OECD 
Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Identical to OECD 
Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent. 
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Treaty contains a deemed residence 
rule for managed investment trusts. 
Treaty first to 
mention ‘managed 
investment trusts’ 
Art 5(2) 
 
AV6 
 
‘Agricultural, pastoral or forestry 
property’ included on list of examples 
All except 1969 Singapore and 
2010Turkish Treaties.  In 2006 
Finnish Treaty reference is confined 
to ‘an agricultural, pastoral or forestry 
property situated in Australia’. 
In 1946 UK – 
Australia Tax 
Treaty 
‘agricultural or 
pastoral 
property’ was 
expressly 
mentioned in the 
‘includes’ 
portion of the 
2013 Swiss Treaty  
2015 German 
Treaty 
Examples in 5(2) 
identical to 1977 
OECD Model as 
amended 
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377 
definition.  In 
1953 US – 
Australia Tax 
Treaty 
‘agricultural or 
pastoral 
property’ was 
expressly 
mentioned in the 
‘includes’ part of 
the definition.  In 
1960 Australia – 
New Zealand Tax 
Treaty 
‘agricultural, 
pastoral or 
forestry 
property’ was 
expressly 
mentioned in the 
‘includes’ part of 
the definition. 
 
 
 
378 
378 
Art 5(3) 
 
AV7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV8(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
AV9(a) to 
 
 
Inclusion of ‘assembly project’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inclusion of ‘connected supervisory 
activities’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Art 5(5) in 2015 German Treaty 
extends to connected activities by 
closely related enterprises.  Reflects 
OECD BEPS recommendations. 
 
 
6 month limit for building site, 
 
 
38 treaties use term ‘assembly 
project’.  2015 German Treaty uses 
‘installation project’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All except Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
15 treaties 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Treaty 1967 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Origins in 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Treaty 1967 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
Australia – 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty.   Not in 
2013 Swiss 
Treaty.  2015 
German Treaty 
includes an 
‘installation 
project’. 
 
 
2013 Swiss 
Treaty. 
2015  German 
Treaty reference 
is in Art 5(4)(a) 
and 9 months 
requirement 
applies. 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 2010 Turkish 
 
 
‘assembly or 
installation project’ 
Included in UN Art 
5(3)(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Included in UN Art 
5(3)(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent. 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Art 5(3)(a) 
 
 
 
379 
379 
Art 5(4) 
AV11 
 
 
 
 
AV12 
 
 
 
 
 
AV12(a) 
‘Delivery of goods’ not in list of 
exclusions 
 
 
 
 
Examples of preparatory activities 
given – ‘such as advertising, the 
supply of information or scientific 
research’ 
 
 
2015 German Treaty Article 5(7) 
limits exclusions in Article 5(6) to 
those of a preparatory or auxiliary 
character where closely related 
enterprises with business activities 
constituting complementary functions 
as part of a cohesive business 
operation. 
Argentina, Indonesia, Norway and 
Singapore (variation made by 1st 
Protocol 1989) 
 
 
 
All except Finland, Hungary, South 
Africa, Norway, New Zealand, Japan, 
the UK , and 2015 German Treaty. 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty reflecting 
OECD BEPS recommendations. 
1st Singapore 
Protocol 1989 
 
 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1967 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
Treaty with 
Norway 2006 
 
 
 
 
2013 Swiss Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
‘Delivery of goods’ 
not in list of 
exclusions 
 
 
 
No equivalent 
 
 
 
 
 
Cf UN Art 5(4)(f) 
Art 5(5) 
 
AV13 
Dependant agent without authority to 
conclude contracts but who 
habitually maintains a stock of goods 
Treaties with Fiji, India, Indonesia, 
Kiribati, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Papua New Guinea, Russia, 
Origins can be 
traced to 1946 
Australia – 
Turkish Treaty 
2010 
 
Equivalent 
provision 
contained in UN 
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AV13(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
is deemed to be a permanent 
establishment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty varies language 
by referring in Art 5(8) to a person 
who ‘habitually concludes contracts, 
or habitually plays the principal role 
in the conclusion of contracts that are 
routinely concluded without material 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty as an 
exception to the 
exclusion of 
agents from 
being permanent 
establishments.  
Positive deeming 
contained in 
1967 Australia-
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty.  
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
Article 5(5)(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No  
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AV14 
modification by the enterprise’.  
Reflects OECD BEPS 
recommendations. 
 
 
Person who manufactures or 
processes in the State for the 
enterprise goods or merchandise 
belonging to the enterprise is 
deemed to be a permanent 
establishment. 
 
 
 
 
 
All treaties 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia – 
Canada Tax 
Treaty 1957 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
Equivalent 
provision not 
contained in UN 
Model 
Art 5(6) 
 
AV15 
Agent not independent where 
activities devoted wholly or almost 
wholly to the relevant enterprise and 
relations between the agent and the 
enterprise differ from those that 
would exist between independent 
enterprises  
Treaties with China, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Germany 
Treaty with the 
Philippines 1979 
 
Origins, but not 
precise terms, 
can be traced to 
1946 Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty –
appears was 
agreed to be 
included in 1967 
2001 Mexican 
Treaty.  In 2015 
German Treaty 
with some 
modifications.  
This reflects 
OECD BEPS 
recommendations 
Equivalent 
provision in UN 
Model Article 5(7). 
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382 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty but 
this did not 
happen  
Art 5(7) 
 
AV16 
Additional paragraph extends 
principles in Article 5 to determining 
whether there is a permanent 
establishment outside both 
Contracting States and for 
determining whether an enterprise 
not being an enterprise of one of the 
Contracting States has a permanent 
establishment in one of the 
Contracting States. 
Appears in thirty five Australian 
treaties. 
1976 Netherlands  
Treaty 
2015 German 
Treaty 
Equivalent 
provision not in 
UN Model 
Art 7(1) 
 
 
 
 
AV17 
Force of attraction rule applied 
irrespective of whether there is tax 
avoidance 
 
 
Force of attraction rule applied only 
where there is tax avoidance  
 
Treaties with India and Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Argentina, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Mexico, the Philippines, Papua New 
Guinea, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
Australia – USA 
Treaty 1953 
 
 
 
1979 Philippines 
Treaty 
Indian Treaty 
1991 
 
 
 
1999 Argentina 
Treaty 
Limited force of 
attraction applied 
in UN Art 7(1) 
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383 
Art 7(3) 
 
AV18 
 
 
 
 
AV18(a) 
 
 
Exclusion of certain payments to 
head office in determining the profit 
attributable to a permanent 
establishment 
 
Allowance for deductions in 
determining profits of permanent 
establishment. 
 
 
Treaties with Argentina, China, 
Indonesia, Mexico and Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties subsequent to 
change to OECD Model Article 7 
 
 
1991 China Treaty 
 
 
 
 
Origins can be 
traced to 1953 
US Treaty 
 
 
2002 Mexican 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
Equivalent 
provision in UN 
Art 7(3) 
 
 
Equivalent 
provision in UN 
Art 7(3) 
Art 7(4) 
 
AV19 
 
 
 
AV20 
 
 
Old OECD Article 7(4) only appears 
in three Australian tax treaties 
 
 
Provision allowing the application of 
domestic law where information is 
inadequate (or if there are 
exceptional difficulties – treaties with 
India and Korea) to determine profit. 
 
 
All Australian treaties except those 
with Denmark, Germany 1972 and 
Switzerland 1980 
 
All Australian treaties or protocols to 
the relevant treaty except 2013 
Swiss Treaty and 2015 German 
Treaty  
 
 
Treaty with the 
UK 1946 
 
 
Australia-UK 
Treaty 1946 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty.   
 
 
UN Model 
identical to old 
OECD Art 7(4) 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
Art 7(6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
384 
384 
AV21 Only in  9 Australian treaties  Only in Australian treaties with 
China, Hungary, India, Japan, Malta, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sri Lanka, 
and USA 
Australia – UK 
Treaty 1946 
2015 German 
Treaty 
UN Article 7(5) is 
identical to OECD 
Article 7(6) 
Art 7 
 
Australian  
Addition 
 
AV22 
 
 
 
 
 
Saving clause for domestic law 
dealing with insurance at time treaty 
is signed 
 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties or protocols 
except the treaties with Chile, 
German Treaty 1972, Korea, 1980 
Switzerland, 2013 Switzerland and 
2015 Germany.  The treaty with Chile 
has a different provision dealing with 
insurance premiums.  Protocols to 
the  1972 German, Korean and 
Swiss treaties stated that Article 7  
does not apply to insurance business 
other than life insurance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Australia – UK 
Treaty 1946 
  
 
 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty.  Not 
included in 2013 
Swiss Treaty.  
Included in 2015 
German Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent 
provision in UN 
Model 
Art 7 
Australian  
Addition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
385 
385 
 
AV23 
 
Permanent establishment of an 
enterprise operated through a trust 
(other than a trust treated as a 
company for tax purposes) deemed 
to be a permanent establishment of 
the beneficiaries of the trust. 
 
All Australian treaties except the 
treaties with Belgium, Denmark, 
German Treaty 1972, Italy, Ireland, 
Korea, Malta, the Netherlands, the 
Philippines,  and Sweden . 
 
Austrian Treaty 
1986 
 
2015 Germany  
Treaty. 
 
No equivalent 
provision in UN 
Model 
Art 7  
Australian 
Addition  
 
AV 23.1  
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty contains a 10 
year time limit on adjustments.  
Reflects OECD BEPS 
recommendations.  New Zealand 
Treaty contains a 7 year limit on 
adjustments. 
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty for 10 year 
limit.  2009 New Zealand Treaty for 7 
year limit 
 
 
 
 
2009 New 
Zealand Treaty for 
limits generally 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent. 
Art 8 
 
AV24 
 
 
 
 
 
Australian articles on shipping and 
air transport differ from the OECD 
Model.  A resident of a Contracting 
State is taxable on shipping and 
 
 
This pattern is followed in all 
Australian tax treaties other than the 
2000 Romanian Treaty. 
 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1967.  
Current 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty.   
 
 
 
 
Article 8(1) is 
identical to Article 
8(1) in the OECD 
Model 
 
 
 
386 
386 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV26 
 
 
aircraft profits only in that State.  No 
reference is made to the place of 
effective management of the 
enterprise. This connects back to the 
definition of ‘resident’ in Art 4(1) or in 
some treaties to the definition of 
‘international traffic’ in Art 3.2 
 
 
 
All but five Australian treaties permit 
source taxation of shipping and 
aircraft profits of residents of the 
other Contracting State where the 
carriage of passengers or goods is 
confined solely to the source 
country.3 
 
Four of Australia’s treaties limit 
source country taxation in relation to 
carriage of passengers or goods to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This restriction occurs in all 
Australian treaties other than the 
treaties with Italy, Korea, the 
Philippines, Romania and the US 
 
 
 
 
The treaties that impose the 5% limit 
are Belgium, German 1972 Treaty, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland (the 
Australian article 
virtually identical 
to original UK 
draft in 1946 UK 
treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1967 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1967 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1980 Swiss Treaty 
1980. 1977  
Belgian Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
 
                                                          
2  The OECD Commentary on Art 8(1) at 2[2] permits this variation. 
3  This practice is consistent with the definition of ‘international traffic’ in Article 3 of the OECD Model and with the OECD Commentary on Article 3(1) at 6[6], 6.1[-], 
6.2 [-], and 6.3 [-]. 
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AV27 
5% of the freight charges. 
 
 
All but five Australian treaties contain 
a paragraph which provides that 
profits from the carriage of 
passengers and certain specified 
cargo shipped in a Contracting State 
for discharge in that State are 
deemed to be profits from operations 
solely with that State. 
old treaty) 
 
 
All Australian treaties other than the 
treaties with Korea, the Philippines,  
Russia, 2013 Switzerland and 2015 
Germany. 
 
 
  
Japanese Treaty 
1969 
 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
Art 8(2) 
 
AV28 
 
 
Not in any Australian tax treaties but 
Australian article provides that 
country may tax shipping where 
shipping and discharge in the same  
Contracting State. 
 
 
All Australian tax treaties 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1946 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
Alternative A of 
Art 8(2) identical 
to OECD Art 8(2) 
Art 8(3) 
 
AV29 
 
 
Only in two Australian tax treaties  
 
 
Only in the tax treaties with Italy and 
Romania. 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1946 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
Identical to OECD 
Model in this 
respect 
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388 
Art 9(1) 
 
AV30 
 
 
Addition to treaty with Hungary 
provides that profit adjustments may 
be made where a person acting in 
the Contracting State on behalf of the 
enterprise  manufactures or 
processes in the State for the 
enterprise goods or merchandise 
belonging to the enterprise4 
 
 
1990 Hungarian Treaty  
 
 
1990 Hungarian 
Treaty 
 
 
1990 Hungarian 
Treaty   
 
 
Not in UN Model 
Art 9(2) 
 
AV31 
 
 
Not included in two of Australia’s 
post 1977 tax treaties 
 
 
Not included in treaties with Italy and 
Switzerland 1980 
 
 
Australia –United 
Kingdom Tax 
Treaty 1946 
 
 
Italian Treaty 
1982 
 
 
Art 9(2) identical 
to OECD Art 9(2) 
Art 9(3)  
UN Model 
included  
AV32 
 
 
 
When provisions in paragraph 2 do 
not apply 
 
 
 
Only appears in treaties with Czech 
Republic and Mexico 
 
 
 
Treaty with Czech 
Republic 1995  
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Mexico 2003 
 
 
 
Art 9(3) only in UN 
Model 
Art 9      
                                                          
4  Note that, consistent with the OECD Model, Article 5(3)(c) of the Hungary Treaty states that an enterprise shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment 
merely by reason of the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of processing by another enterprise. 
 
 
 
389 
389 
Australian 
addition 
AV33 
 
 
Saving provision for the application 
of domestic law consistently with the 
principles of the article where 
information inadequate to determine 
arm’s length 
 
 
All Australian treaties except the 
Korean, Thai and 2015 German 
Treaty 2015 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1946 
 
 
2013 Swiss Treaty   
Not in 2015 
German Treaty.  
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
Art 9  
Additional 
provision 
 
AV34(a) 
 
 
 
 
Saving provision for the application 
of domestic law overriding Article 9 in 
so far as is practical to do so in 
accordance with the principles of 
Article 9 
 
 
 
 
Korean and Thai treaties 
 
 
 
 
Difference in 
wording but can 
be traced to 1946 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty.  
Provenance is 
already 
accounted for in 
AV33 
 
 
 
 
Thai Treaty 1989 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
Art 9 
Additional  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
390 
390 
Provision 
 
AV34(b) 
 
 
Article 9 only to apply where both 
Contracting States have a tax 
interest 
 
 
Korean treaty 
 
 
Korean Treaty 
 
 
Korean Treaty 
1983 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
Art 9 
Additional 
provision 
 
AV35(a) 
 
 
 
 
Seven year time limit from date of tax 
return for adjustment of profits under 
Article 9.  Does not apply in case of 
fraud, gross negligence, or wilful 
default or where audit commenced 
within the seven year period. 
 
 
 
 
Japanese, New Zealand and Chilean 
Treaties 
 
 
 
 
2008 Japanese 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
2010 Chilean 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
Art 9  
Additional 
provision  
 
AV35(b) 
 
 
 
 
Ten year time limit from end of tax 
year when profits accrued for 
adjustment of profits under Article 9.  
Does not apply in case of fraud, 
 
 
 
 
2105 German Treaty  
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
 
 
 
391 
391 
gross negligence, or wilful default or 
where audit commenced within the 
seven year period. 
Art 10(1) 
 
AV36 
 
 
Inclusion of a requirement in 
paragraph (1) that dividends be 
‘beneficially owned’ by resident of 
other Contracting State or that the 
dividends be ‘dividends to which a 
resident of the other Contracting 
State is beneficially entitled,’ 
 
 
In all Australian treaties or protocols 
except the treaty with Chile. 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1946 
first to use 
phrase 
‘beneficially 
owned’.5  Phrase 
does not appear 
in 1953 
Australia- United 
States Tax 
Treaty nor in 
1957 Australia – 
Canada Tax 
Treaty, nor in 
1960 Australia – 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty.  In 
paragraph 10(2) 
of 2013 Swiss 
Treaty and 2015 
German Treaty.  
 
 
Beneficial 
ownership 
requirement in Art 
10(2) of UN Model 
                                                          
5  It should be noted, however, that the beneficial ownership requirement in the 1946 UK Treaty was confined to the situation where a United Kingdom resident 
owned all the shares in an Australian company. 
 
 
 
392 
392 
New Zealand Tax 
Treaty.  Phrase 
reappears in 
1967 Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty.  
Phrase 
‘beneficially 
entitled’ first 
appears in 1969 
Australia – 
Singapore Tax 
Treaty 
Art 10(2) 
 
AV37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rate of 15% for portfolio dividends 
paid by Australian company but 
different rate for dividends paid by 
company resident in other 
Contracting State  
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia (zero per cent); Singapore 
(zero per cent for dividend by 
Singapore company or Malaysian 
company out of Singapore profits); 
Ireland 15 per cent where Australian 
resident entitled to tax credit 
otherwise zero; Malta – may not 
exceed tax chargeable on the profits 
 
 
1969 Singapore 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1984 Maltese 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model does 
not specify limits 
on withholding tax 
on portfolio 
dividends but 
leaves this to be 
determined by bi-
lateral 
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AV38(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV38(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Less than 15% Australian dividend 
withholding tax payable if certain 
conditions are met otherwise 15% 
withholding tax applies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher than 15% dividend 
withholding tax for portfolio and non-
portfolio dividends payable in certain 
circumstances 
 
 
 
 
 
out of which dividend paid. 
 
 
Argentina 10% to extent Australian 
dividend franked and paid to 
company with minimum of 10% 
voting power; Czech Republic 5% if 
to extent Australian dividend franked; 
Taiwan 10% to extent Australian 
dividend franked; New Zealand 5% if 
paid to a New Zealand life insurance 
company. 
 
 
Philippines treaty – rate is 25% 
where foreign tax credit is not 
available; Papua New Guinea rate is 
15% for dividends paid by Australian 
company and 25% for dividends paid 
by Papua New Guinea company; Fiji 
rate is 20%; Kiribati rate is 20%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Czech Treaty 
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philippines Treaty 
1979 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Zealand 
Treaty 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiribati Treaty 
1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
negotiations 
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AV38B(c) 
 
 
 
 
AV38(d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test for application of dividend 
withholding tax rate of 5% is 10% of 
voting power not 25% of capital  
 
 
Test for application of 5% withholding 
tax has another different requirement 
from OECD Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Canada, Chile, Finland, 
France, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Norway, Romania, South Africa, the 
UK and the US 
 
Treaty with Turkey requires 10% 
ownership for dividend paid by 
Australian company but 25% 
ownership for dividend paid by 
Turkish company. Treaty with Russia 
requires: (a) dividends to be paid 
from profits that have borne normal 
rate of company tax; (b) holding of at 
least 10% of capital; (c) minimum 
investment of AUD700,000; and (d) 
where paid by a Russian company 
the dividends are exempt from tax in 
Australia.  Treaty with Czech 
Republic requires holding 20% of 
capital of company where dividend 
paid by Czech company. 
 
 
Canada Treaty 
1980 
 
 
 
Czech Treaty 
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan Treaty 
2008 
 
 
 
Turkish Treaty 
2010 
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395 
AV38(d)  
 
 
 
 
 
AV39 
 
 
 
 
 
AV40(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limit on source country tax only 
applies where recipient holds at least 
25% of the capital of paying 
company with rates differing from 
OECD Model. 
 
Only six Australian treaties expressly 
exclude the operation of the 5% rate 
or 0% rate where the beneficial 
owner of the dividend is a 
partnership. 
 
Rate of dividend withholding tax on 
non-portfolio dividends (defined as 
minimum of 10% voting power) is 
higher than 5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Thailand applies 15% 
dividend withholding tax where 
paying company an industrial 
undertaking and 20% in other cases. 
 
 
The treaties with Mexico, Norway, 
Romania, Russia , Turkey and 2015 
Germany. 
 
 
 
Treaty with Argentina 10% dividend 
withholding tax; treaty with Austria 
15% dividend withholding tax; treaty 
with Belgium 15% dividend 
withholding tax; treaty with China 
15% dividend withholding tax; treaty 
with Denmark 15% dividend 
withholding tax; treaty with Fiji 20% 
dividend withholding tax; Germany 
15% with additional special provision 
in the Protocol paragraph 6; Hungary 
Treaty with 
Thailand 1989 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Romania 2000 
 
 
 
 
Australia – USA 
Tax Treaty 1953 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Thailand 1989 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Switzerland 2013 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Slovakia 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not in UN Model 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model does 
not specify a limit 
to withholding tax 
on non-portfolio 
dividends but 
leaves this to be 
determined 
through bi-lateral 
negotiations  
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15%; India 15%; Indonesia 15%; 
Ireland 15% dividend withholding tax 
except that zero dividend withholding 
tax applies where Australian recipient 
of dividend paid by Irish company 
does not receive a foreign tax credit; 
Italy  15% dividend withholding tax; 
Kiribati 20% dividend withholding tax; 
Korea 15% dividend withholding tax; 
Malaysia – 15% dividend withholding 
tax on unfranked portion of dividend 
paid by Australian company to 
Malaysian shareholder with 10% of 
more voting power; Malta – 15% 
dividend withholding tax on dividends 
paid by Australian company; Mexico 
15% dividend withholding company 
where dividend not paid from profits 
that have borne normal rate of 
company tax; The Netherlands 15% 
dividend withholding tax; Papua New 
Guinea 20% dividend withholding tax 
on dividends paid by Papua New 
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397 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guinea company with 15% dividend 
withholding tax on dividends paid by 
Australian company; Philippines – 
15% dividend withholding tax where 
dividend derived by a company 
where credit relief given with 25% 
dividend withholding tax in other 
cases; Poland 15% dividend 
withholding tax; Romania 15% 
dividend withholding tax on 
unfranked portion of dividend paid by 
Australian company and on portion of 
dividend paid by Romanian company 
not paid out of profits subject to 
profits tax; Russia 15% dividend 
withholding tax where not paid from 
profits that have borne normal rate of 
tax or where recipient’s investment is 
less than AUD700,000 or where 
dividend is not exempt from 
Australian tax; Singapore 15% 
dividend withholding tax on dividends 
paid by Australian company and 
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398 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
provision that 15% withholding tax to 
apply on dividends paid by a 
Singapore company or  a Malaysian 
company if Singapore reintroduces a 
tax on dividends; Slovakia 15% 
dividend withholding tax; Spain 15% 
dividend withholding tax; Sri Lanka 
15% dividend withholding tax; 
Sweden 15% dividend withholding 
tax; old Swiss treaty 15% dividend 
withholding tax; Taipei 15% dividend 
withholding tax on unfranked portion 
of dividends paid by an Australian 
company; Thailand 15% dividend 
withholding tax where shareholder a 
company holding at least 25% of the 
capital and is an industrial 
undertaking and 20% dividend 
withholding tax in other cases;  
Turkey 15% dividend withholding tax 
where dividend by Turkish company 
to the extent not paid from profits that 
have been subjected to the full rate 
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399 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV40(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rate of dividend withholding tax on 
non-portfolio dividends (defined as 
minimum of 10% ownership) is less 
than 5%. 
of corporation tax  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Mexico – zero dividend 
withholding tax where at least 10% 
voting power and dividend paid from 
profits that have borne normal rate of 
company tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002 Mexican 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002 Mexican 
Treaty 
Art 10(3) 
 
AV41 
 
 
 
Treaty with Singapore does not 
contain a definition of dividend.   
 
 
Treaty with Singapore 
 
 
 
Treaty with UK 
1946 
 
 
Treaty with 
Singapore 1969 
 
 
Art 10(3) identical 
to OECD Model 
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AV42 
 
All Australian treaties other than 
treaty with Singapore contain a 
definition of dividend but omit 
‘jouissance shares or jouissance 
rights, mining rights, founders 
shares’.  
 
All Australian treaties other than 
treaty with Singapore. 
 
1972 German 
Treaty.  Only 
previous treaty 
containing a 
definition of 
‘dividends’ was 
1967 UK Treaty 
which simply 
applied domestic 
law meaning of 
each country. 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty. 2015 
German Treaty – 
additional 
modifications due 
to German law.  
Art 10(5) 
 
AV43 
 
 
Several Australian treaties vary 
Article 10(5) by adding a proviso that 
the paragraph does not limit 
Australia’s taxing rights where the 
paying company is a dual resident of 
the two Contracting States 
 
 
All currently operative pre 2000 
Australian treaties with the exception 
of the treaties with Canada, China, 
German 1972 Treaty, Hungary, 
Poland, Singapore, Spain and the 
USA.   
 
 
Treaty with the 
Netherlands 
March 1976 
 
 
Treaty with the 
Slovak Republic, 
August 1999 
 
 
UN Model does 
not contain this 
variation from 
OECD Model 
Art 10  
 
Australian 
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401 
omission 
 
AV 44 
 
 
1969 Singapore Treaty, 1972 
German Treaty do not include an 
equivalent to Art 10(5) 
 
 
1969 Singapore Treaty and 1972 
German Treaty 
 
 
Treaty with 
United Kingdom 
1946 did not 
contain an 
equivalent of Art 
10(5) but 
contained Article 
VI(4) expressly 
permitting levy 
of undistributed 
profits tax 
 
 
1972 German 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
UN Model 
contains 
equivalent to Art 
10(5) OECD 
Model with 
variations 
Art 10  
 
Australian 
Addition 
 
AV 44(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty Art 10(7) State 
other than State of corporate 
residence may tax dividend where 
underlying profit has not been 
subject to tax at corporate level 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent 
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Art 10  
 
Australian 
addition 
 
AV45 
 
 
Zero dividend withholding tax where 
dividend paid to listed company 
holding 80% or more of voting power 
in company paying the dividend. 
 
 
Treaties with US, UK, Finland, 
Norway, Japan, 2013 Switzerland, 
and 2015 Germany 
 
 
US Protocol 2001 
but zero source 
country tax was 
payable on 
dividends paid by 
a wholly owned 
subsidiary under 
1946 Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 
 
 
2008 Japan 
Treaty   2015 
German Treaty  
 
 
No equivalent 
Art 10  
 
AV46 
 
 
Anti-Abuse rule 
 
 
Treaties with UK, Finland, Norway, 
Japan and Turkey. 
 
 
2003 UK Treaty 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent  
Art 11(1) 
 
AV47 
 
 
Beneficial ownership requirement 
included in paragraph 1 rather than 
in paragraph 2 in all Australian 
 
 
Treaty with Singapore is structured 
differently and beneficial ownership 
requirement appears in both 
 
 
Beneficial 
ownership 
requirement first 
 
 
Treaty with Chile 
signed March 
2010 
 
 
UN Model 
identical to OECD 
Model in this 
 
 
 
403 
403 
treaties other than the treaty with 
Singapore, the 2010 Turkish Treaty, 
the 2013 Swiss Treaty and the 2015 
German Treaty. 
paragraph 1 and paragraph 2.  
Beneficial ownership requirement 
appears in paragraph 2 of treaty with 
Turkey. 
appears in 
paragraph 1 in 
1967 Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 
respect 
Art 11(2) 
 
AV48(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Six Australian treaties specific a flat 
rate of withholding tax higher than 
10%6   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argentina treaty specifies 12%, 
treaties with India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Malta and the Philippines specify 
15%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior to 1967 
Australia-United 
Kingdom Tax 
Treaty no 
interest article 
was included on 
the basis that full 
source country 
taxing rights 
would be 
retained in 
respect of 
interest.  10% 
withholding tax 
first appears in 
 
 
Treaty with 
Argentina 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model does 
not specify a limit 
to withholding tax 
on interest but 
leaves this to be 
determined in bi-
lateral 
negotiations 
                                                          
6  Australia introduced interest withholding tax in its domestic law in 1967 by Income Tax Assessment Act (No4) 1967. 
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AV48(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV48(c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two treaties specify a rate higher 
than 10% in certain circumstances  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One treaty specifies a positive rate of 
5% where the interest is derived by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexican treaty specifies 10% if 
person beneficially entitled is a bank 
or insurance company, or if derived 
from bonds and securities regularly 
and substantially traded on a 
recognised securities market, or paid 
by banks, or paid by a purchaser of 
machinery and equipment under a 
credit sale.  In all other cases the 
Mexican treaty specifies 15%.  The 
Thai treaty specifies 10% for interest 
to which a financial institution is 
beneficially entitled and 25% in all 
other cases. 
 
Treaty with Chile 2010. 
1967 Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty  
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Thailand 1989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Mexico 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile 
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an unrelated financial institution 
dealing wholly independently of the 
payer and 10% in all other cases. 
2010. 2010. 
 
 
 
Art 11(3) 
 
AV49 
 
 
All but ten Australian treaties define 
‘interest’ consistently with the 
definition in the 1963 OECD draft 
Model.  Ten post 1977 treaties 
contain definitions that differ from the 
definitions in both the 1963 draft 
OECD Model and the 1977 OECD 
Model. 
 
 
Tax treaties with Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, Norway, Finland, the 
Netherlands (2nd Protocol), China, 
France, Hungary, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Japan, Turkey, Chile, 
2013 Switzerland and 2015 Germany 
all contain definitions that differ from 
both the 1963 draft OECD Model and 
the 1977 OECD Model.7 
 
 
1969 Australia – 
Singapore Tax 
Treaty first to 
include a 1963 
OECD Model 
definition of 
interest.  1967 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 
contained a 
‘negative’ 
definition of 
‘interest’. 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty  
 
 
UN Model 
definition 
substantially 
similar to 1977 
OECD but also 
includes: 
‘premiums and 
prizes attaching to 
such securities, 
bonds or 
debentures’ 
                                                          
7  The differences from the 1963 Draft OECD Model largely concern word order rather than matters of substance. 
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406 
Tax Treaty with 
Belgium first post 
1977 treaty to 
follow neither the 
OECD 1963 nor 
1977 definition of 
‘interest’. 
Art 11(4) 
 
AV50 
 
 
One treaty includes a limited force of 
attraction provision. 
 
 
Treaty with Papua New Guinea 
 
 
Australia – USA 
Tax Treaty 1953 
contained a 
force of 
attraction 
provision. 
 
 
Treaty with Papua 
New Guinea 1989 
 
 
Art 11(4) in the 
UN Model 
contains a limited 
force of attraction 
rule 
Art 11(5) 
 
AV51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Singapore does not 
include an equivalent to paragraph 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Singapore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australian 
treaties prior to 
the 1972 
Australia – 
Germany Tax 
Treaty do not 
 
 
Treaty with 
Singapore 1969 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model 
includes an 
equivalent to 
OECD 11(5) 
 
 
 
 
 
407 
407 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paragraph 5 expanded in 34 treaties 
to include deemed source rule for 
interest borne by permanent 
establishment or fixed base in third 
state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, 2015 
Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Korea, 
Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Papua New 
Guinea, the Philippines, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland,  
Turkey, Thailand, the USA and 
Vietnam. 
contain an 
equivalent to 
paragraph 5.  
1967 UK Treaty 
is the first with 
an interest 
article and hence 
the first with 
AV51 
 
Extended 
deeming has its 
origins in the 
1969 Australia – 
Singapore Tax 
Treaty but 
deemed source 
rules were 
contained in a 
separate article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed source 
rule included in 
Art 11(5) in UN 
Model but not 
extended to 
position where PE 
or fixed base in 
third state. 
Art 11       
 
 
 
408 
408 
Australian 
addition 
 
AV53 
 
 
 
Eighteen treaties provide that no 
interest withholding tax may be 
levied in the source country in 
respect of interest derived by the 
other State. 
 
 
 
Treaties with Argentina, Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, 
Romania, South Africa, Sweden, 
Thailand, the UK and the USA. 
 
 
 
Treaty with the 
USA 1982  
 
 
 
2008 Treaty with 
Japan  
 
 
 
No equivalent 
Art 11 
Australian 
addition 
 
AV54 
 
 
 
 
Nine treaties provide that no interest 
withholding tax may be levied in the 
source country in respect of interest 
derived by an unrelated financial 
institution other than in the case of 
back to back loans. 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Finland, France, Japan, 
Norway, South Africa, the UK, the 
USA, Switzerland 2013 and the  
2015 German Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
Protocol with the 
USA 2001 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent 
Art 11 
Australian 
addition 
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AV55(a) 
 
Seven treaties deny benefits where 
there has been either a lack of bona 
fides or where the indebtedness was 
created or assigned to take 
advantage of the article.   
Treaties with Finland, Japan, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa 
and the UK. 
 
South African 
Treaty 1999 
 
2009 New 
Zealand Treaty  
No equivalent  
Art 12(1) 
 
AV56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties vary paragraph 
1 by making taxation by the state of 
residence permissive rather than 
exclusive.  All Australian treaties 
permit the source country to levy 
withholding tax on royalties under 
paragraph 2 of the article. Rates vary 
from 5% to 25%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior to 1967 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaties 
Australian tax 
treaties did not 
set upper limits 
of source 
taxation of those 
royalties where 
source taxing 
rights were 
retained.  1967 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty was 
  
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty.  In 
paragraph 10(2) 
of 2013 Swiss 
Treaty.  2015 
German  Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model allows 
taxation by source 
state at 
withholding rates 
to be agreed in bi-
lateral 
negotiations 
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410 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Turkey and Chile do not 
require that the resident of the other 
contracting state be beneficially 
entitled to the royalties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Turkey and Chile. 
first Australian 
treaty to set a 
general 
percentage limit 
on source 
taxation of 
royalties. 
 
 
 
2010 Chilean 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beneficial 
ownership 
requirement is 
included in Art 
12(2) of UN Model 
as a pre-requisite 
for limiting source 
country taxation. 
Art 12(2) 
 
AV58 
 
 
 
 
Definition of royalties in Australian 
treaties, other than treaty with 
Singapore, includes ‘films or tapes 
 
 
All Australian treaties other than 
treaty with Singapore. 
 
 
 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1967  
See also Japan 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty and 2013 
Swiss Treaty.  
 
 
Substantially 
similar language 
used in Art 12(4) 
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411 
 
 
 
 
 
AV59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
used for radio or television 
broadcasting’. 
 
 
 
Definition of royalties in Australian 
treaties up to the 2003 treaty with the 
UK included ‘for the use of, or the 
right to use industrial, commercial or 
scientific equipment’.  No Australian 
treaties between 2003 and 2010 
include this aspect of the definition 
and it was also removed in 2001 by 
protocol to the USA Treaty and in 
2008 by protocol to the South African 
Treaty.  This aspect of the definition 
was then included in the treaties with 
Chile and Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties entered into prior 2003 other 
than the treaties with theUSA and 
South Africa as amended by 2001 
and 2008 protocols respectively.  
Treaties with Chile and Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax Treaty 1969 
 
 
 
 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1967 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More generic 
terminology is 
used 2015 
German Treaty. 
 
2010  Turkish 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of UN Model 
 
 
 
 
Included in Art 
12(4) of UN Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
412 
412 
AV60 Definition in ten treaties includes 
items not within the definitions in 
either the OECD or UN Models. 
Treaties with Argentina, Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, and Spain. 
Treaty with the 
United Kingdom 
1967 
 
Treaty with 
Germany 2015 
Art 12(3) 
 
AV61 
 
 
Of Australia’s post 2000 treaties only 
the treaties with Chile, Mexico and 
Turkey continue to refer to a ‘fixed 
base’. 
 
 
Treaties with Chile, Mexico and 
Turkey. 
 
 
2002 Mexican 
Treaty with  
 
 
2010 Chilean  
 
 
Art 12(4) UN 
Model refers to a 
‘fixed base’ 
Art 12  
Australian 
addition 
 
AV62 
 
 
 
 
All of Australia’s treaties, other than 
the treaty with Singapore, include a 
rule deeming royalties to have a 
source where royalties are borne by 
a permanent establishment or fixed 
base in one of the Contracting 
States. 
 
 
 
 
All of Australia’s treaties other than 
the 1969 Singapore Treaty 
 
 
 
 
1969 Japan 
Treaty– in the 
1967 UK Treaty a 
different source 
rule was 
contained in the 
credit article 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
Deemed source 
rule contained in 
Art 12(5) of UN 
Model 
Art 12 
Australian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
413 
413 
addition 
 
AV63 
 
 
Thirty five Australian treaties include 
a deemed source rule where 
royalties are borne by a permanent 
establishment or fixed base in a third 
state. 
 
 
Treaties with Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, 
Germany 2015, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Kiribati, Korea, Malta, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Thailand, the USA, and 
Vietnam. 
 
 
1976 Netherlands  
Treaty 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
Art 12 
Australian 
addition 
 
AV64(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Six Australian treaties deny benefits 
of the article where there is either a 
lack of bona fides or rights were 
created or assigned to take 
advantage of the article. 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Finland, Japan, Mexico, 
Norway, South Africa and the UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Mexico 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Japan 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model Art 
12(6) corresponds 
with OECD Model 
Art 12(4).   
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414 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Art 13(1)8 
 
AV65(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV65(b) 
 
 
 
 
All but three Australian treaties refer 
to ‘real property’ instead of 
‘immovable property’ in the OECD 
Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysian treaty refers to ‘land’ 
instead of ‘immovable property’. 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties except the 
treaties with Malaysia, Mexico, Chile 
and the 2015 German Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysian treaty. 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Germany 1972 
but only refers to 
‘income from 
real property’ 
 
Treaty with 
Netherlands 1976 
first to refer to 
‘income from the 
alienation of real 
property’ 
 
Malaysian treaty 
 
 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysian treaty 
 
 
 
 
Art 13(1) of UN 
Model refers to 
immovable 
property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8  The 1976 Netherlands Treaty was the first Australian tax treaty to contain an ‘alienation of property’ article.  At the time Appendix 3 was prepared the 1972 
German Treaty was still in force and had not been amended by Protocol.  That treaty did not contain an alienation of property or a capital gains article.   It was 
thought that differences between Australian treaty practice and the OECD Model would be overstated if differences due to the omission of Article 13 from the 
1972 German Treaty were taken into account.  
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AV65(c) 
 
 
 
AV65(d) 
 
 
 
 
 
AV66(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV66(b) 
 
 
Mexican and Chilean treaties refer to 
‘immovable (real) property’. 
 
 
Twelve Australian treaties refer to 
‘income or gains’ instead of ‘gains’ in 
the OECD Model. 
 
 
 
Twenty two  Australian treaties refer 
to ‘income, profit or gains’ instead of 
‘gains’ in the OECD Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eight Australian treaties refer to 
‘income’ instead of ‘gains’ in the 
 
Treaties with Mexico and Chile. 
 
 
 
Treaties with China, Hungary, India, 
Ireland, Malta, Papua New Guinea, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, , Thailand, the 
UK, the USA. 
 
 
Treaties with Argentina, Canada, 
Chile,  Czech Republic, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Romania, Slovakia, South 
Africa, Spain, 2013 Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Turkey, Vietnam, and 2015 
Germany. 
 
 
Treaties with Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, Korea, the 
 
Treaty with 
Mexico 2002 
 
 
Swiss Treaty 1980 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Fiji 
1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1976 Netherlands 
Treaty 
 
2010 Chilean 
Treaty  
 
 
2003 UK Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1986 Austrian 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model refers 
to ‘gains’ 
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AV66(c) 
 
 
 
AV67 
 
 
OECD Model. 
 
 
 
 
The treaty with Malaysia refers to 
‘profits’ instead of ‘gains’ in the 
OECD Model. 
 
Article 21 in the1972 German Treaty 
allows the taxation of ‘capital 
represented by real property’ and 
does not refer to gains from the 
alienation of immovable property. 
Netherlands, the Philippines and 
Sweden. 
 
 
 
Treaty with Malaysia. 
 
 
 
1972 German Treaty   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Malaysia 
 
 
1972 German 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Malaysia 
 
 
1972 German   
Art 13(2) 
 
AV68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four Australian treaties do not 
include paragraph 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Austria, Italy, Malta and 
the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the 
Netherlands 1976 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Austria 1986 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model 
includes 
paragraph 2 but 
includes gains 
from movable 
property of a fixed 
base for the 
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417 
 
 
 
AV69(b) 
 
 
 
Thirty treaties contain a reference to 
‘independent personal services’. 
 
 
 
 
Treaties other than treaties with 
Austria, Belgium, Fiji, France, 
Germany, Japan, Malaysia, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Norway,  and the 
UK. 
 
 
 
Treaty with the 
Philippines 1979 
 
 
 
2013 Swiss Treaty 
 
 
purpose of 
performing 
independent 
personal services 
Art 13(3) 
 
AV70 
 
 
 
 
 
AV71 
 
 
Paragraph 3 is not included in nine 
Australian treaties. 
 
 
 
 
All remaining Australian treaties with 
an equivalent to Article 13(3) include 
paragraph 3 but do not refer to ‘boats 
engaged in inland waterways 
transport’. 
 
 
 
Treaties with Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, Malta, the 
Netherlands, the Philippines, 
Sweden and Switzerland (old treaty). 
 
 
All Australian treaties other than 
treaties with Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, Malta, the 
Netherlands, the Philippines, 
Sweden and Switzerland. 
 
 
 
 
1976 Netherlands 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
1976 Netherlands 
Treaty 
 
 
 
1986 Austrian 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
UN Model 
includes 
paragraph 3 
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Art 13(4) 
 
 
 
V72(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
AV72(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
AV72(c) 
 
 
 
 
AV72(d) 
 
 
 
 
 
Thirteen treaties expressly include 
interests in partnerships, trusts and 
other entities. 
 
 
 
Treaties with Norway and Turkey and 
2015 German Treaty  refer to ‘shares 
or comparable interests’. 
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile refers to ‘shares or 
other rights’. 
 
 
 
Treaty with Finland refers to ‘shares 
or comparable interests in an entity’ 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, Malta, the 
Netherlands, the Philippines, 
Sweden and Switzerland (old treaty). 
 
 
Treaties with Norway and Turkey and 
2015 German Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile. 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Finland. 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the 
Netherlands 1976 
 
 
 
 
2006 Norwegian 
Treaty   
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile  
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Finland 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Austria 1986 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
treaty 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile  
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Finland 
 
 
 
 
UN Model Art 
13(4) refers to 
interests in 
partnerships and 
trusts 
 
UN Model does 
not refer to 
‘shares or 
comparable 
interests’ 
 
UN Model does 
not refer to 
‘shares or other 
rights’ 
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419 
 
 
AV72(e) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV 72(f) 
 
 
 
 
 
AV73 
 
 
All remaining Australian treaties refer 
to ‘interests in a company’. 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty refers back 365 
days for determining whether shares 
met underlying asset test in relation 
to immovable property.  Reflects 
BEPS recommendations. 
 
All but eight of Australian treaties 
refer to assets of the company 
consisting ‘principally’ of real 
property instead of specifying that 
50% of the assets consist of real 
property as in the OECD Model. 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties other than 
treaties with Austria, Belgium, Chile, 
Denmark, Germany, Finland, Italy, 
Malta, the Philippines, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
 
 
2015 German Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties other than 
treaties with Chile, Finland, 1972 
Germany, Japan, Norway ,2013 
Switzerland, 2010 Turkey and 2015 
Germany..   
 
 
 
Treaty with the 
Netherlands 1976 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
1976 Netherlands 
Treaty  
 
 
Treaty with Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
2009 New 
Zealand Treaty  
 
 
UN Model does 
not use this 
terminology 
UN Model does 
not refer to 
‘interests in a 
company’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model Art 
13(4) refers to 
assets of the 
company 
consisting 
‘principally of 
immovable 
property’.   
 
 
 
420 
420 
Art 13(5) 
 
AV74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV75 
 
 
F0ur Australian treaties include a 
paragraph which applies only in 
respect of ‘income from the 
alienation of capital assets of the 
enterprise’. 
 
 
Only six Australian treaties include a 
paragraph identical to OECD 13(5).    
 
 
Treaties with Belgium, Denmark, the 
Philippines, Sweden and . 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties other than treaties with 
Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, 
France,  Germany 2015, Japan, 
Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, 
2013 Switzerland  and Turkey do not 
include paragraph 13(5) or an 
equivalent paragraph. 
 
 
1979 Belgian 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
1976 
Netherlands 
Treaty  
 
 
1981 Danish 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with New 
Zealand 2009 
 
 
No equivalent in 
the UN Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 13(6) in the 
UN Model is the 
equivalent to 
OECD Article 
13(5) 
 
 
Art 13  
Australian 
addition 
 
AV76 
 
 
 
 
Provision giving state of residence  of 
the company right to tax gains from 
shares with a minimum participation 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Italy, the Netherlands, 
Turkey, India, Spain, Japan and 
Chile. Terms of provision vary 
 
 
 
 
1976 Netherlands 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
UN Model Article 
13(5) is an 
equivalent 
 
 
 
421 
421 
percentage in a company that is a 
resident of a Contracting State. 
considerably between these treaties.   provision 
Art 13  
Australian 
addition 
 
AV77(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
AV77(b) 
 
 
 
 
Ten Australian treaties include a 
definition of ‘real property’ which 
states that ‘real property’ includes 
rights to exploit or explore natural 
resources.   
 
The USA treaty contains a definition 
of ‘real property’ but that definition 
does not expressly include rights to 
exploit or explore natural resources. 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, 
Korea, the Netherlands, the 
Philippines, and Sweden. 
 
 
The 1982 USA treaty. 
 
 
 
 
1976 Netherlands 
Treaty  
 
 
 
 
The 1982 USA 
treaty 
 
 
 
 
1986 Austrian 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
The 1982 USA 
treaty 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
Art 13 
Australian 
addition 
 
AV78 
 
 
 
 
Twenty six Australian treaties include 
a saving provision for domestic law in 
relation to the taxation of capital 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Argentina, Canada, 
China, Czech Republic, Fiji, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, 
 
 
 
 
1988 China Treaty 
 
 
 
 
2009 New 
Zealand Treaty 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
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422 
gains except as provided for in 
Article 13. 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, the UK, the 
US, and Vietnam. 
 
Art 13 
Australian 
addition 
 
AV79 
 
 
 
 
2001 Protocol to US Treaty included 
‘trailing tax’ provisions relating to 
residence taxation of capital gains 
where residence has changed. 
 
 
 
 
2001 Protocol to US Treaty, 2003 UK 
Treaty and 2015 German Treaty 
 
 
 
 
2001 Protocol to 
US Treaty 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent  
Art 17(2) 
 
AV80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does not appear in 1969 Singapore 
treaty.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
1969 Singapore Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Did not appear in 
Australian tax 
treaties prior to 
German Treaty 
1972.  Australia-
United Kingdom 
 
 
1969 Singapore 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Art 17(2) is 
the equivalent to 
OECD Art 17(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
423 
423 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operation of paragraph restricted to 
cases where public entertainer 
controls, directly or indirectly the 
enterprise deriving the profits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Restriction appears in treaties with 
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, 
old Switzerland, and the US 
Tax Treaty 1967 
did not contain 
Art 17.  Was not 
in 1963 OECD 
Model 
 
 
 
 
 
1972 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1982 US Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Art 17(2) is 
not so restricted 
Art 21(1) 
 
AV82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 21 is not included in seven 
Australian treaties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, the 
Philippines, Singapore and 2013 
Switzerland. 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1946 
did not contain 
an equivalent to 
Art 21 
 
 
 
2013 Swiss Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model 
contains 
equivalents to Arts 
21(1) and (2) but 
adds Art 21 (3).  
See discussion of 
AV85 below 
 
 
 
424 
424 
 
 
AV83 
 
 
Nineteen post 1977 Australian 
treaties continue to use the language 
in the 1963 OECD Article 21(1) 
rather than the language in the 1977 
OECD Article 21(1). 
 
 
Treaties with Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Fiji, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Kiribati, Korea, Malta, Papua 
New Guinea, Poland, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden and Thailand. 
 
 
1980 Canada 
Treaty  
 
 
1992 Indonesia 
Treaty  
 
 
UN Art 21(1) is 
identical to 1977 
OECD Art 21(1) 
Art 21(2) 
 
AV84 
 
 
Seventeen Australian treaties omit 
the exclusion of immovable property 
from Article 21(2). 
 
 
Treaties with Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Fiji, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Kiribati, Korea, 
Malta, Papua New Guinea, Poland, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden and 
Thailand. 
 
 
1980 Canada 
Treaty 
 
 
1992 Indonesia 
Treaty 
 
 
UN Model Art 
21(2) includes 
reference to 
immovable 
property 
Art 21  
Australian 
addition 
 
AV85 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties which include 
Article 21, other than the treaty with 
Sweden, contain a provision giving 
the source country the right to tax 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties other than the 
treaty with Sweden. 
 
 
 
 
1980 Canada 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
UN Model Art 
21(3) but 
reference is to 
income ‘arising in 
 
 
 
425 
425 
income from sources in that state. the other 
Contracting State’ 
Art 21  
Australian 
addition 
 
AV86 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Sweden gives source 
country right to tax in paragraph 1 
and in paragraph 2 states that the 
residence country has exclusive right 
to tax income of its residents from 
sources in the residence country or a 
third country 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Sweden  
 
 
 
 
Cf the ‘tax on 
third country  
income’ article in 
the 1967 
Australia – UK 
treaty. 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Sweden 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model 
Art 22 
 
AV87 
 
 
Not included in any Australian tax 
treaties  except 2015 German Treaty 
 
 
All Australian treaties other than 
2015 German Treaty 
 
 
1946 Australia – 
UK Tax Treaty 
 
 
2013 Swiss Treaty   
 
 
UN Model 
contains an article 
dealing with 
Taxation of 
Capital  
Art 22 
 
AV87(a) 
 
 
2015 German Treaty Art 21 modifies 
 
 
2015 German  Treaty 
 
 
2015 German 
 
 
2015 German 
 
 
Modification not in 
 
 
 
426 
426 
OECD Art 22 by only applying to 
Germany not recipocrally 
Treaty Treaty UN Model 
Art 23  
Australian 
Variations 
 
AV88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australian treaties typically allow a 
credit for foreign tax paid in the treaty 
partner country on income in respect 
of Australian tax payable on the 
income.  The effect is that a credit is 
not allowed in respect of foreign 
source income which is exempt from 
Australian tax. 
 
 
 
Twenty one Australian treaties prior 
to 2003 allowed a credit for foreign 
underlying corporate tax where the 
Australian shareholder held 10% or 
more voting interest in the paying 
company 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Canada, China, Czech 
Republic, Fiji, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Kiribati, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Papua New Guinea, Poland, 
Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
 
 
 
 
1946 Australia – 
UK Tax Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the 
UK 1967 was the 
first to have a 
corresponding 
provision.  
Credits for 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Czech 
Republic signed 
March 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 22B of the 
UN Model differs 
from Article 23B of 
the OECD Model 
but does not have 
the same 
structure as 
Australian tax 
treaties 
 
 
UN Model does 
not provide for a 
credit for foreign 
underlying tax 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fourteen Australian tax treaties have 
provided for tax sparing, however, 
with the exception of the treaty with 
the Philippines, these provisions 
were subject to time limits which 
have now expired.  The tax sparing 
provision in the Philippines treaty is 
confined to royalty income. 
Thailand, the USA, and Vietnam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The treaties in which Australia 
agreed to tax sparing were those 
with Argentina, China, Fiji, India, 
Kiribati, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, 
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. 
underlying tax 
were allowed 
irrespective of 
the level of 
shareholding in 
the 1946 
Australia – UK 
Tax Treaty 
 
 
Treaty with 
Singapore 1969. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Argentina 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model does 
not provide for tax 
sparing 
Art 23 
 
 
AV90 
 
 
 
 
Article 22(3) of 2015 German Treaty 
contains rules dealing with situation 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
No equivalent 
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428 
 where different characterisation in 
the Contracting States  of items of 
income, profits, gains or elements 
thereof.  Reflects BEPS 
recommendations.9 
Art 24(1) 
 
AV91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Only eight Australian treaties include 
a non-discrimination article.  In the 
case of the treaty with the United 
States the non-discrimination article 
was not given the force of law in 
Australia and remains as an 
agreement between governments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties other than those with Chile, 
2015 Germany,  Finland, Japan, 
Norway, South Africa, 2013 
Switzerland , Turkey, the UK and the 
US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the 
United Kingdom 
1946. Treaty with 
UK 1967 first 
treaty where 
treaty partner’s 
draft had 
contained a non-
discrimination 
article 
The treaty with the 
UK in 2003 was 
the first to give the 
force of law in 
Australia to a non-
 
 
2008 Treaty with 
France most 
recent new treaty 
to omit a non-
discrimination 
article.  Protocols 
to Belgian, 
Singaporean and 
Malaysian treaties 
did not insert a 
non-discrimination 
article into those 
treaties.   
 
 
 
 
UN Model Art 
24(1) is identical 
to OECD Model 
Art 24(1). 
                                                          
9  While reflecting BEPS recommendations this variation can be seen as having its origins in the 1999 OECD Partnership Report. 
 
 
 
429 
429 
 
 
 
 
 
AV92 
 
 
 
 
 
Only six Australian treaties include 
the final sentence in OECD Model 
Art 24(1). 
 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties except those 
with Chile, Finland, 2015 Germany, 
Japan, South Africa and Switzerland. 
discrimination 
article. 
1982 US Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
Art 24(2) 
 
AV93 
 
 
OECD Art 24(2) does not appear in 
any Australian treaties 
 
 
All Australian treaties. 
 
 
Treaty with the 
USA 1982 was 
the first treaty 
containing a non –
discrimination 
article that did not 
contain an 
equivalent to 
OECD Art 24(2).   
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
UN Model Art 
24(2) is identical 
to OECD Model 
Art 24(2). 
Art 24(3) 
 
AV94 
 
 
 
Six Australian treaties qualify the first 
sentence in OECD Art 24(3) by 
 
 
Treaties with Chile, Finland, Japan, 
South Africa, Turkey and the UK. 
 
 
Treaty with the UK 
2003 
 
 
2010  Turkish 
Treaty 
 
 
Modification does 
not appear in UN 
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430 
 
 
AV95 
 
 
 
 
AV96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV97 
adding, ‘in similar circumstances’. 
 
Two Australian treaties qualify the 
first sentence in OECD Art 24(3) by 
adding, ‘in the same circumstances’.   
 
 
Second sentence in OECD Art 24(3) 
is only included in unmodified form in 
treaty with Japan 2013 treaty with 
Switzerland and 2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
Second sentence in OECD Art 24(3) 
is included in Finland and South 
Africa in modified form but is not 
included in any other Australian 
treaties other than treaty with Japan. 
 
 
Treaties with Norway and the USA. 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Chile, Norway, Turkey, 
the UK and the USA.  Treaties with 
Finland and South Africa include the 
sentence but omit the phrase ‘on 
account of civil status or family 
responsibilities’.   
 
 
Treaties with Finland and South 
Africa.  All other Australian treaties, 
which include an equivalent to Art 24, 
other than the treaties with Japan 
and the revised Swiss Treaty, do not 
include the second sentence in 
OECD Art 24(3). 
 
 
Treaty with the 
USA 1982 
 
 
 
1982 US Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Finland 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with 
Norway 
 
 
 
Treaty with Turkey 
2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty South 
Africa 2008 
 
 
 
Model 
 
Modification does 
not appear in UN 
Model 
 
 
Second sentence 
of Art 24(3) in UN 
Model is identical 
to OECD Model 
 
 
 
 
Second sentence 
of Art 24(3) in UN 
Model is identical 
to OECD Model 
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Art 24(5) 
AV98 
 
 
 
 
AV98(a) 
 
 
 
 
AV98(b) 
 
Six Australian treaties modify Art 
24(5) by adding the phrase ‘similar 
enterprises in similar circumstances’. 
 
 
Treaty with Chile modifies Art 24(5) 
by adding the phrase ‘similar 
company in similar circumstances’. 
 
 
Treaty with the USA modifies Art 
24(5) by adding the phrase ‘similar 
corporations in similar 
circumstances’. 
 
Treaties with Finland, Japan, 
Norway, South Africa, Turkey, and 
the UK. 
 
 
Treaty with Chile. 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the USA. 
 
 
Treaty with the UK 
2003 
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the 
USA 1982 
 
Treaty with Turkey 
2010  
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile 
signed March 
2010 
 
 
Treaty with the 
USA 1982 
 
Modification not 
included in UN 
Model 
 
 
Modification not 
included in UN 
Model 
 
 
Modification not 
included in UN 
Model 
Art 24(6) 
 
AV99 
 
 
 
AV100 
 
 
 
Treaties with Norway, South Africa 
and the USA do not include OECD 
Art 24(6). 
 
Treaties with Finland, Turkey and the 
UK modify Art 24(6) by stating that 
 
 
Treaties with Norway, South Africa 
and the USA 1982. 
 
 
Treaties with Finland, Turkey and the 
UK. 
 
 
Treaty with the 
USA 1982 
 
 
Treaty with the UK 
2003 
 
 
Treaty with 
Norway 2006 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty  
 
 
UN Art 24(6) 
identical to OECD 
Art 24(6). 
 
 
 
432 
432 
 
 
 
AV101 
Art 24 only applies to taxes subject to 
the treaty. 
 
Treaty with Chile states that Art 24 
applies to the taxes subject to the 
treaty as well as the GST in the case 
of Australia and the VAT in the case 
of Chile. 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile. 
 
 
 
Treaty with Chile. 
 
 
 
2010 Chile Treaty  
Art 24  
Australian 
addition 
 
AV102(a) 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties which include a 
non-discrimination article exclude 
provisions designed to prevent the 
avoidance or evasion of taxes from 
its operation. 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Chile, Finland, 
Germany 2015,Japan, Norway, 
South Africa, Switzerland 
2013,Turkey, the UK and the US.  No 
other Australian treaties include a 
non-discrimination article. 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with USA 
1982. 
 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model. 
Art 24  
Australian 
addition 
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433 
 
AV102(b) 
 
Australia’s treaties with Finland, 
Japan, Norway, South Africa, Turkey 
and the UK exclude from the 
operation of Art 24 provisions which 
do not permit deferral of tax on 
transfer of an asset where 
subsequent transfer would be 
beyond the tax jurisdiction of the 
Contacting State. 
 
Treaties with Finland, Japan, 
Norway, South Africa, Turkey and 
the UK. 
 
Treaty with the UK 
2003. 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model. 
Art 24  
Australian 
addition 
 
AV102(c) 
 
 
 
 
Australia’s treaties with Finland, 
Japan, Norway, South Africa, Turkey 
and the UK exclude from the 
operation of Art 24 provisions which 
provide for consolidation of groups of 
entities as a single entity for tax 
purposes. 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Finland, Japan, 
Norway, South Africa, Turkey and 
the UK. 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the UK 
2003. 
 
 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model. 
Art 24  
Australian 
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434 
addition. 
 
AV102(d) 
 
 
Australia’s treaties with Finland, 
Japan, Norway and South Africa 
exclude from the operation of Art 24 
provisions which do not allow tax 
rebates or credits in relation to 
dividends. 
 
 
Australia’s treaties with Finland, 
Japan, Norway and South Africa. 
 
 
Treaty with 
Norway 2006 
 
 
2006 Norwegian 
Treaty 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model. 
Art 24  
Australian 
addition 
 
AV102(e) 
 
 
 
 
All Australian treaties which include 
Art 24, other than the USA, Swiss 
2013 and German 2015 treaties, 
exclude from the operation of Art 24 
provisions which provide for 
deductions to eligible taxpayers for 
expenditure on research and 
development. 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Chile, Finland, Japan, 
Norway, South Africa, Turkey, and 
the UK.  No other Australian treaties, 
other than the treaties with the USA, 
2013 Switzerland and 2015 Germany 
include a non-discrimination article. 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the UK 
2003. 
 
 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model. 
Art 24 
Australian 
addition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
435 
435 
 
AV102(f) 
 
All Australian treaties which include 
Art 24, other than the USA, Swiss 
2013 and German 2015 treaties, 
exclude from the operation of Art 24 
provisions which  are otherwise 
agreed to be unaffected by Art 24. 
 
Treaties with Chile, Finland, Japan, 
Norway, South Africa, Turkey, and 
the UK.  No other Australian treaties, 
other than the treaties with German 
2015, Switzerland 2013 and the 
USA, include a non-discrimination 
article. 
 
2003 UK Treaty . 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model. 
Art 24 
 
AV102(g) 
 
 
Treaties with Chile, Norway, Turkey 
and the UK exclude from the 
operation of Art 24 provisions that 
restrict entitlement to personal 
allowances, reliefs and reductions to 
residents.10 
 
 
Treaties with Chile, Norway, Turkey 
and the UK 
 
 
Treaty with the UK 
2003. 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty with Turkey 
signed April 2010 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model. 
Art 24  
Most 
favoured 
nation 
clauses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10  It is questionable whether this is a true variation or merely the relocation to a separate paragraph the final sentence in OECD Article 24(3). 
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AV103 Australia’s treaties with Korea, 
Mexico, Romania, Spain and Taipei 
contain a provision to the effect that if 
Australia subsequently enters into a  
treaty with a third state containing a 
non-discrimination article Australia 
will enter into negotiations with the 
treaty partner with a view to providing 
the same treatment to the treaty 
partner as is provided in the treaty 
with the third state. 
Treaties with Korea, Mexico, 
Romania, Spain and Taipei. 
1982 Korean 
Treaty 
2003 Mexican 
Treaty 
No equivalent in 
UN Model. 
Art 25(1) 
AV104(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV104(b) 
 
 
Australia’s treaties with Canada, 
Germany, Singapore and 
Switzerland (old treaty) do not 
include a time limit in Article 25(1). 
 
 
 
 
 
The treaty with the United Kingdom 
specifies the time limits which apply 
 
Treaties with Canada, Germany, 
Singapore and Switzerland (old 
treaty) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the United Kingdom 
2003. 
 
Australia – 
United States 
Tax Treaty 1953 
contained 
mutual 
agreement 
article with no 
time limit 
 
Treaty with the 
United Kingdom 
 
Treaty with 
Canada 1980 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with the 
United Kingdom 
 
UN Model 
identical to OECD 
Model in this 
respect 
 
 
 
 
 
Variation not in 
UN Model 
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AV104(c) 
 
 
 
AV104(d) 
in domestic law. 
 
 
The treaties with Italy, Malaysia and 
the Philippines uses a two year time 
limit. 
 
The treaties with the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia use a four year time 
period. 
 
 
 
Treaties with Italy, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines. 
 
 
Treaties with the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. 
2003 
 
 
Treaty with the 
Philippines 1980 
 
 
1995 Czech 
Treaty 
 
2003 
 
 
Treaty with Italy 
1983 
 
 
1999 Slovakian 
Treaty 
 
 
 
Variation not in 
UN Model 
Art 25(2) 
AV105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Singapore does not 
contain Art 25(2) but includes words 
having similar effect to Art 25(2) in 
paragraph (1) of its mutual 
agreement procedure article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with Singapore 1969 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia –United 
States Tax 
Treaty 1953 also 
had this form.  
Australia – 
Singapore Tax 
Treaty 1969 
follows 
Australia-United 
Kingdom Tax 
Treaty 1967  
 
 
Treaty with 
Singapore 1969 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Model Art 
25(2) identical to 
OECD Model Art 
25(2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
438 
438 
 
AV106(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV106(b) 
Treaties with Belgium, Canada, Fiji, 
Germany, Italy, the Philippines and 
Switzerland (old treaty) omit the 
reference to ‘notwithstanding any 
time limits’ in Art 25(2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia is required to implement 
agreement ‘notwithstanding any time 
limits’ in treaties with Mexico, Chile 
and Turkey but respective treaties 
set out time limits for relevant treaty 
partner. 
 
Treaties with Belgium, Canada, Fiji, 
Germany, Italy, the Philippines, and 
Switzerland (old treaty). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Mexico, Chile and 
Turkey. 
 
 
No reference to 
time limits in 
Australia – 
United States 
Tax Treaty 1953.  
Germany Treaty 
1972 first to 
contain Art 25(2) 
with this 
variation 
 
No reference to 
time limits in 
Australia –United 
States Tax 
Treaty 1953.  
Treaty with 
Mexico 2003 first 
to contain this 
variation from 
Art 25(2)  
 
1990 Fiji Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
Treaty 
 
Variation not in 
UN Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variation not in 
UN Model 
Art 25(4)      
 
 
 
439 
439 
 
AV107 
 
All Australian treaties omit the phrase 
‘including through a joint committee 
consisting of themselves or their 
representatives.’ 
 
All Australian treaties. 
 
Australia – 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty 1967 
contained a 
provision 
permitting 
communication 
between tax 
authorities which 
did not refer to a 
joint committee.  
Australia –
Germany Tax 
Treaty 1972 was 
first to contain 
an equivalent of 
Art 25(4) and did 
not refer to a 
joint committee 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
UN Model varies 
from OECD Model 
but not in this 
particular respect 
Art 25(5) 
 
AV108 
 
 
Equivalent provision included in 
 
 
All treaties other than treaties with 
 
 
The early mutual 
 
 
2010 Turkish 
 
 
UN Model does 
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440 
treaty with New Zealand and there it 
is limited to issues of fact.  
Equivalent provision is included 2013 
Swiss Treaty and in 2015 German 
Treaty. 
New Zealand and 2013 Swiss Treaty 
and 2015 German Treaty. 
agreement 
procedure 
provisions in the 
United States 
Tax Treaty 1953 
and in the 1967 
United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty did 
not contain an 
equivalent of Art 
25(5). 
Treaty not contain 
equivalent to 
OECD Art 25(5). 
Art 25  
Australian 
addition 
 
AV109 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Canada, Chile, France, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa, 
Turkey and the UK contain an 
alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism under which a dispute 
can be taken to the Council for Trade 
in Services established under GATS. 
 
 
 
 
Treaties with Canada, Chile, France, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa and 
Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
Treaty with South 
Africa 1999 
 
 
 
 
2013 Swiss Treaty 
 
 
 
 
No equivalent in 
UN Model. 
 
 
 
441 
441 
Art 26(1) 
 
Australia’s pre 2005 treaties conform 
to the pre 2005 OECD Model.  
Australia’s post 2005 treaties confirm 
to the 2005 amendment to the OECD 
Model.  In addition, protocols to the 
treaties with Singapore, Malaysia, 
and South Africa mean that those 
treaties now conform to the 2005 
amendments to Art 26(1) of the 
OECD Model.  This has not been 
classified as a variation.  The 2015 
German treaty contains minor 
variations from the OECD Article 
26(1) in that the obligation to provide 
information on behalf of political 
subdivisions or local authorities is 
confined to Germany.  This has not 
been classified as a variation. 
    
Art 26(3) 
 
AV110 
 
 
Paragraph 3 of the Australia-USA 
Tax Treaty varies from the OECD 
Model 
 
 
1982 USA  Treaty 
 
 
1982 USA Treaty 
 
 
1982 USA Treaty 
 
 
UN Art 26 does 
not contain an 
equivalent to 
 
 
 
442 
442 
OECD Art 26(3). 
Art 26(4) Australia’s pre 2005 treaties, and the 
South African treaty as amended by 
a 2008 Protocol, conform to the pre 
2005 OECD Model.  Australia’s post 
2005 treaties confirm to the 2005 
amendment to the OECD Model.  
This has not been classified as a 
variation. 
    
Art 26(5) Australia’s pre 2005 treaties, and the 
South African Treaty as amended by 
a 2008 Protocol, conform to the pre 
2005 OECD Model.  Australia’s post 
2005 treaties confirm to the 2005 
amendment to the OECD Model.  
This has not been classified as a 
variation. 
    
Art 27 
 
AV111 
 
 
Of Australia’s tax treaties coming into 
force post 2008 only those with 
Finland, France, New Zealand and 
Norway, the South African Treaty as 
 
 
All post 2008 tax treaties other than 
those with Finland, France, New 
Zealand, Norway, the South African 
Treaty as amended by the 2008 
 
 
Treaty with Japan 
2008 
September 1966 
UK draft 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty. 
 
 
UN Model has no 
equivalent to Art 
27. 
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443 
amended by a 2008 Protocol, the 
2013 Swiss Treaty and the 2015 
German Treaty contain an 
assistance in collection article. 
Protocol, the 2013 Swiss Treaty and 
the 2015 German Treaty 
contained an 
assistance in 
collection article 
but at Australia’s 
request it was 
excluded from the 
final version of the 
treaty. 
Art 27(8) 
 
AV112 
 
 
All Australian treaties that contain an 
assistance in collection article 
include an additional sub-paragraph 
stating that there is no obligation on 
a contracting state ‘to provide 
assistance if that State considers that 
the taxes with respect to which 
assistance is requested are imposed 
contrary to generally accepted 
taxation principles.’  Paragraph 37 of 
the OECD Commentary suggests 
that this subparagraph could be 
included in the assistance in 
 
 
Treaties with Finland, France, New 
Zealand, Norway, the South African 
Treaty as amended by the 2008 
Protocol, the 2013 Swiss Treaty and 
the 2015 German Treaty 
 
 
Protocol to Treaty 
with South Africa 
2008 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
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collection article. 
Additional 
article 
 
AV113 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 28 provides for procedural 
rules for deduction of withholding tax 
at source at rates set in domestic law 
and for subsequent refund where 
rates reduced by treaty. 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
No equivalent 
Additional 
article  
 
AV114 
 
 
 
 
Article 30 provides for protection of 
personal information 
 
 
 
2015 German Treaty  
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
2015 German 
Treaty 
 
 
 
No equivalent 
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APPENDIX 4 
TABLE 2: VARIATIONS FROM CURRENT OECD MODEL HAVING THEIR ORIGINS IN AUSTRALIA – UNITED KINGDOM TAX TREATY 
1946 AND VARIATIONS FROM 1945 UNITED KINGDOM – UNITED STATES TAX TREATY 
OECD Model 
Article 
AV number 
from Table 1 
Variation 
From UK – US 
Treaty 1945 
Variation present in first UK draft  
6th May 1946 
History of amendments between first draft  
and final treaty 
Initiator of variation  
from UK – US 1945 
 
Art 1 
 
No OECD Art 1 not present in UK draft of 6th 
May 1946 
OECD Art 1 not present in Draft II, Draft III or 
Final form of Article 
UK 
Art 2(1) 
AV1 
No – same 
basic 
approach 
Yes – but not in the form that appeared in 
final treaty 
Article I(1) 
The taxes which are the subject of the 
present Agreement are:  
(a) In the Commonwealth of Australia: 
The Commonwealth income taxes including 
sur-taxes and undistributed profits taxes 
(hereinafter referred to as “Australian tax”; 
(b) In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland: 
The income tax (including sur-tax) and the 
national defence contribution (hereinafter 
referred to as “United Kingdom tax” 
 
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
Article I(1) 
The taxes which are the subject of the present 
Agreement are:  
(c) In the Commonwealth of Australia: 
The Commonwealth income tax, including super- 
tax, the additional tax assessed on undistributed 
income of private companies and non-private 
companies respectively and war-time (company) 
tax (hereinafter referred to as “Australian tax”; 
(d) In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland: 
The income tax (including sur-tax), the excess 
profits tax,  and the national defence contribution 
(hereinafter referred to as “United Kingdom tax” 
[Change from draft of 6th May 1946] 
Basic approach UK 
Precise terms Australia 
 
 
 
446 
446 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
[Unchanged] 
Draft III (Prepared in Australia 8th August 1946) 
Article I(1) 
The taxes which are the subject of the present 
Agreement are:  
(a) In the Commonwealth of Australia: 
The Commonwealth income tax (including super- 
tax), the social services contribution,  the 
additional tax assessed on the undistributed 
amount of the distributable income of a private 
company, the further tax imposed on the portion 
of the taxable income of a company (other than a 
private company) which has not been distributed 
as dividends, and the war-time (company) tax 
(hereinafter referred to as “Australian tax”; 
[Change from Draft II] 
(b) In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland: 
The income tax (including sur-tax), the excess 
profits tax,  and the national defence contribution 
(hereinafter referred to as “United Kingdom tax” 
[No change from Draft II] 
Final form of Article I (1) in Treaty  
 
[As per Draft III] 
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447 
 
Art2(2) 
AV2 
No No equivalent in UK draft of 6th May 1946 No equivalent in Draft II, Draft III or Final Form of 
Article. 
 
UK 
Art 2(4) 
Variation not 
present in any 
current 
Australian Tax 
Treaties 
No -Virtually 
identical to UK 
– Australia 
1946 
Equivalent provision in UK draft of 6th May 
1946 was Art II(2) which read: 
(2) The present Agreement shall also apply 
to any other taxes of a substantially similar 
character imposed by either Contracting 
Government subsequently to the date of 
signature of the present Agreement or by 
the Government of any territory of which the 
present Agreement is extended under 
Article XIV. 
 
No changes in Draft II, Draft III and Final form of 
Article  
UK 
 
Art 3(1) 
AV3 
Yes - no 
equivalent in 
UK – US 1945 
UK draft of 6th May 1946 included a 
definition of ‘industrial or commercial profits’ 
as follows: 
(i) The term "industrial or commercial  
profits” includes mining and farming profits 
but does not include income in the form of 
dividends, interest, rents or royalties, 
insurance premiums, management charges, 
or remuneration for personal services. 
 
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
(i) The term "industrial or commercial enterprise 
or undertaking" includes an enterprise or 
undertaking engaged in mining, agricultural or 
pastoral activities, or in the business of banking, 
insurance, life insurance or dealing in 
investments, and the term "industrial or 
commercial profits" includes profits from such 
activities or business but does not include income 
in the form of dividends, interest, rents, royalties, 
management charges, or remuneration for 
personal services.  [Change from draft of 6th 
Basic structure - UK 
Precise terms- Australia  
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448 
May 1946] 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  [no change from 
Draft II 22nd May 1946] 
Draft III (8th August 1946)  [no change from Draft 
II] 
Final form of Article  [no change from Draft II] 
Art 3(2) No - 
Substantially 
similar but not 
identical 
UK draft of 6th May 1946 was identical to 
what would later become Art 3(2) of the 
1963 Draft OECD Model  
[No changes made in Draft II, Draft III, or the 
Final form of Article.] 
UK 
Art 4(1) 
AV4 
No – same 
basic 
approach but 
detailed 
drafting 
different 
 
Yes, but not in form that appeared in final 
version of the treaty 
Article II(f) 
The terms “resident of the United Kingdom” 
and “resident of Australia” mean 
respectively any person who is resident in 
the United Kingdom for the purposes of 
United Kingdom tax and not resident in 
Australia for the purposes of Australian tax 
and any person who is resident in Australia 
for the purposes of Australian tax who is not 
resident in the United Kingdom for the 
purposes of United Kingdom tax; and a 
company shall be regarded as resident in 
the United Kingdom if its business is 
managed and controlled in the United 
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
Article II(f) 
The terms “resident of the United Kingdom” and 
“resident of Australia” mean respectively any 
person who is resident in the United Kingdom for 
the purposes of United Kingdom tax and not 
resident of Australia for the purposes of Australian 
tax and any person who is resident of Australia for 
the purposes of Australian tax who is not resident 
in the United Kingdom for the purposes of United 
Kingdom tax; and a company shall be regarded 
as resident in the United Kingdom if its business 
is managed and controlled in the United Kingdom 
and shall be regarded as resident of Australia if it 
is incorporated in Australia or if, not being 
incorporated in Australia, it carries on business in 
Basic approach  UK 
Detailed drafting Australia 
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449 
Kingdom and shall be regarded as resident 
in Australia if its business is managed and 
controlled in Australia. 
 
Australia and has either its central management 
and control in Australia or its voting power 
controlled by Australian residents. [Change from 
draft of 6th May 1946] 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
Article II(f) 
The terms “resident of the United Kingdom” and 
“resident of Australia” mean respectively any 
person who is resident in the United Kingdom for 
the purposes of United Kingdom tax and not 
resident of Australia for the purposes of Australian 
tax and any person who is resident of Australia for 
the purposes of Australian tax who is not resident 
in the United Kingdom for the purposes of United 
Kingdom tax; [Change from Draft II as at 22nd 
May 1946]  
Draft III (8th August 1946) 
[No change from Draft II as at 19th July 1946 
Final form of Article  
[As per Draft II as at 19th July 1946] 
 
Art 5 
Definition of PE 
‘Agricultural, 
pastoral or 
forestry 
property’ not 
United Kingdom draft of 6th May 1946 
Article II(j) 
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia)  
Article II(j) 
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AV6 
 
 
 
 
 
AV13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV15 
included in list 
of examples in 
UK –US 1945 
 
 
 
 
Dependant 
agent without 
authority to 
conclude 
contracts but 
who habitually 
maintains a 
stock of goods 
is deemed to 
be a 
permanent 
establishment 
was included 
in UK – US 
1945 but ‘at 
prices fixed’ 
not in UK – US 
1945 
Requirement 
that broker or 
commission 
agent not a PE 
only if 
The term “permanent establishment” when 
used in respect of an enterprise of one of 
the territories, means a branch, 
management, mine, farm, or other fixed 
place of business, but does not include an 
agency unless the agent has, and habitually 
exercises,  a general authority to negotiate 
and conclude contracts on behalf of such 
enterprise or has a stock of merchandise 
from which he regularly fills orders on its 
behalf. 
 
An enterprise of one of the territories shall 
not be deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in the other territory merely 
because it carries on business dealings in 
that other territory through a bona fide 
broker or general commission agent acting 
in the ordinary course of his business as 
such.  
 
 
The fact that an enterprise of one of the 
territories maintains in the other territory a 
fixed place of business exclusively for the 
purchase of goods or merchandise shall not 
of itself constitute that fixed place of 
The term "permanent establishment", when used 
with respect to an enterprise of one of the 
territories, means a branch, mine, agricultural or 
pastoral property, or other fixed place of business, 
but does not include an agency in the other 
territory unless the agent has, and habitually 
exercises, authority to conclude contracts on 
behalf of such enterprise otherwise than at prices 
fixed by the enterprise or has a stock of 
merchandise from which he regularly fills orders 
on its behalf.  [Change from draft of 6th May 
1946] 
 
An enterprise of one of the territories shall not be 
deemed to have a permanent establishment in 
the other territory merely because it carries on 
business dealings in that other territory through a 
bona fide broker or general commission agent 
acting in the ordinary course of his business as 
such and receiving remuneration in respect of 
those dealings at a rate not less than that 
customary in the class of business in question.  
[Change from draft of 6th May 1946] 
The fact that an enterprise of one of the territories 
maintains in the other territory a fixed place of 
business exclusively for the purchase of goods or 
merchandise shall not of itself constitute that fixed 
place of business a permanent establishment of 
the enterprise. [No change from draft of 6th May 
1946] 
 
UK used term ‘farm’.   
Australia substituted: 
‘agricultural or  
pastoral property’ 
 
UK included deeming re  
dependant agent 
Australia added  
‘at prices fixed etc’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia inserted  
‘rate customary’ 
 
 
 
451 
451 
remuneration 
at rate 
customary – 
not in UK – US 
1945 
 
 
business a permanent establishment of the 
enterprise. 
 
The fact that a company which is a resident 
of one of the territories has a subsidiary 
company which is a resident of the other 
territory or which is engaged in trade or 
business in that other territory (whether 
through a permanent establishment or 
otherwise) shall not of itself constitute that 
subsidiary company a permanent 
establishment of the parent company. 
 
  
 
 
The fact that a company which is a resident of 
one of the territories has a subsidiary company 
which is a resident of the other territory or which 
is engaged in trade or business in that other 
territory (whether through a permanent 
establishment or otherwise) shall not of itself 
constitute that subsidiary company a permanent 
establishment of its parent company. [No change 
from draft of 6th May 1946] 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
Article II(j) 
The term "permanent establishment", when used 
with respect to an enterprise of one of the 
territories, means a branch or other fixed place of 
business and includes a management, factory, 
mine, agricultural or pastoral property, but does 
not include an agency in the other territory unless 
the agent has, and habitually exercises, authority 
to conclude contracts on behalf of such enterprise 
otherwise than at prices fixed by the enterprise or 
regularly fills orders on its behalf from a stock of 
goods or merchandise in that other territory. 
[Change from Draft of 6th May 1946 and from 
Draft II as at 22nd May 1946]  
Provided that an enterprise of one of the 
territories shall not be deemed to have a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia changed word order  
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permanent establishment in the other territory 
merely because it carries on business dealings in 
that other territory through a bona fide broker or 
general commission agent acting in the ordinary 
course of his business as such and receiving 
remuneration in respect of those dealings at the 
rate customary in the class of business in 
question. [Change from Draft of 6th May 1946 
and from Draft II as at 22nd May 1946] 
Provided that the fact that an enterprise of one of 
the territories maintains in the other territory a 
fixed place of business exclusively for the 
purchase of goods or merchandise shall not of 
itself constitute that fixed place of business a 
permanent establishment of the enterprise. 
[Change from draft of 6th May 1946 or from 
Draft II as at 22nd May 1946] 
The fact that a company which is a resident of 
one of the territories has a subsidiary company 
which is a resident of the other territory or which 
is engaged in trade or business in that other 
territory (whether through a permanent 
establishment or otherwise) shall not of itself 
constitute that subsidiary company a permanent 
establishment of its parent company. [No change 
from draft of 6th May 1946 or from Draft II as at 
22nd May 1946] 
Draft III (8th August 1946) 
[Only change from Draft II was that the order 
of the second and third paragraphs was 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia changed to  
‘the rate customary’  
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reversed.] 
Final form of Article  
[As per Draft II with insertion of ‘or’ before 
‘agricultural’] 
Art 7 
UK addition 
Yes UK draft 6th May 1946 
Article III(4) 
Profits derived by an enterprise of one of 
the territories from sales, under contracts 
concluded in that territory, of goods stocked 
in a warehouse in the other territory for 
convenience of delivery and not for 
purposes of display shall not be attributed to 
a permanent establishment of the enterprise 
in that other territory, notwithstanding that 
the offers of purchase have been obtained 
by an agent of the enterprise in the other 
territory and transmitted by him to the 
enterprise for acceptance. 
 
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
[No change in printed copy.  Handwritten note 
indicates to be omitted.] 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
[Omitted] 
Draft III (1st August 1946) 
[As per Draft II 19th July 1946] 
Final form of Article 
[As per Draft II 19th July 1946] 
Initial UK addition rejected by  
Australia 
Art 7(3) No No equivalent to Art 7(3) in UK draft of 6th 
May 1946 
No change in Draft II, Draft III, or Final form of 
Article 
UK 
Art 7 
Australian 
Addition 
Yes Not in original UK draft of 6th May 1946 
Article III(3) 
Where an enterprise of one of the territories 
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
[No change from UK draft of 6th May 1946] 
Australia 
UK involved in final  
Drafting  
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AV20 is engaged in trade or business in the other 
territory through a permanent establishment 
situated therein, there shall be attributed to 
that permanent establishment the industrial 
or commercial profits which it might be 
expected to derive in that other territory if it 
were an independent enterprise engaged in 
the same or similar activities under the 
same or similar conditions and dealing at 
arm’s length with  the enterprise of which it 
is a permanent establishment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
Article III(3) 
Where an enterprise of one of the territories is 
engaged in trade or business in the other territory 
through a permanent establishment situated 
therein, there shall be attributed to that permanent 
establishment the industrial or commercial profits 
which it might be expected to derive in that other 
territory if it were an independent enterprise 
engaged in the same or similar activities and its 
dealings with the enterprise of which it is a 
permanent establishment were dealings at arm's 
length with that enterprise; and the profits so 
attributed shall be deemed to be income derived 
from sources in that other territory. 
Draft III (1st August 1946) 
Where an enterprise of one of the territories is 
engaged in trade or business in the other territory 
through a permanent establishment situated 
therein, there shall be attributed to that permanent 
establishment the industrial or commercial profits 
which it might be expected to derive in that other 
territory if it were an independent enterprise 
engaged in the same or similar activities and its 
dealings with the enterprise of which it is a 
permanent establishment were dealings at arm's 
length with that enterprise or an independent 
enterprise; and the profits so attributed shall be 
deemed to be income derived from sources in 
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that other territory. 
If the information available to the taxation 
authorities concerned is inadequate to determine 
the profits to be attributed to the permanent 
establishment, nothing in this paragraph shall 
affect the application of the law of either territory 
in relation to the liability of the permanent 
establishment to pay tax on an amount 
determined by the exercise of a discretion or the 
making of an estimate by the taxation authorities 
of that territory: Provided that such discretion shall 
be exercised or such estimate shall be made, so 
far as the information available to the taxation 
authority permits, in accordance with the principle 
stated in this paragraph. 
Final form of Article 
As per Draft III with ‘authorities’ being 
changed to ‘authority’ in both instances where 
it appears in Draft III and with minor 
punctuation changes.  
Art 7(6) 
AV21 
No OECD Article 7(6) not in original UK draft of 
6th May 1946 
No change in Draft II, Draft III, or Final form of 
Article 
UK  
Art 7(7) No OECD Article 7(7) not in original UK draft of 
6th May 1946 
No change in Draft II, Draft III, or Final form of 
Article 
UK 
Art 7 
Australian  
Yes Not in original UK draft of 6th May 1946 
Article III 
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
Article III 
Australia 
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Addition 
AV22 
(1) The industrial or commercial profits of a 
United Kingdom enterprise shall not be 
subject to Australian tax unless the 
enterprise is engaged in trade or business 
in Australia through a permanent 
establishment situated therein. If it is so 
engaged, tax may be imposed on those 
profits by Australia, but only on so much of 
them as is attributable to that permanent 
establishment: 
 
(1) The industrial or commercial profits of a United 
Kingdom enterprise shall not be subject to 
Australian tax unless the enterprise is engaged in 
trade or business in Australia through a 
permanent establishment situated therein. If it is 
so engaged, tax may be imposed on those profits 
by Australia, but only on so much of them as is 
attributable to that permanent establishment: 
Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall 
affect any provisions of the law of Australia 
regarding the taxation of income from the 
business of insurance. 
[Change from UK draft of 6th May 1946] 
 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
Article III 
(1) The industrial or commercial profits of a United 
Kingdom enterprise shall not be subject to 
Australian tax unless the enterprise is engaged in 
trade or business in Australia through a 
permanent establishment situated therein. If it is 
so engaged, tax may be imposed on those profits 
by Australia, but only on so much of them as is 
attributable to that permanent establishment: 
Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall 
affect- 
(a) the operation of Divisions 14 and 15 of Part III 
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of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936-1946 (or that Act as amended from time to 
time) relating to film business controlled abroad 
and insurance with non-residents, or the 
corresponding provisions of any statute 
substituted for that Act; or 
(b) the application of the law of Australia 
regarding the imposition of war-time (company) 
tax where a holding company has elected that its 
subsidiary companies shall be treated as 
branches. 
[Change from Draft II as at 22nd May 1946] 
Draft III (1st August 1946) 
[As per Draft II as at 19th July 1946] 
Final form of Article 
[As per Draft II as at 19th July 1946] 
 
Art 8 
AV24 
 
 
 
Final form of 
UK – Australia 
1946 was 
closer to UK-
US 1945 than 
was original 
UK draft 
 
Original UK Draft 6th May 1946 
Article V 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles III 
and IV, profits which a resident of one of the 
territories derives from operating ships or 
aircraft shall be exempt from tax in the other 
territory.   
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
Article V 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles III and 
IV, profits which a resident of one of the territories 
derives from operating ships whose port of 
registry is in that territory, or aircraft registered in 
that territory, shall be exempt from tax in the other 
Initial UK draft differed  
from UK – US 1945. 
Australia initiated  
amendments bringing  
draft closer to UK – US 
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458 
 
 
 
AV28 
AV29 
 
 
 
 
No equivalents 
in UK – US 
1945  to 
OECD 8(2) or 
8(3) 
 
 
 
Language similar to that used in initial UK 
draft was reverted to in the September 1966 
UK draft and can in this sense be seen as 
the source of AV24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
territory. 
[Changed from UK draft of 6th May 1946] 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946 [As per Draft II] 
Draft III (1st August 1946) 
[As per Draft II] 
Final form of Article 
[As per Draft II] 
 
 
UK following UK –US  
Art 9(2) 
 
AV31 
No OECD Article 9(2) not included in United 
Kingdom draft of 6th May 1946 (not in 1963 
Draft OECD Model) 
No change in Draft II, Draft III, or Final form of 
Article 
UK 
Art 9 
Australian 
addition 
AV33 
Yes Not included in United Kingdom draft of 6th 
May 1946 
Article IV 
Where  
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
[No change from UK draft of 6th May 1946] 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
[Handwritten changes consistent with Draft III 
Australia 
UK involved in final 
drafting  
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(a) an enterprise of one of the territories 
participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an 
enterprise of the other territory, or 
(b) the same persons participate directly or 
indirectly in the management, control or 
capital of an enterprise of one of the 
territories and an enterprise of the other 
territory, and 
(c) in either case conditions are made or 
imposed between the two enterprises, in 
their commercial or financial relations, which 
differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, 
then any profits which would but for those 
conditions have accrued to one of those 
enterprises, but by reason of those 
conditions have not so accrued, may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and 
taxed accordingly. 
 
below.] 
Draft III (1st August 1946) 
Article IV 
(1) Where 
(a) an enterprise of one of the territories 
participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of 
the other territory, or 
(b) the same persons participate directly or 
indirectly in the management, control or capital of 
an enterprise of one of the territories and an 
enterprise of the other territory, and 
(c) in either case conditions are operative 
between the two enterprises in their commercial 
or financial relations which differ from those which 
might be expected to operate between 
independent enterprises dealing at arm's length 
with one another, 
then, if by reason of those conditions profits which 
might be expected to accrue to one of the 
enterprises do not accrue to that enterprise, there 
may be included in the profits of that enterprise 
the profits which would have accrued to it if it 
were an independent enterprise and its dealings 
with the other enterprise were dealings at arm's 
length with that enterprise or an independent 
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enterprise. 
(2) Profits included in the profits of an enterprise 
of one of the territories under paragraph (1) of this 
Article shall be deemed to be income derived 
from sources in that territory and shall be taxed 
accordingly. 
(3) If the information available to the taxation 
authority concerned is inadequate to determine, 
for the purposes of paragraph (1) of this Article, 
the profits which might be expected to accrue to 
an enterprise, nothing in that paragraph shall 
affect the application of the law of either territory 
in relation to the liability of that enterprise to pay 
tax on an amount determined by the exercise of a 
discretion or the making of an estimate by the 
taxation authority of that territory: Provided that 
such discretion shall be exercised or such 
estimate shall be make, so far as the information 
available to the taxation authority permits, in 
accordance with the principle stated in that 
paragraph. 
[Changed from UK draft of 6th May 1946 and 
Draft II] 
Final form of Article 
[As per Draft III] 
 
Art 10(1) Yes, no 
mention of 
United Kingdom draft of 6th May 1946 Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia)  UK 
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AV36 ‘beneficial 
ownerships’ 
although note 
final sentence 
in Article VI(1) 
of UK – US 
1945 
Article VI 
(1) The rate of Australian tax on dividends 
derived from sources within Australia by a 
resident of the United Kingdom who is 
subject to United Kingdom tax in respect 
thereof and not engaged in trade or 
business in Australia through a permanent 
establishment situated therein shall not 
exceed half the rate which would be 
applicable to the dividends but for this 
paragraph. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the 
foregoing paragraph, dividends paid to a 
company which is a resident of the United 
Kingdom by a company which is a resident 
of Australia  paid by a company  resident in 
Australia, all of whose shares (less 
directors’ qualifying shares) which have 
under all circumstances full voting rights are 
beneficially owned by the former company 
shall be exempt from Australian tax: 
Provided that exemption shall not be 
allowed if ordinarily more than one quarter 
of the gross income of the Australian 
company is derived from interest and 
dividends other than interest and dividends 
from any wholly-owned subsidiary company. 
(3) Dividends paid by a company which is a 
resident of the United Kingdom to persons 
not resident in Australia shall be exempt 
Article VI 
(1) As per UK draft of 6th May 1946 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the 
foregoing paragraph, dividends paid by a 
company which is a resident of Australia to  a 
company which is a United Kingdom resident and 
beneficially owns all the shares (less directors’ 
qualifying shares) of the former company which 
have under all circumstances full voting rights 
shall be exempt from Australian tax: 
Provided that exemption shall not be allowed if 
ordinarily more than one quarter of the gross 
income of the Australian company is derived from 
interest and dividends other than interest and 
dividends from any wholly-owned subsidiary 
company.  [Change from UK draft of 6th May 
1946] 
(3) Dividends paid to a United Kingdom resident 
by a company which is a United Kingdom resident 
shall be exempt from Australian tax.  [Change 
from UK draft of 6th May 1946] 
(4) Dividends paid by a company resident in the 
United Kingdom to an individual who is an 
Australian resident subject to Australian tax in 
respect thereof and is not engaged in trade or 
business in the United Kingdom through a 
permanent establishment situated therein shall be 
exempt from United Kingdom sur-tax.  [Change 
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from Australian tax. 
(4) Dividends derived from sources within 
the United Kingdom by an individual who is 
a resident of Australia subject to Australian 
tax in respect thereof, and not engaged in 
trade or business in the United Kingdom 
through a permanent establishment situated 
therein, shall be exempt from United 
Kingdom sur-tax. 
 
from UK draft of 6th May 1946] 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
Article VI 
(1) Any dividend paid to a United Kingdom 
resident by a company which is a United Kingdom 
resident shall be exempt from Australian tax. 
[Change from previous drafts by relocating 
provision from Article VI(3) to Article VI(1)] 
(2) Any dividend paid by a company which is a 
resident of Australia (whether also resident in the 
United Kingdom or not) to a company which- 
(a) is a United Kingdom resident, 
(b) is subject to United Kingdom tax in respect 
thereof, and 
(c) beneficially owns all the shares (less directors' 
qualifying shares) of the former company, 
shall be exempt from Australian tax: Provided that 
the exemption shall not apply if ordinarily more 
than one-half of the taxable income of that 
company is derived from interest, dividends and 
rents other than interest, dividends and rents from 
any wholly-owned subsidiary company the 
taxable income of which consists wholly or mainly 
of industrial or commercial profits.  [Change from 
previous drafts] 
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(3)  Without limiting the exemptions provided by 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this article, the amount 
of Australian tax payable in respect of any 
dividend paid out of profits derived from sources 
in Australia to a United Kingdom resident who is 
subject to United Kingdom tax in respect thereof 
and is not engaged in trade or business in 
Australia through a permanent establishment 
situated therein, shall not exceed half the amount 
which would be payable in respect of the dividend  
but for this paragraph.  [Change from previous 
drafts] 
(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of 
this Article, the amount of the additional tax 
assessable in respect of the undistributed amount 
of the distributable income of a company which is 
a private company for purposes of Australian tax 
shall be the amount which would have been 
assessable if those provisions had not been 
included in this Agreement.  [Change from 
previous drafts] 
(5) Any dividend paid by a company resident in 
the United Kingdom (whether also a resident of 
Australia or not) to an individual who- 
(a) is an Australian resident, 
(b) is subject to Australian tax in respect thereof, 
and 
(c) is not engaged in trade or business in the 
United Kingdom through a permanent 
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establishment situated therein, 
shall be exempt from United Kingdom sur-tax.  
[Change from previous drafts] 
 
Draft III (1st August 1946) 
[As per draft II as at 19th July 1946] 
Final form of Article 
Article VI 
(1) Any dividend paid to a United Kingdom 
resident by a company which is a United Kingdom 
resident shall be exempt from Australian tax. 
(2) Any dividend paid by a company which is a 
resident of Australia (whether or not also resident 
in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) to a 
company which- 
(a) is a United Kingdom resident, 
(b) is subject to United Kingdom tax in respect 
thereof, and 
(c) beneficially owns all the shares (less directors' 
qualifying shares) of the former company, 
shall be exempt from Australian tax: Provided that 
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the exemption shall not apply if 
(i) the total of the directors' qualifying shares 
exceeds five percent of the paid-up capital of the 
company paying the dividend, or 
(ii) ordinarily more than one-half of the taxable 
income of that company is derived from interest, 
dividends and rents other than interest, dividends 
and rents from any wholly-owned subsidiary 
company the taxable income of which consists 
wholly or mainly of industrial or commercial 
profits.  [Change from previous drafts] 
(3) Subject to such provisions as may be enacted 
in Australia for the purpose of determining the 
amount of Australian tax payable in respect of any 
dividend, and without limiting the exemptions 
provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article, 
the amount of Australian tax payable in respect of 
any dividend the whole or part of which is paid out 
of profits derived from sources in Australia to a 
United Kingdom resident who is subject to United 
Kingdom tax in respect thereof and is not 
engaged in trade or business in Australia through 
a permanent establishment situated therein, shall 
not exceed half the amount which would be 
payable in respect of the dividend or part thereof 
but for this paragraph.  [Change from previous 
drafts] 
(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of 
this Article, the amount of the additional tax 
assessable in respect of the undistributed amount 
of the distributable income of a company which is 
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a private company for purposes of Australian tax 
shall be the amount which would have been 
assessable if those provisions had not been 
included in this Agreement. 
(5) Any dividend paid by a company resident in 
the United Kingdom (whether or not also a 
resident of Australia or elsewhere) to an individual 
who- 
(a) is an Australian resident, 
(b) is subject to Australian tax in respect thereof, 
and 
(c) is not engaged in trade or business in the 
United Kingdom through a permanent 
establishment situated therein, 
shall be exempt from United Kingdom sur-tax. 
 
Art 10(3) 
AV41 
No 
 
 
United Kingdom draft of 6th May 1946 did 
not contain a definition of ‘dividend’ 
 
 
 
No definition of ‘dividend’ was contained in: Draft 
II (22nd May 1946 – 1st draft worked on in 
Australia); Draft II as at 19th July 1946; Draft III (1st 
August 1946); or Final form of Article 
UK 
Art 10 Australian 
addition 
relating to 
Not included in draft of 6th May.   Not included in Draft II as at 22nd May 1946.  
Included in Draft II as at 19th July 1946.  Draft III 
Australia.   
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calculation of 
undistributed 
profits tax.  
Article VI(4) in 
signed Treaty. 
and Final form of Article VI(4) are identical to 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946. 
 
Ministerial agreement  
discussed at 2.90  
allowed Australia to  
continue to levy  
undistributed profits tax. 
Form of article drafted  
by Australia. 
Art 10  
Australian 
addition 
Precendent for 
AV45 
Zero dividend 
withholding tax 
where dividend 
paid to listed 
company 
holding 80% or 
more of voting 
power in 
company 
paying the 
dividend. 
UK draft 6th May 1946 no withholding tax on 
dividends paid by a wholly owned subsidiary 
Substantive aspects of provision not altered in 
subsequent drafts. 
UK 
Art 11 Yes, UK-US 
Article VII was 
an ‘interest’ 
article  
UK draft of 6th May 1946 did not contain an 
‘interest’ article 
 
No changes were made to UK draft of 6th May 
1946 by Draft II, Draft III or Final Form of Article. 
Australia via ministerial  
agreement 
Art 12(1) Yes, UK –US 
1945 
exempted 
industrial and 
cultural 
United Kingdom draft of 6th May 1946 
Article VII 
(1) Royalties derived from sources within one of 
Draft II (worked on in Australia) 22nd May 1946 
No change from UK draft of 6th May 1946 
Product of ministerial  
agreement 
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royalties under 
Art VIII while 
Art IX imposed 
a 15% limit on 
US source 
taxation of 
mineral 
royalties and 
exempted 
mineral 
royalties from 
UK sur-tax 
the territories by a resident of the other 
territory who is subject to tax in that other 
territory in respect thereof and not engaged 
in trade or business in the first mentioned 
territory through a permanent establishment 
situated therein, shall be exempt from tax in 
the first mentioned territory; but no 
exemption shall be allowed under this 
Article in respect of any royalty paid by a 
company to a company which controls, 
directly or indirectly, more than one-half of 
the entire voting power in the paying 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946 
Article VII 
(1) Any royalty derived from sources within one of the 
territories by a resident of the other territory who 
is subject to tax in that other territory in respect 
thereof and not engaged in trade or business in 
the first mentioned territory through a permanent 
establishment situated therein, shall be exempt 
from tax in the first mentioned territory; but no 
exemption shall be allowed in respect of so much 
of any such royalty as exceeds an amount which 
represents a fair and reasonable consideration for 
the rights for which the royalty is paid. 
Draft III 1st August 1946 
Final Form of the Article  
[Both Draft III and the Final Form of the Article 
were as per Draft II as at 19th July 1946] 
Art 12(2) Yes, UK-US 
1945 merely 
stated that 
‘royalties’ 
included 
United Kingdom draft 6th May 1946 
Article VII 
(2) In this Article the term “royalty” means any 
Draft II (worked on in Australia) 22nd May 1946 
Article VII 
(2) In this Article the term “royalty” means any royalty 
UK initial definition but 
Australian amendments 
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rentals in 
respect of 
motion picture 
films 
 
royalty or other amount paid as 
consideration for the use of, or the privilege 
of using, any copyright, patent, design, 
secret process or formula, trade-mark, or 
other like property, but does not include 
royalties or other amounts paid in respect of 
the operation of mines or quarries or of 
other extraction of natural resources or 
rents or royalties in respect of 
cinematograph films. 
 
 
or other amount paid as consideration for the use 
of, or the privilege of using, any copyright, patent, 
design, secret process or formula, trade-mark, or 
other like property, but does not include royalties 
or other amounts paid in respect of the operation 
of mines or quarries or of other extraction of 
natural resources or rents or royalties in respect 
of motion picture films. 
 (Change from UK draft of 6th May 1946) 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946 
Article VII 
(2)      In this Article the term “royalty” means any 
royalty or other amount paid as consideration for 
the use of, or the privilege of using, any copyright, 
patent, design, secret process or formula, trade-
mark, or other like property, but does not include 
royalty or other amount paid in respect of the 
operation of a mine or quarry or of other 
extraction of natural resources or a rent or royalty 
in respect of a motion picture film. 
(Change from UK draft of 6th May 1946 and 
from Draft II as at 22nd May 1946) 
Draft III 1st August 1946 
Final Form of the Article  
[Both Draft III and the Final Form of the Article 
were as per Draft II as at 19th July 1946] 
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Art 13 Yes, Art XIV of 
US – UK 1945 
exempted UK 
residents not 
engaged in US 
trade or 
business from 
US tax on 
gains from 
sale or 
exchange of 
capital assets 
No equivalent in United Kingdom draft of 6th 
May 1946 
 
No changes were made to UK draft of 6th May 
1946 by Draft II, Draft III or Final Form of Article. 
 
UK 
Art 17 
AV80 
No  Not in 6th May 1946 United Kingdom draft No changes were made to UK draft of 6th May 
1946 by Draft II, Draft III or Final Form of Article. 
UK 
Art 21(1) 
AV82 
No Not in UK draft 6th May 1946 
 
No changes were made to UK draft of 6th May 
1946 by Draft II, Draft III or Final Form of Article. 
UK 
Art 22 
AV87 
No Not in UK draft 6th May 1946 No changes were made to UK draft of 6th May 
1946 by Draft II, Draft III or Final Form of Article. 
UK 
Art 23  
Australian 
Variations 
AV88 
 
Australian 
treaties 
typically allow 
a credit for 
foreign tax 
paid in the 
treaty partner 
country on 
income in 
respect of 
UK draft 6th May 1946 
Article XIII 
(1)       Subject to the provisions of the law 
of the United Kingdom regarding the 
allowance as a credit against United 
Kingdom tax of tax payable in a territory 
outside the United Kingdom, Australian tax 
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
Article XIII 
(1) Subject to the provisions of the law of the 
United Kingdom regarding the allowance as a 
credit against United Kingdom tax of tax payable 
in a territory outside the United Kingdom, 
Australian tax payable, whether directly or by 
deduction, in respect of income derived from 
Basic provisions UK 
Australia refined drafting 
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Australian tax 
payable on the 
income. 
 
Twenty one 
Australian 
treaties prior to 
2003 allowed a 
credit for 
foreign 
underlying 
corporate tax 
where the 
Australian 
shareholder 
held 10% or 
more voting 
interest in the 
paying 
company 
  
payable, whether directly or by deduction, in 
respect of income derived from sources 
within Australia shall be allowed as a credit 
against any United Kingdom tax payable in 
respect of that income. Where such income 
is an ordinary dividend paid by a company 
resident in Australia, the credit shall take 
into account the Australian tax payable in 
respect of its profits by the company paying 
the dividend, and where it is a dividend paid 
on participating preference shares and 
representing both a dividend at a fixed rate 
to which the shares are entitled and an 
additional participation in profits, the 
Australian tax so payable by the company 
shall likewise be taken into account in so far 
as the dividend exceeds that fixed rate. 
(2) Subject to such provisions (which shall 
not affect the general principle hereof) as 
may be enacted by Australia, United 
Kingdom payable in respect of income from 
sources within the United Kingdom 
(including United Kingdom tax deductible 
from such income) shall be allowed as a 
credit against any Australian tax payable in 
respect of that income.  Where such income 
is an ordinary dividend paid by a company 
resident in the United Kingdom, the credit 
shall take into account (in addition to any 
United Kingdom income tax appropriate to 
sources in Australia shall be allowed as a credit 
against any United Kingdom tax payable in 
respect of that income. Where such income is an 
ordinary dividend paid by a company resident in 
Australia, the credit shall take into account (in 
addition to any Australian tax payable in respect 
of the dividend) the Australian tax payable in 
respect of its profits by the company paying the 
dividend, and where it is a dividend paid on 
participating preference shares and representing 
both a dividend at the fixed rate to which the 
shares are entitled and an additional participation 
in profits, the Australian tax so payable by the 
company shall likewise be taken into account in 
so far as the dividend exceeds that fixed rate. 
 (2) Where income is derived from sources in the 
United Kingdom by a resident of Australia and 
United Kingdom tax is payable in respect thereof: 
(a) the income shall be exempt from Australian 
tax unless it is a dividend; 
(b) if the income is a dividend, the United 
Kingdom tax payable in respect thereof shall be 
included in the assessable income for purposes of 
Australian tax for the person entitled to the 
dividend and shall be allowed as a credit against 
any Australian tax payable in respect of the 
dividend. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, a dividend 
paid by a company resident in the United 
Kingdom shall be deemed to be income derived 
from sources in the United Kingdom, and the 
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the dividend) the United Kingdom national 
defence contribution payable by the 
company in respect of its profits, and where 
it is a dividend paid on participating 
preference shares and representing both a 
dividend at the fixed rate to which the 
shares are entitled and an additional 
participation in profits, the national defence 
contribution so payable by the company 
shall likewise be taken into account in so far 
as the dividend exceeds that fixed rate. 
(3)         Where tax is imposed by both 
Contracting Governments on income 
derived from sources outside both Australia 
and the United Kingdom by a person who is 
a resident of Australia for purposes of 
Australian tax and is also resident in the 
United Kingdom for purposes of United 
Kingdom tax, there shall be allowed against 
the tax imposed by each Contracting 
Government a credit which bears the same 
proportion to the amount of that tax (as 
reduced by any credit allowed in respect of 
tax payable in the territory from which the 
income is derived) or to the amount of the 
tax imposed by the other Contracting 
Government (reduced as aforesaid), 
whichever is the less, as the former amount 
(before any such reduction) bears to the 
sum of both amounts (before any such 
United Kingdom tax payable in respect of any 
such dividend shall be deemed to be:  
(i) the amount of United Kingdom income tax 
deductible from the gross amount of the dividend, 
but not exceeding tax on that gross amount at the 
net rate of United Kingdom income tax applicable 
to the dividend for the purposes of United 
Kingdom tax where, owing to the allowance of 
double taxation relief in the United Kingdom, that 
net rate is less than the rate of United Kingdom 
income tax deductible from the dividend;  
(ii) in the case of an ordinary dividend, such part of 
the United Kingdom national defence contribution 
payable in respect of its profits by the company 
paying the dividend as is attributable to the 
proportion of those profits represented by the 
dividend; and 
(iii) in the case of a dividend paid on participating 
preference shares and representing both a 
dividend at the fixed rate to which the shares are 
entitled and an additional participation in profits, 
such part of the United Kingdom national defence 
contribution payable in respect of its profits by the 
company paying the dividend as would fall to be 
included under sub-paragraph (ii) if the amount 
representing that additional participation was an 
ordinary dividend. 
(3)  For the purposes of this Article, profits or 
remuneration for personal (including professional) 
services performed in one of the territories shall 
be deemed to be income derived from sources in 
that territory, and the services of an individual 
whose services are wholly or mainly performed in 
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reduction). 
(4)      For the purposes of this Article, 
profits or  remuneration for personal 
(including professional) services performed 
in one of the territories shall be deemed to 
be income derived from sources within that 
territory, and the services of an individual 
whose services are wholly or mainly 
performed on aircraft operated by a resident 
of one of the territories shall be deemed to 
be performed in that territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ships operated by a resident of one of the 
territories, or who is a member of the air-crew of 
aircraft operated by a resident of one of the 
territories shall be deemed to be performed in that 
territory. 
[Change from UK draft of 6th May 1946] 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
Article XII (renumbered from XIII) 
(1) Subject to the provisions of the law of the United 
Kingdom regarding the allowance as a credit 
against United Kingdom tax of tax payable in a 
territory outside the United Kingdom, Australian 
tax payable, whether directly or by deduction, in 
respect of income derived from sources in 
Australia shall be allowed as a credit against any 
United Kingdom tax payable in respect of that 
income. Where such income is an ordinary 
dividend paid by a company who is a resident of 
Australia, the credit shall take into account (in 
addition to any Australian tax (other than War-
time (Company) tax) payable in respect of the 
dividend) the Australian tax (other than War-time 
(Company) tax) payable in respect of its profits by 
the company paying the dividend, and where it is 
a dividend paid on participating preference shares 
and representing both a dividend at the fixed rate 
to which the shares are entitled and an additional 
participation in profits, the Australian tax so 
payable by the company shall likewise be taken 
into account in so far as the dividend exceeds that 
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fixed rate. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, any amount 
which is included in a person's taxable income 
under Division 14 of the Australian Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936/46 (or that Act as amended 
from time to time) relating to film business 
controlled abroad or under the corresponding 
provisions of any statute substituted for that Act, 
shall be deemed to be derived from sources in 
Australia. 
(2)       Where Australian tax is payable in respect 
of income derived from sources in the United 
Kingdom by a person who is a resident of 
Australia, being income in respect of which United 
Kingdom tax is payable, whether directly or by 
deduction, the United Kingdom tax so payable 
reduced by the amount of any relief or repayment 
attributable to that income to which that person is 
entitled under the law of the United Kingdom 
shall, subject to such provisions (which shall not 
affect the general principle hereof) as may be 
enacted in Australia, be allowed as a credit 
against the Australian tax payable in respect of 
that income: if that person elects to have the 
amount of the United Kingdom tax (as so 
reduced) included in his assessable income for 
purposes of Australian tax. 
 
For the purposes of this paragraph, a dividend 
paid by a company resident in the United 
Kingdom shall be deemed to be income derived 
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from sources in the United Kingdom, and the 
United Kingdom tax payable in respect of any 
such dividend shall be deemed to be:  
(i) the amount of United Kingdom income tax 
deductible from the gross amount of the dividend, 
but not exceeding tax on that gross amount at the 
net rate of United Kingdom income tax applicable 
to the dividend for the purposes of United 
Kingdom tax where, owing to the allowance of 
double taxation relief in the United Kingdom, that 
net rate is less than the rate of United Kingdom 
income tax deductible from the dividend;  
(ii) in the case of an ordinary dividend, such part of 
the United Kingdom national defence contribution 
payable in respect of its profits by the company 
paying the dividend as is attributable to the 
proportion of those profits represented by the 
dividend; and 
(iii) in the case of a dividend paid on participating 
preference shares and representing both a 
dividend at the fixed rate to which the shares are 
entitled and an additional participation in profits, 
such such part of the United Kingdom national 
defence contribution payable in respect of its 
profits by the company paying the dividend as 
would fall to be included under sub-paragraph (ii) 
if the amount representing that additional 
participation was an ordinary dividend. 
(3)   Where tax is imposed by both Contracting 
Governments on income derived from sources 
outside both Australia and the United Kingdom by 
a person who is a resident of Australia for 
purposes of Australian tax and is also resident in 
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the United Kingdom for purposes of United 
Kingdom tax, there shall be allowed against the 
tax imposed by each Contracting Government a 
credit which bears the same proportion to the 
amount of that tax (as reduced by any credit 
allowed in respect of tax payable in the territory 
from which the income is derived) or to the 
amount of the tax imposed by the other 
Contracting Government (reduced as aforesaid), 
whichever is the less, as the former amount 
(before any such reduction) bears to the sum of 
both amounts (before any such reduction). 
(4)  For the purposes of this Article, profits or 
remuneration for personal (including professional) 
services performed in one of the territories shall 
be deemed to be income derived from sources in 
that territory.  
 
[Change from UK draft of 6th May 1946 and 
from Draft II as at 22nd May 1946] 
Draft III (1st August 1946) 
Article XII 
(1)  Subject to the provisions of the law of the United 
Kingdom regarding the allowance as a credit 
against United Kingdom tax of tax payable in a 
territory outside the United Kingdom, Australian 
tax payable, whether directly or by deduction, in 
respect of income derived from sources in 
Australia shall be allowed as a credit against any 
United Kingdom tax payable in respect of that 
income. Where such income is an ordinary 
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dividend paid by a company which is a resident of 
Australia, the credit shall take into account, in 
addition to any Australian tax payable in respect 
of the dividend, the Australian tax (other than war-
time (company) tax) payable in respect of its 
profits by the company paying the dividend, and 
where it is a dividend paid on participating 
preference shares and representing both a 
dividend at the fixed rate to which the shares are 
entitled and an additional participation in profits, 
the Australian tax (other than war-time (company) 
tax) so payable by the company shall likewise be 
taken into account in so far as the dividend 
exceeds that fixed rate. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, any amount 
which is included in a person's taxable income 
under Division 14 or 15 of Part III of the Australian 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-46 (or that Act 
as amended from time to time) relating to film 
business controlled abroad and insurance with 
non-residents, or under the corresponding 
provisions of any statute substituted for that Act, 
shall be deemed to be derived from sources in 
Australia. 
(2)  Where Australian tax is payable in respect of 
income derived from sources in the United 
Kingdom by a person who is a resident of 
Australia, being income in respect of which United 
Kingdom tax is payable the United Kingdom tax 
so payable (reduced by the amount of any relief 
or repayment attributable to that income to which 
that person is entitled under the law of the United 
Kingdom), shall, subject to such provisions (which 
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shall not affect the general principle hereof) as 
may be enacted in Australia, be allowed as a 
credit against the Australian tax payable in 
respect of that income: Provided that where the 
income is a dividend paid by a company resident 
in the United Kingdom the credit the recipient 
elects to have the amount of the United Kingdom 
tax (as so reduced) included in his assessable 
income for purposes of Australian tax. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, a dividend 
paid by a company resident in the United 
Kingdom shall be deemed to be income derived 
from sources in the United Kingdom, and the 
United Kingdom tax payable in respect of any 
such dividend before reduction as aforesaid shall 
be deemed to be the amount of United Kingdom 
income tax deductible from the gross amount of 
the dividend but not exceeding tax on that gross 
amount at the net United Kingdom rate applicable 
to the dividend for purposes of United Kingdom 
tax where, owing to the allowance of double 
taxation relief in the United Kingdom, that net rate 
is less than the rate of United Kingdom income 
tax deductible from the dividend. 
(3)  Where tax is imposed by both Contracting 
Governments on income derived from sources 
outside both Australia and the United Kingdom by 
a person who is a resident of Australia for 
purposes of Australian tax and is also resident in 
the United Kingdom for purposes of United 
Kingdom tax, there shall be allowed against the 
tax imposed by each Contracting Government a 
credit which bears the same proportion to the 
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amount of that tax (as reduced by any credit 
allowed in respect of tax payable in the territory 
from which the income is derived) or to the 
amount of the tax imposed by the other 
Contracting Government (reduced as aforesaid), 
whichever is the less, as the former amount 
(before any such reduction) bears to the sum of 
both amounts (before any such reduction). 
(4) For the purposes of this Article, profits, 
remuneration or other income in respect of 
personal (including professional) services 
performed in one of the territories shall be 
deemed to be income derived from sources in 
that territory. 
[Change from UK draft of 6th May 1946, from 
Draft II as at 22nd May 1946 and from Draft II as 
at 19th July 1946 
Final form of Article 
Article XII 
(1) Subject to the provisions of the law of the 
United Kingdom regarding the allowance as a 
credit against United Kingdom tax of tax payable 
in a territory outside the United Kingdom, 
Australian tax payable, whether directly or by 
deduction, in respect of income derived from 
sources in Australia shall be allowed as a credit 
against any United Kingdom tax payable in 
respect of that income. Where such income is an 
ordinary dividend paid by a company which is a 
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resident of Australia, the credit shall take into 
account, in addition to any Australian tax payable 
in respect of the dividend, the Australian tax 
(other than war-time (company) tax) payable in 
respect of its profits by the company paying the 
dividend, and where it is a dividend paid on 
participating preference shares and representing 
both a dividend at the fixed rate to which the 
shares are entitled and an additional participation 
in profits, the Australian tax (other than war-time 
(company) tax) so payable by the company shall 
likewise be taken into account in so far as the 
dividend exceeds that fixed rate. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, any amount 
which is included in a person's taxable income 
under Division 14 or 15 of Part III of the Australian 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1946 (or that 
Act as amended from time to time) relating to film 
business controlled abroad and insurance with 
non-residents, or under the corresponding 
provisions of any statute substituted for that Act, 
shall be deemed to be derived from sources in 
Australia. 
(2) Where Australian tax is payable in respect of 
income derived from sources in the United 
Kingdom by a person who is a resident of 
Australia, being income in respect of which United 
Kingdom tax is payable, whether directly or by 
deduction, the United Kingdom tax so payable 
(reduced by the amount of any relief or repayment 
attributable to that income to which that person is 
entitled under the law of the United Kingdom), 
shall, subject to such provisions (which shall not 
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affect the general principle hereof) as may be 
enacted in Australia, be allowed as a credit 
against the Australian tax payable in respect of 
that income: Provided that where the income is a 
dividend paid by a company resident in the United 
Kingdom the credit shall be allowed only if the 
recipient elects to have the amount of the United 
Kingdom tax (as so reduced) included in his 
assessable income for purposes of Australian tax. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, a dividend 
paid by a company resident in the United 
Kingdom shall be deemed to be income derived 
from sources in the United Kingdom, and the 
United Kingdom tax payable in respect of any 
such dividend before reduction as aforesaid shall 
be deemed to include the amount of United 
Kingdom income tax deductible from the gross 
amount of the dividend (but not so much of that 
income tax as exceeds tax on that gross amount 
at the net United Kingdom rate applicable to the 
dividend for purposes of United Kingdom tax 
where, owing to the allowance of double taxation 
relief in the United Kingdom, that net rate is less 
than the rate of United Kingdom income tax 
deductible from the dividend). 
(3) Where tax is imposed by both Contracting 
Governments on income derived from sources 
outside both Australia and the United Kingdom by 
a person who is a resident of Australia for 
purposes of Australian tax and is also resident in 
the United Kingdom for purposes of United 
Kingdom tax, there shall be allowed against the 
tax imposed by each Contracting Government a 
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credit which bears the same proportion to the 
amount of that tax (as reduced by any credit 
allowed in respect of tax payable in the territory 
from which the income is derived) or to the 
amount of the tax imposed by the other 
Contracting Government (reduced as aforesaid), 
whichever is the less, as the former amount 
(before any such reduction) bears to the sum of 
both amounts (before any such reduction). 
(4) For the purposes of this Article, profits, 
remuneration or other income in respect of 
personal (including professional) services 
performed in one of the territories shall be 
deemed to be income derived from sources in 
that territory. 
[Changes from all previous drafts] 
Art 24 
AV91 
Yes, Art XXI of 
US – UK 1945 
was a non-
discrimination 
article 
Not in UK draft of 6th May 1946 
 
 
 
 
 
No changes were made to UK draft of 6th May 
1946 by Draft II, Draft III or Final Form of Article. 
 
 
UK 
Art 25(1) 
AV105 
No 
 
Not in UK draft of 6th May 1946 
 
No changes were made to UK draft of 6th May 
1946 by Draft II, Draft III or Final Form of Article. 
UK 
 
 
 
483 
483 
  
 
 
 
Art 26 
Exchange of  
information 
No.  Art XX of 
UK – US 1945 
was identical 
to Art XIII in 
UK draft of 6th 
May 1946 
United Kingdom draft of 6th May 1946 
Article XIII 
(1) The taxation authorities of the 
Contracting Governments shall exchange 
such information (being information 
available under the respective taxation laws 
of the Contracting Governments) as is 
necessary for carrying out the provisions of 
the present Agreement or for the prevention 
of fraud or for the administration of statutory 
provisions against legal avoidance in 
relation to the taxes which are the subject of 
the present Agreement. Any information so 
exchanged shall be treated as secret and 
shall not be disclosed to any persons other 
than persons concerned with the 
assessment or collection of the taxes which 
are the subject of the present Agreement. 
No information shall be exchanged which 
would disclose any trade secret or trade 
process. 
(2) As used in this Article, the term "taxation 
authorities" means, in the case of Australia, 
the Commissioner of Taxation or his 
authorised representative; in the case of the 
United Kingdom, the Commissioners of 
Draft II (22nd May 1946 – worked on in Australia) 
 [No change from UK draft of 6th May 1946] 
Draft II as at 19th July 1946  
Article XIII 
(1) The taxation authorities of the Contracting 
Governments shall exchange such information 
(being information available under the respective 
taxation laws of the Contracting Governments) as 
is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the 
present Agreement or for the prevention of fraud 
or for the administration of statutory provisions 
against legal avoidance in relation to the taxes 
which are the subject of the present Agreement. 
Any information so exchanged shall be treated as 
secret and shall not be disclosed to any person 
other than persons (including a Court) concerned 
with the assessment or collection, or the 
determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes 
which are the subject of the present Agreement. 
No information shall be exchanged which would 
disclose any trade secret or trade process. 
(2) As used in this Article, the term "taxation 
authorities" means, in the case of Australia, the 
Commissioner of Taxation or his authorised 
UK 
Australian drafting  
changes 
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Inland Revenue or their authorised 
representative; and in the case of any 
territory to which the present Agreement is 
extended under Article XIV, the competent 
authority for the administration in such 
territory of the taxes to which the present 
Agreement applies. 
 
representative; in the case of the United Kingdom, 
the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or their 
authorised representative; and in the case of any 
territory to which the present Agreement is 
extended under Article XIV, the competent 
authority for the administration in such territory of 
the taxes to which the present Agreement applies. 
[Change from UK draft of 6th May 1946 and 
from Draft II as at 22nd May 1946] 
Draft III (1st August 1946) 
[Minor change from Draft II as at 19th July 1946 
by inserting ‘of’ after ‘collection’ in paragraph 
1. 
Final form of Article 
Identical to Draft III 
Art 27 
 
No Not in 6th May 1946 United Kingdom draft  No changes were made to UK draft of 6th May 
1946 by Draft II, Draft III or Final Form of Article. 
 
UK 
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APPENDIX 5 
VARIATIONS FROM 1963 DRAFT OECD MODEL IN  AUSTRLIA – UNITED KINGDOM TREATY 1967 
OECD 
Model 
Article 
Australian 
Variation Number 
(AV) 
 
(a) 2014 OECD 
Version 
(b) 1963 OECD 
Draft  
Present In UK Draft Of September 1966? 
Present in previous Australian Tax 
Treaties? 
Drafting history to Final Draft Initiator of 
variation 
Art 1  2014 and 
1963 
identical 
 
No equivalent to Art 1 in earlier Australian tax 
treaties 
 
No equivalent to Art 1  in UK Draft September 
1966 
 
 
No changes UK 
No longer 
reflected in 
Australian Tax 
Treaties currently 
in force 
Art 2(1) AV1 
2014 and 1963 
identical 
 
 
Yes, although the UK draft contemplated that 
Australia would draft the list of Australian 
taxes  
 
AV1 present in earlier Australian tax treaties 
 
Final draft identical to draft of 13th April 1967 
which read: 
 
(b) In Australia: 
the Commonwealth income tax, 
including the additional upon the 
undistributed amount of the 
Basic approach 
UK but precise 
terms Australia 
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 distributable income of a private 
company. 
Art 
2(2) 
AV2 
 
2014 and 1963 
identical 
 
 
No equivalent to Art 2(2) included  in UK 
Draft  
 
AV2 present in earlier Australian tax treaties 
 
 
No changes UK 
Art 3(1) AV3 
Industrial or 
commercial profits 
defined in terms 
which excluded 
particular types of 
income 
 
Neither 2014 nor 
1963 contained 
definition of 
‘industrial or 
commercial profits’ 
or of ‘business 
AV3 present in earlier Australian tax treaties  
 
Yes, but UK draft was amended by narrowing 
the definition during the negotiation and 
drafting process. 
 
UK draft September 1966 
Article 6(6) 
The term "industrial or commercial profits" 
means income derived by an enterprise from 
the conduct of a trade or business, including 
income derived by an enterprise from the 
furnishing of services of employees or other 
personnel, but it does not include dividends, 
interest, royalties (as defined in Articles 9, 10, 
and 11) or rents other than dividends, 
Final Draft (apart from renumbering) 
corresponded with Draft of Article 5(7) of the 
draft of 13th April 1967 which read as follows: 
 
5(7) The term "industrial or commercial 
profits" means income derived by an 
enterprise from the conduct of a trade or 
business, including income derived by an 
enterprise from the furnishing of services of 
employees or other personnel, but it does not 
include- 
(a) dividends, interest, royalties (as defined in 
Articles 8, 9 and 10) or rents other than 
dividends, interest, royalties or rents 
effectively connected with a trade or business 
carried on through a permanent 
establishment which an enterprise of one of 
Basic approach 
UK but definition 
narrowed at 
Australia’s 
request. 
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profits’ interest, royalties or rents effectively 
connected with a trade or business carried on 
through a permanent establishment which an 
enterprise of one of the territories has in the 
other territory; nor does the term include 
remuneration for personal (including 
professional) services.  
the territories has in the other territory; or 
(b) remuneration for personal (including 
professional) services; or 
(c) income arising from, or in relation to, 
contracts or obligations to provide the 
services of public entertainers or athletes 
referred to in Article 13. 
 
Art 4(1) AV4 
 
1963 differed 
from 2014  
with Art 4(1) 
being 
identical to 
UK draft 
September 
1966 Art 3(1) 
 
AV4 Present in earlier Australian Treaties 
No.  UK draft Art 3(1) identical to Art 4(1) 
OECD 1963 Draft except for use of ‘territory’ 
or ‘territories’ instead  of ‘Contracting State’ 
or ‘Contracting States’ 
UK draft September 1966 
(1)For the purposes of this Agreement the 
terms ‘resident of the United Kingdom’ and 
‘resident of Australia’ mean respectively any 
person who, under the law of the United 
Kingdom,  is liable to tax therein by reason of 
his domicile, residence, place management 
or any other criterion of a similar nature and 
any person who, under the law of Australia, is 
liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, 
Draft of 13th April 1967 read as follows: 
 
Article 3(1) 
(1) For the purposes of this Agreement -  
 (a) the term ‘Australian company’ means any 
company which  
(i) is incorporated in Australia and 
which has its centre of administrative 
or practical management in Australia 
(whether or not any person outside 
Australia exercises or is capable of 
exercising any overriding control or 
discretion of the company or of its 
Australia 
Australian draft 
16th June 1967 
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residence, place of  or any other  criterion of 
a similar nature. 
 
Art 3(2) and Art 3(3) of the UK draft were 
identical to Art 4(2) and Art 4(3) of the 1963 
OECD Draft with the words ‘territory’ or 
‘territories’ being substituted for ‘Contracting 
State’ or ‘Contracting States’ respectively. 
 
(2) Where by reason of the provisions of 
paragraph (1) above an individual is a 
resident of both territories, then his status 
shall be determined in accordance with the 
following rules: 
(a) he shall be deemed to be a 
resident  of the territory in which he 
has a permanent home available to 
him.  If he has a permanent home in 
both territories, he shall be deemed to 
be a resident of the territory with 
which his personal and economic 
relations are closest (hereinafter 
referred to as his “centre of vital 
policy or affairs in any way 
whatsoever; or  
(ii) is managed and controlled in 
Australia; 
(b) the term ‘United Kingdom company’ 
means any company which is managed and 
controlled in the United Kingdom and which is 
not an Australian company; 
(c) the term "United Kingdom resident" 
means any United Kingdom company and 
any person (other than a company) who is 
resident in the United Kingdom for the 
purposes of United Kingdom tax but the term 
does not include any individual, not being 
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, 
who is liable to tax in the United Kingdom 
only if he derives income from sources 
therein; and 
(d) the term "Australian resident" means any 
Australian company and any other person 
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interests”); 
(b) if the territory in which he has his 
centre of vital interests cannot be 
determined or if he has not a 
permanent home available to him in 
either territory, he shall be deemed to 
be a resident of the territory in which 
he has an habitual abode; 
(c) if he has an habitual abode in both 
territories or in neither of them, he 
shall be deemed to be a resident of 
the territory in which he is a national; 
(d) if he is a national of both territories 
or of neither of them, the taxation 
authorities of the territories shall 
determine the question by mutual 
agreement. 
 
(3) Where by reason of the provisions of 
paragraph (1) a person other than an 
individual is a resident of both territories, then 
it shall be deemed to be a resident of the 
territory in which its place of effective 
(other than a United Kingdom company) who 
is a resident of Australia for the purposes of 
Australian tax but the term does not include 
any individual, not being ordinarily resident in 
Australia, who is liable to tax in Australia only 
if he derives income from sources therein. 
(2) Where by reason of the provisions of 
paragraph (1) of this Article an individual is 
both a United Kingdom resident and an 
Australian resident- 
(a) he shall be treated solely as a United 
Kingdom resident- 
(i) if he has a permanent home available to 
him in the United Kingdom and has not a 
permanent home available to him in 
Australia; 
(ii) if sub-paragraph (a)(i) is not applicable but 
he has an habitual abode in the United 
Kingdom and has not an habitual abode in 
Australia; 
(iii) if neither sub-paragraph (a)(i) nor sub-
paragraph (a)(ii) of this paragraph is 
applicable but the territory with which his 
personal and economic relations are closest 
is the United Kingdom; 
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management is situated. 
 
Article 3(4) in UK draft had no equivalent in 
OECD Draft 1963 
 
(4) The terms “resident of one of the 
territories” and “resident of the other territory” 
mean a person who is a resident of the 
United Kingdom or a person who is a resident 
of Australia as the context requires. 
(5) The terms ‘United Kingdom enterprise’ 
and ‘Australian enterprise’ mean respectively 
an industrial or commercial enterprise or 
undertaking carried on by a United Kingdom 
resident and an industrial or commercial 
enterprise or undertaking carried on by an 
Australian resident, and the terms ‘enterprise 
of one of the territories’ and ‘enterprise of the 
other territory’ mean  a United Kingdom 
enterprise or an Australian enterprise, as the 
context requires. 
 
(b) he shall be treated solely as an Australian 
resident- 
(i) if he has a permanent home available to 
him in Australia and has not a permanent 
home available to him in the United Kingdom; 
(ii) if sub-paragraph (b)(i) is not applicable but 
he has an habitual abode in Australia and 
has not an habitual abode in the United 
Kingdom; 
(iii) if neither sub-paragraph (b)(i) nor sub-
paragraph (b)(ii) is applicable but the territory 
with which his personal and economic 
relations are closest is Australia. 
(3) Where by reason of the provisions of 
paragraph (1) of this Article a person other 
than an individual is both a United Kingdom 
resident and an Australian resident- 
(a) it shall be treated solely as a United 
Kingdom resident if it is managed and 
controlled in the United Kingdom; 
(b) it shall be treated solely as an Australian 
resident if it is managed and controlled in 
Australia. 
(4) Identical to United Kingdom draft of 
September 1966 
(5) Identical to United Kingdom draft of 
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September 1966. 
 
Final Draft was as per Australian draft 16th 
June 1967 
 
Article 3(1) 
(1) For the purposes of this Agreement -  
 (a) the term ‘Australian company’ means any 
company which being a resident of Australia 
– remainder of 1(a) was identical with draft of 
13th April 1967. 
(b) identical with draft of 13th April 1967. 
(c) the term "United Kingdom resident" 
means any United Kingdom company and 
any person (other than a company) who is 
resident in the United Kingdom for the 
purposes of United Kingdom tax but the term 
does not include any individual, not being 
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, 
who is liable to tax in the United Kingdom 
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only if he derives income from sources 
therein; and 
(d) the term "Australian resident" means any 
Australian company and any other person 
(other than a United Kingdom company) who 
is a resident of Australia for the purposes of 
Australian tax but the term does not include 
any individual, not being ordinarily resident in 
Australia, who is liable to tax in Australia only 
if he derives income from sources therein. 
(2) Where by reason of the provisions of 
paragraph (1) of this Article an individual is 
both a United Kingdom resident and an 
Australian resident- 
(a) he shall be treated solely as a United 
Kingdom resident- 
(i) if he has a permanent home available to 
him in the United Kingdom and has not a 
permanent home available to him in 
Australia; 
(ii) if sub-paragraph (a)(i) of this paragraph is 
not applicable but he has an habitual abode 
in the United Kingdom and has not an 
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habitual abode in Australia; 
(iii) if neither sub-paragraph (a)(i) nor sub-
paragraph (a)(ii) of this paragraph is 
applicable but the territory with which his 
personal and economic relations are closest 
is the United Kingdom; 
(b) he shall be treated solely as an Australian 
resident- 
(i) if he has a permanent home available to 
him in Australia and has not a permanent 
home available to him in the United Kingdom; 
(ii) if sub-paragraph (b)(i) of this paragraph is 
not applicable but he has an habitual abode 
in Australia and has not an habitual abode in 
the United Kingdom; 
(iii) if neither sub-paragraph (b)(i) nor sub-
paragraph (b)(ii) of this paragraph is 
applicable but the territory with which his 
personal and economic relations are closest 
is Australia. 
(3) Identical to draft of 13th April 1967. 
(4) Identical to draft of 13th April 1967. 
(5) Identical to draft of 13th April 1967. 
 
Art 5(2)- AV6 AV6 present in earlier Australian tax treaties   
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5(3)  
 
 
AV7 
But here UK draft 
followed 1963 
OECD which 
differed from 2014 
OECD in this 
respect 
 
AV8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV9 
 
 
 
 
Yes, assembly project included in UK Draft 
September 1966 but here followed OECD 
Draft 1963 
 
AV7 not present in earlier Australian tax 
treaties 
 
 
 
No, connected supervisory activities not 
included in UK Draft September 1966 
 
AV8 not present in earlier Australian tax 
treaties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Final draft was as per draft of 16th June 1967 
which, apart from the insertion of commas 
was identical to Article 4(4) in the draft of 13th 
Arpil 1967.  Article 4(4) in draft of 16th June 
1967 read: 
 
‘An enterprise of one of the territories shall be 
deemed to have a permanent establishment 
in the other territory if it carries on 
supervisory activities in that other territory for 
more than six months in connection with a 
building site, or a construction, installation or 
 
 
 
UK initiated AV7 
but this was not a 
variation from 
1963 OECD Draft  
 
 
 
 
Australia initiated 
‘connected 
supervisory 
activities’ 
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UK Draft September 1966 required 12 
months for building site  
 
AV9 not present in earlier Australian tax 
treaties 
 
UK draft September 1966 
 
Article 4(2) 
 
(2) The term “permanent establishment” shall 
include especially: 
 (g) a building site, construction or 
assembly project  which exists for 
more than twelve months. 
 
 
assembly project which is being undertaken 
in the other territory’. 
 
 
Final draft was as per draft of 13th April 1967 
which required 6 months for building sites, 
construction or installation projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia initiated 
6 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Art 5(4) AV12 
1963 and 2014 
AV12 not present in earlier Australian tax 
treaties 
Final draft corresponded with draft of 13th 
April 1967 which added ‘such as advertising 
Australia initiated 
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differ.  At the time 
OECD Draft 1963 
did not include 
examples  
 
 
No, UK draft followed OECD Draft 1963  
or scientific research’ to the end of Article 
4(3)(e). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Art 5(5) AV13 
1963 and 2014 
differ. The 1963 draft 
excluded the 
operation of the 
deeming where the 
activities of the 
agent were limited to 
the purchase of 
goods or 
merchandise for the 
enterprise.  The 
2014 Model 
excludes the 
operation of the 
deeming where the 
AV13 not present as a deeming in earlier 
Australian tax treaties  
 
No, UK draft followed OECD Draft 1963 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not applicable  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia initiated 
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activities of the 
agent are limited to 
those mentioned in 
paragraph 4. 
 
AV14 
Not present in either 
1963 Draft or in 
2014 Model 
 
 
 
 
No, no equivalent in UK draft of September 
1966 
 
 
AV14 originated in 1957 Australia – Canada 
Tax Treaty but refined in 1967 Australia – 
United Kingdom Tax Treaty 
 
 
 
 
Final draft corresponded with draft of 13th 
April 1967 which added paragraph (c) to 
Article 4(5).  Paragraph (c) read as follows: 
 
‘If in so acting he manufactures or processes 
in that first-mentioned territory any goods for 
the enterprise. 
 
 
 
 
Australia initiated 
Art 6 1967 Australia – UK 
Tax Treaty did not 
contain an income 
from immovable 
property article  
UK Draft of September 1966 contained an 
immovable property article  
 
UK Draft September 1966 
 
Article 5 
 
(1) Income from immovable property may 
be taxed in the territory in which such 
property is situated. 
(2) (a) The term “immovable property” 
shall, subject to sub-paragraph (b) 
below, be defined in accordance with 
the laws of the territory in which the 
property in question is situated;(b) the 
Final Draft corresponded with draft of 13th 
April 1967 which did not contain an 
immovable property article  
Australia initiated 
omission of 
immovable 
property article  
 
Not reflected in 
Australian Tax 
Treaties currently 
in force 
 
 
 
498 
498 
term “immovable property” shall in any 
case include property accessory to 
immovable property, livestock and 
equipment of agricultural and forestry 
enterprises, rights to which the 
provisions of general law respecting 
landed property apply, usufruct of 
immovable property and rights to 
variable or fixes payments for the 
working of, or right to work, mineral 
deposits, sources and other natural 
resources; ships and aircraft shall not 
be regarded as immovable property. 
(3) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall 
apply to income derived from the 
direct us of, letting, or use in any other 
form of immovable property. 
(4) The provisions of paragraphs (1) to 
(3) of this Article shall also apply to 
income from immovable property of 
an enterprise and to income from 
immovable property used for the 
performance of professional services. 
Art 7(4) AV19 
1963 OECD Draft 
Art 7(4) not present 
in 2014 Model 
Not present in UK draft September 1966 
 
AV19 present in earlier Australian Tax 
Treaties 
No change UK initiated 
Art 7 
Australian 
addition 
 
Not present in 1963 
OECD Draft or in 
2014 Model  
Not present in UK draft September 1966 
UK Draft September 1966 
 
Art 6(4) 
Art 5(4) Final Version corresponded with draft 
of 13th April 1967 which read as follows: 
In determining the industrial or commercial 
profits of an enterprise of one of the territories 
which are taxable in the other territory in 
 
No longer 
reflected in 
Australian Tax 
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In determining the industrial or commercial 
profits of an enterprise of one of the territories 
which are taxable in the other territory in 
accordance with the previous paragraphs of 
this Article, there shall be allowed as 
deductions all expenses of the enterprise 
(including executive and general 
administrative expenses) which would be 
deductible if the permanent establishment 
were an independent enterprise and which 
are reasonably connected with the profits so 
taxable, whether incurred in the territory in 
which the permanent establishment is 
situated or elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 
Variation not present in earlier Australian 
Tax Treaties and not reflected in 
Australian Tax Treaties currently in force 
 
accordance with the previous paragraphs of 
this Article, there shall be allowed as 
deductions all expenses of the enterprise 
(including executive and general 
administrative expenses) which would be 
deductible if the permanent establishment 
were an independent enterprise and which 
are reasonably connected with the profits so 
taxable, whether incurred in the territory in 
which the permanent establishment is 
situated or elsewhere, but where goods 
manufactured out of the other territory by the 
enterprise are imported into that territory, and 
the goods are, either before or after 
importation, sold in that territory by the 
enterprise, the profits of the enterprise 
taxable in that territory may be determined by 
deducting from the sale price of the goods 
the amount for which, at the date the goods 
were shipped to that territory, goods of the 
same nature and quality could be purchased 
by a wholesale buyer in the country of 
manufacture, and the expenses incurred in 
transporting them to and selling them in that 
territory. 
 
Treaties currently 
in force 
 
UK initiated 
words underlined 
 
Australia initiated 
words in italics 
Art 7  
Australian 
addition 
AV20 
Not present in 1963 
OECD Draft or in 
No present in UK Draft September 1966 
 
AV20 present in earlier Australian Tax 
Art 5(5) Final Version corresponded with draft 
of 13th April 1967 which read as follows: 
If the information available to the taxation 
Australia initiated 
variation 
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2014 Model  Treaties authority concerned is inadequate to 
determine the profits to be attributed to the 
permanent establishment, nothing in this 
Article shall affect the application of the law of 
either territory in relation to the liability of the 
permanent establishment to pay tax on an 
amount determined by the exercise of a 
discretion or the making of an estimate by the 
taxation authority of that territory. Provided 
that such discretion shall be exercised or 
such estimate shall be made, so far as the 
information available to the taxation authority 
permits, in accordance with the principle 
stated in this Article. 
 
Art 7 
Australian 
addition 
AV22 
Not present in 1963 
OECD Draft or in 
2014 Model 
UK Draft September 1966 contained Article 
6(7) preserving certain aspects of UK law 
relating to insurance 
 
Art 6(7) UK Draft September 1966 
 
Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this 
Article shall affect any of the provisions of the 
law of the United Kingdom relating to the 
liability to tax of a life assurance company not 
having its head office in the United Kingdom 
in respect of income from the investment of 
its life assurance fund, being provisions 
which (except so far as they were rendered 
 
Article 5(8) in draft of 13th April 1967 read as 
follows: 
 
Nothing in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this 
Article shall affect any provisions of the law of 
either territory relating specifically to any 
person who carries on a business of any form 
of insurance or who derives income from a 
film business controlled abroad.  Provided 
that if the law in force in either territory at the 
date of signature of this Agreement relating to 
the taxation of such persons is varied 
(otherwise than in minor respects so as not to 
affect its general character, or by this 
UK introduced 
saving provision 
relating to certain 
UK insurance 
provisions.  
Australia initiated 
extension to 
insurance with 
non-residents 
generally and to 
film business 
controlled abroad. 
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ineffective by virtue of Article III of the 
Agreement between Australia and the United 
Kingdom with respect to taxes on income 
signed at London on 29 October, 1946) were 
in force on the date of signature of this 
Agreement, or which, if they have been 
modified since that date, have been modified 
only in minor respects so as not to affect their 
general character. 
Previous Australian treaties had contained  a 
form of AV22 
Agreement), the Contracting Governments 
shall consult with each other with a view to 
agreeing to such amendment of this 
paragraph as may be necessary. 
 
Final Version Art 5(8) corresponded with Art 
5(8) in draft of 16th June 1967 which read as 
follows: 
Nothing in this Article shall apply to either 
territory to prevent the operation in the 
territory of any provisions of its law relating 
specifically to the taxation of any person who 
carries on a business of any form of 
insurance or to the taxation of a non-resident 
who derives income under any contract or 
agreement with any person in relation to the 
carrying on in the territory by that person of 
any form of film business controlled abroad. 
Provided that if the law in force in either 
territory at the date of signature of this 
Agreement relating to the taxation of such 
persons is varied (otherwise than in minor 
respects so as not to affect its general 
character, or by this Agreement), the 
Contracting Governments shall consult with 
each other with a view to agreeing to such 
amendment of this paragraph as may be 
necessary. 
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Art 8 AV24 
 
Art 8(1) identical in 
1963 and 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AV25 
No equivalent in 
1963 Draft or in 
2014 Model 
 
 
 
UK draft of September 1966 based exclusion 
on residence. 
UK Draft September 1966 
 
Art 7 
 
A resident of one of the territories shall be 
exempt from tax in the other territory on 
profits from the operation of ships or aircraft 
in international traffic 
 
A version of AV24 present in previous 
Australian Tax Treaties but form of current 
AV24 dates from 1967 UK Treaty 
 
 
 
Not present in UK Draft September 1966 
 
Article 7 in UK Draft September 1966 
 
A resident of one of the territories shall be 
exempt from tax in the other territory on 
This aspect unchanged in Final Draft 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 6 in draft of 13th April 1967 read as 
follows: 
(1) ) A resident of one of the territories 
shall be exempt from tax in the other 
territory on profits from the operation 
of ships or aircraft other than profits 
from voyages or flights confined solely 
to places in the other territory, 
voyages of ships or aircraft between a 
UK initiated AV24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia initiated 
AV25 
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AV26 
No equivalent in 
1963 Draft or in 
2014 Model 
 
 
 
 
 
profits from the operation of ships or aircraft 
in international traffic. 
 
AV25 not present in earlier Australian Tax 
Treaties 
 
Not present in UK Draft September 1966 
 
AV26 not present in earlier Australian Tax 
Treaties 
place in Australia and a place in the 
Territory of Papua or the Territory of 
New Guinea being treated as voyages 
between places within Australia. 
(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this 
Article, where, in accordance with 
paragraph (1) of this Article, a resident 
of one of the territories is charged to 
tax in the other territory on profits from 
the operation of ships the amount of 
the profits so charged shall not 
exceed five per cent, of the amounts 
paid (net of any rebates) for the 
carriage of passengers, mails or 
cargoes shipped in the other territory.  
(3) Paragraph (2) of this Article shall not 
apply to the profits derived from the 
operation of ships by a United 
Kingdom enterprise whose principal 
place of business is in Australia, but 
there shall be excluded from the 
profits on which any such enterprise is 
charged to Australian tax any 
amounts of profits taxed in the 
Territory of Papua or the territory of 
New Guinea. 
 
Article 6 in draft of 16th June 1967 read as 
follows: 
 
(1) Identical to draft of 13th April 1967 
(2) Where a resident of one of the 
territories is not exempted under 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia initiated 
AV26 
 
 
 
504 
504 
paragraph (1) of this Article from tax in 
the other territory on profits from the 
operation of ships the amount of such 
profits that shall be charged to tax in 
that other territory shall not exceed 
five per cent of the amounts paid or 
payable (net of rebates) for the 
carriage of passengers, livestock, 
mails or goods shipped in the other 
territory. 
(3) Identical to draft of 13th April 1967. 
 
Johnson’s letter to Cain dated 4th September 
1967 suggested substituting ‘of ships or 
aircraft’ for ‘or flights’ in paragraph (1).  
Johnson also suggested an amendment to 
paragraph (2) which was substantially 
reflected in the draft of 11th October 1967 
which read as follows: 
 
 (2) The amount which shall be charged to 
tax in one of the territories as profits from 
voyages of ships in respect of which a 
resident of the other territory is not exempt 
from tax in the first-mentioned territory under 
paragraph (1) of this Article shall not exceed 
5 per cent of the amounts paid or payable 
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(net of rebates) in respect of such voyages 
for the carriage of passengers, livestock, 
mails or goods shipped in the first-mentioned 
territory. 
 
Article 6 in the Final Version of the Treaty 
corresponded with the draft of 16th June 
1967. 
 
Art 8(2) 
 
AV28 
Both 1963 Draft and 
2014 Model contain 
Art 8(2) 
Yes, Art 8(2) omitted from UK Draft 
September 1966 
 
AV28 present in previous Australian Tax 
Treaties 
 
No change UK initiated AV28 
Art 8(3)  AV29 
Both 1963 Draft and 
2014 Model contain 
Art 8(3)  
Yes, Art 8(3) omitted from UK Draft 
September 1966 
 
AV29 present in previous Australian Tax 
Treaties 
No change UK initiated AV29 
Art 9(2) AV31 
1963 OECD Draft 
did not contain Art 
Yes, UK Draft September 1966 did not 
contain Art 9(2) 
 
No change UK initiated AV31 
but this was not a 
variation from the 
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9(2) AV31 present in previous Australian Tax 
Treaties 
1963 OECD Draft 
Art 9 
Australian 
addition 
AV33 Not present in UK Draft September 1966 
 
AV33 present in previous Australian Tax 
Treaties 
Final Draft Art 7(3) corresponded with Art 
7(3) of draft of 13th April 1967 which read as 
follows: 
 
If the information available to the taxation 
authority concerned is inadequate to 
determine, for the purposes of paragraph (1) 
of this Article, the profits which might be 
expected to accrue to an enterprise, nothing 
in this Article shall affect the application of the 
law of either territory in relation to the liability 
of that enterprise to pay tax on an amount 
determined by the exercise of a discretion or 
the making of an estimate by the taxation 
authority of that territory. Provided that such 
discretion shall be exercised or such estimate 
shall be made, so far as the information 
available to the taxation authority permits, in 
accordance with the principle stated in that 
paragraph. 
 
Australia initiated 
AV33 
Art 10(1) AV36 
 
Phrase does not 
appear in 1963 Draft 
Requirement present in UK Draft September 
1966 
 
AV36 appeared in 1946 Australia – UK Tax 
This aspect not changed in subsequent drafts  UK initiated AV36 
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Art 10(1) nor in 2014 
Model Art 10(1) 
 
 
Treaty but not in 1953 Australia – US, 1957 
Australia – Canada nor in 1960 Australia – 
NZ.  Phrase reappears in 1967 UK Treaty 
Art 10(2) AV40(a) 
 
1963 Draft and 2014 
substantially the 
same 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK Draft September 1966 contemplated 
differential rates on portfolio and non-portfolio 
dividends. 
 
UK Draft September 1966 
Art 9(1) 
1) United Kingdom tax on dividends 
beneficially owned by a resident of 
Australia which are derived by such a 
resident from a company which is a 
resident of the United Kingdom shall 
not exceed-  
(a)       per cent of the gross amount 
of the dividends if the recipient is a 
company which controls directly or 
indirectly at least 25 per cent of 
the voting power in the company 
paying the dividend; 
(b) In all other cases       per cent of 
the gross amount of the dividend. 
2) Australian resident shall not exceed 
15 per cent of the gross amount of the 
Final Draft Arts 8(1) & (2) was identical with 
draft of 13th April 1967 which read as follows: 
(1) The United Kingdom tax on dividends 
derived and beneficially owned by an 
Australian resident shall not exceed 15 per 
cent of the gross amount of the dividends. 
(2) The Australian tax on dividends derived 
and beneficially owned by a United Kingdom 
resident shall not exceed 15 per cent of the 
gross amount of the dividends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia initiated  
AV40(a) 
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dividends. 
AV 40(a) {in the sense of a standard limit on 
source country tax of both portfolio and non-
portfolio dividends} originated in 1953 
Australia – United States Tax Treaty and is 
also found in the 1957 Australia – Canada 
Tax Treaty and in the 1960 Australia –New 
Zealand Tax Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Art 10(3) AV42 
 
1963 Draft and 2014 
Model differ but not 
a a respect which is 
relevant to AV42 
Yes, but amended to final form in negotiation 
and drafting process. 
 
UK Draft September 1966 
 
Article 9(3) 
Article 8(3) in draft of 13th April 1967 read as 
follows: 
(3) The term "dividends" includes any item 
(other than interest or royalties relieved from 
tax under Article 9 or Article 10 of this 
Agreement) which- 
UK initiated AV42 
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(a) The term "dividends" in the case of the 
United Kingdom includes any item (other than 
interest or royalties relieved from United 
Kingdom tax under Article 9 or Article 10 of 
this Agreement) which- under the law of the 
United Kingdom is treated as a distribution of 
a company; 
 
(b) the term “dividends” in the case of 
Australia includes – [to be drafted by 
Australia] 
 
No previous Australian Tax Treaty had 
contained a definition of ‘dividend’ 
 
(a) in the case of the United Kingdom is, 
under the law of the United Kingdom, a 
distribution of a company; 
(b) in the case of Australia is, or is deemed to 
be, under the law of the Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
 
 
Final Draft Article 8(3) was identical with draft 
of 16th June 1967 which read as follows: 
 
 (3) The term "dividends" includes any item 
(other than interest or royalties relieved from 
tax under Article 9 or Article 10 of this 
Agreement) which- 
(a) in the case of the United Kingdom is, 
under the law of the United Kingdom, a 
distribution of a company; 
(b) in the case of Australia is, or is deemed to 
be, under the laws in force in Australia 
relating to Australian tax, a dividend. 
 
Art 10  There were other variations in the UK draft   
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Other 
variations 
and others developed in negotiations (due 
to New Broken Hill situation).  The 
variations were particular to the context 
and none of then affect currently operative 
treaties 
Art 11(1) 
 
AV47 (variant) 
Beneficial ownership 
requirement appears 
in both Art 9(1) and 
(2) as in 1969 
Australia – 
Singapore Tax 
Treaty. 
 
1963Draft Art 11(2) 
did not contain a 
beneficial ownership 
requirement 
Yes, UK draft of September 1966 contained 
‘beneficial ownership’ requirement in both 
Arts 10(1) and (2)  
 
Previous Australian Tax Treaties do not 
contain an interest article and hence do 
not contain a variant on AV47 
 
 
This aspect not changed in final draft  UK initiated 
variation 
Art 11(3) AV49 (variant) 
1963 Draft definition 
of ‘interest’ differed 
from 2014 Model 
definition of ‘interest’ 
UK draft of September 1966 did not contain a 
definition of ‘interest’ 
 
Previous Australian Tax Treaties do not 
contain an interest article and hence do 
This aspect not changed in final draft UK initiated 
variation 
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not contain a variant on AV49 
Art 11(5) AV51 
Differences exist 
between 1963 Draft 
Art 11(5) and 2014 
Model 11(5) but 
these are not 
relevant to the 
omission of Art 11(5) 
that is AV51 
UK draft of September 1966 did not include 
an equivalent to Art 11(5)Previous 
Australian Tax Treaties do not contain an 
interest article and hence do not contain 
AV51 
This aspect not changed in final draft UK initiated 
variation 
Art 11  There were other variations which  were 
particular to the context and are not 
reflected in currently operative treaties  
  
Art 12(1) 
 
AV56 
2014 Model differs 
from 1963 Draft by 
adding a beneficial 
ownership 
requirement but this 
difference is not 
relevant for AV56 
No. 
UK Draft September 1966 
 
Articles 11(1) and (2) 
 
(1) Royalties derived and beneficially 
owned by a resident of the United 
Kingdom shall be exempt from tax in 
Australia; 
(2) Royalties derived and beneficially 
owned by a resident of Australia shall 
be exempt from tax in the United 
Kingdom. 
Final Draft Articles 10(1) and (2) was identical 
with draft of 13th April 1967 which read as 
follows: 
 
(1) The United Kingdom tax on royalties 
derived and beneficially owned by an 
Australian resident shall not exceed 10 per 
cent of the gross amount of the royalties. 
(2) The Australian tax on royalties derived 
and beneficially owned by a United Kingdom 
AV56 initiated by 
Australia 
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Previous Australian Tax Treaties gave 
exclusive residence basis taxation to 
some royalties and did not set upper 
limits on source taxation of other 
royalties.  1967 UK – Australia Tax Treaty 
is first exact instance of AV56. 
 
resident shall not exceed 10 per cent of the 
gross amount of the royalties. 
Art 12(2) AV 58 
 
No reference in 
either 1963 Draft or 
in 2014 Model to 
‘films or tapes used 
for radio or television 
broadcasting’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK Draft September 1966 included reference 
to films or tapes for radio or television 
broadcasting but exact phraseology was 
developed during negotiations and drafting. 
 
UK Draft September 1966 
Article 11(4) 
 
The term "royalties" as used in this Article 
means any royalties, rentals or other 
amounts paid as considerations for the use 
of, or the right to use, copyrights of literary, 
artistic or scientific works (including motion 
picture films* or films or tapes for radio or 
television broadcasting), patents, designs or 
Article 10(5) in draft of 13th April 1967 read as 
follows: 
(5) In this Article the term "royalties" means 
payments of any kind to the extent to which 
they are paid as consideration for the use of, 
or the right to use, any copyright, patent, 
design or model, plan, secret formula or 
process, trademark, or other like property or 
right, or industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment, or for the supply of scientific, 
technical, industrial or commercial 
knowledge, information or assistance but 
does not include royalties or other amounts 
paid in respect of the operation of mines or 
UK initiated AV58 
but Australia 
settled exact 
phraseology 
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AV59 
1963 Draft definition 
of included ‘for the 
use of, or the right to 
use industrial, 
commercial or 
scientific    
 
 
 
models, plans, secret processes or formulae, 
trade-marks or other like property or rights, or 
for industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment, or for information concerning  
industrial, commercial or scientific 
experience, but does not include royalties or 
other amounts paid in respect of the 
operation of mines or quarries or of the 
extraction or removal of natural resources. 
 
 
No previous Australian treaties had 
included AV58 
AV59 
AV 59 was included in UK Draft of September 
1966 but this was not a variation from 1963 
OECD Draft  
No previous Australian Tax Treaties had 
included AV59 
 
AV60 
Portions in italics in 1966 UK Draft above 
were not included in 1963 OECD Draft 
quarries or of the extraction or removal of 
natural resources. 
Final Draft Article 10(5) was identical with 
draft of 16th June 1967 which read as follows: 
(5) In this Article the term "royalties" means 
payments of any kind to the extent to which 
they are paid as consideration for the use of, 
or the right to use, any copyright, patent, 
design or model, plan, secret formula or 
process, trademark, or other like property or 
right, or industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment, or for the supply of scientific, 
technical, industrial or commercial 
knowledge, information or assistance, and 
includes any payments of any kind to the 
extent to which they are paid as 
consideration for the use of, or the right to 
use, motion picture films, films or video tapes 
for use in connection with television or tapes 
for use in connection with radio broadcasting, 
but does not include royalties or other 
amounts paid in respect of the operation of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK initiated AV59 
but this was 
consistent with 
1963 OECD Draft 
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AV60 
definition.  The portion underlined in the 1966 
UK Draft above was an exclusion not in the 
1963 OECD Draft.   
*The OECD Draft referred to ‘cinematograph 
films’ whereas the United Kingdom draft of 
September 1966 referred to ‘motion picture 
films’. 
Portions in italics in the draft of 16th June 
1967 were initiated by Australia  
mines or quarries or of the extraction or 
removal of natural resources. 
 
No change in this respect in subsequent 
drafting. 
See extract from draft of 16th June 1967 
quoted in relation to AV 58. 
 
 
Some AV60 
variations were 
initiated by the 
UK with others 
being initiated by 
Australia  
Art 12  
Australian 
addition 
AV62 
Neither 1963Draft 
nor 2014 Model 
contains a source 
rule for royalties in 
Article 12 
A different source rule for royalties was 
contained in the credit article  
A different source rule for royalties was 
contained in the credit article 
See discussion of 
credit article 
Art 13) No equivalent to 
Article 13 in Final 
Draft of 1967 
Australia – United 
Kingdom Tax Treaty 
 
Significant 
differences between 
1963 Draft and 2014 
September 1966 UK Draft contained a capital 
gains article  
 
UK Draft September 1966 
 
(1) Gains from the alienation of property 
forming part of the business property 
of a permanent establishment which 
an enterprise of one of the territories 
has in the other territory or of any 
property pertaining to a fixed base 
Draft of 13th April 1967 and all subsequent 
drafts including the Final Draft did not contain 
a capital gains article  
Variation from 
1963 OECD 
Model and from 
September 1966 
UK Draft initiated 
by Australia 
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Model but 
September 1966 UK 
Draft differed from 
1963 OECD Draft  
available to a resident of one of the 
territories for the purpose of 
performing professional services, 
including such gains from the 
alienation of such a permanent 
establishment (either alone or 
together with the whole enterprise) or 
of such a fixed base, may be taxed in 
the other territory. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this 
Article, gains derived by a resident of 
one of the territories from the 
alienation of ships or aircraft operated 
in international traffic and movable 
property pertaining to the operation of 
such ships and aircraft shall be 
exempt from tax in the other territory. 
(3) Gains from the alienation of property 
other than those mentioned in 
paragraph (1) shall be taxable only in 
the territory of which the alienator is a 
resident. 
Art 17 
Australian 
variation 
1963 Draft Art 17(1) 
differed in 
phraseology from 
2014 Model and did 
not include Art 17(2) 
of 2014 Model  
UK September 1966 Draft Article 15 
corresponded to Article 17 of 1963 OECD 
Draft 
As discussed at 5.87 the inclusion of a 
source rule had been agreed on 6th April 
1967 but the inclusion is not mentioned as a 
change in the draft of 16th June 1967.  The 
Final Draft is identical with the draft of 13th 
April 1967 which reads as follows: 
 
Article 13 
 
Australian 
initiated deemed 
source rule and 
removal of 
equivalent to 
OECD 1963 Art 
17 
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Notwithstanding anything contained in 
Articles 11 and 12, income derived by public 
entertainers, such as theatre, motion picture, 
radio or television artistes, and musicians, 
and by athletes, from their personal activities 
as such shall be deemed to have a source in, 
and may be taxed in, the territory in which 
these activities are exercised. 
Art 17(2) AV80 
 
OECD 1963 did not 
contain an 
equivalent to Article 
17(2) 
 
UK draft September 1966 did not contain an 
equivalent to Article 17(2). 
 
Previous Australian treaties had not 
contained an equivalent to Article 17(2) 
No change UK initiated 
Art 21 AV82 
Paragraph 2 of 2014 
did not appear in 
1964 Draft 
 
AV82 
No, UK Draft September 1966 included an 
‘other income’ article  
 
Previous Australian Tax Treaties had not 
contained ‘other income’ articles but1967 
Australia – UK Tax Treaty was first where 
treaty partner’s draft had included an 
‘other income’ article 
Final version of 1967 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty did not contain an ‘other income 
article. 
Australia initiated 
AV82 
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Art 21 
Australian 
addition 
Cf AV86 UK Draft September 1966 contained an 
‘other income’ article which read: 
Items of income of a resident of one of the 
territories who is subject to tax there in 
respect thereof being income of a class or 
from sources not expressly mentioned in the 
foregoing Articles of this Agreement shall be 
taxable only in that territory. 
Article 18 in the draft of 13th April 1967 read 
as follows: 
 
Income derived from sources outside both 
the United Kingdom and Australia by a 
resident of one of the territories who is 
subject to tax there in respect thereof shall be 
taxed only in that territory. 
 
Article 18 in draft of 16th June 1967 read as 
follows: 
 
(1) This article shall apply to a person 
who is resident of Australia and is also 
resident in the United Kingdom;  
(2) Where income is derived from 
sources outside both the United 
Kingdom and Australia by such a 
person and that person is treated as a 
resident of one of the territories and is 
subject to tax in that territory in 
respect of that income, the income so 
derived shall be taxed only in that 
territory. 
 
By letter to Cain dated 4th September 1967 
Johnson suggested that paragraph (2) be 
Australia initiated 
change.  Not 
reflected in any 
currently 
operative 
Australian tax 
treaties. 
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amended to read as follows: 
 
(3) Where such a person is treated for the 
purposes of this Agreement solely as 
a resident of one of the territories he 
shall be exempt in the other territory 
from tax on any income in respect of 
which he is subject to tax in the first-
mentioned territory if that income is 
derived:  
 
(a) from sources in the first mentioned 
territory; or  
(b) from sources outside both 
territories. 
 
Johnson’s amendment was incorporated in 
the draft of 11th October 1967.  Article 18 in 
the final version of the treaty corresponded 
with Article 18 in the draft of 11th October 
1967. 
 
 
Art 22 AV87 AV87 
No equivalent to Art 22 was included in UK 
Draft September 1966 
 
No change UK initiated. 
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Previous Australian Tax Treaties had not 
contained an equivalent to Art 22 
Art 23  
Australian 
Variations 
AV 89  
UK Draft September 1966 Article 21  
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of the law of 
the United Kingdom regarding the 
allowance of a credit against United 
Kingdom tax of tax payable in a 
territory outside the United Kingdom 
(which does not affect the general 
principle hereof) – 
(a) Australian tax payable under the 
laws of Australia and in 
accordance with this Agreement 
whether directly or by deduction, 
on profits, income or chargeable 
gains from sources within 
Australia, (excluding in the case of 
a dividend tax payable in respect 
of the profits out of which the 
dividend is paid) shall be allowed 
as a credit against any United 
Kingdom tax computed by 
reference to the same profits, 
income or chargeable gains by 
reference to which Australian tax 
is computed; and  
(b) In the case of a dividend paid by a 
company which is a resident of 
Australian to a company which is 
resident in the United Kingdom 
and which controls directly or 
 
Draft dated 13th April 1967 
 
1            (a) unchanged 
(b) In the case of a dividend paid by a 
company which is a resident of 
Australian to a company which is 
resident in the United Kingdom and 
which controls directly or indirectly at 
least 10 per cent of the voting power 
in the Australian company, the credit 
will take into account (in addition to 
any Australian tax creditable under (a) 
the Australian tax payable by the 
company in respect of the profits out 
of which such dividend is paid. 
(2)  
(a) Subject to the provisions of the law 
of Australia from time to time in force 
and which relate to the allowance of a 
credit against Australian tax of tax 
Australia initiated 
variations but 
further variations 
were initiated by 
the United 
Kingdom. 
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indirectly at least 10 per cent of 
the voting power in the Australian 
company, the credit will take into 
account (in addition to any 
Australian tax creditable under (a) 
the Australian tax payable by the 
company in respect of the profits 
out of which such dividend is paid. 
(2) [To be drafted by Australia] 
(3) For the purposes of this Article profits 
or remuneration for personal 
(including professional) services 
performed in one of the territories 
shall be deemed to be income from 
sources within that territory, and the 
services of an individual whose 
activities are wholly or mainly 
performed in ships or aircraft operated 
in international traffic by a resident of 
one of the territories shall be deemed 
to be performed in that territory. 
(4) Where profits on which an enterprise 
of one of the territories has been 
charged to tax in that territory are also 
included in the profits of an enterprise 
of the other territory and the profits so 
included are profits which would have 
accrued to that enterprise in the other 
territory if the conditions made 
between each of the enterprises had 
been those which would have been 
made between independent 
enterprises dealing at arm’s length, 
the amount of such profits included in 
the profits of both enterprises shall be 
payable in a country outside Australia 
(which shall not affect the general 
principle hereof), the United Kingdom 
tax payable under the laws of the 
United Kingdom and in accordance 
with this Agreement, whether directly 
or indirectly or by deduction, on 
income derived by a resident of 
Australia from sources in the United 
Kingdom shall be allowed as a credit 
against the Australian tax assessed 
by reference to the same income by 
reference to which the United 
Kingdom tax is payable. 
 
(b) In the event that Australia should 
cease to allow a company which is a 
resident of Australia a rebate at the 
average rate of tax payable by the 
company in respect of dividends 
derived from sources in the United 
Kingdom and included in the taxable 
income of the company, the 
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treated for the purposes of this Article 
as income from a source in the other 
territory of the enterprise of the first-
mentioned territory and credit shall be 
given accordingly in respect of the 
extra tax chargeable in the other 
territory as a result of the inclusion of 
the said amount. 
 
 
 
Credits for underlying tax were allowed 
irrespective of the level of shareholding in 
the 1946 Australia – UK Tax Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contracting Governments will enter 
into negotiations in order to establish 
new provisions concerning the credit 
to be allowed by Australia against its 
tax on the dividends. 
(3) For the purposes of this Article –  
(a) dividends (as defined in Article 8) 
paid by a company under the law 
of one of the territories is a 
resident, or is resident in that 
territory, for the purposes of that 
territory’s tax shall be treated in 
the other territory as being income 
from sources in the first-
mentioned territory; 
(b) interest and royalties (as defined 
in Articles 9 and 10) which under 
the law of one of the territories are 
derived from sources within that 
territory shall be treated in the 
other territory as having  a source 
in the first-mentioned territory; 
(c) remuneration in respect of an 
employment exercised aboard a 
ship or aircraft in international 
traffic shall be treated as having a 
source in the territory in which the 
place of effective management of 
the enterprise is situated; 
(d) any amount which is included, for 
the purposes of tax in one of the 
territories, in the chargeable 
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profits or taxable income of a 
person who is a resident of the 
other territory, and which is so 
included under any provision of 
the law of the first-mentioned 
territory for the time being in force 
regarding taxation of income of a 
business or any form of insurance 
or of a film business controlled 
abroad shall be treated as having 
a source in the first-mentioned 
territory. 
(4) As per UK Draft of September 1966. 
 
Draft of 16th June 1967 
 
(1)          (a) unchanged 
(b) In the case of a dividend paid by a 
company which is a resident of 
Australian to a company which is 
resident in the United Kingdom and 
which controls directly or indirectly at 
least 10 per cent of the voting power 
in the  first mentioned company, the 
credit will take into account (in 
addition to any Australian tax 
creditable under (a) the Australian tax 
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payable by the company in respect of 
the profits out of which such dividend 
is paid. 
For the purpose of allowing relief from United 
Kingdom tax in accordance with this 
paragraph, where a distribution is made by a 
company which is a resident of Australia and 
which is also a resident in the United 
Kingdom, the amount of the United Kingdom 
income tax for which the company is liable to 
account in respect of the distribution shall be 
computed by reference to the gross amount 
of the distribution charged to Australian tax 
and credit for the Australian tax so charged 
shall be allowed against the said amount of 
income tax. 
 
(2)  
(a) Subject to the provisions of the law 
of Australia from time to time in force 
and which relate to the allowance of a 
credit against Australian tax of tax 
payable in a country outside Australia 
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(which shall not affect the general 
principle hereof), the United Kingdom 
tax payable under the laws of the 
United Kingdom and in accordance 
with this Agreement (reduced by the 
amount of any relief or repayment 
attributable to that income under the 
law of the United Kingdom), whether 
directly or indirectly or by deduction, 
on income derived by a resident of 
Australia from sources in the United 
Kingdom (excluding in the case of 
dividends tax payable in respect of 
the profits out of which the dividend is 
paid) shall be allowed as a credit 
against the Australian tax assessed 
by reference to the same income by 
reference to which the United 
Kingdom tax is payable. 
 
(b) In the event that Australia should 
cease to allow a company which is a 
resident of Australia a rebate in its 
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assessment at the average rate of tax 
payable by the company in respect of 
dividends derived from sources in the 
United Kingdom and included in the 
taxable income of the company, the 
Contracting Governments will enter 
into negotiations in order to establish 
new provisions concerning the credit 
to be allowed by Australia against its 
tax on the dividends. 
 
(3) For the purposes of this Article –  
(a)  dividends (as defined in Article 8) 
paid by a company under the law of 
one of the territories is a resident, or is 
resident in that territory, for the 
purposes of that territory’s tax shall be 
treated in the other territory as being 
income from sources in the first-
mentioned territory; 
(b) interest and royalties (as defined in 
Articles 9 and 10), which under the 
law of one of the territories –  
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(i)          are derived from sources 
within that territory; or 
(iii) being derived by a non-
resident are subject to 
withholding tax, 
shall be treated in the other 
territory as having a source in the 
first-mentioned territory; 
 
(c) unchanged from draft of 13th April 
1967; 
(d) any amount which is included, for 
the purposes of tax in one of the 
territories, in the chargeable 
profits or taxable income of a 
person who is a resident of the 
other territory, and which is so 
included under any provision of 
the law of the first-mentioned 
territory for the time being in force 
regarding taxation of income of a 
business or any form of insurance 
or of income derived under a 
contract or agreement with a 
person who carries on in the first-
mentioned territory any form of 
film business controlled abroad 
shall be treated as having a 
source in the first-mentioned 
territory. 
(e) profits to which paragraph (2) of 
Article 6 applies derived by a 
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resident of one of the territories 
from the operation of ships, being 
profits that are charged to tax in 
the other territory, shall be treated 
as having a source in that other 
territory. 
(5) Where profits, on which an enterprise 
of one of the territories has been 
charged to tax in that territory, are 
also included, by virtue of this 
Agreement, in the profits which, 
because of the circumstances existing 
between the two enterprises, might 
have been expected to accrue to the 
enterprise of the other territory, the 
profits so included shall be treated for 
the purposes of this Article as profits 
of the enterprise of the first-mentioned 
territory from a source in the other 
territory and relief shall be given in 
accordance with this Article in respect 
of the extra tax chargeable in the 
other territory as a result of the 
inclusion of such profits. 
 
Final draft was identical with draft of 11th 
October 1967 which read as follows: 
 
(1) Unchanged from draft of 16th June 
1967. 
(2) Unchanged from draft of 16th June 
1967. 
(3) For the purposes of this Article: 
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(a) (i) Australian tax borne by a 
United Kingdom resident in 
respect of dividends (as defined in 
Article 8) paid by a company 
which is a resident of Australia 
shall be treated as tax on income 
from sources in Australia; 
(ii) United Kingdom tax borne by 
an Australian resident in respect 
of dividends (as defined in Article 
8) paid by a company which is 
resident in the United Kingdom 
shall be treated as tax on income 
from sources in the United 
Kingdom; 
(b) Unchanged from draft of 16th June 
1967. 
(c) Unchanged from draft of 16th June 
1967. 
(d) Unchanged from draft of 16th June 
1967. 
(e) Unchanged from draft of 16th June 
1967. 
(4) Unchanged from draft of 16th June 
1967. 
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Art 24(1) AV91 
1963 Draft did not 
contain words ‘in 
particular with 
respect to residence’ 
in paragraph 1.  
1963 Draft contained 
a definition of 
‘nationals’ in 
paragraph 2.  1963 
Draft did not contain 
2014 paragraph 4. 
AV91 
UK Draft September 1966 contained a ‘non-
discrimination article’. 
 
Previous Australian Tax Treaties had not 
contained a ‘non-discrimination’ article 
but 1967 Australia – UK Tax Treaty was 
first where treaty partner’s draft had 
included a ‘non-discrimination’ article  
Final version of 1967 Australia – UK Tax 
Treaty did not contain a ‘non-discrimination’ 
article. 
Australia initiated 
AV91 
Art 25(1) AV104(a) 
 
1963 OECD Draft 
Art 25(1) did not 
contain a time limit.  
Significant 
differences in 
phraseology existed 
between 1963 
OECD Draft and 
2014 Model  
AV104(a)  
UK Draft September 1966 differed from 1963 
OECD Draft but both drafts did not contain 
time limits.  1953 US Treaty contained a 
mutual agreement procedure with no time 
limits 
 
UK Draft September 1966 
 
Article 23 
 
Final Draft was identical with draft of 13th April 
1967 which read as follows: 
 
Article 20 
(1) Where a taxpayer considers that the 
action of the taxation authority of either 
territory has resulted or will result in taxation 
contrary to the provisions of this Agreement, 
he shall be entitled to present his case to 
either taxation authority. Should the 
taxpayer's claim be deemed worthy of 
consideration, the taxation authority to which 
the claim is made shall endeavour to come to 
an agreement with the other taxation 
UK initiated 
variations from 
1963 OECD 
Draft.  Australia 
finalised drafting.  
AV 104(a) was 
not a variation 
from 1963 OECD 
Draft. 
 
AV105 was not a 
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AVI05 
1963 OECD Draft 
Art 25 did not 
contain an 
equivalent to 2014 
Art 25(2) 
AV106  
1963 OECD Draft 
Art 25 did not 
contain 2014 Art 
25(2) and hence 
AV106 is not a 
variation from 1963 
OECD Draft  
 
AV107 Equivalent 
phrase was included 
in 1963 OECD Draft 
Art 25(4) 
 
AV108  
1963 OECD Draft 
Article 20 
(1) Where a taxpayer considers that the 
action of the taxation authorities of the 
Contracting Government has resulted or will 
result in taxation contrary to the provisions of 
this Agreement, he shall be entitled to 
present his case to the Government of the 
territory of which he is a national or resident. 
Should the taxpayer's claim be deemed 
worthy of consideration, the taxation authority 
of the Government to which the claim is 
made shall endeavour to come to an 
agreement with the other taxation authority of 
the other Government with a view to a 
satisfactory adjustment. 
(2) The taxation authorities of the Contracting 
Governments may communicate with each 
other directly to implement the provisions of 
this Agreement and to assure its consistent 
interpretation and application. In particular, 
the taxation authorities may consult together 
to endeavour to resolve disputes arising out 
of the application of paragraph (3) of Article 6 
authority with a view to a satisfactory 
adjustment. 
(2) Unchanged from UK draft of September 
1966 
variation from 
1963 OECD Draft 
 
AV106 was not a 
variation from 
1963 OECD Draft 
 
AV107 
UK initiated 
AV107 
 
AV108 was not a 
variation from 
OECD 1963 Draft  
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Art 25 did not 
contain an 
equivalent to 2014 
Art 25(5) 
or Article 8, or the determination of the 
source of particular items of income. 
 
1953 US Treaty had contained a mutual 
agreement procedure with no time limit.  
The mutual agreement procedure article in 
1969 Singapore Treaty follows 1967 UK 
Treaty form. 
 
AV107 was a variation from 1963 OECD 
Draft Art 25(4) 
 
AV108 was not a variation from 1963 OECD 
Draft Art 25 
Art 26(1) 1963OECD Draft did 
not contain an 
equivalent to 2014 
Model Art 26(2) or 
Art 26(4).  
Phraseology of Art 
26(1) of 1963 Draft 
differed from 
phraseology of 2014 
Exchange of information article in UK Draft 
September 1966 differed from 1963 OECD 
Draft. 
UK Draft September 1966 
Article 24 
The taxation authorities of the Contracting 
Governments shall exchange such 
information (being information which is at 
their disposal under their respective taxation 
laws in the normal course of administration) 
Final Draft was identical with draft of 13th April 
1967 which read as follows: 
 
Article 21 
The taxation authorities shall exchange such 
information (being information which is at 
their disposal under their respective taxation 
laws in the normal course of administration) 
as is necessary for carrying out the 
provisions of this Agreement or for the 
prevention of fraud or for the administration of 
UK initiated 
variation.  Only 
minor drafting 
change between 
UK Draft 
September 1966 
and Final Draft.  
Form of article 
not reflected in 
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Model. as is necessary for carrying out the 
provisions of this Agreement or for the 
prevention of fraud or for the administration of 
statutory provisions against legal avoidance 
in relation to the taxes which are the subject 
of this Agreement. Any information so 
exchanged shall be treated as secret but may 
be disclosed to persons (including a court or 
tribunal) concerned with the assessment, 
collection, enforcement or prosecution in 
respect of the taxes which are the subject of 
this Agreement. No information as aforesaid 
shall be exchanged which would disclose any 
trade, business, industrial or professional 
secret or trade process. 
statutory provisions against legal avoidance 
in relation to the taxes which are the subject 
of this Agreement. Any information so 
exchanged shall be treated as secret but may 
be disclosed to persons (including a court or 
tribunal) concerned with the assessment, 
collection, enforcement or prosecution in 
respect of the taxes which are the subject of 
this Agreement. No information as aforesaid 
shall be exchanged which would disclose any 
trade, business, industrial or professional 
secret or trade process. 
currently 
operative 
Australian Tax 
Treaties 
Art 27 
 
AV111 
1963 OECD Draft 
did not contain an 
‘assistance in 
collection article’ 
AV111 
UK Draft of September 1966 did contain an 
‘assistance in collection’ article. 
 
UK Draft September 1966 
Article 25 
(1) Each of the Contracting Governments 
will endeavour to collect on behalf of 
the other Contracting Government, 
such amounts as may be necessary 
to ensure that relief granted by this 
Agreement from taxation imposed by 
such other Contracting Government 
Article did not appear in Final Version or in 
subsequent drafts.  United Kingdom ‘Notes of 
Meetings’ for 31 March 1967 records that 
‘The Australians might have constitutional 
difficulties in giving the article legal effect and 
it might be better to drop it. 
 
Australia initiated 
what is a variation 
from current 
OECD Model but 
this was not a 
variation from 
1963 OECD 
Draft. 
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does not endure to the benefit of 
persons not entitled thereto. 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this Article shall not 
impose upon either of the Contracting 
Governments the obligation to carry 
out administrative measures which 
are of a different nature from those 
used in the collection of its own tax or 
which would be contrary to its 
sovereignty, security or public policy.  
In determining the administrative 
measures to be carried out each 
Contracting Government may take 
into account the administrative 
measures and practices of the 
Contracting Government in recovering 
taxes on behalf of the first-mentioned 
Contracting Government. 
(3) The competent authorities of the 
Contracting Government shall consult 
with each other for the purpose of co-
operating and advising in respect of 
any action to be taken in 
implementing this Article.   
 
Only the 1953 Australia – United Kingdom 
Tax Treaty had contained an ‘assistance in 
collection’ article.   
 
Total number of variations from 2014 OECD Model  in currently operative Australian tax treaties  40 
Number of variations that had their origins in 1946 UK Treaty or other earlier Australian treaties    5 
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Number of variations originating in 1967 UK Treaty       35 
Number of variations initiated by the UK        22 ( 5 were modified by Australia in drafting) 
Number initiated by the UK that followed 1946 UK Treaty       3 
Number initiated by the UK that followed 1963 OECD        7 
Number initiated by Australia          17 (1 was modified by UK in drafting) 
Number initiated by Australia that followed earlier Australian treaties      2 
Number initiated by Australia that followed 1963 OECD        1 (although this was  variation from UK 
1966 draft) 
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APPENDIX 6: FEATURES OF AUSTRALIAN TAX TREATY PRACTICE LISTED BY KT 
ALLEN IN 1988-1990 
(1)  the definition of ‘Australia’ (where Allen emphasised the need to 
include the continental shelf in order to continue to tax offshore 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources)1;  
(2)  the extended definition of income from real property to include royalty 
and other payments for the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources and income from leasing contracts2;  
(3)  the definition of permanent establishment (here Allen highlighted the 
Australian inclusions of ‘agricultural, pastoral or forestry property’, the 
deemed carrying on of business by an enterprise through a permanent 
establishment where substantial equipment was used by or under 
contract with the enterprise, provisions which applied a six month rule 
to building sites, construction, installation or assembly projects and 
associated supervisory activities and specifically mentioned the 
deemed services permanent establishment provision in the Australia – 
China Tax Treaty3);  
(4)  the provision limiting expenses that can be deducted in calculating 
business profits to those that would be allowable if the permanent 
establishment were an independent entity paying the expenses (Allen 
comments that this provision was intended to exclude from 
deductibility expenses which were not deductible under the domestic 
law of the country where the permanent establishment was located)4;  
(5)  the provisions authorising the application of domestic law consistently 
with the general principles of the business profits article in instances 
where the information available is inadequate to determine profits to 
be attributed to a permanent establishment (Allen saw this provision 
as permitting a reference back to the then transfer pricing provisions in 
ITAA 1936 Div13)5;  
(6)  provisions in some treaties, such as the 1988 Australia – China Tax 
Treaty) clarifying Australia’s right to tax business profits from the 
carrying on of a business in Australia through a permanent 
establishment indirectly through an interposed trust6;  
(7)  the use of the expression ‘might be expected to operate’ in place of 
‘would be made between’ in the associated enterprises article, a 
                                                          
1  K T Allen Assistant Commissioner (International Branch) Policy and Legislation Group, ATO, Canberra, 
‘The relevant considerations, factors and criteria involved in negotiating Australia's double tax 
agreements’, Thomson Reuters, Checkpoint, Commentary, International Agreements at [1860]. 
2  Allen, supra note 1 at [1865]. 
3  Allen, supra note 1 at [1870]. 
4  Allen, supra note 1 at [1885]. 
5  Allen, supra note 1 at [1885].  At [1895] Allen makes the same point in relation to Australia’s 
variations on the associated enterprises article. 
6  Allen, supra note 1 at [1890]. 
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change which Allen regarded as recognising that independent firms 
did not always deal independently with one another7;  
(8)  the rates of withholding tax on dividends, interest and royalties then 
usually sought by Australia in tax treaties (namely, 15% on dividends, 
10% on interest and 10% on royalties) noting that since the 
introduction of dividend imputation the withholding tax on dividends 
only applied to unfranked dividends and pointing out that, in addition, 
Australia, as an aid to source taxation, sought the widest definition of 
‘royalty’ for tax treaty purposes8; 
(9)  the then recent change of policy on articles dealing with capital gains 
which, subject to certain exceptions, was to require capital gains to be 
taxed in accordance with the domestic law of each country9;  
(10) the practice of giving the source country the right to tax ‘anything that 
is otherwise left out’ that is derived by a resident of one country from a 
source in the other country10;  
(11) the Australian practice of including source rules in tax treaties which 
can have the effect of giving greater taxing rights than are specified in 
Australian domestic law11; 
(12) the practice of not construing credit provisions in Australian tax 
treaties in a manner which limits the scope of relief from international 
double taxation provided by Australian domestic law12; 
(13) the then current policy, notwithstanding proposed changes to overall 
government policy on the tax treatment of foreign source income, to 
provide tax sparing relief for specified development incentives of 
appropriate treaty partner countries in otherwise satisfactory 
agreements13; 
(14) not agreeing to the non-discrimination which Allen characterised as: 
being outside the proper scope of a tax treaty; possibly preventing a 
country from taking appropriate steps to ensure a proper distribution of 
taxing rights between them; and possibly preventing a government 
                                                          
7  Allen, supra note 1 at [1895].  
8  Allen, supra note 1 at [1900]. 
9  Allen, supra note 1 at [1905].  Allen also commented that previously Australia’s tax treaties did not 
deal comprehensively with capital gains as the fact that Australia did not tax them meant that there 
could be no double taxation.  Allen noted that Australia’s approach had been to ensure that income 
from the alienation of real property could be taxed in the source country.  Allen’s view was that, 
subject to a few limited exceptions, Australia’s existing tax treaties did not prevent Australia from 
taxing ‘as ordinary income’ under its domestic law, capital gains from the disposal of a ‘taxable 
Australian asset’ as defined in ITAA 1936 former s160T.  
10  Allen, supra note 1 at [1915]. 
11  Allen, supra note 1 at [1910].  Allen justified this practice as resolving any conflict in domestic law 
source rules and as obviating any question of income not having, by domestic law rules, a source in 
the country to which the treaty gave taxing rights. 
12  Allen, supra note 1 at [1920]. 
13  Allen, supra note 1 at [1925]. 
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from using taxation measures for the purposes of desirable economic 
regulation.14 
  
                                                          
14  Allen, supra note 1 at [1935]. 
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APPENDIX 7 
ANALYSIS OF DEEMED SOURCE RULES IN CURRENTLY OPERATIVE AUSTRALIAN 
TAX TREATIES  
Treaties where deeming is for the purposes of Australian law generally and separate 
deeming of Australian source is made in the credit article 
2015 Treaty with Germany 
Treaties where deeming is for the purposes of Australian tax generally and separate 
deeming for credit purposes for both Contracting States is made in the credit article. 
Treaty with the United Kingdom 
Treaties where deeming is for the purposes of the law of both Contracting States and no 
other deeming is made  
Treaty with Chile (also contains specific source rules for interest and royalties) 
Treaty with Denmark 
Treaty with New Zealand 
Treaty with Slovakia  
Treaty with Sri Lanka 
Treaty with Switzerland 
Treaties where deeming is for the purposes of Australian tax generally and a separate 
deeming of source in the other Contracting State is made for credit purposes 
Treaty with Austria (also contains specific source rules for interest and royalties) 
Treaty with the Czech Republic 
Treaty with Belgium (also contains specific source rules for interest) 
Treaty with The Netherlands (in Protocol only) 
Treaty with Sweden (deemed Swedish source for credit purposes is only for the 
purposes of Australian law) 
Treaties where deeming is made for purposes of Australian tax generally and a separate 
deeming is made for credit purposes for both Contracting States 
Treaty with Argentina (also contains specific source rules for interest and royalties) 
Treaty with Canada (also contains specific source rules for interest and royalties) 
Treaties where deeming is made for the purposes of the law of both Contracting States 
generally and a separate deeming is made for credit purposes for both Contracting States 
Treaty with Fiji 
Treaty with Finland 
Treaty with France (also contains separate deeming relating to business profits and 
deeming for credit purposes does not extend to business profits.  Also contains 
separate deeming provisions in relation to partnership profits) 
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Treaty with India 
Treaty with Japan  
Treaty with Kiribati  
Treaty with Papua New Guinea (provision states that deeming will not apply to 
interest to which Article 11 applies until the law of Papua New Guinea includes 
source rules  
Treaty with Romania 
Treaty with South Africa 
Treaty with Turkey 
Treaty with Vietnam 
Treaties where deeming is made for credit purposes only for both Contracting States 
Treaty with China (also contains specific source rules for interest and royalties) 
Treaties where deeming is made for credit purposes for both Contracting States and same 
paragraph also extends deeming to the law of both Contracting States generally 
Treaty with Hungary 
Treaty with Indonesia 
Treaty with Italy 
Treaty with Korea 
Treaty with Malaysia 
Treaty with Mexico 
Treaty with Norway 
Treaty with The Philippines 
Treaty with Poland  
Treaty with Russia 
Treaty with Spain 
Treaties where deeming is confined to business profits and associated enterprises articles 
Treaty with Singapore 
Treaties where deeming is confined to interest and royalties articles 
Treaty with the United States (but basically applies domestic source rules of the two 
states although there are some deeming provisions) 
Treaties where no deeming is made  
Treaty with Taipei  
 
  
